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Abstract 
The energy challenges facing society are as varied as they are great, and for this reason 
energy has become a key area to address in the twenty-first century.  Central among these 
concerns is the specter of global climate change.  The impact of energy production and 
consumption on the earth’s climate system has been well documented, and scientific 
studies now suggest that annual greenhouse gas emissions must be cut 50 to 80 per cent 
worldwide by 2050 in order to stabilize the climate and avoid the most destructive 
impacts of climate change.  Yet, despite the growing consensus for the need to mitigate 
emissions, the strategies for meeting these ambitious targets have not been clearly 
defined, and the technology and policy options are not well enough understood.  Given 
this uncertainty, scenario analysis tools have emerged as a useful way to inform the 
policy debate by envisioning the potential evolution of energy systems over time.  This 
dissertation describes three separate scenario analysis projects, each of which looks at the 
potential for a dramatic transformation of the energy system over the long term at varying 
geographic and sectoral scales.  First, the 80in50 study analyzes the various pathways for 
making deep reductions in greenhouse gas emissions across all subsectors of U.S. 
transport system.  The CA-TIMES project then takes this work to the next level by 
developing an energy-engineering-environmental-economic optimization model for the 
California energy system, in order to bring economics and dynamics into the analysis, as 
well as to study the interactions between transport and the various other energy producing 
and consuming sectors.  Finally, a collaborative project with scientists at the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) is described, in which a global systems 
engineering optimization model (MESSAGE) and a global climate model (MAGICC) are 
iv 
 
jointly utilized to evaluate synergies and trade-offs between a variety of energy objectives 
(climate mitigation, air pollution, energy security, and affordability).   
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FOREWORD 
The structure of this dissertation incorporates both traditional and non-traditional 
elements, and for this reason I believe it is useful here at the outset to provide a brief 
overview of how the three chapters of my thesis fit together and, moreover, how the three 
projects underlying them originally came into being.  My dissertation work really started 
in earnest in early-2008, after finishing my M.S. degree and beginning the so-called 
“80in50” project under the direction of Dr. Christopher Yang.  The original 80in50 study 
focused on the California transportation sector, and once it was completed, Chris and I 
took the analysis to the next level by looking at deep greenhouse gas reduction scenarios 
for the entire U.S.  The latter research is described in Chapter I of this dissertation.  
However, due to the limitations of the 80in50 research effort, there were discussions at 
that time within the UC-Davis STEPS Program to develop an energy-engineering-
environmental-economic (4E) MARKAL-TIMES systems model for the state of 
California, which would bring economics and dynamics into the scenario development 
process, as well as interactions between the transport sector and the various other energy 
producing and consuming sectors within the California energy system.  As one might 
imagine, it is quite an undertaking to build an energy systems model from scratch, and 
actually in my case it has taken about two and a half years of sometimes part-time, 
sometimes full-time work to bring the CA-TIMES model to the current stage of 
development.  A fairly detailed description of the model is provided in Chapter II, along 
with scenario analyses looking at how deep reductions in greenhouse gas emissions might 
xvii 
 
be made across the entire California energy system in the long term.  Finally, Chapter III 
of my dissertation describes a collaborative research effort with scientists at the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria.  In 
the summer of 2009, I participated in IIASA’s annual Young Scientists Summer 
Program, with the intention of supporting the scenario development process for the 
Global Energy Assessment.  Due to the success of my summer project at IIASA and also 
because of the unique contributions this analysis adds to my Ph.D. research portfolio, I 
eventually decided to include the work in my dissertation.  In particular, the research at 
IIASA expands the focal area of my scenario analyses to the global level and at the same 
time brings other energy objectives – in addition to climate mitigation – into 
consideration, such as energy security and air pollution. 
 
Each of the three main chapters of my dissertation is distinct, in the sense that each 
focuses on a distinct research project; however, at the same time, they are all closely 
related, as they fall under the more general umbrella theme of long-term energy modeling 
and scenario analysis to support policy.  After all, the central objective of my dissertation 
research is to understand the potential evolution of energy and climate systems over time, 
considering multiple sustainable development goals and advanced technologies and fuels.  
The three research projects simply differ in terms of their system boundaries and in the 
methods that are employed.  For these reasons, I prefer to think of the three chapters of 
my dissertation as unique “Research Streams”, and I have organized these three streams 
into a logical sequence so that they build off each other at each stage.  As the figure 
below illustrates shows, the focal area, or scope, of my research expands as my 
xviii 
 
dissertation progresses.  Depending on the stage of the analysis, this expansion is 
sectoral, temporal, geographic, and/or criterial in nature. 
 
 
 
The three dissertation chapters are, for the most part, self-contained.  Each possesses its 
own introductory material, methodological description, discussion of results, conclusions, 
and acknowledgements.  The only exception is the shared introduction of Part One, 
which applies to both the 80in50-US and CA-TIMES research streams.  Part Two of the 
dissertation contains only the third chapter, which focuses on the energy trade-offs 
research stream.  Note that the first and third chapters of the dissertation are rather 
succinct in nature, as they either have already been published elsewhere or draw upon 
xix 
 
other studies and model documentation, which themselves have been previously 
published.  In contrast, the second chapter is rather long because it describes a model 
(CA-TIMES) that has never before been discussed in the publicly available literature.  As 
with any complex model, a fair amount of prose is required to provide a reasonably 
thorough explanation. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Chapter I 
The first chapter of this dissertation explores several scenarios which achieve 50-80% 
reductions in US transportation sector carbon emissions below 1990 levels by 2050 
through incorporation of significant technological and behavioral changes. A Kaya 
framework that decomposes GHG emissions into the product of four major drivers—
population (P), transport intensity (T), energy intensity (E), and carbon intensity (C) – is 
integrated in our scenario analysis model, LEVERS, to analyze mitigation options and 
emissions. In addition, our LEVERS framework includes all major transport subsectors—
light duty vehicles, buses, heavy-duty trucks, rail, aviation, marine, agriculture, off-road, 
and construction. The values for reduction potential from various options in each of the 
subsectors come from an extensive review of the literature.  
 
The scenarios that are developed using the LEVERS model illustrate the enormous 
challenges associated with making deep GHG reductions in the US transportation sector.  
While they represent only a small subset of all potential futures that could potentially 
meet the 80% reduction target, they provide value by showing the diversity of approaches 
that might be pursued. These scenarios, first and foremost, are meant to convey the scale 
and scope of the changes required to meet this aggressive target and to motivate the 
aggressive action (i.e., policy and technological development) that will be required in all 
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transport subsectors and on all fronts (vehicles, fuels, and travel demand management) 
over the coming decades.  
 
Several Silver Bullet scenarios are created in order to show that no one mitigation option 
can singlehandedly meet the ambitious GHG goals, especially since total travel demand 
(P x T) in each subsector is expected to increase significantly by 2050. This puts a large 
burden on vehicle and fuel technologies (E x C) to decarbonize, and by our estimates it is 
unreasonable to think a single technology approach can shoulder this burden entirely on 
its own, given the diversity of vehicle types and requirements in the transportation sector.  
 
When multiple technological strategies are combined together in a portfolio approach, 
however – assuming the wide array of technical, economic, social, and policy challenges 
can be overcome – the potential for emission reductions could be great, as the 50in50 and 
80in50 scenarios highlight. This mixed strategy approach would include (1) restraining 
the growth in travel demand with strong transport and land use planning policies, and (2) 
targeting advanced technologies and fuels to the subsectors where they are most feasible. 
Because multiple options are employed, the portfolio approach reduces the required level 
of vehicle and fuel technology development and usage for any given mitigation strategy. 
A portfolio approach also helps to reduce the sensitivity of GHG emissions to any one 
technology, resource, or behavioral change and the associated risks if the strategy does 
not succeed.  
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Constraints on primary resources and the penetration of new technologies into the market 
could put limits on how deeply US transport emissions might be reduced, however. In 
particular, biofuel production is limited by the total amount of biomass resources 
available in the US and globally. The use of electric-drive vehicles will not likely be 
limited by resource constraints, but challenges will arise from the timing of technology 
development and cost reductions in light of the slow turnover of vehicle fleets, as well as 
from the limited applicability of electricity and hydrogen outside of on-road, rail, and 
perhaps some marine applications. Deep emission reductions are also particularly 
sensitive to fuel carbon intensities. This depends on the land use impacts (direct and 
indirect) of expanded biomass production and the potential of CCS to decarbonize fossil-
based electricity and hydrogen production, neither of which is fully understood at this 
time. 
 
The extent to which the transport sector will ultimately need to reduce its emissions is not 
certain since deep reductions are not yet law and reductions will likely not be equal 
across all sectors of the economy. But as one of the largest current contributors to total 
US GHG emissions, transportation must play a major role (IEA, 2008; Yeh et al., 2008). 
If the US is to have a low-carbon transportation sector by 2050, it will need to expand its 
policy toolkit in order to adequately address emissions from all subsectors. A diverse, 
portfolio approach for mitigating GHG emissions necessitates continued research and 
policy support for improving vehicle and fuel technologies and reducing transport 
intensity. While the potential carbon impacts of the various technology options are 
relatively well understood, the impacts of the behavioral options are less so, especially in 
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the non-LDV transport subsectors (UKERC, 2009). Behavioral and structural changes, 
and policies promoting them, are critically important to alleviate dependence on future 
technology developments and also to reduce other non-GHG-related problems related to 
unchecked growth in travel demand, including traffic congestion and fatalities. 
 
Chapter II 
The second chapter of this dissertation describes the development of an energy-
engineering-environmental-economic (4E) systems optimization (linear programming) 
model that represents the vast majority of energy and emission flows within, to, and from 
California.  The CA-TIMES model, as it is called, is built within the well-established 
MARKAL-TIMES framework and is, thus, extremely rich in bottom-up technological 
detail.  The main application of the model is to develop scenarios for how California’s 
energy system could potentially evolve over the next several decades, in light of strong 
policies to reduce energy use and greenhouse gas emissions.  The scenarios range from a 
business-as-usual Reference Case to a Deep GHG Reduction Scenario, in which a mixed-
strategy, portfolio approach allows California economy-wide emissions to be reduced 
80% below 1990 levels by 2050.  Several variants of the Deep GHG scenario are then 
also developed, in order to explore important sensitivities related to the stringency of the 
emissions cap (i.e., less stringent than an 80% reduction) and the ultimate potential of key 
resources and technologies to contribute to greenhouse gas mitigation (e.g., sustainable 
biomass supply, nuclear power, carbon capture and storage, and electricity and hydrogen 
as transportation fuels). 
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In sum, this analysis shows that deep, economy-wide reductions on the order of 50% to 
80% appear to be technically feasible at reasonable costs (e.g., 1.0% to 2.7% of 
California Gross State Product over the 2005-2055 time period, relative to the baseline 
scenario – considering only the transportation, electricity, and fuel conversion sectors).  
Policy cost estimates of this magnitude are in line with those of other studies for 
decarbonization of the U.S. and global energy systems (IEA, 2010; NRC, 2010).  The 
bulk of the costs would be incurred in the medium to long term (between 2025 and 2050), 
as increasingly advanced technologies are used to make deeper and deeper reductions.  
The challenge for policy, however, is perhaps the next ten years (2010-2020).  This 
analysis shows that whether policymakers ultimately decide to pursue a reduction target 
of 80% or something much less stringent (say, 50%), the types of technologies that need 
to be introduced in the near term are for the most part the same; hence, the emissions 
trajectories up to 2025 would be fairly similar.  Furthermore, results of this study indicate 
that California’s current target for 2020 – the AB32 goal of bringing emissions back 
down to 1990 levels – may not be stringent enough.  To allow time for significant market 
penetration of the kinds of transformational technologies that will be needed in the long 
term (due to the inertia of energy system infrastructure and investments), advanced 
technologies must be introduced over the next ten years at a quicker rate than what the 
existing 2020 target is likely to motivate.  More specifically, over the coming decade a 
significant expansion in, or at least the introduction of, the following mitigation options 
are likely needed:  renewable electricity generation, specifically from wind, solar, and 
geothermal resources; advanced transportation technologies and fuels, including biofuels, 
hybrid-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, battery-electric vehicles, and 
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hydrogen fuel cell vehicles; and a shift toward greater utilization of electricity as an end-
use fuel in the industrial, commercial, residential, and agricultural sectors.  Demand 
reduction is also likely to play an invaluable role in mitigating future emissions, both 
through energy efficiency and conservation efforts and reduced vehicle travel.  The latter, 
which could be achieved by strong transit, land use, and auto pricing policies, deserves a 
considerably more attention in the development of energy and climate scenarios for 
California. 
 
In terms of decarbonizing California’s energy system, the transportation sector poses 
perhaps the biggest challenge and is therefore the most costly.  Over half of the state’s 
GHG emissions are attributable to transport at present, resulting primarily from the 
combustion of fossil fuels (gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and residual fuel oil).  Of course, 
because fossil fuels are relied upon so heavily, the potential for reducing transport GHGs 
via alternative fuel and vehicle technologies is quite huge.  Biofuels are the most cost-
effective option for making these emission cuts, both from the perspective of a single 
vehicle or when viewed at the energy systems level, the latter including fuel production 
and distribution infrastructure and considering competition for biomass from other 
sectors, such as electric generation and industry.  The challenge with biomass is that total 
resources, while renewable on an annual basis, are actually rather limited.  Only if 
California were to have access to biomass supplies far beyond its “fair share” of the 
national or global total (e.g., >30% of all U.S. consumption), would the state be able to 
fuel its entire transport sector with biofuels.  This is perhaps unlikely in a future where 
other U.S. states and countries are also counting on biomass/biofuels to mitigate their 
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GHG emissions.  Given constraints on biomass resources, the results of this analysis 
indicate that the most optimal use of biofuels is in the non-light duty subsectors, namely 
in the form of bio-derived gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and residual fuel oil.  The reason for 
this is fairly intuitive:  there are fewer alternative technological/fuel options to reduce 
GHG emissions in these other transport subsectors, hence the value of a tonne of biomass 
is higher.  In fact, a marked advantage of light-duty vehicles is that there are quite a few 
alternatives for technology- and fuel-switching.  Specifically, electric-drive vehicles 
could feasibly be used to satisfy a large portion of total VMT demand, whereas electricity 
and/or hydrogen are simply not realistic alternatives in some of the other subsectors, due 
to range limitations and refueling issues.  The GHG reduction scenarios developed here 
rely heavily on HEVs and PHEVs (Gasoline and E-85), as well as Hydrogen FCVs to 
some extent, to make deep emission cuts in the light-duty subsector.  In contrast, BEVs 
do not penetrate the LDV market to any significant degree, a result that may have more to 
do with model dynamics than anything else.  BEVs are not favored by the model because 
of the various inputs that are currently assumed for the efficiencies and costs of vehicles 
and plug-in recharging infrastructure.  The assumed costs for BEVs, for instance, are 
higher than for other advanced vehicle technologies because, in an effort to be fair, all 
vehicles in CA-TIMES are assumed to have roughly the same size, weight, range, power, 
etc.  While this aggregated level of vehicle class representation for the most part makes 
sense within the modeling framework, it potentially disadvantages BEVs, which may be 
particularly well suited to the small car and small light truck markets or to urban driving, 
where travel distances are shorter.  The current version of CA-TIMES is not able to 
capture this possibility, though future work may attempt to address this issue. 
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As the transport sector is decarbonized, emissions from the energy supply/conversion 
sector are likely to be reduced significantly as well, since the types of facilities that 
produce low-carbon transport fuels (e.g., bio-refineries, FT syn-fuels poly-generation 
plants, hydrogen plants, zero- and low-carbon electricity generation) tend to emit low 
levels of greenhouse gases, or at least they would in a low-carbon future.  The exact 
carbon signature of these fuels, of course, depends on which energy resources are used 
for generating heat and electricity at these plants, and also whether or not carbon capture 
and storage is utilized.  Bio-CCS technologies appear to be an especially attractive means 
by which to decarbonize the energy system, since they allow for negative emissions (i.e., 
permanently storing biomass carbon underground).  In the scenarios developed in this 
study, bio-CCS play a major role in reducing GHG emissions while at the same time 
taking the burden off of other sectors, namely transport, which have higher abatement 
costs.  When bio-CCS technologies are eliminated from the potential technology 
portfolio, however, the transport sector is forced to decarbonize much more significantly, 
and in the light-duty sector in particular, more advanced electric-drive vehicles (PHEVs 
and Hydrogen FCVs) become a preferred option for making these emissions cuts. 
 
Emissions from the industrial, commercial, residential, and agricultural (ICRA) end-use 
sectors are reduced in this study through energy efficiency and fuel switching.  In 
particular, drawing on other scenario studies by the IEA (2010), the Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario assumes that an increasing share of energy demand is met by 
electricity and natural gas in the ICRA sectors in the future.  How authentic these 
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emission reductions actually are depends in large part on the simultaneous 
decarbonization of the electric sector, which also appears to be a likely outcome of 
stringent climate policy, as found in this and numerous other studies. 
 
Comparatively, reducing emissions from electric generation is fairly straightforward and 
can be done at abatement costs that are lower than in the transport and energy supply 
sectors (IEA, 2010).  Nonetheless, significant hurdles still remain, particularly with 
respect to spatial and temporal issues.  For example, it could potentially be quite 
expensive to tap solar, wind, and geothermal resources in distant out-of-state locations, 
owing to the substantial capital investments required for long-distance transmission lines.  
In addition, it is still not entirely clear whether intermittent renewables, especially solar 
and wind, can be relied upon to contribute a majority share of total electric generation, 
unless significant storage and/or back-up capacity is built as well.  For these reasons, the 
availability of nuclear power and fossil and/or biomass CCS is critical, so that low-carbon 
options for baseload generation remain in play.  If nuclear and CCS are wholly absent 
from the technology portfolio, as one variant of the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
illustrates, then it will likely become considerably more difficult, and indeed more costly, 
to achieve a deep reduction target, if it is even possible.  Other scenario variants lead to 
similar conclusions when biomass resources are significantly constrained or when the 
potential for electricity and hydrogen to be used in the transport sector is considerably 
limited. 
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An important caveat to this analysis is that it only does a partial economic accounting.  In 
other words, it attempts to capture the total energy system costs of climate mitigation but 
largely ignores the significant economic benefits of pursuing this goal.  For instance, the 
analysis does not consider the avoided costs (i.e., benefits) of climate change (e.g., more 
frequent extreme weather events, impacts on global agriculture and food production) or 
of climate adaptation (e.g., construction of sea walls, relocation of coastal populations).  
Similarly, the benefits accruing from reduced health expenditures and increased life 
expectancies, to the extent they can attributed to climate mitigation, have not been 
monetized here.  Given this partial accounting, it is highly likely that the cost figures 
shown in this chapter are somewhat overestimated, a practice that is a known issue with 
integrated assessment models used to inform energy and climate policymaking (Nemet et 
al., 2010). 
 
Chapter III 
The third chapter of this dissertation attempts to illuminate some of the key synergies, 
and to a lesser extent the trade-offs, between climate mitigation, energy security, air 
pollution and human health, and affordability, highlighting the main results and findings 
from an analysis that was conducted with researchers at the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in support of the Global Energy Assessment (GEA, 
2011).  To this end, two tools are jointly utilized in this study:  a systems engineering 
global energy model (MESSAGE) and a global climate model (MAGICC).  In sum, a 
wide array of plausible energy futures are generated and analyzed, in order to understand 
the potential evolution of the global energy system, and the subsequent climate system 
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response, over the twenty-first century, under varying assumptions for energy security, 
air pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions.  Each of these scenarios looks different, in 
both its inputs and outputs, and on a sliding scale of satisfaction, each meets the different 
energy system objectives to varying degrees.  
 
This work is predicated on the notion that the energy system of the future could 
potentially develop along a number of different paths, depending on how society and its 
decision makers prioritize various, worthwhile energy objectives.  These objectives are 
generally discussed in the context of different timeframes (e.g., security and 
pollution/health in the near term; climate in the medium to long term).  Therefore, they 
frequently compete for attention in the policy world.  An added challenge is that in many 
countries separate policy institutions are often responsible for dealing with the multiple 
objectives.  As a result, important synergies between them are either overlooked or 
simply not understood, and the costs of reaching each objective individually are often 
overstated.  By taking a more holistic and integrated perspective, we find that the 
synergies between the society’s various energy objectives far outweigh the trade-offs.   
 
A commonly discussed long-term goal for climate mitigation is the so-called “2 ºC 
target” – i.e., staying below 2 ºC maximum temperature rise, relative to pre-industrial 
levels, throughout the twenty-first century – which is thought to be needed to avoid 
dangerous interference with the climate system (Solomon et al., 2007).  Maximizing the 
likelihood of achieving the 2 ºC target depends, above all, on making deep reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions over the next several decades, a feat that will be principally 
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accomplished by dramatically scaling up the utilization of zero-carbon energy 
technologies (nuclear, biomass, and other renewables) in the global energy mix.  
Specifically, meeting the 2 ºC target with greater than 50% probability in the long term 
requires zero-carbon energy shares (relative to total global primary energy supply) that 
are 25% or higher in the near term (2030).  Furthermore, because it is pollution-free and 
can be derived from a variety of sources, zero-carbon energy also has the potential to 
significantly decrease air pollution and its corresponding health impacts, as well as 
improve security through supply diversification and reduced import dependence.  For 
example, results of this analysis show that near-term targets for pollution reduction – both 
globally and in key developing world regions where air pollution and its health impacts 
are strongest – can be achieved just as effectively through decarbonization as they can 
through more stringent pollution control measures that are enacted in the absence of 
climate policy.  The main pollution-climate trade-off centers around the small, but non-
trivial, impact that lower levels of air pollutant emissions, namely climate-cooling 
aerosols (e.g., SO2 and organic carbon), could have on the radiative forcing balance of the 
Earth.  For a constant level of GHG emissions, stringent pollution control policies could 
potentially increase global temperatures by a few tenths of a degree, consequently 
lowering the probability of staying below 2 ºC maximum temperature rise by several 
percentage points.  In terms of security benefits, substitution of domestically produced 
renewables (biomass, hydro, wind, solar, and geothermal) for imports of globally traded 
fossil commodities (coal, oil, and natural gas) could simultaneously reduce import 
dependence and diversify the energy resource mix away from one that relies too heavily 
on fossil energy.   
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Viewed from an holistic and integrated perspective, the combined costs of climate 
mitigation, energy security, and air pollution control come at a significantly reduced total 
energy bill if the multiple benefits of each are properly accounted for in the calculation of 
total energy system costs (i.e., when taking a systems view of the problem).  For instance, 
our findings show that the total added costs of pollution control are cut significantly as 
the stringency of climate policy increases and the utilization of zero-carbon, pollution-
free (hence, pollution control-free) technologies rises.  In fact, pollution control cost 
reductions of greater than 80% are possible in the most stringent climate scenarios.  
Similarly, security costs also substantially decrease under increasingly aggressive levels 
of decarbonization.  And in scenarios with extremely stringent climate policies, the added 
costs of security actually approach zero.  While steps taken to mitigate the climate will 
necessarily add to total energy system costs compared to a baseline scenario, these 
climate costs will be substantially compensated for by the corresponding pollution 
control and energy security cost reductions. 
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Introduction 
The energy challenges facing society are as varied as they are great, and for this reason 
energy has become a key area to address in the twenty-first century.  Central among these 
concerns is the specter of global climate change.  The impact of energy production and 
consumption on the earth’s climate system has been well documented, and scientific 
studies now suggest that annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions must be cut 50 to 80 
per cent worldwide by 2050 in order to stabilize the climate and avoid the most 
destructive impacts of climate change (IPCC, 2007).  Toward this goal, several 
governments have adopted emissions targets for 2050 (in many cases, they are still 
aspirational targets), including Germany, Australia, the UK, the European Union, and the 
state of California.  The United States currently has no laws specifically designed to cut 
GHG emissions, but momentum is growing at both the national and state levels (Litz, 
2008; Lutsey and Sperling, 2008; Pew, 2009).  In fact, several climate change bills have 
been proposed in the US Congress over the past several years to set up a domestic 
emissions trading program with a declining cap on annual GHG emissions that would 
ultimately lead to economy-wide reductions in the range of 50-80% by 2050.1,2  Climate 
change has also become a core issue at the international level.  In 2009, for instance, the 
Group of Eight (G8) industrialized nations agreed to reduce global GHG emissions 50% 
below 1990 levels by 2050, with the intent to hold global warming to less than 2 degrees 
Celsius above pre-industrial levels (G8, 2009).  The Copenhagen Accord later adopted 
                                                 
1
 An 80% reduction in annual US GHG emissions (from all sources) below 1990 levels is equivalent to an 
83% reduction below 2005. Annual GHGs in 1990 were 14% lower than in 2005 [EPA, 2008b. Inventory 
of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2006. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, 
DC.]. 
2
 “Comparison of Legislative Climate Change Targets,” World Resources Institute 
(http://www.wri.org/publication/usclimatetargets) and (http://www.wri.org/chart/comparison-legislative-
climate-change-targets-110th-congress-1990-2050)  
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the 2º C target.  Here in California, global climate change could have a pronounced local 
impact, affecting the state’s economy, natural and managed ecosystems, and human 
health and mortality (California Department of Environmental Protection, 2006). 
 
Yet, despite the growing consensus for the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the 
strategies for meeting these ambitious targets have not been clearly defined, and the 
technology and policy options are not well enough understood.  For years, scenario 
analyses and energy modeling tools have been used widely to envision the potential 
evolution of energy systems over time.  Until more recently, however, very few studies, 
had done detailed analyses of how deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions could be made 
across all energy sectors in the long-term, using commercial or near-commercial low-
carbon and advanced technologies and fuels.  In particular, the literature lacked analyses 
focusing specifically on making deep cuts in transport sector emissions, whether in 
California or the United States or at the global level.   
 
A large number of studies have investigated different aspects of making transport sector 
GHG reductions, but very few have simultaneously included all transport subsectors in 
their analyses or have looked at scenarios for making deep emissions cuts.  (At least this 
was true at the start of this dissertation project.)  Most scenario analyses (e.g., 
(Bandivadekar et al., 2008; Grimes-Casey et al., 2009; Mui et al., 2007; NRC, 2008; Yeh 
et al., 2008)) concentrate only on light-duty vehicles (LDV) since they make up such a 
large share (60%) of US transport GHGs, whereas the few studies that do include 
additional on- and non-road subsectors (e.g., (IEA, 2008; WBCSD, 2004)) concentrate 
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their analyses at the global level, meaning one cannot easily use them to assess the 
evolution of national and sub-national transportation systems, such as those in California 
and the US.  Similarly, while several studies have looked at slight to moderate reductions 
from the LDV subsector (e.g., (Bandivadekar et al., 2008; Mui et al., 2007)), very few 
consider the feasibility of making deep carbon cuts in the long-term.  For example, 
WBCSD (2004) develops a scenario that combines multiple GHG mitigation strategies in 
order to bring global annual road vehicle emissions back down to 2000 levels by 2050.  
In addition, a recent report by the National Research Council develops a “Hydrogen 
Success” scenario, in which LDV emissions are reduced 50% below 2005 levels by 2050, 
as well as a portfolio scenario, in which advanced biofuels and high efficiency internal 
combustion engine vehicles also achieve significant penetration, helping to reduce GHGs 
even further (85%).   
 
Over the past two years, as energy and climate change have become even more 
prominent concerns, researchers and analysts have started to fill the void in the literature 
discussed above.  In fact, some of the first major research in this area has been carried out 
by myself and colleagues in the STEPS Program at UC Davis – e.g., see the 
“80in50”studies by Yang, McCollum et al. (2009) and McCollum and Yang (2009), who 
analyzed scenarios for making deep cuts in emissions across all transport subsectors in 
California and the US, respectively.  The US-focused 80in50 analysis is the subject of the 
first chapter of this dissertation. 
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As discussed in Section I, the 80in50 studies investigate the potential for reducing 
transport GHG emissions 50-80% below 1990 levels by 2050.  Scenarios are used to 
envision how such a significant decarbonization might be achieved through the 
application of advanced vehicle technologies and fuels, and various options for 
behavioral change.  In contrast to most previous studies, a relatively simple, easily 
adaptable modeling methodology is developed, which can incorporate insights from other 
modeling studies and organize them in a way that is easy for policymakers to understand.  
Also, a wider range of transportation subsectors is considered than in other studies—e.g., 
light and heavy duty vehicles, aviation, rail, marine, agriculture, off-road, and 
construction.  The analysis investigates scenarios with multiple emissions reduction 
options (increased efficiency, lower-carbon fuels, and travel demand management) across 
the various subsectors.  In support of this effort, two Excel-based spreadsheet modeling 
tools have been developed, which quantify the emission reductions potential of the 
various GHG mitigation strategies in the California and US transportation sectors.3  One 
version of this so-called Long-term Evaluation of Vehicle Emission Reduction Strategies 
(LEVERS) model was tailored to California while another one focused on the entire U.S.  
The analytical framework of these models relies on decomposing total GHG emissions 
into four main drivers (population, travel demand, vehicle fuel consumption, and fuel 
carbon intensity) and expressing emissions as a product of those drivers.  In particular, a 
transport-variant of the Kaya identity is used to do the decomposition analysis (Kaya, 
1990).  Note that several other studies have utilized similar decomposition approaches in 
                                                 
3
 Note that the 80in50 research project originally started out as an analysis for California, but was 
eventually expanded to take on a US focus, as was the LEVERS model.  My role in this research was the 
following: (1) in the California 80in50 project, I was the lead graduate student researcher under the 
supervision of Dr. Christopher Yang; and (2) in the US 80in50 project, I was the lead project investigator, 
working closely with Dr. Yang on the analysis. 
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recent years to study historical energy use and GHG emissions (Ang and Zhang, 2000; 
Lakshmanan and Han, 1997; Mui et al., 2007; Schipper et al., 2001; Scholl et al., 1996).   
 
While the 80in50 studies were successful in answering the types of research questions 
they were intended for, like any research project they had several important limitations.  
Hence, to start to address these shortcomings and to further push our scenario analysis 
capabilities, our research group at UC-Davis undertook the development of an energy-
engineering-environmental-economic systems optimization model.  This type of work 
represents yet another method for developing energy scenarios.  Well-known examples of 
such models include the US Energy Information Administration’s NEMS model, the US 
Environmental Protection Agency’s nine-region MARKet ALlocation (MARKAL) 
model for the United States, and the International Energy Agency’s global MARKAL 
model.  Each of these is capable of analyzing all transport subsectors simultaneously 
along with all other components of the energy system.  However, until recently, none had 
been utilized to study in detail how deep emission reductions could be made in the long-
term from all energy sectors, and in particular from all transport subsectors (e.g., see 
(Gallagher and Collantes, 2008)).  Another problem with these models, at least for the 
purposes of this dissertation, is that because they are so broad in their geographic scope 
(in general, this is a good thing), they are not really conducive to carrying out California-
specific analyses.   
 
As described in Section II, for a large part of my dissertation work, I have developed an 
early version of the CA-TIMES energy systems optimization model.  In sum, CA-TIMES 
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is a technologically-rich, energy systems model for California, along the lines of those 
models developed and maintained by the EIA, IEA, and EPA.  It is a variant of the 
MARKAL and TIMES family of energy models, which focuses on the California energy 
system and contains California-specific data and assumptions.  CA-TIMES represents a 
unique simulation tool in that it is the first publicly available model of its kind in the 
state.  Other types of economic models have previously been used for near-term (2020) 
energy and climate policy analysis in California, for example, the Energy 2020 model by 
Systematic Solutions; an electricity and natural gas sector model by Energy and 
Environmental Economics (E3); and the Environmental Revenue Dynamic Assessment 
Model (E-DRAM) by UC-Berkeley, California Department of Finance, and California 
Air Resources Board.  However, CA-TIMES is different from some or all of these 
models in that contains richer, bottom-up technological detail, covers all sectors of the 
California energy economy, is primarily focused on the medium to long term (2020-
2050), and resides in the public domain.  As California moves forward with a broad 
spectrum of carbon emissions reduction policies, there is a strong need for this kind of 
transparent, flexible, and accessible analysis tool to help inform policy decisions.  My 
dissertation work begins this process by performing scenario analyses, evaluating policy, 
and presenting technological portraits for the future given the specific conditions that 
exist within the state.  In this way, it fills an important void in the literature and research 
community, specifically in California.  In addition, the CA-TIMES energy systems 
modeling project addresses some of the limitations of the 80in50 research by further 
expanding the scope of the analysis.  First, since the CA-TIMES model is an energy-
engineering-environmental-economic systems optimization model, it brings costs and 
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prices into the analysis as decision variables.  This means future technology-fuel 
combinations are selected endogenously by the model, rather than exogenously, as is 
done in the original 80in50 research.  Second, whereas the 80in50 research looks at 
scenario “snapshots” in the year 2050, my analyses with CA-TIMES look at the transition 
pathway from now to 2050, allowing me to focus on important milestone years for policy 
(e.g., 2020).  Third, all energy producing and consuming sectors are represented in the 
CA-TIMES systems model, as opposed to representation of only the transport sector.  
This permits an improved understanding of the potential responses of the entire energy 
system to a suite of energy and climate policies, since cross-sector linkages are accounted 
for.  As an example, competition for limited primary energy resources can be more 
accurately modeled under the CA-TIMES framework (e.g., biomass for transportation 
fuels vs. biomass for electricity production). 
 
The main objective in creating a MARKAL-TIMES model for California is to develop 
and analyze scenarios for meeting future energy and emissions reduction goals, with an 
eye toward the transportation, electricity, and energy supply and conversion sectors.  In 
other words, this research is a direct extension of my 80in50 work, though a bit more 
complex and comprehensive in nature.  The aim is to provide insights on how economic 
drivers, such as cost considerations and an emissions trading program, and policies, like a 
renewable portfolio standard (RPS) for electricity, biofuels mandates, and vehicle tailpipe 
emissions standards, might affect future decisions on the investment of future energy 
technologies and utilization of resources under various scenarios.   
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The CA-TIMES research builds on several previous studies that have used a bottom-up 
energy systems optimization model approach for developing transportation scenarios.  
These include Schäfer and Jacoby (2006), IEA (2008), IEA (2010), and Yeh et al. (2008).  
For example, Schäfer and Jacoby (2006) combine MARKAL with a computable general 
equilibrium model and a modal split model in order to estimate the impact of advanced 
vehicle technologies on GHGs.  They conclude that given an economy-wide reduction 
target, advanced vehicles will not be utilized in large numbers until gasoline prices rise to 
extremely high levels (US$9.50/gal, or $2.50/L).  Similarly, Yeh et al. (2008) also find 
that, under an economy-wide target and because of relatively high marginal abatement 
costs, the transport sector will likely not contribute significantly to GHG reductions until 
less expensive mitigation options in other sectors (such as electricity production) have 
first been exhausted and the prevailing price of CO2 has risen substantially.  Moreover, 
the IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP) studies show that if deep (50-80%) 
economy-wide reductions are to be made in the long-term, all sectors of the energy 
system will eventually need to be significantly decarbonized.  IEA finds that making deep 
reductions in global emissions will require an energy revolution, and they have estimated 
that in an optimistic case (their BLUE Map scenario), reducing global annual GHG 
emissions 50% below 2005 levels by 2050 (requiring 80% reductions in the U.S. and 
other industrialized countries) would involve the utilization of technologies with marginal 
abatement costs up to about $200/tonne CO2.  The IEA ETP studies show that if deep 
GHG reductions are to be made in the long term, the transport sector, which accounts for 
a significant 23% of global GHG emissions at present – in the US the corresponding 
figure is 29%, and in California 40% (CARB, 2008a; EPA, 2006; ITF, 2008) – will have 
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to play a major role.  Their analyses show, in particular, that the most important 
mitigation strategies are likely to be improved vehicle efficiencies, biofuels, and 
advanced technologies such as hydrogen and electric vehicles.  
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RESEARCH STREAM #1 
I. Achieving deep reductions in US transport greenhouse gas 
emissions: Scenario analysis and policy implications (80in50) 
 
David McCollum, Christopher Yang 
Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California-Davis 
 
Abstract: 
This chapter investigates the potential for making deep cuts in US transportation 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the long-term (50-80% below 1990 levels by 2050). 
Scenarios are used to envision how such a significant decarbonization might be achieved 
through the application of advanced vehicle technologies and fuels, and various options 
for behavioral change. A Kaya framework that decomposes GHG emissions into the 
product of four major drivers is used to analyze emissions and mitigation options. In 
contrast to most previous studies, a relatively simple, easily adaptable modeling 
methodology is used which can incorporate insights from other modeling studies and 
organize them in a way that is easy for policymakers to understand. Also, a wider range 
of transportation subsectors is considered here—light and heavy duty vehicles, aviation, 
rail, marine, agriculture, off-road, and construction. This analysis investigates scenarios 
with multiple options (increased efficiency, lower-carbon fuels, and travel demand 
management) across the various subsectors and confirms the notion that there are no 
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“silver bullet” strategies for making deep cuts in transport GHGs. If substantial emission 
reductions are to be made, considerable action is needed on all fronts, and no subsectors 
can be ignored. Light duty vehicles offer the greatest potential for emission reductions; 
however, while deep reductions in other subsectors are also possible, there are more 
limitations in the types of fuels and propulsion systems that can be used. In all cases 
travel demand management strategies are critical; deep emission cuts will not likely be 
possible without slowing growth in travel demand across all modes. Even though these 
scenarios represent only a small subset of the potential futures in which deep reductions 
might be achieved, they provide a sense of the magnitude of changes required in our 
transportation system and the need for early and aggressive action if long-term targets are 
to be met. 
 
*
 Note:  The text of this chapter is primarily derived from an Energy Policy paper that was published by me 
and Chris Yang in 2009.  Therefore, in some places the “voice” may sound more like that of a journal 
article.  (For the full paper, see the following reference:  McCollum, David L. and Christopher Yang (2009) 
Achieving Deep Reductions in U.S. Transport Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Scenario Analysis and Policy 
Implications. Energy Policy 37 (12), 5580 – 5596.) 
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I.1 Historical Energy Use and Emissions in the US Transport Sector 
In this chapter, Domestic GHG emissions include those emissions generated from trips 
taking place entirely within the US—i.e., from a US origin to a US destination. Overall 
emissions attempt to include half of all emissions generated from trips with either an 
origin or destination in the US, which captures emissions generated as a result of US 
passenger and goods transport abroad. In particular, Overall emissions include 
international aviation and marine travel where an airplane or ship leaves (or arrives from) 
the U.S. for (or from) points abroad. Thus, the aviation and marine subsectors account for 
a larger share of Overall emissions than they do of Domestic emissions.  We estimate 
total Domestic well-to-wheel emissions from US transportation in 1990 were 
approximately 1,921 million metric tonnes CO2e (MMTCO2e).4 Overall emissions were 
2,104 MMTCO2e. Note that these figures are higher than those reported elsewhere (e.g., 
in EPA (2006)) for US on- and off-road mobile source emissions because our estimates 
are lifecycle emissions while others may only report end-use emissions generated from 
fuel combustion onboard the vehicle.  
 
Table 1 gives a breakdown of transportation energy use and lifecycle GHG emissions by 
subsector in the US in 1990 for both the Domestic and Overall cases. Light-duty cars and 
trucks (passenger cars, pickup trucks, SUVs, minivans, and motorcycles) were 
responsible for about 60% of Domestic GHG emissions.  Heavy-duty vehicles (large 
trucks and buses) accounted for another 17%.  Domestic aviation (including commercial 
                                                 
4
 MMT = million metric tonnes; CO2e includes CO2, CH4, and N2O weighted by their respective global 
warming potentials (100-year timeframe). The terms CO2 and greenhouse gases are used interchangeably in 
this paper, as calculations are based upon equivalent carbon dioxide emissions (CO2e) using global 
warming potential of different GHGs. 
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(passenger), freight, and general aviation) comprised 11% of emissions, and the 
remaining 12% was from a combination of rail, domestic marine, agriculture, and off-
road equipment.  The breakdown of energy use by subsector is very similar to that for 
GHG emissions because of the overwhelming reliance on various forms of petroleum 
fuels, which all have similar carbon intensity values.   
 
Aviation emissions shown here only account for the six GHGs included in the Kyoto 
Protocol, and in particular CO2, CH4, and N2O, though emissions of NOx, SOx, H2O, and 
soot (i.e., non-CO2 aviation emissions) also impact the climate when released in the upper 
atmosphere (IPCC, 1999). The radiative forcing associated with these emissions is 
influenced by their short persistence in the atmosphere (hours to days) (Forster et al., 
2006). To account for the additional climate impacts that non-CO2 emissions may cause, 
some have proposed multipliers (‘uplift factors’) for converting a given quantity of non-
CO2 emissions into the standard CO2-equivalent metric (Macintosh and Wallace, 2009). 
Current estimates lie in the range of 1.5-4.0, though considerable uncertainty still remains 
(Forster et al., 2007; Marbaix et al., 2008)}.  
 
Table 1  Transportation Energy Use and Lifecycle Emissions by Subsector in the US in 1990  
(Based on authors’ calculations using data from numerous sources) 
  Energy Use GHG Emissions* 
Subsector Vehicle Type Domestic Overall Domestic Overall 
  
(PJ) % (PJ) % MMT CO2e % 
MMT 
CO2e 
% 
Light-duty Cars & Trucks 12,603 60.1% 12,603 54.8%  1,159  60.3%  1,159  55.1% 
Heavy-
duty 
Buses 176 0.8% 176 0.8%  16  0.8%  16  0.8% 
Heavy Trucks 3,370 16.1% 3,370 14.7%  304  15.8%  304  14.5% 
Aviation 
Commercial 
(Passenger) 1,779 8.5% 2,335 10.2%  160  8.3%  210  10.0% 
Freight 365 1.7% 555 2.4%  33  1.7%  50  2.4% 
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General 139 0.7% 139 0.6%  13  0.7%  13  0.6% 
Rail Passenger 77 0.4% 77 0.3%  14  0.7%  14  0.6% Freight 458 2.2% 458 2.0%  41  2.1%  41  2.0% 
Marine 
Large Marine – 
Intl. - 0.0% 1,278 5.6%  -   0.0%  115  5.5% 
Large Marine – 
Domestic 341 1.6% 341 1.5%  31  1.6%  31  1.5% 
Personal Boats 197 0.9% 197 0.9%  18  0.9%  18  0.9% 
Agriculture Agriculture 444 2.1% 444 1.9%  40  2.1%  40  1.9% 
Off-road Off-road 1,017 4.9% 1,017 4.4%  92  4.8%  92  4.4% 
Total – All subsectors 20,966  22,990   1,921  2,104   
* Emissions estimates reported here are higher than those from other published studies because we include 
the GHGs produced during upstream (“well-to-tank”) fuel production processes. 
 
I.2 Methodology  
This analysis builds upon previous work completed by UC-Davis researchers, which 
looked at how the US state of California might reduce its transport sector GHGs (Yang et 
al., 2009).  For that analysis, the Long-term Evaluation of Vehicle Emission Reduction 
Strategies (LEVERS) model was developed to quantify the emission reductions potential 
of the various GHG mitigation strategies in California’s transportation sector. The scope 
of the LEVERS model has since been expanded to conduct US-focused analyses.5 The 
analytical framework relies on decomposing total GHG emissions into a handful of key 
drivers and expressing emissions as a product of those drivers. Decomposition analysis 
has become a popular energy and environmental analysis tool in recent years (Ang and 
Zhang, 2000; Schipper et al., 2001), and several studies have used decomposition 
analysis to study historical energy use and GHG emissions in US transport by subsector 
(Lakshmanan and Han, 1997; Mui et al., 2007; Scholl et al., 1996).  
 
                                                 
5
 For an expanded description of the LEVERS model and all input assumptions, the interested reader is 
encouraged to see the appendix to the published Energy Policy paper, on which this chapter is based.  
(McCollum, David L. and Christopher Yang (2009) Achieving Deep Reductions in U.S. Transport 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Scenario Analysis and Policy Implications. Energy Policy 37 (12), 5580 – 
5596.) 
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In this analysis, a transport-variant of the Kaya identity is used (Kaya, 1990), which 
decomposes transportation CO2e emissions into four main drivers: population, travel 
demand, vehicle fuel consumption, and fuel carbon intensity. This Kaya equation is 
developed for each transport subsector and vehicle type and is summed over these 
categories to obtain emissions for the entire transport sector (see equations 1, 2). Yang et 
al. (2008) and Yang et al. (2009) describe this framework in more detail. 
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ji j
ji,2,Transport CETP CO CO ,2  (2) 
where i = subsector, j = vehicle type 
 
Population (P) and transport intensity (T) are the societal, or activity, parameters. Both of 
these terms are projected to increase substantially by 2050 under business-as-usual 
conditions. The latter two parameters in the identity are technological in nature: energy 
intensity (E) describes the energy use per-mile (e.g., MJ/mile) of transport, and carbon 
intensity (C) describes the carbon emissions per unit of energy (e.g., gCO2e/MJLHV)6. 
Together they define the amount of carbon emitted per-mile of transport. The T, E, and C 
parameters represent the three main “levers” for reducing transport GHG emissions. In 
this analysis, population is not considered as a potential lever. In all scenarios, the US 
                                                 
6
 In this chapter, the carbon intensity values are shown on a lower heating value (LHV) basis, whereas in 
the next chapter on the CA-TIMES work, they are shown on a higher heating value (HHV) basis.  Most 
studies report carbon intensities in terms of LHVs, as they represent the actual quantity of emissions 
associated with the amount of useable energy contained in a given quantity of fuel (minus the latent heat of 
vaporization of H2O, since the energy contained in water vapor generally ends up as waste heat on-board a 
vehicle). 
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population is assumed to increase 69% from 248.7 million in 1990 to 419.9 million in 
2050 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008a, b).  
 
Our study is informed by numerous other studies and reports found in the literature, 
which discuss the various strategies available for mitigating emissions in the different 
transport subsectors by pulling the transport, energy, and carbon intensity levers (e.g., 
(An and Santini, 2004; Ang-Olson and Schroeer, 2003; Arthur D. Little, 2002; CARB, 
2004; Cowart, 2008a; EUCAR, 2007; Eyring et al., 2005; Frey, 2007; Greene and 
Schafer, 2003; Greszler, 2007; IEA, 2008; IUR, 2008; Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2007; Kasseris 
and Heywood, 2007; Kromer and Heywood, 2007b; Marintek, 2000; O'Connor, 2007a; 
Rodier, 2009; Weiss, 2000; Yang et al., 2008)). In this study, we do not explicitly model 
the economics (e.g., costs and benefits) and dynamics (e.g., interactions, timing and 
transition issues) associated with specific mitigation options, although other studies 
addressing these issues have informed our judgments as to what is plausible in the 2050 
timeframe, with respect to technology, economics, consumer acceptance, and structural 
and behavioral change.  The mitigation options described in these numerous studies for 
the various transport subsectors (e.g., possible changes in vehicle efficiency, low-carbon 
fuel options and availability and potential for travel demand reduction) were combined 
using the LEVERS model in order to construct the various scenarios that make up this 
analysis. 
 
Lifecycle fuel carbon intensity assumptions in our analysis are taken from the 
Greenhouse gas Regulated Emissions and Energy Use in Transportation (GREET) model 
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developed by Argonne National Laboratory (Wang, 2007). While a number of alternative 
lifecycle analysis models and studies exist and while there is some controversy over 
which best represents reality (e.g., (Delucchi, 2003; JRC/IES, 2008; Tilman et al., 2006)), 
we ultimately chose GREET because it is comprehensive in its coverage of fuels, has a 
US focus, and is relatively transparent, publicly available, and widely used by 
transportation-energy researchers. It is also likely to be familiar to the intended audience 
of this paper.  Like any lifecycle analysis (LCA) model, GREET has its strengths and 
weaknesses and involves many debatable assumptions, all of which have been inherited 
into our analysis as well. 
 
As in other recent scenario analyses (Grimes-Casey et al., 2009; Olabisi et al., 2009), we 
use lifecycle emissions instead of end-use emissions because we are only focusing on one 
specific sector, transport.  The opposite approach would ignore the spillover effects of the 
transport sector in other sectors (e.g., agricultural, electricity, fuel production) in terms of 
upstream emissions, which would distort the analysis by giving one a false picture of 
which mitigation options are preferred, especially those which have low end-use 
emissions (e.g., hydrogen and electricity) but whose production-related upstream 
emissions can vary widely.  This approach is necessary, since a major goal of this study is 
to envision how significant decarbonization of the transport sector might be achieved 
based on using a variety of transport sector strategies. It is important to note that our LCA 
system boundary includes transportation fuel production and biomass production in the 
agriculture sector, but excludes vehicle manufacture and disposal.  
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I.3 Results and Scenarios for 2050 
Three sets of scenarios and their underlying assumptions were developed for this project 
and are presented and discussed below: (1) a Reference scenario to establish a business-
as-usual baseline for comparison, (2) Silver Bullet scenarios to examine the potential 
reductions from individual solutions and (3) 50in50 and 80in50 scenarios to illustrate 
several mixed (i.e., portfolio) strategy approaches for reducing emissions 50-80% below 
1990 levels by 2050. None of these scenarios should not be taken as predictions or 
forecasts of the future. Rather, they are composed of a large number of assumptions 
informed from other studies about what a 2050 world could potentially look like in terms 
of travel demand and alternative fuel and advanced vehicle technology adoption for 
different levels of GHG reduction.  
 
I.3.1 Reference Scenario 
The Reference scenario describes a future where very little is done specifically to address 
climate change, and transportation activity and technology development follow historical 
trends. It is built from assumptions informed by dozens of other studies. In this business-
as-usual scenario, population grows 69% from 249 million in 1990 to 420 million in 
2050, and across all subsectors transport intensity (T) is expected to increase significantly 
(doubling, on average), with the aviation subsector seeing the largest relative growth 
(Table 2). Vehicle load factors (passengers/vehicle) are assumed to be the same as in 
1990. Total travel demand (P x T) is nearly 3.4 times the 1990 value in the Domestic case 
and 4.2 times higher in the Overall case. These projections are based largely on the EIA’s 
Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2008 Reference Case projections to 2030, which we have 
extended to 2050 using linear extrapolation (EIA, 2008a). Alternately, using projections 
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from the EIA’s High Price Case would bring down the expected growth in travel demand. 
For light-duty vehicles, the projected growth from 1990 to 2050 would be just 51%, 
instead of the 71% shown in Table 2. This would translate into an increase in LDV GHGs 
of only 24%, compared to 41%. 
 
In the Reference scenario, conventional vehicles and fuels continue to be employed. In 
the light-duty vehicle (LDV) subsector, there is a fairly significant reduction in fleet 
energy intensity (47%) compared to 1990, which assumes that the average on-road fuel 
economy is 35 miles per gallon (mpg)—i.e., equal to the 2007 federal Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards (35 mpg (6.7 L/100km) tested for new vehicles in 
2020).7 For most other subsectors, average fleet energy intensities in 2050 are assumed to 
be slightly lower than they were in 2005. For aviation, reductions are greater. Since 1990, 
fleet-average energy intensities (per passenger- or ton-mile) for both commercial and 
freight aircraft have already declined by more than 30% (ORNL, 2008). Lee et al. (2001) 
estimate that if historical trends continue to persist into the future, energy intensities of 
new aircraft will be reduced 30-50% between 2000 and 2025 and that these levels will 
represent the fleet average by 2050. These significant reductions will require the 
widespread adoption of state-of-the-art aircraft technologies such as more efficient 
propulsion systems, advanced lightweight materials, and improved aerodynamics (e.g., 
winglets, increased wingspans), and potentially the adoption of even more advanced 
technologies—e.g., laminar flow control, unducted fan open-rotor engines, and improved 
air traffic control systems) (IEA, 2008; Lee et al., 2001; Schäfer et al., 2009).  
                                                 
7
 CAFE standards would have to be raised slightly beyond 35 mpg as test cycle fuel economies are 
typically higher than on-road values and corrected by multiplying test numbers by a factor of 0.80. 
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Table 2 shows that total transport sector-wide energy intensity is reduced 45% between 
1990 and 2050, and the average carbon intensity of all transportation fuels is about 2% 
lower than in 1990. In the LDV subsector, the carbon intensity reduction is greater (9%) 
due to the use of low-carbon biofuels for blending in LDVs, which in 2050 is assumed to 
be consistent with the new Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) targets for 2022 – 
approximately 24 billion gallons gasoline equivalent (gge) – and that all biofuels come 
from low lifecycle GHG cellulosic sources. The reduction in fuel carbon intensity from 
biofuels is balanced by the increased use of oil from higher carbon, unconventional 
sources in all subsectors. 
 
Domestic (lifecycle) emissions reach 3,496 MMTCO2e in 2050 (+82% from 1990) while 
in the Overall emissions case they reach 4,210 MMTCO2e (+100% from 1990).  
 
Table 2  Change in Transport Intensity, Energy Intensity, Carbon Intensity and GHG Emissions 
Between 1990 and 2050 and GHG Share by Subsector in the Reference Scenario 
  
  
LDV HDV  Aviation Rail Marine / Ag / Offroad 
All 
Subsectors 
T Domestic +71% +99% +266% +43% +92% +102% Overall +71% +99% +415% +43% +92% +148% 
E Domestic -47% -20% -57% -20% -50% -45% Overall -47% -20% -57% -20% -50% -44% 
C Domestic -9% +6% +6% -9% +6% -2% Overall -9% +6% +6% -9% +6% -1% 
GHG Domestic +41% +175% +183% +74% +70% +82% Overall +41% +175% +300% +74% +73% +100% 
GHG 
Share 
Domestic 46.6% 25.2% 16.6% 2.7% 8.8% --- 
Overall 38.7% 20.9% 25.9% 2.3% 12.2% --- 
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I.3.2 "Silver Bullet" Scenarios 
Because of the diversity and breadth of vehicle types and functions across the 
transportation subsectors, individual technology or fuel options alone are unlikely to be 
sufficient in achieving deep reductions in emissions. This “no silver bullet” notion has 
become well established in recent years (e.g., (Grimes-Casey et al., 2009; WBCSD, 
2004)). In order to further illustrate this insight and understand the potential reductions 
from individual options, we developed several Silver Bullet (SB) scenarios that describe 
futures in which one mitigation option (such as an advanced vehicle technology, 
alternative fuel, or travel demand management), is employed to the maximum feasible 
extent from a technological, economical, and behavioral perspective in 2050, based upon 
an extensive literature review.  
 
These scenarios explore individual options such as efficiency, biofuels, hydrogen, 
electricity, and controlling vehicle miles traveled (VMT). Not surprisingly, our findings 
substantiate those of other studies: none of the Silver Bullet scenarios, even with very 
optimistic assumptions, are able to achieve the ambitious 50-80% reduction goal, and 
none even reduce GHG emissions significantly compared to 1990. These scenarios lend 
further support to the notion that a portfolio approach is needed to make deep GHG 
reductions in the transportation sector, especially when constraints on technology and 
resources are properly accounted for.  
 
For an extended discussion of our Silver Bullet scenarios and results, including 
descriptions of the scenarios themselves, the interested reader is encouraged to see the 
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online supplementary material to the original Energy Policy paper, on which this chapter 
is based.  
 
I.3.3 Deep Emission Reduction Scenarios 
While there is no one silver bullet strategy for achieving the ambitious 50-80% GHG 
reduction goal, many of the individual options are complementary and can be combined 
in a portfolio approach to help reduce total transportation emissions. Three mixed-
strategy scenarios were developed to explore these portfolios and understand a range of 
different transportation futures in which Domestic GHG emissions are reduced by either 
50% (50in50 scenarios) or 80% (80in50 scenarios) below 1990 levels by 2050. The two 
50in50 scenarios illustrate the two distinct primary vehicle and fuel paths to low-carbon 
transportation: biofuels and electric-drive. However, increasing vehicle efficiencies and 
decreasing per-capita VMT beyond the Reference scenario are important components of 
these scenarios as well. The 80in50 scenario combines these two main options and looks 
at how emissions might be reduced even further by addressing each subsector to the 
furthest extent possible.  
 
The three deep emission reduction scenarios have been crafted from a set of optimistic, 
yet plausible, assumptions about the extent of technological and behavioral change that 
could be possible out to 2050. A large number of factors (vehicle and fuel technology 
development, economic context, resource limitations, lifestyle changes, consumer 
preferences, and policies) will influence what is possible and ultimately plausible in an 
uncertain world 40+ years into the future. While plausibility is inherently a subjective 
concept, to inform our scenario development, we have relied on a number of other studies 
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which attempt to estimate plausible penetrations of advanced technology and fuel options 
over time.  
 
Given the magnitude of changes required for achieving deep emissions reductions, we 
acknowledge that significant uncertainty and challenges exist in bringing about any 
single mitigation option, let alone the large and diverse suite of options that are ultimately 
needed. Certainly one of the key challenges in meeting the deep emissions reductions 
targets is associated with the rate at which options can be introduced into the 
transportation system.  Vehicles can have very long lifetimes, and as a result, it can take 
decades before a new technology, especially if introduced slowly, becomes widespread 
throughout the vehicle fleet.  New low-carbon fuel infrastructure, smart growth and better 
community design, and public transportation infrastructure are also key contributors to 
potential GHG reductions that will take a long time to implement and become 
widespread. 
 
In the LDV subsector, each scenario assumes a moderate shift away from trucks and 
SUVs towards cars; and along with improvements in vehicle propulsion systems, this 
helps to push up fleet average fuel economies.  For simplicity, we ignore any potential 
“VMT rebound effects” that might result from a shift to cars from trucks/SUVs8 or a shift 
to more-efficient vehicles, since it is not clear that the same factors at play in the past will 
continue to persist into the future. 
 
                                                 
8
 In recent years the average annual VMT of US cars has been greater than that of trucks/SUVs ORNL, 
2008. Transportation Energy Data Book, Edition 27, in: Diegel, D.a. (Ed.). US Department of Energy, Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory..  However, the two vehicle classes were quite similar in the late-1990s.   
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The carbon intensity of electricity assumed in the three scenarios, 43.6 gCO2e/MJ (157 
gCO2e/kWh), is approximately 80% below the 1990 level (207 gCO2e/MJ), which 
assumes significant generation (60%) from zero-carbon resources (nuclear and 
renewables) and large contributions from natural gas combined cycle generators and coal 
plants with carbon capture and sequestration. Many other studies have shown that these 
technologies for decarbonizing the electricity sector are among the least expensive 
options for achieving significant reductions in electric sector GHG emissions and would 
be a major part of any attempt to make deep cuts in economy-wide GHGs (EIA, 2007, 
2008b; EPA, 2007; IEA, 2008; Yeh et al., 2008). Table 3 provides representative average 
lifecycle carbon intensities for gasoline, electricity, biofuels, and hydrogen produced in 
the US. These may serve as a point of comparison for the carbon intensities of advanced 
fuels and energy carriers that are assumed in the scenarios discussed in this study. 
 
Population growth is the same in each 2050 scenario as in the Reference scenario, 
growing 69% from 1990 levels.  
 
Table 3  Representative Average Lifecycle Carbon Intensities (C) of Fuels Produced in the U.S.  
(Source: (Wang, 2007)) 
Fuels and Energy Carriers Carbon Intensity (gCO2/MJ)* 
Gasoline (100%, no biofuel blended) 92 
Electricity  
    Average U.S., 1990 207 
    Coal, conventional boiler-steam turbine 343 
    Natural Gas Combined-Cycle, gas turbine 129 
    Natural Gas, simple cycle gas turbine 215 
    Nuclear 2 
    Renewables (solar PV and thermal, wind, geothermal, hydro) ~0 
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Biofuels α  
    Ethanol, corn 60 – 111 (60 – 205) 
    Ethanol, cellulosic 5 – 20 (5 – 130) 
    Biodiesel, cellulosic 5 – 40 (5 – 150) 
Hydrogen  
    Natural gas feedstock 90 – 112 
Table Notes:  
* As shown by the Kaya equation in Section I.2, the product of vehicle energy intensity (E) and fuel carbon 
intensity (C) defines the GHG emissions per mile (or kilometer) driven, thus even though the carbon 
intensity of electricity may be higher than gasoline, electric vehicles will generally have much lower 
emissions per mile because of much higher vehicle efficiency.  
α
 Base carbon intensity of biofuels depends on production method (e.g., type of biomass feedstock, coal vs. 
natural gas energy input, wet vs. dry distillers grains, etc.). Values in parentheses include the potential 
additional GHG impacts of land use change, using estimates from Searchinger et al. (2008).  
 
Efficient Biofuels 50in50 scenario 
The Efficient Biofuels 50in50 scenario relies heavily on biofuels (cellulosic ethanol and 
biodiesel). The average lifecycle carbon intensity (12.3 gCO2e/MJ) of these biofuels is 
very low, resulting almost entirely from biomass feedstock production, collection, and 
transport, and biofuels distribution (Wang, 2007).  Relative to the Reference scenario, 
improved vehicle efficiencies across all subsectors and reductions in per-capita VMT 
growth contribute to a decrease in total transportation fuel demand and enable the US 
biomass resource base to supply the majority of fuel demands.  All LDVs are powered by 
low-carbon biofuels (no gasoline is used), and in addition biofuels supply 20% of total 
fuel demand for buses and heavy-duty trucks.  No other subsectors are able to be supplied 
with biofuels due to constraints on biomass feedstock availability:  the upper limit of US 
biofuels production has been estimated at roughly 90 billion gge per annum (Perlack et 
al., 2005).9  These other subsectors continue to use conventional fossil fuels, albeit in a 
                                                 
9
 The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) puts this estimate at 120 billion gge [(NRDC, 2004. 
Growing Energy: How Biofuels Can Help End America's Oil Dependence. Natural Resources Defense 
Council.]. IEA estimates global liquid biofuels potential to be in the range of 443-536 billion gge. [IEA, 
2004. Biofuels for Transport: An International Perspective. International Energy Agency, Paris, France.]. 
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more efficient manner (total sector energy intensity declines by 63%, an 18 percentage 
point improvement over the modest energy intensity reductions assumed in the Reference 
scenario).  Improvements in engine efficiency and vehicle hybridization enable the 
average fuel economy of the entire light-duty vehicle fleet to achieve 57 mpgge (on-road) 
in 2050.   
 
This scenario envisions significant slowing of growth in transport intensity (per-capita 
VMT) in each subsector to about half of the Reference scenario growth, which translates 
into a 25% reduction from the Reference scenario in per-capita VMT across all modes.  
In most cases, 2050 transport intensities are still somewhat higher than current (2008) 
levels, but not significantly so. In the LDV subsector in particular, halving of per-capita 
VMT growth translates into a 20% reduction in total VMT compared to the Reference 
scenario in 2050. This level of reduction in LDV VMT would require a suite of strong 
transportation policies: transit, land use, and auto pricing (e.g., road, cordon, and parking 
pricing; fuel taxes; and pay-as-you-go insurance). Studies from Rodier (2009), Cowart 
(2008a) and others have estimated that such approaches have the potential to reduce total 
VMT by 24-29% from business-as-usual forecasts by 2050. Note that to account for a 
shift from personal to public transport in our model, vehicle load factors of buses and rail 
are assumed to increase accordingly while LDV load factors remained unchanged. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the Efficient Biofuels 50in50 scenario, showing, by subsector, the 
breakdown of fuel usage and the normalized values for transport, energy and carbon 
                                                                                                                                                 
US ethanol consumption was just 6 billion gge in 2008 [(EPA, 2008c. Renewable Fuel Standard Program. 
Environmental Protection Agency.]. 
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intensity. By 2050, improvements in vehicle efficiencies have reduced the transportation 
sector-wide average energy intensity by 63% compared to 1990 levels. This is largely the 
result of aggressive improvements in efficiency, including vehicle hybridization where 
possible, being applied in the LDV, HDV, and aviation subsectors (Cheah et al., 2007; 
IEA, 2008; Yang et al., 2008). As a result of the use of low-carbon biofuels, average 
carbon intensity of fuels across the entire transportation sector is reduced by 47% 
compared to 1990 levels. Transport intensity (per-capita VMT) increases by just 52% 
across all modes in the Domestic case and 78% in the Overall case, compared to 102% 
(Domestic) and 148% (Overall) in the Reference scenario. 
 
Table 4  Description of the Deep Reduction Mixed-Strategy Scenarios, Domestic Case. 
 
 
Electric-drive 50in50 scenario 
The Electric-drive 50in50 scenario assumes the widespread use of high-efficiency 
electric-drive vehicle technologies running on low-carbon electricity. The LDV fleet 
makes a major shift towards electrification and by 2050 is composed of 60% hydrogen 
fuel cell vehicles (FCV), 20% battery-electric vehicles (BEV), and 20% gasoline plug-in 
hybrid-electric vehicles (PHEV). (In this study, PHEVs are classified as electric-drive 
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vehicles, but HEVs are not.) As a result of this efficient technology mix, the fleet average 
on-road fuel economy of LDVs is 80 mpgge. This scenario is informed by the optimistic 
levels of FCV penetration (and accompanying hydrogen production, delivery and 
refueling infrastructure) modeled by Greene et al. (2007) and NRC (2008) and assumes 
that BEVs and PHEVs can also make significant inroads by 2050. A similar level of 
electrification occurs for buses, though heavy trucks are run primarily on diesel and 
biofuels. Railroads, both passenger and freight, become completely electrified, and a 
small amount of hydrogen is used to power large oceangoing and domestic freight vessels 
and for a limited number of aviation (ground operations), agricultural, and off-road 
applications.  
 
A nontrivial quantity (21 billion gge) of biofuels is consumed in this scenario as well. 
This level is just below the requirements set forth by the 2007 Energy Independence and 
Security Act (EISA) RFS, but the biofuels are directed to aviation as a bio-based jet fuel, 
where they account for three-quarters of all aviation fuels consumed.  
 
Table 4 provides additional details about the Electric-drive 50in50 scenario. The 
widespread use of electric-drive by 2050 has led to dramatic improvements in vehicle 
efficiencies, reducing the sector-wide energy intensity by 67% compared to 1990 levels. 
The use of low-carbon electricity (described earlier) and hydrogen (primarily from fossil 
sources with CCS, biomass, and electrolysis from renewables), which account for 66% of 
total fuel usage, lowers total sector fuel carbon intensity by 41% compared to 1990 
levels. Total biomass feedstock consumption (for both biofuels and hydrogen production) 
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is about 0.5 billion bone dry tons (BDT), well within estimated US resource limits. As in 
the other deep GHG reduction scenarios, the increase in Domestic transport intensity is 
just 52% across the entire sector, a 25% reduction in per-capita VMT from the Reference 
scenario. 
 
Multi-Strategy 80in50 scenario 
The Multi-Strategy 80in50 scenario combines the approaches of the two 50in50 scenarios 
(biofuels and electric-drive) into a single scenario that achieves an 80% reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions across the entire transportation sector. For each subsector, 
assumptions about the efficiency of specific vehicle technologies and behavioral options 
for reducing transport intensity are the same as in the two 50in50 scenarios. In these two 
previous scenarios, limitations on the available supply of biofuels and applicability of 
electric-drive to certain transport subsectors restricted the feasible potential of these 
strategies to contribute to even deeper GHG reductions.  Greater reductions are achieved 
the Multi-Strategy 80in50 scenario by targeting a more optimal distribution of vehicle 
technologies and fuels. For example, light-duty vehicles and buses, which appear to be 
the most flexible in terms of the vehicle/fuel options available to them, are predominantly 
electrified (FCVs, BEVs, and PHEVs), as in Electric-drive 50in50. Biofuels supply the 
small amount of liquid fuel that LDVs and buses consume, and biofuel HEVs comprise 
nearly all (90%) heavy-duty trucks, with the remainder being hydrogen FCVs used for 
short-haul and delivery operations. As above, rail is completely electrified, and a small 
amount (20%) of hydrogen is used in the agricultural and off-road subsectors, generally 
replacing natural gas and LPG in current use.  
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The electrification of transport in the subsectors where it is technically feasible frees up 
biofuels to be used in other subsectors where liquid fuels are most valuable, primarily 
aviation and marine. Biofuels supply all of commercial, freight, and general aviation; 
50% of the fuel demand for large oceangoing vessels; and 25% for domestic freight 
vessels and personal recreational boats. The balance of marine fuels is petroleum-based, 
due to challenges in bringing low-carbon biofuels into the international marine fuel 
supply. 
 
As Table 4 shows, the transportation sector-wide average energy intensity (MJ/mile) is 
68% below 1990 levels in this scenario, and total carbon intensity (gCO2e/MJ) is reduced 
by 76%, meaning average GHG emissions per transport distance (gCO2e/mile) are 
reduced 92% relative to 1990, a very aggressive yet technically feasible level. Total 
biomass consumption (for both biofuels and hydrogen production) is about 1.4 billion 
BDT; this pushes the limits of what the US could potentially produce with domestic 
resources and assumes no biomass is used for electric generation, which may or may not 
be a reasonable assumption in the longer-term given the relative economics of competing 
end-use demands for biomass. As with the two 50in50 scenarios, the increase in transport 
intensity across the entire transportation sector is only 52%, assuming aggressive 
transportation demand management strategies are implemented and prove to be effective. 
 
I.3.4 Scenario Results and Comparison 
Table 5 summarizes the key results of the three deep emissions reduction scenarios, and 
Figure 1 shows how GHG emissions are reduced compared to the Reference scenario for 
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different activity, fuel, and technology options. For each general strategy, reductions are 
further broken down into improvements in vehicle efficiency and carbon intensity.  
 
Table 5  Summary of Results in the Three Deep Emissions Reduction Scenarios  
Scenario Name Scenario Summary 
Efficient Biofuels 50in50 Emission reductions come from three main areas: slowing travel demand 
growth (810 MMTCO2e), conventional vehicles (523 MMTCO2e), and 
biofuels (1,185 MMTCO2e). In the biofuels category, 690 MMTCO2e of 
reductions come from substituting biofuels for conventional petroleum 
fuels, and 495 MMTCO2e of emission reductions are due to increasing the 
efficiencies of vehicles beyond those in the Reference scenario. Demand 
for fossil-based liquid fuels is 77 billion gge per year (4.2 mbpd). 
Electric-drive 50in50 Emission reductions come from a more diverse set of approaches.  Travel 
demand reductions, by assumption, provide the same benefit (810 
MMTCO2e), but the reduction from conventional vehicles is lower (247 
MMTCO2e), as there is a shift towards electric-drive vehicles where 
technically and economically feasible (primarily LDVs, buses, and rail). 
Biofuels make a relatively minor impact (270 MMTCO2e) entirely in the 
aviation subsector. Total biofuels demand is consistent with the EISA2007 
RFS. The major technology-related reductions come from using advanced 
vehicles running on electricity and hydrogen—461 and 754 MMTCO2e, 
respectively. Demand for fossil-based liquid fuels is 65 billion gge per year 
(3.5 mbpd).  
Multi-Strategy 80in50 This scenario combines strategies from the two previous scenarios to make 
even deeper reductions in GHG emissions. Significant cuts in travel 
demand are still required. The large emissions reductions resulting from 
each of the key technologies – hydrogen (778 MMTCO2e), electricity (470 
MMTCO2e) and biofuels (1052 MMTCO2e) – are essentially the same as 
in the two 50in50 scenarios which focus on them. Total Domestic biofuels 
demand is 82 billion gge, and some biomass is used for low-carbon H2 
production. Demand for fossil-based liquid fuels is nearly zero. 
 
Multi-Strategy 80in50 is more successful in making deeper emission reductions because 
it combines the strategies from the two 50in50 scenarios, which are somewhat 
complementary, and helps to address their key limitations. Biofuels are convenient 
replacement liquid fuels that, in theory, can be relatively easily substituted for 
conventional petroleum fuels in any subsector.  In Efficient Biofuels 50in50, constraints 
on biomass resources impose limits to how much biofuel substitution can take place. 
Electric-drive vehicles such as FCVs, PHEVs and BEVs offer the potential for greatly 
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improved vehicle efficiency and the use of low-carbon energy carriers from a variety of 
primary resources.  In Electric-drive 50in50, GHG reductions are limited by the 
challenges associated with applying electric-drive vehicles to certain subsectors (such as 
aviation and heavy duty trucks) because of specific technical considerations, most 
notably energy storage density, as well as temporal limits associated with the market 
penetration and social acceptance of these vehicles and building their requisite refueling 
infrastructure.  
 
In each of the three scenarios, slowing the growth in travel demand with a suite of known 
transit, land use, and pricing policies leads to important GHG reductions across all 
subsectors. Per-capita VMT still grows by 52%, and total VMT by 157%, but this is 
considerably slower growth than in the Reference scenario (102% and 241%, 
respectively). 
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Figure 1  Domestic GHG Reductions by Control Strategy for Three Deep Emission Reduction 
Scenarios  
 
Each of the three scenarios relies heavily on fuels with very low-carbon intensities to 
achieve the deep GHG reduction targets. Hence, they are rather sensitive to assumptions 
about the fuels production processes. There is a vast range of carbon intensities from 
different methods for biofuels, hydrogen, or electricity production, and those that result in 
higher carbon intensity fuels would eliminate much of the emission reductions gained in 
Efficient 
Biofuels 
50in50 
Electric-drive 
50in50 
Multi-
Strategy 
80in50 
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these scenarios. With biofuels in particular, the scenarios are quite dependent on a large 
supply of domestically grown or collected biomass, which is directed primarily to low-
carbon transport fuels production. Perlack et al. (2005) estimate that more than 1.3 billion 
bone dry tons (1.18 billion metric tonnes) of biomass per annum could be “sustainably” 
supplied (without impacting food, feed, and export demands, or displacing corn 
croplands) in the US in the long-term, if competing demands for biomass are ignored 
(e.g., electric generation). About two-thirds of this quantity is comprised of residues that 
would be relatively easy to collect or are already collected for other purposes; the other 
one-third is comprised of energy crops.10 If the amount of available biomass resources 
were constrained to a significantly lower quantity, either because of competing end-use 
demands or other environmental and economic concerns, then it would be nearly 
impossible to meet the deep emission reduction goals across the entire transport sector. 
Similarly, if biomass production cannot achieve such low carbon intensity, because of 
technology challenges or associated direct and indirect land use change (LUC), then the 
deep reduction goals will likewise become much more difficult to attain.  
 
The average lifecycle GHG emissions assumed for the biofuels in our scenarios come 
almost entirely from biomass feedstock production, collection, and transport, and biofuels 
distribution (Wang, 2007). Future cellulosic biofuels plants, employing either 
biochemical or thermo-chemical production methods, will likely be energy self-sufficient 
                                                 
10
 Forestlands in the contiguous US could produce 368 million dry tons annually: fuelwood harvested from 
forests (52 million); residues from wood processing mills and pulp and paper mills (145 million); urban 
wood residues including construction and demolition debris (47 million); residues from logging and site 
clearing operations (64 million); and fuel treatment operations to reduce fire hazards (60 million). 
Agricultural lands could produce nearly 1 billion tons annually: annual crop residues (428 million); 
perennial crops (377 million); grains used for biofuels (87 million); and animal manures, process residues, 
and other miscellaneous feedstocks (106 million). 
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and, therefore, contribute no additional fossil-derived GHG emissions. Furthermore, as 
other transport modes become more efficient and decarbonized, this will also help to 
drive down the lifecycle emissions associated with biomass and biofuels production and 
distribution. We have considered this in our modeling, and it is one reason why the value 
we assume for average US biofuels (12.3 gCO2e/MJ, excluding indirect LUC impacts) is 
fairly optimistic. 
 
To be sure, lifecycle carbon intensities of future advanced biofuels are still uncertain 
(Farrell et al., 2006; Pimentel and Patzek, 2008). One key reason for this uncertainty is 
due to potential direct and indirect land use changes associated with biofuels production, 
the impacts of which are not yet fully known (Sperling and Yeh, 2009). Searchinger et al. 
(2008) have estimated, for instance, that these land use impacts could be as much as an 
additional 111 gCO2e/MJ for a specific class of cellulosic biofuels derived from 
dedicated energy crops grown in the US. Carbon intensities of this large a magnitude 
would far exceed the lifecycle carbon intensity of gasoline (92 gCO2e/MJ) (Wang, 2007), 
thus contributing no GHG reduction benefits whatsoever. However, in this study, since 
only one-third of the available biomass resources we have assumed are energy crops, the 
indirect LUC impacts would probably be, on average, far lower than these extreme 
estimates. Two-thirds of the resources we assume are from waste biomass and would, 
therefore, have no indirect LUC effects at all. Nonetheless, even a small increase in 
average biofuel lifecycle carbon intensity due to LUC (e.g., +15 gCO2e/MJ) would 
double the carbon intensity assumed in this study, eliminating much of the GHG 
reduction potential in the scenarios. In sum, if supplies of low-GHG biofuels are 
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significantly constrained for the reasons mentioned here, then a multi-strategy future with 
considerable penetration of electric-drive vehicles and decarbonized energy carriers (i.e., 
H2 and electricity) may be the only real option for making emission reductions across all 
of transport. In this case, deep transport-wide reductions on the order of 80% may be 
unachievable, though less stringent targets may still be attainable. 
 
Figure 2 compares fuel consumption and primary resource requirements in the three deep 
emission reduction scenarios. By aggressively improving vehicle efficiencies across all 
subsectors, large annual fuel savings can be achieved: 160-185 billion gge in 2050 
relative to the Reference scenario, or the energy equivalent of 8.7-10 million barrels of oil 
per day (mbpd). Oil savings are greater in the Electric-drive 50in50 and Multi-Strategy 
80in50 scenarios, owing to the penetration of higher efficiency electric-drive vehicles. 
The demand for fossil-based liquid fuels in the three scenarios is low enough to be 
supplied completely by projected domestic US oil production in 2050, either from 
conventional or unconventional sources. 
 
The results for primary resource requirements are similar to fuel consumption. Resource 
requirements in Electric-drive 50in50 are the lowest of all due to higher end-use vehicle 
efficiencies. In addition, the diversity of primary resource types is much greater in 
Electric-drive 50in50 and Multi-Strategy 80in50 because the use of decarbonized energy 
carriers such as electricity and hydrogen provides significant resource flexibility and 
diversification. The exact resource mixes that are chosen for producing these energy 
carriers will ultimately be determined by policy, economics, and resource constraints, 
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factors that will affect, and also be constrained by, the resulting carbon intensity of the 
energy carrier.  Note that in contrast to the other two scenarios, Efficient Biofuels 50in50 
is heavily reliant on just two primary energy resources, petroleum and biomass.   
 
While a multi-strategy portfolio approach may be preferred, there are inherent challenges 
to developing multiple, parallel supply infrastructures for different fuels, as economies of 
scale and natural monopolies tend to exist. A vast refining and distribution infrastructure 
for petroleum already exists, and some of this can likely be used for future biofuels 
distribution. The electricity transmission and distribution system is also vast, though it 
would need to be expanded and upgraded for widespread use of electricity as a vehicle 
fuel. Infrastructure for the production, distribution and refueling of hydrogen fuel would 
likely require the most significant investment and large-scale change.  
 
The EIA’s business-as-usual projections for future domestic US energy production in 
2030 are sufficient to meet the primary resource demands of the 50in50 and 80in50 
scenarios (EIA, 2008a).11 For biomass and renewable electricity generation, the scenario 
resource demands are well below the untapped supply potential using domestic resources 
(NREL, 2004; Perlack et al., 2005). Note that the total transportation-related electricity 
consumption estimates shown for each scenario in Figure 2 include electricity used for 
vehicle recharging and for hydrogen production and distribution. CO2 capture from 
hydrogen and electricity production in the scenarios would necessitate storage 
requirements of at most 430 MMTCO2 per year, well below the roughly 3,600,000 – 
                                                 
11
 EIA’s projections for domestic energy production in 2030 include: crude oil (12,699 PJ), natural gas 
(21,099 PJ), coal (30,202 PJ), biomass (8,570 PJ), total electric generation (17,599 PJ), nuclear power 
(10,093 PJ), and renewable power (1,991 PJ). 
12,900,000 MMTCO2 of storage capacity that is potentially available in US oil and gas 
reservoirs, unmineable coal seams, and deep saline formations 
 
Figure 2  Transportation Fuel Use and Primary Resource Consumption in 2050 by S
(Domestic Emissions)
* Note:  “Total Electricity” bar in the Primary 
electricity used for transportation purposes in the given scenario. Because electricity is not a primary 
resource, the bar is superimposed on top of the primary resource bars.
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emissions in this scenario by increasing biofuels utilization would require an additional 
28 billion gge (+34%) for a total of 110 billion gge of biofuels (or 1.8 billion BDT of 
biomass, including H2 production). In light of the surging growth of international 
passenger and goods movement and constraints on biomass resources, it appears it will be 
a more significant challenge to reduce Overall US transport sector emissions by as much 
as 80%. Considering the substantial efficiency improvements already assumed for air and 
marine transport, either a greater quantity of biofuels (perhaps from non-US sources) will 
be required, especially for aviation, or travel intensity in the international aviation and 
marine subsectors must be kept to levels not much higher than today’s. 
 
I.4 Policy Implications of Scenario Analysis 
The US currently has no laws specifically designed to cut GHG emissions, but 
momentum is growing at both the national and state levels (Litz, 2008; Lutsey and 
Sperling, 2008; Pew, 2009). In fact, several climate change bills have been proposed in 
the US Congress over the past several years to set up a domestic cap-and-trade program 
with a declining cap on annual GHG emissions that would ultimately lead to economy-
wide reductions in the range of 50-80% by 2050 (WRI, 2008).12  
 
As discussed previously, a combination of transportation sector-specific policies and 
broad, economy-wide policies will be needed to help tackle emissions from the 
transportation sector.  And within the broad category of transportation policies, there are 
                                                 
12
 An 80% reduction in annual U.S. GHG emissions (from all sources) below 1990 levels is equivalent to 
an 83% reduction below 2005. Annual GHGs in 1990 were 14% lower than in 2005 [EPA, 2008b. 
Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2006. Environmental Protection Agency, 
Washington, DC.]. 
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a many types of policies that can be used to address the three main “levers” – reducing 
travel demand, improving vehicle efficiency and reducing fuel carbon intensity.  Some 
examples of these policies are fuel economy (MJ/mi), fuel carbon intensity (gCO2e/MJ), 
and GHG emissions (gCO2e/mi) standards; feebates and/or subsidies for vehicle purchase 
based upon fuel economy or GHG intensity; fuel and technology mandates; and 
government investment in technology R&D, fuel infrastructure. Related to addressing 
these T, E and C factors, there is also the need to target emissions in each of the 
transportation subsectors.  Based upon this framework, gaps in current US climate, 
energy and transportation policy can be identified where policy fails to address specific 
mitigation levers in a given transport subsector. By addressing and filling these gaps, the 
goal of making deep reductions in US transport GHG emissions will become easier to 
meet.  
 
First, a large portion of transport emissions, namely the non-LDV subsectors, are not 
covered by any federal or state policies, and this gap in policy is accompanied by a gap in 
the policy literature related to the best policy tools needed to motivate these reductions 
within the specific context (i.e., industry and market structure) of a transportation 
subsector, whether through broad market mechanisms or more targeted policies.  Second, 
while the literature is relatively robust on the technological options available for 
achieving emissions reductions by pulling the energy intensity (E) and carbon intensity 
(C) levers (many of which have been mentioned in this chapter), far less research has 
addressed transport intensity (T) as a strategy for achieving GHG reductions, especially 
with respect to the non-LDV subsectors.   
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I.4.1 Vehicle Efficiency  
The new CAFE standards will help reduce LDV GHG emissions in an important way, but 
the Reference scenario shows that in the absence of future increases in CAFE, LDV fuel 
use and GHGs will both continue to increase dramatically. Two Silver Bullet efficiency 
scenarios were developed that show the benefits of further energy intensity reductions 
beyond the most recent CAFE standards. Yet, improved efficiency alone is not enough to 
achieve significant GHG emission reductions from 1990 – the scenarios achieve an 
average LDV on-road fleet fuel economy of 51 and 61 mpgge, respectively, with other 
subsectors increasing their average efficiency a comparable amount by 2050. As a result, 
the fuel economies that LDVs need to achieve in the 50in50 and 80in50 scenarios are 
even higher. Figure 3 compares the scenario fuel economies to current and proposed fuel 
economy standards in the US, California, and several other countries. The trajectory of 
fuel economy improvement over the next several decades would clearly be steep; 
however, one should keep in mind the step changes in efficiency improvements that 
HEVs, BEVs, PHEVs, and FCVs make possible. 
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Figure 3  Fuel Economy Standards for New LDVs by Country/Region Compared to Average Fuel 
Economies of New LDVs in 50in50 and 80in50 Scenarios  
(Figure obtained from ICCT (2008) and modified. Reproduced with permission) 
 
This analysis shows that any serious policy portfolio to reduce transport GHGs must deal 
with the policy gaps in other subsectors, particularly those growing the most rapidly—
heavy-duty trucks, large marine vessels, and aviation. Higher efficiency vehicles in other 
subsectors, such as those in the 50in50 and 80in50 scenarios, are necessary for deep 
emission reductions since LDVs cannot, by themselves, reduce total transport GHGs 50-
80%. There have never been efficiency standards for the non-LDV transport modes, 
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thereby leading to the historical underinvestment in more efficient technologies.13 The 
long lifetimes of these types of vehicles (compared to LDVs) require that policies setting 
minimum efficiency standards be enacted soon so that fleets can incorporate these 
technologies by 2050. Importantly, US action in this area can have global consequences 
for future aircraft and shipping technologies since it accounts for such a large share of 
combined global demand and because there are only a few major aircraft and ship 
manufacturers in the world.  
 
I.4.2 Fuels Policy 
The 50in50 and 80in50 scenarios all have very significant reductions in average fuel 
carbon intensity relative to 1990 (41-47% for the 50in50 scenarios and 76% for the 
80in50 scenario), highlighting the importance of reducing carbon intensity in meeting the 
targets. Because there are no options for significantly reducing carbon intensity from 
petroleum fuels, reducing fuel carbon intensity requires switching to alternative fuels.  
The US does not have any federal policies expressly designed to reduce fuel carbon 
intensities, though the biofuels mandates in the existing federal RFS contain some 
language addressing this issue.  A more robust and durable option which is currently 
under discussion at the federal level may be a low carbon fuel standard (LCFS), because 
it specifies GHG performance rather than mandating a specific type of fuel. Some have 
argued that a LCFS is a more direct and effective policy than a RFS (i.e., fuel mandate) 
for spurring innovation and reducing consumer and industry risk and uncertainty 
(Sperling and Yeh, 2009). A LCFS and vehicle mandate program could also be extended 
                                                 
13
 The principal-agent problem is one reason for this underinvestment, which is a market failure that 
distorts incentives for investing in efficiency (IEA, 2007. Mind the Gap -- Quantifying Principal-Agent 
Problems in Energy Efficiency. International Energy Agency.. 
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to subsectors other than just LDVs in order to address the gap in regulation of other 
transportation subsectors and spur the development and use of alternatively-fueled 
planes, ships, heavy trucks, etc. In the absence of such policies, achieving the fuel mixes 
and carbon intensity values postulated in the 50in50 and 80in50 scenarios would be 
challenging.  
 
This analysis lends further support to the notion that vehicle efficiency standards, travel 
demand management strategies, and fuels policy are complementary. Higher vehicle 
efficiencies and reduced travel demand growth in all subsectors decrease total fuel 
requirements and improve the effectiveness of resource-constrained fuels, such as 
biofuels, by allowing them to replace a greater share of total US transportation fuel 
demand. If biofuels are to make a meaningful contribution to deep emission reductions, 
then the constrained US biomass resource base must be extended as far as technically 
possible. Of course, it is still unclear as to how much biomass will ultimately be available 
for biofuels production, given competing demands for other end-uses (e.g., electricity 
production), the “food vs. fuel” conflict, water consumption issues, and land use change 
concerns. In this scenario analysis, we take these important concerns into account and 
assume that they are adequately addressed when supplying biofuels by limiting 
production to sources which can be “sustainably” supplied—e.g., agricultural and forest 
residues, municipal solid wastes, and energy crops requiring minimal irrigation water 
(Perlack et al., 2005). Ultimately, robust policies will be needed to incentivize the 
production of sustainable biofuels.  Low carbon fuel standards appear to be the most 
direct and effective policy strategy for doing this (Sperling and Yeh, 2009).  
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The options for alternative fuels and advanced drivetrain technologies are more limited in 
certain subsectors than others, as technical challenges with the use of electricity and 
hydrogen, such as energy storage density, fast refueling times, and cost, become much 
more important (IEA, 2008; IPCC, 2007; Yang et al., 2008). As the Multi-Strategy 
80in50 scenario illustrates, using electric-drive technologies with hydrogen and 
electricity for LDVs, railroads, and buses, enables the use of limited biofuel resources in 
the other subsectors (i.e., aviation, marine and heavy-duty trucks). Policies may be 
needed to incentivize this arrangement.  
 
Moreover, for many vehicle applications, ethanol is not an ideal fuel, and the biofuels 
that are likely to be used in these other subsectors will more closely resemble diesel and 
jet fuel than gasoline. However, most of the recent activity in biofuels has focused on the 
biochemical production pathway (i.e., hydrolysis followed by fermentation), even though 
thermochemical conversion is better suited to the production of bio-derived gasoline, 
diesel, and jet fuels. Given known constraints on biomass resources and the potential 
longer-term needs for biofuels, both pathways should be pursued and supported. Thermo-
chemical production also offers greater output flexibility and is more amenable to low-
carbon electricity generation.  
 
Finally, there is some evidence that the full emissions benefits of low-carbon biofuels 
would not be realized if they are used in aviation due to the effects of non-CO2 gases and 
particles released in the upper atmosphere, as discussed previously. For example, in the 
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Multi-Strategy 80in50 scenario including an uplift factor of 1.5 or higher on non-CO2 
aviation emissions (from Marbaix et al. (2008)) would more than double the effective 
emissions from that subsector and eliminate much of its reduction potential. Similar 
considerations exist even for hydrogen aircraft fuel used in a combustion engine, as 
increased emissions of H2O and NOx at cruising altitude (compared to conventional jet 
fuel) would negate a portion of hydrogen’s carbon mitigation potential. 
 
I.4.3 Implications of Uncertainty 
Any attempt at forecasting future demands and technologies will, invariably, get many 
things wrong (Craig et al., 2002).  There are many uncertainties in all of the assumptions 
within this study, about the potential and readiness of specific technology and behavioral 
options. We attempt to address some specific questions about uncertainty with respect to 
policy and technology development in areas that many readers may be aware of.  
However, given the wide range of assumptions, it is difficult to discuss all of the 
important uncertainties in every area or make a comparison of the relative uncertainties 
that underlie our assumptions.  
 
Developing durable and robust policy for the 2050 time horizon is challenging because 
the process must rely on a host of uncertainties. The major uncertainties associated with 
the Efficient Biofuels 50in50 scenario center on the future availability of low-carbon 
biofuels (including key questions of total availability, their true lifecycle carbon intensity, 
and land-use and water impacts). In Electric-drive 50in50, the uncertainty centers around 
the future potential of FCVs, PHEVs, and EVs to penetrate different subsectors 
(including questions of cost and the adequacy of energy storage and driving range) and 
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the production of low-carbon hydrogen and electricity on a massive scale (including the 
technical and economic feasibility of CCS and reliable renewable electricity, as well as of 
their social acceptance).  A durable, robust policy will avoid picking winners while these 
uncertainties become resolved over time, while recognizing that some strategies are more 
uncertain than others and will therefore take longer to resolve.   
 
Because predicting the course of technology in the future is impossible and there is a 
poor history of picking technology “winners” from among a suite of possible contenders, 
this analysis has attempted to look at several possible scenarios involving different types 
of advanced vehicle technologies and fuels.  Putting a cost on carbon and GHGs and 
implementing other policies will enable the market to decide which options will 
ultimately prevail and provide significant levels of mobility while reducing emissions.  
That said, one can still say a few words about the current status of technologies and their 
potential in the future.  Despite much recent progress in batteries and hydrogen fuel cells 
(namely costs, storage densities, and/or conversion efficiencies), BEVs and FCVs still 
remain longer-term and more uncertain options than using HEVs, PHEVs, and biofuels 
(at least at relatively low volumes) (IEA, 2008). While some consumer BEVs already 
exist, they still suffer from a combination of technical (battery storage, limited range) and 
economic (battery cost) challenges, both of which will take time to resolve before the 
BEV can truly be a mass-market vehicle. For FCVs, the major challenges center on 
vehicle costs and the rollout of the requisite hydrogen production, distribution, and 
refueling infrastructure. Low-carbon biofuels, HEVs, and PHEVs do not appear to face 
the same degree of challenges, though even in the nearer-term, options such as biofuels 
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and PHEVs still require considerable technological development.  In both cases, costs 
must be reduced, and with biofuels it is not entirely clear what their lifecycle carbon 
footprint will ultimately be when produced on a massive scale, considering direct and 
indirect LUC impacts, as discussed in Section I.3.4.  Progress has also been made in CCS 
technology and geologic reservoir characterization in recent years; and researchers in a 
number of countries hope to resolve some of the remaining uncertainties in the next few 
years by constructing demonstration power plants that will capture and sequester CO2. 
Nevertheless, the future viability of CCS is still unknown and is not yet at the stage 
where it can be relied upon (MIT, 2007); though, this is true of advanced vehicle 
technologies like BEVs and FCVs as well. The potential of renewable electricity is 
arguably more certain than CCS, but questions surrounding its reliability, intermittency, 
and cost will likely remain for some time (IEA, 2008).  Widespread use of renewable 
electricity may require substantial investment in energy storage systems or upgrading 
electrical transmission and distribution systems, as well as “smart grids”, yet another 
source of uncertainty (Chupka et al., 2008).  
 
In this scenario study, the efficiency of different vehicle technologies, the emissions 
associated with different fuel production methods, and the efficacy of travel demand 
reduction strategies are all specified as input assumptions. However, real policies 
designed to bring about these technologies, fuels, and demand reductions must deal with 
uncertainty and risk in their actual implementation and impact. Reliance on one strategy, 
such as biofuels, leaves the ultimate level of GHG reduction susceptible to future 
uncertainties in, for example, the resource availability of biofuels, indirect LUC, and the 
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evolution of fuel production technologies. The diversification of GHG mitigation 
strategies (i.e., developing a portfolio of mitigation options) that is seen in the various 
50in50 and 80in50 scenarios, which involves travel demand reductions, vehicle 
efficiency improvements, advanced vehicle technologies, alternative fuels, and reductions 
in fuel carbon intensity, not only makes it easier to achieve the deep emissions reduction 
goals, but also helps mitigate the reliance (and therefore sensitivity) of the overall 
reductions to any one technology or option. 
 
I.4.4 Other Policy Implications 
This analysis is based upon an extensive review of the literature to assess the potential for 
GHG emissions reductions in each of the transportation subsectors, which then provides 
the basis for the many input assumptions into the LEVERS model. As with any model, 
these assumptions are still in need of further refinement as more and better information 
about these options becomes available, especially in key areas where fewer analyses have 
been undertaken or where greater uncertainties have yet to be resolved. For instance, 
there are many sources of information about mitigation options for the LDV subsector; 
however, the literature is not nearly as extensive for the other subsectors.  This makes it 
challenging to fully understand these sectors’ potential for adopting alternative 
drivetrains, alternative fuels, and especially options for transportation demand 
management.  In addition to technical analysis, more analysis is needed on the policy side 
to better understand these other subsectors, their current and future structure and the 
appropriate incentives that are needed to bring about emissions reductions.   
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Moreover, the findings of this study provide further analytical support, particularly in the 
US context, to a notion that has been advanced by others: behavioral and structural 
changes must complement technological change if deep reductions in transportation GHG 
emissions are to be achieved (Gallagher et al., 2007; IEA, 2008; Mui et al., 2007; 
Samaras et al., 2009; Sperling and Gordon, 2008). While most policies being discussed 
address fuel carbon intensity (C) and vehicle energy intensity (E), strong policy is needed 
to pull the transport intensity (T) lever as well. Without addressing T in the 50in50 and 
80in50 scenarios, it would be considerably more difficult, if not impossible, to make such 
deep reductions in GHGs by 2050. Because the built environment has a decades-long 
lifetime, land-use plans and infrastructure development that are implemented today will 
impact GHG emissions in 2050.  
 
There are currently no federal policies specifically designed to reduce GHG emissions by 
addressing growth in travel demand, and certainly none to limit population (P). However, 
over the past several decades, many US states and firms have implemented a variety of 
travel demand management (TDM) policies and strategies in an attempt to slow the 
growth in LDV VMT and thereby reduce the impacts of transportation externalities such 
as air pollution, congestion, and noise (Berman and Radow, 1997; DOT, 2004; Saleh and 
Sammer, 2009).  These and other proposed actions include road, cordon, and parking 
pricing; fuel taxes; pay-as-you-go insurance; high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes; 
ridesharing; employee incentives for telecommuting and transit; and traveler information 
systems. For a variety of political and institutional reasons, these actions have generally 
failed, thus far, to significantly slow the rapid growth in total national VMT. Though, 
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success has been achieved in certain locales, and studies indicate the potential for TDM 
strategies to reduce future fuel use and GHG emissions could actually be quite substantial 
(Cowart, 2008a; Deakin et al., 1996; Rodier, 2009; Safirova et al., 2007; UKERC, 2009). 
Still, addressing transport intensity as a key driver for reducing emissions remains 
inherently complicated. A potentially unique way forward is the linking of regional land-
use planning to GHG reduction targets, as California’s landmark anti-sprawl legislation 
(SB 375) is the first to do. Moreover, continued thought should be given to the 
implementation of TDM measures in the other transport subsectors where consumer 
choice can be influenced, namely commercial aviation. In the case of freight transport 
(trucking, rail, aviation, and marine), TDM measures may not be the most appropriate 
method for controlling emissions, as shippers are very sensitive to costs (in addition to 
factors such as timing and reliability) and may respond sufficiently to carbon prices.   
 
I.5 Conclusions 
This study explores several scenarios which achieve 50-80% reductions in US 
transportation sector carbon emissions below 1990 levels by 2050 through incorporation 
of significant technological and behavioral changes. A Kaya framework that decomposes 
GHG emissions into the product of four major drivers—population (P), transport 
intensity (T), energy intensity (E), and carbon intensity (C) – is integrated in our scenario 
analysis model, LEVERS, to analyze mitigation options and emissions. In addition, our 
LEVERS framework includes all major transport subsectors—light duty vehicles, buses, 
heavy-duty trucks, rail, aviation, marine, agriculture, off-road, and construction. While 
the values for reduction potential from various options in each of the subsectors come 
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from an extensive review of the literature, these inputs, as with any model inputs, are 
always in need of further refinement. Fortunately, within our simple modeling 
framework, the assumptions can be easily improved as more information about, and a 
better understanding of, these options becomes available.  
 
The unique contributions of this study are three-fold. First, the treatment of the 
transportation sector is broader and more detailed here than in many other scenario and 
economic studies that have just concentrated on light-duty vehicles.  Second, this study 
utilizes a relatively simple, easily adaptable modeling approach, which can incorporate 
insights from other modeling studies and organize them in a way that is easy for 
policymakers to understand.  In fact, the model is being used by other researchers and 
analysts in the development and analysis of transportation, energy, and climate policy.  
Thirdly, this analysis develops multiple distinct scenarios to understand the interplay 
between the adoption of specific mitigation options in different transport subsectors and 
the level of GHG reduction.  We believe there is value in approaching the problem in 
these ways, as opposed to the more “black box” approach of complex energy-systems 
models, although the latter offers numerous advantages as well. 
 
The scenarios presented in the chapter illustrate the enormous challenges associated with 
making deep GHG reductions in the transportation sector.  While the scenarios represent 
only a small subset of all potential futures that could potentially meet the 80% reduction 
target, they provide value by showing the diversity of approaches that might be pursued. 
These scenarios, first and foremost, are meant to convey the scale and scope of the 
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changes required to meet this aggressive target and to motivate the aggressive action (i.e., 
policy and technological development) that will be required in all transport subsectors 
and on all fronts (vehicles, fuels, and travel demand management). In addition, 
consumers, firms, and society will need to be provided with the appropriate incentives to 
value the long-term goal of climate change mitigation so that they purchase low-carbon 
vehicles and fuels and consume the appropriate amount of transportation services.   
 
The Silver Bullet scenarios confirm results from other studies, showing that no one 
mitigation option can singlehandedly meet the ambitious GHG goals, especially since 
total travel demand (P x T) in each subsector is expected to increase significantly by 
2050. This puts a large burden on vehicle and fuel technologies (E x C) to decarbonize, 
and by our estimates it is unreasonable to think a single technology approach can 
shoulder this burden entirely on its own, given the diversity of vehicle types and 
requirements in the transportation sector.  
 
When multiple technological strategies are combined together in a portfolio approach, 
however – assuming the wide array of technical, economic, social, and policy challenges 
can be overcome – the potential for emission reductions could be great, as the 50in50 and 
80in50 scenarios highlight. This mixed strategy approach would include (1) restraining 
the growth in travel demand with strong transport and land use planning policies, and (2) 
targeting advanced technologies and fuels to the subsectors where they are most feasible. 
Because multiple options are employed, the portfolio approach reduces the required level 
of vehicle and fuel technology development and usage for any given mitigation strategy. 
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A portfolio approach also helps to reduce the sensitivity of GHG emissions to any one 
technology, resource, or behavioral change and the associated risks if the strategy does 
not succeed.  
 
Though this analysis focuses mainly on Domestic emissions, the results of all of the 
scenarios show that meeting a 50-80% reduction in Overall emissions is more 
challenging. The main issue stems from the greater importance of the aviation and marine 
subsectors in international travel and the inherent challenge of decarbonizing these two 
subsectors. 
 
Constraints on primary resources and the penetration of new technologies into the market 
could put limits on how deep emissions might be reduced. In particular, biofuel 
production is limited by the total amount of biomass resources available in the US and 
globally. The use of electric-drive vehicles will not likely be limited by resource 
constraints, but challenges will arise from the timing of technology development and cost 
reductions in light of the slow turnover of vehicle fleets, as well as from the limited 
applicability of electricity and hydrogen outside of on-road, rail, and perhaps some 
marine applications. Deep emission reductions are also particularly sensitive to fuel 
carbon intensities. This depends on the land use impacts (direct and indirect) of expanded 
biomass production and the potential of CCS to decarbonize fossil-based electricity and 
hydrogen production, neither of which is fully understood at this time. 
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The extent to which the transport sector will ultimately need to reduce its emissions is not 
certain since deep reductions are not yet law and reductions will likely not be equal 
across all sectors of the economy. But as one of the largest current contributors to total 
US GHG emissions, transportation must play a major role (IEA, 2008; Yeh et al., 2008). 
If the US is to have a low-carbon transportation sector by 2050, it will need to expand its 
policy toolkit in order to adequately address emissions from all subsectors. A diverse, 
portfolio approach for mitigating GHG emissions necessitates continued research and 
policy support for improving vehicle and fuel technologies and reducing transport 
intensity. While the potential carbon impacts of the various technology options are 
relatively well understood, the impacts of the behavioral options are less so, especially in 
the non-LDV transport subsectors (UKERC, 2009). Behavioral and structural changes, 
and policies promoting them, are critically important to alleviate dependence on future 
technology developments and also to reduce other non-GHG-related problems related to 
unchecked growth in travel demand, including traffic congestion and fatalities. 
 
Comparison of our results and conclusions to those of other recent scenario studies is 
made difficult by the fact that no other studies have analyzed the issue of long-term 
transport sector GHG reductions in quite the same way.  Either the studies have taken a 
much more limited view of the transport sector, choosing to focus only on LDVs (e.g., 
(Bandivadekar et al., 2008; Grimes-Casey et al., 2009; Mui et al., 2007; NRC, 2008; Yeh 
et al., 2008)), or the focus has not been on the US specifically (e.g., (IEA, 2008; 
WBCSD, 2004)).  Nevertheless, the central conclusion of this analysis is consistent with 
these other studies:  a multi-strategy, portfolio approach is needed in order to make deep 
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reductions in transport GHG emissions, given physical constraints on resources and 
technological constraints on the types of fuels and vehicles that can be applied in certain 
subsectors.  Another important conclusion, which is consistent with IEA (2008), is that 
achieving deep reductions will require the decarbonization of the non-LDV subsectors, as 
emissions from these subsectors are projected to account for greater than half of all US 
transport emissions by 2050. 
 
There are a number of limitations to the scenario approach employed in this study, and 
certain caveats apply to the results presented here.  First, the analysis is based on 
hundreds of input assumptions which have been developed from dozens of published 
studies.  While we have tried to be as judicious as possible in selecting assumptions that 
are the most reasonable, the reader will undoubtedly disagree with some of our choices 
and, potentially, our results and conclusions.  For this reason and in an attempt to be 
transparent, we include all of our input assumptions in an appendix that can be found in 
the online supplementary material to the original Energy Policy paper, on which this 
chapter is based.  Another limitation of this study is that it focuses on only one sector of 
the economy, transport, and does not attempt to model GHG mitigation potential in other 
sectors.  In order to account for the transport sector’s spillover effects in other sectors, we 
use lifecycle GHG emissions rather than end-use emissions in our calculations.  Since 
lifecycle emissions are quite sensitive to modeler assumptions, we have based our LCA 
estimates on the widely used and relatively transparent GREET model.  Moreover, in 
attempting to represent various 2050 snapshots of the US transport sector, we do not 
explicitly model economics and dynamics in our analysis; though, it should be noted that 
58 
 
 
 
all of our input assumptions are informed by studies that do consider these important 
elements.   
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RESEARCH STREAM #2 
II. Modeling optimal transition pathways to a low-carbon economy 
in California: Impacts of advanced vehicles and fuels on the 
energy system (CA-TIMES) 
 
David McCollum, Sonia Yeh, Chris Yang, Joan Ogden 
Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Davis 
 
Abstract: 
Climate change could have a large impact on California’s economy, natural and managed 
ecosystems, and human health and mortality; and because of this, the state has taken a 
leading role in regulating greenhouse gas emissions.  Yet, while California has taken 
major steps defining technology pathways and designing complementary policies and 
regulations to meet its 2020 target of bringing total emissions back down to the 1990 
level, the steps needed to achieve the state’s long-term, aspirational goal (80 percent 
below the 1990 level by 2050) have not been clearly defined, and the technology and 
policy options are not well understood.  In an effort to better inform the policy process, I 
have worked with colleagues to develop a new simulation tool for modeling California’s 
future energy system and for generating and analyzing scenarios for meeting the state’s 
long-term (2020-2050) GHG emission reduction goals.  In this capacity, the work offers 
the unique capability to perform scenario analyses, evaluate policy, and present 
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technological portraits for the specific conditions that exist within the state.  This 
dissertation chapter provides a detailed description of the modeling tool, which has been 
named CA-TIMES and is the first bottom-up, technologically-rich, integrated energy-
engineering-environmental-economic systems model of its kind for California.  The 
model has been developed within the TIMES framework (The Integrated MARKAL-
EFOM System), and it covers all sectors of the California energy economy, including 
primary energy resource extraction, imports/exports, electricity production, fuel 
conversion, and the residential, commercial, industrial, transportation, and agricultural 
end-use sectors.  Using the model, I analyze the structure and operation of the future 
California energy system under various future energy demand scenarios, technology 
assumptions and carbon policies and evaluate the impacts of these various scenarios in 
terms of investments in technologies, technology and infrastructure adoption, fuel use 
and resource demands, electricity generation mix, and environmental impacts, namely 
GHG emissions.  The scenario analyses and model runs focus on the evolution of the 
transportation, fuel supply, and electric generation sectors, specifically the use of 
advanced technologies and alternative fuels in response to various energy and climate 
policies.  In sum, achieving deep reductions in California greenhouse gas emissions is 
technically feasible in the long term at reasonable cost (total cumulative policy costs of 
<2.7% of Gross State Product, considering only the transportation, electricity, and fuel 
conversion sectors).  Actually, the net cost to society could be even lower, when one 
considers avoided costs (such as for climate change adaptation) and other co-benefits 
(such as air pollution and energy security).  The current analysis does not capture these 
other benefits (i.e., negative costs).  To be sure, the deep reductions envisaged in this 
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analysis are dependent on the full availability of a low-carbon technology portfolio.  If 
the potential of certain key resources and technologies (e.g., biomass, nuclear power, 
CCS, or electricity and hydrogen as transportation fuels) is significantly limited, then it 
could become extremely difficult, as well as more costly, to reach an 80% reduction 
target by 2050. 
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II.1 California Energy Use and GHG Emissions in the Base-Year 2005 
In developing future energy scenarios for California, it is first necessary to take a 
historical perspective of energy use and greenhouse gas emissions in the state.  The 
overview provided in this section paints a picture of California’s energy landscape as it 
existed in 2005, which is used as the base-year throughout this study, since a considerable 
amount of data exists for 2005 and also because it is in the not-too-distant past. 
 
II.1.1 End-Use Energy Demand in the Transportation, Industrial, Commercial, 
Residential, and Agricultural Sectors 
California’s energy system is largely reliant on fossil fuels, though a significant amount 
of energy is also sourced from nuclear, hydro, biomass, and various other types of 
renewable and non-renewable fuels.  Much of this energy is either produced and/or 
converted to a finished fuel product within the state, in order to meet the ever-increasing 
demands of the five end-use sectors:  Transportation, Industrial, Commercial, Residential, 
and Agricultural.  Figure 4 depicts final energy consumption for each of these sectors in 
2005.  All values shown here and throughout this chapter reflect the use of higher heating 
values (HHV) when converting from native units (e.g., kg, scf, lbs) to energy units (e.g., 
PJ, MJ).  In fact, all energy flows in CA-TIMES are estimated on a HHV basis. 
 
It is important to note that according to the definition of final (i.e., end-use) energy 
consumption that is applied here, the numbers shown in the following figures do not 
include conversion of primary energy resources (e.g., crude oil, natural gas, coal, etc.) to 
final energy carriers (e.g., electricity, gasoline, diesel, etc.) at oil refineries, electric power 
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plants, and other types of fuel conversion facilities.  If primary energy consumption were 
allocated to each of the end-use sectors in fair proportions, the energy shares shown here 
would look quite a bit different indeed.  (For example, the transport share would be 
significantly smaller.)  In short, the greater the use of fuel combustion for the purposes of 
useful work (e.g., moving a vehicle) – as opposed to heat – the greater will be the end-use 
energy demand.  Since work-related fuel combustion processes (e.g., internal combustion 
engines) are inherently inefficient, total energy consumption in, say, the transport sector 
is over-emphasized compared to the other end-use sectors where electrically-powered 
consumer devices and fossil fuel heaters/cookers play dominant roles.  The major 
efficiency losses associated with, for example, electricity generation occur at the power 
plant stage – i.e., during the conversion from primary to final energy.  (While there are 
certainly efficiency losses at refineries associated with converting crude oil to gasoline, 
diesel, jet fuel, and all other refined products, these losses are small in comparison to 
power plants and internal combustion engines.)  Because these power plant efficiency 
losses are ignored, the results shown here for final energy consumption by end-use sector 
provide a different picture than one might expect if looking only at primary energy 
consumption. 
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Figure 4  Final Energy Consumption by End-Use Sector, 2005 
 
California’s commercial sector accounts for about 11% of total energy demand in the 
state.  The two most consumed fuels are, by far, electricity and natural gas (Figure 5).  
Certain other fuels, such as distillate, coal, kerosene, LPG, wood, gasoline, and 
geothermal energy, are used in far smaller quantities. 
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Figure 5  Commercial Sector Final Energy Consumption by Fuel Type, 2005 
 
The residential sector is very similar to the commercial sector in its share of total end-use 
energy demand (~15%) and in that electricity and natural gas are the two dominant fuels 
(Figure 6).  However, in this case the situation is actually reversed – natural gas is the 
principal fuel, and electricity assumes the minority role.  Moreover, solar energy, in the 
form of rooftop solar photovoltaics and passive solar water heating, comprise a non-
trivial share of residential energy supply. 
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Figure 6  Residential Sector Final Energy Consumption by Fuel Type, 2005 
 
The industrial sector accounts for about 12% of California’s total end-use energy 
demand.  When compared to some other states and countries, this is actually a relatively 
small fraction, though it should hardly be surprising given that heavy industry is not the 
basis for California’s economy.  That being said, the industries that do exist in California 
are relatively diverse; hence, the fuels consumed in the industrial sector are also quite 
diverse (Figure 7).  Natural gas and electricity continue to play the two dominant roles, 
but a number of other fuels are also used in fairly significant quantities, for instance, coal, 
gasoline, distillate, and biomass, as well as niche fuels such as asphalt and road oil and 
lubricants, which according to the CARB GHG Inventory are actually combusted for 
energy purposes in California, thereby generating GHG emissions.   
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Figure 7  Industrial Sector Final Energy Consumption by Fuel Type, 2005 
 
The smallest of California’s end-use energy sectors is agriculture.  It accounts for only 
1.6% of the state’s total energy demand, despite the fact that agriculture plays such an 
important role in California’s economy and society.  Note that although it may not be so 
clear from Figure 8, fuel consumption for agricultural vehicles is not included here, but 
rather in the transportation sector.  Yet, even if energy demands for agricultural vehicles 
were included, total energy demand for the agricultural sector would still only amount to 
2.3% of all end-use energy consumption in California. 
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Figure 8  Agricultural Sector Final Energy Consumption by Fuel Type, 2005 
(does not include energy consumption for agricultural vehicles) 
 
The largest end-use energy sector in California is transportation, which by itself 
consumes more energy than all of the other end-use sectors combined, accounting for 
roughly 60% of the state’s entire end-use energy demand (Figure 4).  The most important 
transport sector fuels are petroleum-based: gasoline, diesel (i.e., distillate), jet fuel, and 
residual fuel oil.  Natural gas, electricity, and ethanol are used as well, albeit at much 
lower levels.   
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Figure 9  Transportation Sector Final Energy Consumption by Fuel Type, 2005 
 
Like the other end-use sectors, transport is far from being a homogenous category.  It is 
comprised of a number of distinct subsectors, each of which fulfills a unique role within 
California’s energy economy.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the most used transport fuel is 
gasoline (Figure 9), and the largest subsector is light-duty vehicles (Figure 10).  Light-
duty passenger cars and trucks account for a little more than half of all transport energy 
consumption in California.  The other on-road subsectors (motorcycles, medium- and 
heavy-duty trucks, and buses) contribute an additional ~15%, while the aviation and 
marine subsectors comprise almost a quarter of all transport sector energy consumption.  
Off-road and construction devices, agricultural vehicles, and pipelines makes up the final 
~6%. 
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Figure 10  Final Energy Consumption by Transport Subsector, 2005 
 
The fuel use estimates shown in Figure 10 include all energy consumption for any 
vehicles that purchase fuel within California, regardless of the destination of the trip – 
whether it be intrastate (within the state), interstate (to another state), or international (to 
another country).  By this definition, the fuel consumption of a vehicle that starts its trip 
in another state or country and then terminates in California is not included, an issue that 
principally concerns the aviation and marine subsectors and is important because, in a 
relative sense, the vast majority of California’s aviation and marine activity crosses state 
borders.  It is also important from a policy perspective.  Following guidelines published 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the California Air Resources 
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Board (CARB) calculates, but excludes, fuel use and GHG emissions resulting from 
aviation and marine fuel purchased in California and used for interstate and international 
trips (CARB, 2009a).  Therefore, the energy and emissions estimates provided in this 
chapter will appear higher than those published by CARB in its official Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory.  In order to do a fair comparison, when using the CARB numbers, one should 
make sure to add back in the energy and emissions estimates from their so-called 
“Excluded Emissions” category.   
 
The reason I have chosen to include all transport activity, energy, and emissions in the 
estimates presented in this chapter, as well as in the CA-TIMES model itself, is quite 
simple:  my objective is to model the entire California energy system, both present and 
future, in an effort to develop deep GHG reduction scenarios that allow the state to meet 
its long-term energy and environmental goals.  While the policy process of today may not 
clearly specify which regulatory entities will eventually have jurisdiction over aviation 
and marine trips that cross state/country boundaries, it is quite likely that if a dramatic 
transformation of California’s energy system is to ultimately take place, none of the 
state’s energy sectors or subsectors can afford to be ignored.  Therefore, I have made sure 
not to ignore them in my modeling.  
 
II.1.2 Electricity Generation 
The electricity sector is similar to oil refineries, bio-refineries, and hydrogen production 
facilities, in that power plants take a primary energy feedstock (e.g., natural gas, biomass, 
uranium, wind, hydro, coal) and convert it into a finished fuel product, in this case 
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electricity, which can then be delivered and consumed within one of the five end-use 
sectors (industrial, commercial, residential, agricultural, and transportation).  For this 
reason, these conversion facilities are often said to be a part of the “secondary” energy 
sector, where the “primary” sector refers to, for example, oil and natural gas production, 
coal and uranium mining, and biomass feedstock collection. 
 
A variety of power plant types are used to produce electricity for the California market, 
the so-called “generation mix” (Figure 11).  Natural gas, which actually encompasses 
several different plant technologies (combined-cycles, steam turbines, and gas turbines), 
is used to supply almost half of all electricity that is generated within California.  The 
next largest categories are hydropower and nuclear, respectively.  Production from other 
renewable and non-renewable sources comprises the remainder of in-state generation.  
However, a large share of California’s electricity is actually supplied from outside the 
state.  In fact, if it were classified as its own generation type, imports would represent the 
single largest source of electricity supply for California.  In reality, imports are generated 
from a variety of fuel sources, and there are two different types of imports: firm and 
system.  Firm imports refer to generation from power plants located outside of California 
but owned by in-state utilities (e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison, 
San Diego Gas & Electric).  At present, these utilities operate plants that are located in 
Oregon, Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah.  System imports, on the other hand, 
refer to electricity produced by utilities in the Pacific Northwest (Oregon and 
Washington) or Desert Southwest (Arizona and New Mexico) that is only imported when 
available or needed – essentially the spot market for electricity.  Because of fluctuating 
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electricity demand and supply and annual rainfall levels (which impacts hydro 
availability), both within California and in these other states, the mix of imports changes 
from year to year.  Figure 12 shows what the import mix looked like in 2005.  Natural 
gas, hydro, and coal are the main fuel sources.  Note that, although not shown, firm 
imports accounted for ~40% of the import total in 2005, while system imports made up 
the rest.  (As discussed in a later section, Ryan McCarthy’s dissertation is the source of 
most of the historical electricity sector data shown here and input to the CA-TIMES 
model for calibration between 2005 and 2010 (McCarthy, 2009).) 
 
 
Figure 11  Electricity Generation by Plant Type, 2005 
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Figure 12  Electricity Imports by Type, 2005 
 
Continuing a previous discussion, it is interesting to note that, as required by the Global 
Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32), the energy use and emissions related to 
electricity imports are included in CARB’s official GHG Inventory (CARB, 2009a).  
Thus, in the CA-TIMES model and in the data and results presented in this chapter, I also 
follow this same convention, attributing energy and emissions from electricity imports to 
the CA-Combustion in-state category. 
 
II.1.3 Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
California greenhouse gas emissions are a by-product of fuel combustion in the 
electricity, refining, transport, industrial, commercial, residential, and agricultural sectors, 
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as well as due to a host of other non-fuel combustion activities, including, but not limited 
to, industrial processes (e.g., cement and lime production, manufacturing of electronics 
equipment), livestock enteric fermentation and manure management, forest lands, crop 
burning, solid waste disposal and wastewater treatment, to name just a few (CARB, 
2009a).  This non-fuel combustion (i.e., non-energy) category partly includes high-GWP 
(Global Warming Potential) gases, such as hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), halocarbons, and 
sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).  In addition, a small, but non-significant quantity of GHG 
emissions are annually sequestered (i.e., stored) in California’s vast forests and 
rangelands. 
 
According to the California Air Resources Board’s official GHG Inventory (CARB, 
2007a, 2010a), the state’s total emissions of greenhouse gases from all sources amounted 
to 518 million tonnes carbon dioxide-equivalent (Mt CO2-eq) in 2005, a figure that was 
up 6.7% from 486 Mt in 1990 (Figure 13).  These totals include emissions from interstate 
and international aviation and marine activity, what CARB refers to as “Excluded” 
emissions, a category that contributed 59 and 45.5 Mt CO2-eq in 1990 and 2005, 
respectively.  Also included in the official CARB statistics are non-energy GHGs, which 
contributed 35.8 and 55.4 Mt CO2-eq in 1990 and 2005, respectively.   
 
76 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13  Comparison of GHG Emissions Estimates: CARB GHG Inventory and CA-TIMES 
 
Unlike the CARB GHG Inventory, the current version of the CA-TIMES model only 
covers emissions from fuel combustion activities.  Non-energy GHGs (which accounted 
for just 11% of total emissions in 2005) are not modeled at the present time, though there 
are plans to do so at a later date by other members of our research team.  Moreover, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the model covers intrastate, interstate, and international 
aviation and marine activities.  Therefore, the emissions estimates from CA-TIMES are 
directly comparable to the sum of the “Fuel Combustion” and “Excluded” emissions 
categories from the CARB GHG Inventory.  Figure 13 clearly illustrates this 
comparability and at the same time indicates how closely the CA-TIMES model 
(comprised of hundreds of technologies – each with unique fuel inputs, efficiencies, and 
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costs – which are spread over the various primary, secondary, and end-use energy 
sectors) is able to replicate the energy system of California in the base-year 2005.  The 
statistical difference between the CA-TIMES model output and the 2005 data is less than 
0.1%.  In total, the current version of the CA-TIMES model captures 89% of all GHG 
emissions currently produced by the California energy system.  Such broad coverage 
becomes especially important when developing deep GHG reduction scenarios, since the 
emissions reductions required in the future depend in large part on the historical baseline. 
 
Given that California’s transportation sector is the single largest energy-consuming 
category in the state, as discussed previously, it is perhaps not surprising that transport is 
also the greatest emitter, comprising a little more than half of all greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2005 (Figure 14).  The second largest polluter is the electricity sector, 
followed by the combined industrial/supply sector.  The residential, commercial, and 
agricultural sectors emit relatively low quantities of GHGs since electricity makes up 
such a large share of fuel consumption in each of these sectors, and emissions from 
electric generation are accounted for in the “Electricity” category in Figure 14.  Viewed 
another way, Figure 15 allocates electric sector emissions to the various end-use sectors – 
i.e., each end-use sector is assigned an additional quantity of emissions in proportion to 
the share of electricity it consumes in total economy-wide production.  The sectors most 
affected by this allocation are residential, commercial, agricultural, and industrial.  
Because the transport sector in California only consumes a small amount of electricity at 
present (mostly for rail and certain bus applications), its emissions are essentially 
unchanged.  Note that because the transport, electricity, and supply sectors account for 
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85% of all emissions related to fuel combustion, these are the sectors that receive the 
most attention in this dissertation and are, thus, modeled with the greatest bottom-up 
technological detail in the current version of the CA-TIMES model. 
 
At this point, the reader should note a small, but important, accounting detail that 
concerns industrial and supply sector emissions.  Officially, there is no “Supply” category 
in the CARB GHG Inventory.  Within the CA-TIMES modeling framework, however, 
the supply sector covers certain industrial activities, including petroleum refining, oil and 
gas extraction and production, biomass feedstock collection and transport, coal and 
uranium mining, and delivery of finished fuel products; in future model years, bio-
refineries, hydrogen production facilities, and a few other types of conversion plants are 
included as well.  Therefore, the combined industrial/supply category in CA-TIMES is 
synonymous with the conventional meaning of the “Industrial” sector, as might be found 
in the CARB GHG Inventory or elsewhere.  Naturally, care has been taken not to double-
count energy use and emissions in the industrial and supply sectors of CA-TIMES. 
 
79 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14  CA-TIMES GHG Emissions Estimates, CA-Combustion and +Out-of-state Supply, 2005 
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Figure 15  CA-TIMES GHG Emissions Estimates, CA-Combustion +Out-of-state Supply, 2005 
(electricity emissions allocated to end-use sectors) 
 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 both show two types of emissions estimates, CA-Combustion 
and +Out-of-state Supply.  CA-Combustion emissions are fairly self-explanatory:  they 
include all emissions produced from fuel combustion activities within the boundaries of 
California’s energy system, which in this analysis is defined to also include emissions 
from interstate and international aviation and marine trips whose origin is California and 
from all power plants whose electricity is destined for the California market, even if those 
plants are located in neighboring states.  (The latter procedure is consistent with the 
CARB GHG Inventory, wherein only the “California share” of emissions from electricity 
imports is counted.)  For the base-year 2005, the CA-Combustion designation does not 
include emissions that result from transporting primary energy feedstocks (e.g., crude oil, 
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natural gas, coal, uranium, biomass) or finished fuels (e.g., refined petroleum products, 
biofuels) from outside of the state into California, nor are the upstream lifecycle (“well-
to-tank”) emissions resulting from production/conversion of these feedstocks/fuels 
outside of California considered, except for combustion emissions related to electricity 
imports.  Nevertheless, from a modeling standpoint, it would be quite useful to be able to 
calculate the full lifecycle GHG emissions (both “well-to-tank” and “tank-to-wheel”) for 
all of the fuels consumed within the California energy system, including emissions from 
the upstream supply stages that occur outside the state or even in another country (e.g., 
crude oil production in the Middle East).  For this reason, the CA-TIMES model also 
tracks the vast majority of upstream emissions related to imported energy commodities 
and assigns these out-of-state emissions to the +Out-of-state Supply emissions total.  In 
particular, the emissions are allocated to the supply sector category.  The upstream 
emission factors for each type of resource/fuel generally come from the California-
specific version of Argonne National Laboratory’s Greenhouse gases, Regulated 
Emissions and Energy Use for Transportation (GREET) Model (CARB, 2007b).  Figure 
14 and Figure 15 illustrate that total emissions including out-of-state supply are, as 
expected, slightly larger than CA-Combustion emissions in the base-year 2005.  This is 
due entirely to total supply sector emissions being about 75% greater than in the CA-
Combustion case.  In other words, a large portion of the upstream emissions that are 
generated while producing final energy carriers for end-use consumption in California 
actually occur outside of the state’s borders.  Emissions from the non-supply sectors are, 
by definition, the same in both the CA-Combustion and +Out-of-state Supply cases.  
Therefore, one should not think of the figures as showing the well-to-wheel emissions of 
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each energy sector.  This calculation would require the careful allocation of total supply 
and electric sector emissions to each of the end-use demand sectors, which incidentally 
has been done separately, as discussed below. 
 
The average lifecycle carbon intensities of several fuels commonly used in California in 
2005 are shown in Figure 16 (technically speaking, electricity is an energy carrier).  Both 
upstream (well-to-tank) and fuel combustion (tank-to-wheel) emissions are highlighted.  
The carbon intensities of the refined petroleum product fuels (gasoline, diesel, residual 
fuel oil, and jet fuel) are roughly similar, ranging from 78 to 88 gCO2-eq/MJHHV, with 
most of their emissions being attributable to the fuel combustion stage.  Natural gas is 
less carbon-intensive than these fuels; in fact, natural gas is the least carbon-intensive of 
all commonly used fossil fuels.  Interestingly, the most carbon-intensive fuel shown in 
the figure is electricity (based on California’s average grid mix), whose emissions are 
attributed entirely to the upstream stages, because electricity is not actually combusted.  
One must keep in mind, however, that electric motors tend to be more efficient energy 
conversion devices than internal combustion engines, boilers, and gas turbines 
(efficiencies can be up to four times greater).  Therefore, the true carbon intensity of 
electricity is actually quite a bit less than the other fuels shown, if one takes as the 
boundary the useful work (i.e., energy service) that is supplied by an energy conversion 
device.   
 
In comparing the fuel carbon intensities shown here to those of other studies, it is 
important to note that I estimate all carbon intensities on a higher heating value (HHV) 
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basis.  (In fact, all energy flows in CA-TIMES are estimated on a HHV basis.)  
Utilization of a HHV for a fuel’s heat content (in units of, say, MJ/gal) has the effect of 
lowering a carbon intensity estimate on a lower heating value (LHV) basis by about 7 to 
11%, depending on the particular fuel (except for electricity, of course, for which LHVs 
and HHVs are the same).  This is important because the convention adopted by the 
GREET model, the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) regulations, and most 
other lifecycle analysis studies is to use a LHV basis for estimating fuel carbon 
intensities.  Our research group has chosen to adopt a HHV basis throughout the CA-
TIMES model because it represents a more accurate treatment of energy flows (from 
primary resource supply through conversion to end-use) and because it is the approach 
adopted by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) in its National Energy 
Modeling System (NEMS) energy forecasting and scenarios model.   
 
Taking this LHV/HHV conversion issue into account, the average lifecycle carbon 
intensities calculated within the CA-TIMES framework match up quite well to what one 
would expect to see, based on other studies.  In truth, the CA-TIMES values are a little on 
the low side, if only slightly, say by about 2% to 4%.  This is due to inherent limitations 
with trying to capture every single process and emission flow related to the lifecycle 
production of a particular resource/fuel commodity.  Entire careers have been devoted to 
developing modeling tools to do just that (e.g., Argonne’s GREET and Delucchi’s LEM).  
The lifecycle analysis (LCA) model used in conjunction with CA-TIMES is simply an 
Excel-based tool that I developed (somewhat tangentially to the core model 
development), in order to post-process the results produced by CA-TIMES.  The tool 
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takes the output of a given CA-TIMES model run/scenario and allocates all of the energy 
and emission flows to the various production stages for the numerous fuel products.  
Great care is taken to apportion these flows in the correct way.  The LCA calculations 
definitely do not occur internally within the current version of the CA-TIMES model, 
which is a very important point since this limits one’s ability to impose dynamic 
constraints on carbon intensities while the model is running, something that might be 
desirable if one were to want to analyze an LCFS policy.  Future work by other members 
of the CA-TIMES research team may attempt to address this important limitation of the 
model.  In any case, various other types of energy and environmental constraints can be 
feasibly implemented within the model framework, including carbon caps, vehicle fuel 
economy standards, renewable portfolio standards, and so on (as discussed in greater 
detail in later sections). 
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Figure 16  Average Lifecycle Carbon Intensities of Common Fuels, 2005 
 
By comparison, California’s energy system is less carbon-intensive than other US states 
and other countries.  For instance, as shown in Figure 16, the CA-TIMES model 
estimates that the average carbon intensity of California’s electricity grid – taking 
transmission line losses into account – was 97.4 gCO2-eq/MJ (351 gCO2-eq/kWh) in 
2005, a value confirmed by McCarthy (2009).  This is significantly less than U.S. average 
electric generation, which achieved a carbon intensity of 170 gCO2-eq/MJ (612 gCO2-
eq/kWh) in 2005 (EIA, 2006; EPRI, 2007).  The reason for this large difference is fairly 
straightforward:  the vast majority of California’s electricity comes from relatively low-
carbon sources, such as nuclear, hydro, natural gas, and other renewables, whereas a 
significant portion of US electric generation (~50%) is derived from coal power.   
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Other similar metrics also indicate that California’s economy and energy system are less 
carbon-intensive than the rest of the country.  Table 6 presents California GHG emissions 
relative to the state population and the state’s gross domestic product (GDP/GSP) in 1990 
and 2005.  For comparison, average values for the U.S. are shown as well.  The emissions 
estimates shown here include all types of in-state GHGs (or in the case of the U.S., all 
domestic GHGs), i.e., emissions from fuel combustion, non-energy emissions, and 
forestry/rangeland sinks, etc. that occur within California, excluding interstate and 
international aviation and marine emissions.  The statistics show that the carbon intensity 
of California’s economy has decreased significantly since 1990.  In fact, California was 
less carbon-intensive in 1990 than the entire U.S. was fifteen years later in 2005. 
 
Table 6  Indicators of Economy-Wide GHG Emissions in California and the U.S. 
 California United States* 
Year 1990 2005 1990 2005 
tCO2-eq per Mill$ GDP 477 305 640 490 
$ GDP per tCO2-eq 2,097 3,281 1,563 2,040 
tCO2-eq per capita 17.4 14.0 19.9 20.1 
Data sources:  CARB (2007a), CARB (2010a), UN (2010)*  
*
 Notes: U.S. emissions estimates are taken from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) statistics, rather than from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) 
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II.2 Methodology 
The model developed in this project has been named CA-TIMES.  It is a technologically-
rich, integrated energy-engineering-environmental-economic systems model that is a 
variant of the MARKAL and TIMES family of energy models, focusing on the California 
energy system and containing California-specific data and assumptions.14  CA-TIMES is 
a unique simulation tool, in that it will represent the first publicly available model of its 
kind in the state, when it is fully developed.  Unlike other economic models that have 
previously been used for California energy and climate policy analysis15, CA-TIMES is a 
bottom-up, optimization model, which covers all sectors of the California energy 
economy, including primary energy resource extraction, imports/exports, electricity 
production, fuel conversion, and the residential, commercial, industrial, transportation, 
and agricultural end-use sectors.  Over the next several years, CA-TIMES will be used by 
UC-Davis researchers and the California Air Resources Board to generate and analyze 
scenarios for meeting California’s long-term (2020-2050) GHG emission reduction goals.  
My dissertation work begins this process by performing scenario analyses, evaluating 
policy, and presenting technological portraits for the future given the specific conditions 
that exist within the state. 
 
                                                 
14
 An alternative way of viewing MARKAL and TIMES is that they are model “shells”.  We take this shell, 
which contains hundreds of embedded equations and algorithms, and input the data for California, thereby 
creating a California-specific energy systems model.  In this sense, the modeling is data-driven, and we 
avoid wasting excessive time tinkering with the model code. 
15
 For example, the Energy 2020 model by Systematic Solutions; an electricity and natural gas sector model 
by Energy and Environmental Economics (E3); and the Environmental Revenue Dynamic Assessment 
Model (E-DRAM) by UC-Berkeley, California Department of Finance, and CARB. 
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II.2.1 Solution Framework of the CA-TIMES Model 
The MARKet ALlocation (MARKAL) model and its next-generation extension, The 
Integrated MARKAL-EFOM1 System (TIMES), are comprehensive energy-engineering-
environmental-economic (so-called “4E”) modeling frameworks used by the U.S. DOE 
National Laboratories, the U.S. DOE Energy Information Administration (EIA), the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the International Energy Agency (IEA), and 
most UNFCCC Annex I governments.  In fact, over the past 30 years, MARKAL-TIMES 
models have been utilized by more than 250 institutions in some 70 countries worldwide 
(Goldstein, 2009).  While there are at present two national-level U.S. MARKAL models 
used for government energy forecasting and analysis, there are none, quite surprisingly, 
that are specific to the state of California.  In fact, there are no publicly available bottom-
up energy-engineering-environmental-economic models that cover all sectors of the 
state’s energy system.  As California moves forward with a broad spectrum of carbon 
emissions reduction policies, there is a strong need for this kind of transparent, flexible, 
and accessible analysis tool to help inform policy decisions. 
 
MARKAL-TIMES models are partial-equilibrium models that solve iteratively in GAMS 
(General Algebraic Modeling System) via optimization of an objective function (Loulou 
et al., 2005).16  The standard solution method is linear programming (LP), though mixed-
integer and stochastic programming are also possible.  An interior point solver using 
CPLEX or XPRESS is normally chosen.  The objective of a typical model is to supply 
energy services at minimum global cost (or more accurately, at minimum loss of 
consumer and producer surplus, by reaching a supply-demand equilibrium with 
                                                 
16
 Documentation of the TIMES model framework can be found at http://www.etsap.org/documentation.asp  
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endogenous energy service demands)17 subject to a larger set of technical and policy 
constraints (Figure 17, Figure 18).18  Importantly, the technological supply curves in 
TIMES are not assumed by the modeler; rather, they are built endogenously within the 
model.  The modeler inputs a host of data and assumptions for individual technologies, 
and then TIMES implicitly constructs the supply curves internally.  These supply curves 
are not fixed in any given time period and/or across different model runs: rather, they 
shift and vary, as the model continuously makes decisions in an effort to maximize total 
consumer and producer surplus.  Demand curves, on the other hand, may be input 
exogenously by the modeler or built endogenously within the model, depending on 
whether the demand commodity in question is an energy service demand or energy 
carrier or material.  In the latter case (e.g., for a fuel such as gasoline), it is not necessary 
for the modeler to specify an exogenous demand because the demand for the commodity 
will be calculated endogenously within TIMES – i.e., TIMES chooses whether or not to 
consume the fuel/material based on whether or not it is a cost-effective to do so from a 
systems level perspective.  In the case of energy service demands (e.g., for light-duty 
vehicle-miles traveled), either the modeler exogenously specifies a demand trajectory for 
each year of the model time horizon or she specifies a demand trajectory and in addition a 
constant own-price elasticity for the demand in each year.19  In the latter case, the TIMES 
model internally constructs a demand function, using the demands and elasticities as 
                                                 
17
 Total surplus is maximized at the point where the quantities and prices of the model’s various 
commodities (energy carriers, demands, materials, and emissions) are in equilibrium, i.e., their prices and 
quantities in each time period are such that the suppliers produce exactly the quantities demanded by the 
consumers. 
18
 The basic equations of the model are commodity balances, transformation equations, input/output shares 
on process flows, activity definitions, utilization constraints, and market share constraints.  
19
 An own-price elasticity of demand is a measure of the responsiveness of the quantity demanded of a 
good or service to a change in its price.  It is typically represented as a percentage change in quantity 
demanded in response to a one percent change in price (holding constant all the other determinants of 
demand, such as income). 
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inputs.  Note that if the modeler specifies fixed demands (not demand functions), then the 
optimization problem is essentially transformed from the maximization of total consumer 
and producer surplus to the minimization of total system costs.  In this situation, the 
model becomes more of a supply model, as its ability to flexibly adjust demands is 
reduced.  Figure 19 diagrammatically illustrates the alternative supply-demand 
equilibrium in TIMES when fixed energy service demands are exogenously specified by 
the modeler.  The capability of specifying elastic demands is a special feature of 
MARKAL-TIMES models; however, not all modeling groups choose to run their models 
in “elastic mode” due to the problems that can potentially arise if reliable elasticity data is 
not able to be found for all demands of interest. 
 
 
Figure 17  Simplified Representation of the Linear Programming Optimization Problem in TIMES 
*
 Figure source:  Uwe Remme, University of Stuttgart and International Energy Agency 
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Figure 18  Supply-Demand Equilibrium in TIMES for an Endogenous Energy Carrier, Material, 
Emission, or Service Demand 
*
 Figure source:  Loulou et al. (2005) 
 
Figure 19  Supply-Demand Equilibrium in TIMES for an Exogenous Energy Service Demand 
*
 Figure source:  Loulou et al. (2005) 
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The TIMES objective function sums the discounted net present values (NPV) of capital 
costs, fixed and variable O&M, import and export costs, delivery costs, taxes and 
subsidies, salvage values, and welfare losses (resulting from reduced end-use demands), 
as well as other cost terms, for all years and regions within the model.20  Basically, the 
consumption and production of every demand, energy carrier, material, and emission 
within the model has a cost associated with it – all vehicles, fuel conversion devices, and 
power plant technologies, all primary energy resources, and so on – and the total 
discounted NPV of these costs is minimized.  In doing so, the model attempts to replicate 
the kind of rational economic behavior that, in theory, we should see exhibited by 
consumers and firms in a perfectly competitive market.  Of course, in reality many 
markets are imperfect (e.g., consumers of private transportation, oil suppliers, etc.), and 
consumers and firms often exhibit irrational behavior from purely an economic 
perspective (when considering only private costs).  It, therefore, becomes necessary to 
depart from the perfectly competitive market framework, and this is possible in TIMES 
through the introduction of taxes, subsidies, and explicit user-defined constraints (e.g., 
limits to technological growth and penetration, constraints on emissions, technological 
hurdle rates, demand elasticities, etc.). 
 
A strongpoint of MARKAL-TIMES models is that they have the capacity to represent 
technologies in considerably rich, bottom-up detail, thereby allowing for the 
characterization of energy system dynamics over a long-term, multi-period time horizon 
                                                 
20
 A global discount rate of 4% is used in the CA-TIMES model.  However, certain process have 
technology-specific discount rates (i.e., hurdle rates), which may be considerably higher. 
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(e.g., from 2005 to 2050).  A given model contains a large database with hundreds to 
thousands of technologies, and each technology is characterized by technical, financial 
and environmental parameters (e.g., efficiencies, capital and O&M costs, and emissions 
factors). These databases are written in Excel spreadsheet tables and are, thus, easily 
accessed and transferable.  Technological progress21 is accounted for in the model, and 
the future availability of new, advanced technologies is considered.  The main decision 
variables are investment choices (e.g., new capacities, extension, and retirement) based 
on annualized costs (capital, variable, fuel, O&M, and emissions prices), activities, 
energy/emission flows, storage, demand, and trade.  Shadow prices of the decision 
variables, representing the marginal system values of the constraints, are determined by 
the dual equations.  Note that in the TIMES model, demands can be decision variables as 
well, if they are specified to depend on energy prices (i.e., if they have elasticities 
associated with them). 
 
The current version of CA-TIMES can be described as a perfect foresight model with a 
single decision-maker (sometimes referred to as the “social planner”).  The model has 
perfect information over the entire model planning horizon and complete knowledge of 
the market’s parameters, both now and in the future.  In other words, the model knows in 
2010 what the total electricity demand and cost of a particular power plant will be in 
2030, 2040, and 2050; therefore, it can make the best possible investment and operating 
decisions in each year, in order to optimize costs over the entire model time horizon.  
                                                 
21
 Technological progress is captured via exogenous specification of future technology cost and 
performance assumptions, investment in new technologies, and early retirement of inefficient technologies.  
The model also has the potential to represent technological progress endogenously through learning and 
experience curves (i.e., a progress ratio approach), although the current version of the CA-TIMES model 
does not make use of this feature. 
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Alternately, a non-standard, myopic version of the TIMES model also exists, though I 
have chosen not to use it for the purposes of my dissertation.  (The myopic version may 
be used in the future by other members of the research team.)  Perfect foresight models 
are preferred for scenario development and when conducting so-called “what if” 
exercises because they allow a researcher to answer questions, such as, “What is the best 
way for society to get from where we are today to where we want to be in the future?”  
Myopic models, in contrast, are typically used for forecasting and predicting and are 
better geared to answer questions such as, “What is likely to happen in the future given 
current policies and how we think energy prices and technologies will develop over 
time?”  While the differences between these two modeling approaches may be subtle, 
they are nevertheless important. 
 
Box 1 
In layman’s terms:  How CA-TIMES makes fuel use and investment decisions 
 
This box provides a straightforward explanation of how the CA-TIMES model makes its fuel use 
and investment decisions, hundreds of thousands of which are made in parallel during a single 
model run.  Supply of light-duty car demand over the multi-period time horizon is taken as an 
example. 
 
First, the modeler specifies an exogenous trajectory of light-duty car demand (in units of vehicle-
miles traveled) over the next several decades.  These growth projections are typically taken from 
other studies or official government forecasts.  The model can choose to meet this demand in a 
number of different ways.  For instance, it can choose to invest in gasoline internal combustion 
engine (ICE) vehicles or hybrid-electric vehicles (HEV), diesel ICEs or HEVs, biofuel ICEs or 
HEVs, battery-electric vehicles (BEV), hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (FCV), or a number of other 
options.  It can also choose some combination of all these vehicle types.  The decision criterion 
for investment is the vehicle-fuel combination with the lowest total discounted net present value 
cost over its entire life (say, 15 years).  The costs considered are the annualized stream of capital 
costs, fuel costs, and variable and fixed O&M costs.  However, some of the more advanced 
vehicle technologies are quite unfamiliar to consumers; thus, there is a certain risk associated 
with them.  This manifests itself as a cost premium and is formulated in the model as assigning a 
higher hurdle rate (i.e., technology-specific discount rate) to these advanced technologies.   
 
While the investment cost of each of the vehicle technologies is exogenously specified by the 
modeler for each year of the model (typically, by using results from techno-economic studies as a 
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basis for the assumptions), the fuel costs are constantly varying, as the model solves for them 
endogenously using supply curves that it calculates internally.  These curves depend on (1) the 
cost of the technologies supplying the particular fuels (e.g., oil refineries, bio-refineries, hydrogen 
production facilities, electric generation plants), and (2) the cost of primary energy resources that 
are fed to the fuel conversion sector.  The cost trajectories of each of the electric generation and 
fuel conversion technologies are exogenously specified by the modeler for each year of the model 
(unless the endogenous technological learning function is used), and the costs and quantities of 
the various primary energy resource commodities (e.g., coal, oil, natural gas, uranium, biomass, 
and imports of finished fuel products) are represented with supply curves or price trajectories for 
future years.  As before, common practice is for these input assumptions to be based on the 
findings of other reliable studies. 
 
Here, one can begin to see the indirect link between investment and fuel use decisions in 
seemingly unrelated sectors, such as transport and electric generation.  For instance, the decision 
of whether or not to invest in a BEV depends on the full lifecycle costs of this technology, which 
itself depends, at least in part, on how much it costs to install new electric generation and 
transmission capacity and, if there is a carbon cap or tax, the carbon intensity of the electricity 
that is produced.  The decision to install new generation capacity depends on the demand for 
electricity in each of the other end-use sectors and the cost of primary energy resources that are 
consumed to generate the electricity.  Similar decisions are continuously being made for other 
types of light-duty car technologies, as well as all of the other technologies in the other transport 
subsectors and the electricity, supply, industrial, commercial, residential, and agricultural sectors.  
The ability to represent a multitude of simultaneous decisions across a wide range of sectors is at 
the heart of systems level modeling, and this is certainly what makes it an attractive and useful 
tool for conducting energy analyses. 
 
 
II.2.2 CA-TIMES Reference Energy System 
The concept of the Reference Energy System (RES) is fundamental to the craft of energy 
systems modeling.  The RES describes the entire structure and network of a particular 
system via three types of entities (Loulou et al., 2005):  
• Technologies: these encompass all technologies including mining, import, export, 
fuel conversion, electric generation, transportation, and other end-use demand 
technologies; 
• Commodities: these consist of energy carriers, energy services, materials, 
monetary flows, and emissions. 
• Commodity flows: these are the links between processes and commodities. 
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The CA-TIMES RES represents California’s energy system as it exists today, and it 
provides full descriptions for potentially available technologies, energy resource 
potentials, and service demands for future years out to 2055.  The energy flows and 
energy balances are calibrated to 2005, and then optimized for all future years (generally 
at 5-year time steps).  The RES essentially connects all processes (i.e., energy production, 
conversion, and end-use technologies) with commodity flows (i.e., fuels, materials, 
emissions, demands) of the model.  As one might imagine, this ultimately leads to a fairly 
complex network, with seemingly unrelated processes and commodities (say, gasoline-
powered light-duty vehicles and electric-powered industrial equipment) all depending on 
and/or reacting to each other in some way.  Such complexity is representative of the real 
world, as economic actors in various sectors of the economy each make decisions based 
on information (prices, costs, quantities, etc.) that simultaneously depend on the decisions 
of others.  The CA-TIMES model attempts to capture these decisions, at an aggregated 
level, within the California energy system, and therefore the RES is built to reflect, as 
accurately as possible, the system as it exists today and the potential pathways it could 
take in the future. 
 
Figure 20 shows an extremely simplified schematic of the CA-TIMES Reference Energy 
System.  The diagram is helpful for illustrating the model’s main components in a linear 
fashion; however, it fails to represent the numerous feedbacks and the complex web of 
interdependencies that exist within the model.  For instance, progressing from left to 
right, one sees how the model takes primary energy resources (e.g., crude oil) and feeds 
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them to the fuel conversion sector where the primary resources are turned into final 
energy commodities (e.g., gasoline, electricity) with varying degrees of efficiency, 
dependent on technology.22  These final energy commodities are then consumed by 
technologies in the various end-use sectors, in order to produce enough useful energy to 
meet the required energy service demands (e.g., VMT, PMT, TMT).  
 
 
Figure 20  Simplified Schematic of the CA-TIMES Reference Energy System 
 
  
                                                 
22
 A point of clarification: Note that in the diagram imports of refined petroleum products, electricity, 
biofuels, and hydrogen are shown to feed the fuel conversion sector when, in reality, these final energy 
commodities would bypass the fuel conversion sector and go directly to the end-use technologies. 
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Electric Generation Sector 
The electric generation technologies in CA-TIMES are part of the larger fuel conversion 
sector.  These technologies consume primary (and even some secondary) energy 
resources and convert them to a final energy commodity, electricity.  (In certain cases, 
heat is also produced as a by-product.)  Twenty-five (25) separate power plant 
technologies are used to represent California’s entire generation system in the base-year 
2005 (Table 7).  A further thirty-seven (37) are available in future years as potential 
technologies in which CA-TIMES can choose to invest.  The model aggregates the 
generation capacity of similar plant types (e.g., natural gas combined-cycle), as opposed 
to representing every single one of California’s 690+ power plants as a separate entity 
(EPA, 2009).  This distinction is important, as it should be recognized that CA-TIMES 
has been designed to be an energy systems model, not exclusively a power market model 
like PROSYM or ReEDS.23  Such fine resolution would be beyond the scope of the 
current analysis. 
  
                                                 
23
 For further information on PROSYM, see the Ventyx webpage:  
http://www.ventyx.com/analytics/market-analytics.asp.  For further information on ReEDS, see the NREL 
webpage:  http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/reeds/. 
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Table 7  Electric Generation Technologies in CA-TIMES 
Base-Year Technologies Future Technologies 
Oil Steam (Distillate, Jet Fuel, and RFO) Natural Gas Combustion (Gas) Turbine (NGGT) 
Diesel Oil Combustion Turbine Advanced Natural Gas Combustion (Gas) Turbine (NGGT) 
Diesel Oil Combined-Cycle Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC) 
Natural Gas Combustion (Gas) Turbine (NGGT) Advanced Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC) 
Natural Gas Steam Turbine (NGST) Advanced Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC), w/CCS 
Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC) Coal Steam 
NGGT, Combined Heat & Power (CHP) Advanced Coal Int. Gasif. Combined-Cycle (IGCC) 
Coal Steam Advanced Coal Int. Gasif. Combined-Cycle (IGCC), w/ CCS 
Biomass Steam (Forest Residues) Biomass IGCC (Forest Residues) 
Biomass Steam (Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed) Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed) 
Biomass Steam (Municipal Solid Waste, Paper) Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Paper) 
Biomass Steam (Municipal Solid Waste, Wood) Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Wood) 
Biomass Steam (Municipal Solid Waste, Yard) Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Yard) 
Biomass Steam (Orchard and Vineyard Waste) Biomass IGCC (Orchard and Vineyard Waste) 
Biomass Steam (Pulpwood) Biomass IGCC (Pulpwood) 
Biomass Steam (Agr. Residues, Stovers/Straws) Biomass IGCC (Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws) 
Biomass Steam (Energy Crops) Biomass IGCC (Energy Crops) 
Biogas from Landfills and Animal Waste Digesters Biogas from Landfills and Animal Waste Digesters 
Geothermal Geothermal, in California 
Hydroelectric, Conventional Geothermal, in Western U.S. Outside California 
Hydroelectric, Reversible (Pumped Storage) Hydroelectric, Conventional 
Wind Hydroelectric, Reversible (Pumped Storage) 
Solar Thermal Wind, Lower Class Resources in CA 
Solar Photovoltaic Wind, Higher Class Resources in CA 
Nuclear, Conventional Light Water Reactors (LWR) Wind, Lower Class Resources in Western U.S. Outside CA 
 Wind, Higher Class Resources in Western U.S. Outside CA 
 Wind, Offshore 
 Solar Thermal, in CA 
 Solar Thermal, in Western U.S. Outside CA 
 Solar Photovoltaic 
 Nuclear, Conventional Light Water Reactors (LWR) 
 Nuclear, Pebble-Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) 
 Nuclear, Gas Turbine - Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR) 
 Molten Carbonate Fuel Cell 
 Tidal and Ocean Energy 
 Generic Distributed Generation – Baseload 
 Generic Distributed Generation – Peak 
 
In order to paint a realistic picture of the current electricity landscape in California, the 
CA-TIMES electric generation sector is calibrated to the base-year 2005 based on data 
from a variety of sources, including most notably McCarthy (2009), CARB (2010b), 
CEC (2010b), and the California Biomass Collaborative (CBC, 2009).  The types of data 
needed for calibration include plant efficiencies (i.e., heat rates), fuel input shares, fixed 
and variable O&M costs, generation capacities, scheduled capacity retirements, and 
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plant-specific availabilities by timeslice.  The model is then calibrated to the years 2006–
2010 by carefully controlling the capacity investment in, and utilization of, future 
technologies (from the perspective of 2005), using the same sources listed above.  (Note 
that while data for 2010 is not yet available in full, McCarthy (2009) has estimated what 
California’s 2010 generation mix is likely to be in a baseline scenario.)  After 2010, the 
model is free, more or less, to invest in any of the potential future power plant 
technologies shown in Table 7, subject to certain constraints on capacity growth and 
policies, such as the state’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS).  The types of input 
assumptions that are needed for the future technologies are the same as those mentioned 
above, as well as a few others:  start years (i.e., first year of plant availability), plant 
lifetimes (in years), investment costs, transmission costs, technology-specific discount 
rates (i.e., hurdle rates), and maximum annual limits to capacity growth. 
 
Power plant investment, utilization, and fuel use decisions in CA-TIMES are made based 
on the principle of cost minimization (over the entire lifetimes and lifecycles of the 
technologies).  In this sense, one might suppose that CA-TIMES in some way 
approximates an electricity dispatch model.  While this may be true in a basic sense, it is 
not an entirely accurate depiction of the current version of the model.  For instance, there 
are forty-eight (48) timeslices24 in CA-TIMES, a number much less than typical power 
market models (which have hundreds or thousands of timeslices) but considerably more 
                                                 
24
 In the field of energy-economic systems modeling, a “timeslice” refers to the temporal disaggregation of 
the model.  It represents a pre-defined length of time (typically on the order of hours, weeks, months, or 
years), for which the modeler provides data to the model.  The model then treats each individual timeslice 
as homogenous throughout the year when carrying out its optimization.  Generally speaking, the more 
timeslices available to the model, the more accurate the solution.  However, that being said, there are 
important trade-offs with respect to model computation time and data availability.   
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than typical MARKAL-TIMES and other energy systems models (with only 6 to 12).  
This finer level of resolution offers certain advantages, paramount of which is a more 
realistic optimization/solution/scenario. 
 
Each model year of CA-TIMES is divided up into six “seasons”, or rather, pairs of 
months:   
• January/February 
• March/April 
• May/June 
• July/August  
• September/October  
• November/December 
 
These month-pairs are subsequently partitioned into eight three-hour time blocks:   
• 0:00 – 3:00 
• 3:00 – 6:00 
• 6:00 – 9:00 
• 9:00 – 12:00 
• 12:00 – 15:00 
• 15:00 – 18:00 
• 18:00 – 21:00 
• 21:00 – 24:00 
The combination of the six month-pairs and eight time blocks leads to the 48 timeslices 
of the model (6 x 8 = 48).  Every timeslice is unique; but within each, the representation 
is homogenous.  For example, the time block between 6:00 to 9:00 during the 
January/February season is the same on January 4 as it is on January 23, February 12, or 
any other day during January or February.  In addition, from the model’s perspective the 
timeslices are not chronological:  in other words, what happens in the January/February 
3:00-6:00 timeslice has little bearing on what happens in the 6:00-9:00 timeslice of the 
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same season.  The model treats each timeslice distinctly when making dispatch decisions.  
Other considerations that are not included in CA-TIMES but that would bear on dispatch 
decisions in reality include power plant air pollutant emissions rules, unexpected outages, 
and ramp rates.   
 
Incorporating a fairly high degree of timeslice resolution into the model is important 
because electricity demand and supply fluctuates over the course of the day, week, 
month, and year.  This is illustrated by the “heat maps” of Figure 21, where red colors 
indicate high values, yellow/orange indicates intermediate values, and green indicates 
low values.  Clearly, California electricity demands peak during the afternoons and 
evenings of summer and early-autumn days.  For the most part, this coincides with solar 
insolation (i.e., solar power potential), which is strong in California throughout the year 
and which peaks in the late-morning and early-afternoon.  In contrast, wind speeds (i.e., 
wind power potential) tend to be strongest during the nighttime hours of spring and 
summer days, matching poorly the times of the day/year with the highest electricity 
demands.  (This data is for 2003, and comes from McCarthy and Yang (2008a).) 
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Figure 21  Electricity Demand, Wind Speeds, and Solar Insolation for Each of the 48 Timeslices in 
CA-TIMES 
 
In the CA-TIMES model, the timing of electricity demands is specified for each of the 
end-use sectors, based on unpublished data from Ryan McCarthy that feeds into his 
EDGE-CA electricity dispatch model.  The data represents the base-year 2005, and for 
the industrial, commercial, residential, and agricultural end-use sectors, the timing of 
electricity demands (across the 48 timeslices of the model) is assumed to follow the same 
temporal profile in all model years.  Transportation demands for electricity are treated 
separately, however.  In fact, in the current version of the model, these demands are only 
specified at the seasonal level, allowing the model to decide the optimal time to recharge 
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plug-in electric vehicles.  The only exception in the transport sector is the rail subsector, 
whose electricity demand profiles (for light- and heavy-rail) are currently known; hence, 
their demands are assumed to follow the same profile in all future years. 
 
On the supply side the availability of all electric generation technologies are restricted to 
capacity factors within each timeslice that are consistent with historical averages (for 
thermal power plants, hydro, and nuclear) and resource availability (for wind, solar, and 
other renewables) for actual power plants and resources in California.  These capacity 
factors depend on technological constraints to production (e.g., planned and unplanned 
outages due to maintenance), as well as on the timing of renewable resource potential 
(e.g., wind and hydro availability and solar insolation).  In defining timeslice-specific 
capacity factors for the CA-TIMES model, information on power plant and renewable 
resource availability data is sourced from the EDGE-CA electricity dispatch model by 
McCarthy and Yang (2009), which compiles a large amount of data on historical outage 
periods for all thermal power plants in California, as well as actual wind speed and solar 
insolation profiles for several different sites in the state. 
 
The CA-TIMES model also captures the cost of investing in new electrical transmission 
and distribution lines.  This is especially important for “stranded” renewable resources 
that exist in remote regions of the western U.S. and Canada (e.g., solar, wind, and 
geothermal), for which transmission distances, and thus costs, would be rather significant 
if these resources were tapped for the California market.  Transmission investment cost 
estimates for various renewable resource types are based on the California Public Utility 
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Commission’s “33% RPS Implementation Analysis”, which includes a spreadsheet model 
developed by the consulting firm E3 (CPUC, 2009). 
 
Supply Sector 
The supply sector is the largest and most complex sector of the CA-TIMES model, with 
respect to the sheer number of technologies and fuels that comprise it and the web of 
processes and commodity flows that link together to form its network.  It is the most 
fundamental of all sectors in the model, since it is the source of all primary energy 
resources and is responsible for delivering all energy commodities (except for electricity) 
to both the fuel conversion and end-use sectors. 
 
A number of primary energy resources are produced, or have the potential to be 
produced, in California or in surrounding states.  CA-TIMES represents the production of 
these resources with supply curves of varying complexity.  In the case of crude oil and 
natural gas, the “supply curves” are simply exogenous price projections for each future 
year, which are sourced from other studies (e.g., EIA (2010a) and IEA (2010)).  Because 
oil and natural gas are globally-traded commodities and California only makes up a small 
share of global consumption/production, California is assumed to be a price-taker for 
these energy resources under the CA-TIMES framework – hence, the exogenous price 
projections, despite the fact that crude oil and natural gas are produced in California.  In 
the case of biomass, CA-TIMES makes us of unique supply curves for each of twelve 
different feedstock types that have the potential to be produced “sustainably” (i.e., no 
water for irrigation, thus rain-fed, if water is needed for feedstock production) in 
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California and/or the Western United States outside of California.  The supply curves are 
taken from Parker (2010), and the feedstocks include Forest Residues, Municipal Solid 
Waste (Mixed)25, Municipal Solid Waste (Paper), Municipal Solid Waste (Wood), 
Municipal Solid Waste (Yard), Orchard and Vineyard Waste, Pulpwood, Agricultural 
Residues (Stovers and Straws), Energy Crops (Herbaceous), Yellow Grease, Animal 
Tallow, and Corn. 
 
The CA-TIMES model also allows imports of primary energy resources and final energy 
commodities.  For instance, because California does not have the capability to mine coal 
or uranium, these energy resources can be imported into the state from elsewhere in the 
U.S. or from abroad.  And even for commodities that California can produce, the model 
still allows for a certain quantity to be imported from outside the state, as is the case for 
crude oil, natural gas (via pipeline or LNG), refined petroleum products (e.g., gasoline 
diesel, jet fuel, kerosene, residual fuel oil, etc.), biofuels (e.g., corn ethanol, cellulosic 
ethanol, sugarcane ethanol, bio-diesel, etc.), and hydrogen.  Supply curves and/or 
exogenous price projections are specified for each of these imported commodities. 
 
Dozens of fuel transport and delivery technologies are used in CA-TIMES to distribute 
the various primary and final energy commodities to the fuel conversion and end-use 
sectors.  Along the way, production, transport, and delivery costs are assigned, and 
upstream emissions are allocated.  The bulk of primary energy resources are delivered to 
the fuel conversion portion of the supply sector, which consists of crude oil refineries, 
                                                 
25
 Municipal Solid Waste (Mixed) includes the MSW (Dirty) and MSW (Food) categories from Nathan 
Parker’s dissertation work. 
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bio-refineries, Fischer-Tropsch poly-generation plants, and hydrogen production 
facilities. 
 
The refinery technology in CA-TIMES is able to flexibly produce a range of different 
petroleum products, taking crude oil, natural gas liquids, natural gas, and electricity as 
inputs (Figure 22).  Crude oil and natural gas liquids are feedstock inputs (i.e., their 
carbon and energy content is converted into the fuel products), while the remaining 
energy carriers are combusted at the refinery in order to generate energy/heat for the 
various refining operations.  In addition, a small fraction of the input crude oil is also 
combusted.  Hydrogen is produced as an intermediary product/input at the refinery using 
natural gas steam methane reformation, though this process is not explicitly modeled.  
The outputs produced at the refinery include distillate heating oil #2, low-sulfur highway 
diesel (<500 ppm S), ultralow-sulfur highway diesel (<15 ppm S), conventional gasoline, 
reformulated gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene, high-sulfur residual fuel oil, low-sulfur residual 
fuel oil, liquefied petroleum gases (LPG), methanol, petrochemical feedstocks, asphalt, 
and petroleum coke.  Reflective of a real-world refinery, the flexible technology in CA-
TIMES is constrained from over-producing each fuel product by setting an upper limit on 
the share of total refinery output that can come from a particular fuel.  These fuel product 
splits are relaxed slightly over time, and along with refinery efficiencies and resource 
inputs, they are calibrated to the base-year 2005, using data from the CEC’s Energy 
Almanac (CEC, 2010a), the EIA Petroleum Navigator (EIA, 2010d), and the assumptions 
to the Petroleum Market Module of the EIA’s NEMS model (EIA, 2010c).  Through a 
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process known as “capacity creep”26, the existing stock of California refineries is allowed 
to expand over time.  Estimates of future refinery creep for California refineries have 
been put at about 0.45% per year according to the CEC (CEC, 2010c).  Thus, the state’s 
refining capacity is able to grow, albeit with a much smaller capital outlay than would be 
expected if a “greenfield” refinery were to be built on a new site.  Such greenfield 
expansions are also possible in the model through investments in a future refinery 
technology. 
 
 
Figure 22  Simplified Schematic of Flexible Refinery Technology in CA-TIMES 
 
                                                 
26
 Refinery capacity creep is the term used to describe the cumulative result of many small projects and 
productivity enhancements that enable a refinery to increase crude oil input over time. 
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Several different types of bio-refinery technologies are modeled in CA-TIMES (Table 8), 
though only a couple of these are available in the base-year 2005:  bio-diesel production 
facilities consuming yellow grease or animal tallow as feedstocks.  Ethanol supply until 
2010 is met by imports of corn ethanol from the Midwestern U.S. and sugarcane ethanol 
from Brazil.  Soon after 2010, the model is able to invest in cellulosic ethanol plants (via 
either the biochemical or thermochemical pathway) and bio-derived residual fuel oil 
plants (via a pyrolysis bio-oil pathway).  These future technologies consume one of nine 
types of cellulosic feedstock.  In addition to producing their liquid fuel products, these 
bio-refineries also generate a small amount of electricity as a by-product.  Feeding this 
low-carbon electricity to the grid can displace more carbon-intensive sources of 
electricity, such as natural gas plants.  All future bio-refinery technologies are 
characterized by biomass input efficiencies, investment costs, fixed and variable O&M 
costs, annual capacity factors, technology-specific hurdle rates, year-to-year limits on 
capacity growth, and a variety of other information.  These technology characterizations 
largely come from Bain (2007). 
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Table 8  Bio-Refineries and FT Poly-Generation Plants in CA-TIMES 
Production Technology Feedstock Types 
Cellulosic Ethanol Plants 
Biochemical Pathway (50 or 100 million gal per year) 
Thermochemical Pathway (50 or 100 MGY) 
Forest Residues 
Municipal Solid Waste, Paper 
Municipal Solid Waste, Wood 
Municipal Solid Waste, Yard 
Orchard and Vineyard Waste 
Pulpwood 
Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws 
Energy Crops 
Bio-Residual Fuel Oil Plants 
Pyrolysis Bio-Oil Pathway (25 or 100 MGY) 
Forest Residues 
Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed 
Municipal Solid Waste, Paper 
Municipal Solid Waste, Wood 
Municipal Solid Waste, Yard 
Orchard and Vineyard Waste 
Pulpwood 
Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws 
Energy Crops 
Renewable Bio-Diesel Plants 
Hydro-treatment Pathway (50 or 100 MGY) Yellow Grease Animal Tallow 
Fischer-Tropsch Poly-Generation Plants 
Biomass Gasification (61 MGY) 
Biomass Gasification, w/ CCS (61 MGY) 
Forest Residues 
Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed 
Municipal Solid Waste, Paper 
Municipal Solid Waste, Wood 
Municipal Solid Waste, Yard 
Orchard and Vineyard Waste 
Pulpwood 
Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws 
Energy Crops 
Coal-Biomass Gasification, Syngas RC, w/ CCS (138 MGY) 
Coal-Biomass Gasification, Syngas OT, w/ CCS (112 MGY) 
Coal-Biomass Gasification, Syngas OT, w/ CCS (506 MGY) 
Coal 
Forest Residues 
Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed 
Municipal Solid Waste, Paper 
Municipal Solid Waste, Wood 
Municipal Solid Waste, Yard 
Orchard and Vineyard Waste 
Pulpwood 
Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws 
Energy Crops 
 
Fischer-Tropsch (FT) coal-biomass poly-generation plants represent yet another category 
of potential future fuel conversion technologies in CA-TIMES (Table 8).  These plants 
consume one of nine types of cellulosic feedstock and then produce some combination of 
synthetic gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and/or electricity.  Co-firing with coal is an option with 
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certain plant designs.  In the current version of CA-TIMES, I have chosen to include five 
out of the sixteen biomass-to-liquid (BTL) and coal/biomass-to-liquid (CBTL) process 
configurations developed and analyzed by Kreutz et al. (2008).  Using their naming 
convention, the following plant types are characterized in CA-TIMES:  BTL-RC-V, 
BTL-RC-CCS, CBTL-RC-CCS, CBTL-OT-CCS, CBTL2-OT-CCS.  According to the 
authors, all of these system designs are based on commercial or near-commercial 
technologies.  The main differences between them have to do with their varying sizes, 
biomass-to-coal input ratios, and fuel/electricity product splits; whether or not CCS is 
utilized or CO2 is vented to the atmosphere; and whether a once through (OT) or recycle 
(RC) approach is used for the initially unconverted synthetic gas (“syngas”).  (Note that 
RC systems maximize FT liquids production, while OT systems allow for more 
electricity generation at the expense of reduced FT liquids production.)  Two of the five 
plants made available to CA-TIMES consume only biomass (i.e., no coal co-firing); thus, 
they produce liquid fuel products with zero or significantly negative carbon intensities.  
For example, the BTL-RC-CCS plant design is an example of a negative emissions 
technology, since it takes carbon from biomass (which originally pulled CO2 out of the 
atmosphere via photosynthesis) and permanently stores it underground.  Further, because 
the three CBTL plants with coal-biomass co-firing each utilize CCS, they also produce 
liquid fuel products with relatively attractive carbon intensities, even though coal is used 
an input fuel.  These carbon intensities are significantly better, or at least no worse, than 
petroleum-based gasoline.  From a technological perspective, carbon capture and storage 
is particularly attractive with these FT liquids poly-generation plants because the CO2 
stream that is generated is naturally concentrated – in other words, a nearly pure stream 
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of CO2 is generated, by default, as a by-product of the FT process, thus the added costs of 
CO2 capture are quite low.  All future FT BTL/CBTL poly-generation plant technologies 
in CA-TIMES are characterized by coal and biomass input efficiencies, investment costs, 
fixed and variable O&M costs, annual capacity factors, technology-specific hurdle rates, 
year-to-year limits on capacity growth, and a variety of other information.  The 
technology and cost assumptions come from Kreutz et al. (2008). 
 
Hydrogen is supplied to the various end-use sectors in CA-TIMES via a number of 
different pathways.  The following hydrogen production technologies are available to the 
model in future years:  Coal Gasification (w/ and w/o CCS), Natural Gas Steam Methane 
Reformation (w/ and w/o CCS), Water Electrolysis, and Biomass Gasification (w/ and 
w/o CCS).  Both coal gasification facilities in the model are intended for centralized 
production; the large-scale facility produces 1,200 metric tonnes of H2 per day (t/d), 
while the mid-size facility produces 24 t/d.27  The same situation is true of natural gas 
SMR facilities, except that a small-scale technology (0.48 t/d) is also available for 
distributed production at a refueling station.  A mid-size water electrolysis technology 
(24 t/d) is available for centralized production, as well as a small-scale technology (0.48 
t/d) for distributed production.  All mid-size biomass gasification facilities (24 t/d), which 
consume one of the nine types of cellulosic feedstock, are intended for centralized 
production, and the biomass technologies that utilize CCS are potential negative 
emissions technologies.  Hydrogen is the only commodity produced at each of the 
                                                 
27
 A 1,200 tonne/day H2 production facility is roughly equivalent to producing 438 million gasoline gallon 
equivalents (gge) per year on an energy basis.  A 24 t/d facility is equivalent to 8.76 million gge/yr, while a 
0.48 t/d facility is equivalent to 0.175 million gge/yr.  A 2.74 t/d refueling station is equivalent to 1.00 
million gge/yr. 
113 
 
 
 
production facilities, no matter the technology:  no electricity co-generation takes place.  
All future hydrogen production technologies in CA-TIMES are characterized by coal, 
natural gas, biomass, electricity, and/or water input efficiencies, investment costs, fixed 
and variable O&M costs, annual capacity factors, technology-specific hurdle rates, year-
to-year limits on capacity growth, and a variety of other information.  The technology and 
cost assumptions draw heavily from the U.S. EPA’s 9-region MARKAL model (EPA, 
2008a), which is partially based on NRC (2004). 
 
After it is produced, hydrogen is distributed to end-use sector technologies by either 
pipeline or truck transmission and delivery technologies, depending on the form in which 
the hydrogen is to be consumed, gas or liquid (Figure 23).  (Of course, hydrogen 
produced with distributed technologies requires no transmission and delivery since the 
production occurs at the refueling station.)  In the model, distinctions are made between 
three different levels of geographical aggregation:  Urbanized Area (UA), Urban Cluster 
(UC), and Rural Region (RR).  This has a bearing on the costs of hydrogen transmission 
and distribution.  An urbanized area generally refers to a densely settled area of 50,000 or 
more people; an urban cluster refers to an area of at least 2,500 people but fewer than 
50,000 people; and a rural region is any area that falls outside of the two urban 
designations.  Pipeline delivery of gaseous hydrogen from a centralized production 
facility first occurs via long-distance transmission to a UA, UC, or RR city-gate.  Then, 
trunk delivery via pipeline takes place within the UAs and UCs.  Finally, service 
pipelines distribute hydrogen to refueling stations.  (Note that in rural regions, the trunk 
delivery step is bypassed.)  Truck delivery of liquid hydrogen is done in much the same 
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way.  First, long-distance transmission to UA, UCs, and RRs is carried out by large 
trucks; then, for UAs and UCs small trucks distribute hydrogen to refueling stations.  An 
alternate pathway for UAs and UCs is for gaseous hydrogen to be transported to the city-
gate by means of a pipeline; then, the hydrogen is liquefied and loaded onto a truck for 
distribution to the refueling station.  Once at the refueling station, which is assumed to 
have a dispensing capacity of 2,740 kg/day, the model can choose to fuel hydrogen 
vehicles with either gaseous or liquefied hydrogen.  This choice depends on the full 
lifecycle costs of the hydrogen fuel (production + delivery), as well as the investment 
costs of the hydrogen vehicles.  Each step in the delivery process has some cost, 
efficiency, and emission flow associated with it.  These technology characterizations are 
based on the EPAUS9r MARKAL model (EPA, 2008a), NRC (2004), and the U.S. 
DOE’s Hydrogen Analysis (H2A) model (DOE, 2008). 
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Figure 23  Simplified Schematic of Hydrogen Production and Supply Technologies in CA-TIMES 
 
At this point, it should be noted, however, that despite the somewhat sophisticated 
treatment of hydrogen transmission and delivery in CA-TIMES that has been described in 
the above paragraphs, in the current version of the model, there are no constraints to 
specify demand splits between urbanized areas, urban clusters, and rural regions.  In other 
words, there are no constraints to ensure a transition from distributed hydrogen 
production in the early years to centralized production later on, or from the large 
metropolitan areas of the state (“lighthouse cities”) in the early stages to rural regions and 
smaller towns several years thereafter.  The current version of CA-TIMES does not make 
these fine geographic distinctions since it treats California as a single region, although a 
more sophisticated spatial representation could certainly be added at a later date, as has 
already been discussed by other members of our research team.  Such geographic detail is 
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outside the scope of the present analysis.  However, one of the goals of my dissertation 
work to this point has been to put in place most of the model structure needed for 
analyzing these issues, with a realization that there is considerable interest within ITS-
Davis in analyzing spatial aspects of hydrogen (as well as biofuels) infrastructure 
development.  I leave these interesting questions to others and to future research.   
 
Transportation Sector 
The transportation sector of CA-TIMES is the most detailed and disaggregated of the five 
end-use demand sectors.  Indeed, the level of bottom-up technological detail is arguably 
greater than typical energy systems models, especially for the non-LDV transport 
subsectors.  As shown in Table 9, the transport sector consists of eleven separate 
subsectors; a few of these subsectors are further disaggregated into segments (e.g., 
Transit Buses, School Buses, etc.).  Each segment represents a unique service demand, 
which the model must satisfy.  (The units of each service demand are shown in 
parentheses.)  For instance, demand for light-duty cars is distinct from light-duty trucks.  
Both of these are exogenously specified by the modeler, and there is no possibility for 
endogenous segment-switching (i.e., from LDTs to LDCs) – at least in the current version 
of the model – unless the modeler decides to run a scenario with different demands for 
each segment.  In general, demand projections are based on government forecasts and/or 
other research studies. 
 
Within each subsector, a number of technologies exist for satisfying the specified end-use 
demands in each subsector/segment (Table 9).  In the base-year 2005, and up through 
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2010, the model is calibrated to historical data.  This effectively means that, aside from 
some Flex-Fuel E-85 vehicles in the light-duty subsector, the model is constrained to 
invest only in fossil fuel technologies between 2005 and 2010.  (Note that in Table 9, a 
‘*’ represents technologies that were used in the base-year 2005.)  After 2010, the model 
is free to invest in any technology, depending on its assumed first year of availability and 
subject to constraints on its growth.  From a modeling perspective, every transport sector 
technology is represented in essentially the same way.  The technologies consume fuel 
and energy carriers (gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, RFO, natural gas, biofuels, hydrogen, 
electricity, etc.) and produce end-use service demands.  (These fuels/carriers come from 
the supply sector, as described previously.)  Each technology has an assumed efficiency 
for turning energy into service demand, and each is given a fixed upper bound on its 
annual availability (e.g., the maximum number of miles that a single light-duty car can 
travel within a given year).  For the base-year 2005, efficiencies and availabilities are 
calculated for each base-year technology in each transport subsector and segment.  It is 
also necessary to specify average vehicle lifetimes and the stock of technologies in the 
base-year (i.e., how many vehicles of each type were available in each subsector and 
segment in 2005).  Future technologies require much the same information, and in 
addition the technology’s first year of market availability, investment and O&M costs 
(aside from fuel costs), and technology-specific hurdle rates.  In some of these cases (e.g., 
for efficiencies and investment costs), the input assumptions are exogenously specified 
trajectories for all future model years.  Other studies are used to inform these 
assumptions.  With all of this information at its disposal, the model is free to make fuel 
use and investment decisions by trading off the costs of competing end-use technologies.  
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Of course, certain other considerations also come into play, such as vehicle efficiency 
standards and renewable fuel mandates.  An expanded discussion of the CA-TIMES 
transportation sector is found in Section II.2.3 below.  Unfortunately, due to the inherent 
space limitations of this chapter, it is not possible to discuss the composition of each of 
the various transport subsectors in great detail, for example, the relative importance of 
freight versus passenger aviation (comparing intrastate, interstate, and international 
travel) or the breakdown between the various types of rail.  That being said, a fair amount 
of research has previously been conducted on this topic for California, and the interested 
reader is encouraged to read through Yang, McCollum, McCarthy, and Leighty (2008) 
for a considerable amount of further information. 
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Table 9  Transportation Sector Technologies in CA-TIMES 
Transport Subsectors and Service Demands Technologies† 
Light-Duty Vehicles 
Light-Duty Cars (vehicle-miles traveled) 
Light-Duty Trucks (vehicle-miles traveled) 
Gasoline ICE * 
Gasoline HEV * 
Gasoline ICE (Moderate Eff.) 
Gasoline ICE (Advanced Eff.) 
Diesel ICE * 
Diesel HEV 
E-85 Flex Fuel ICE 
E-85 Flex Fuel ICE (Moderate Eff.) 
E-85 Flex Fuel ICE (Advanced Eff.) 
E-85 Flex Fuel HEV 
Dedicated Ethanol ICE 
Natural Gas ICE 
Natural Gas Bi-Fuel ICE 
LPG ICE 
LPG Bi-Fuel ICE 
Gasoline PHEV 10/30/40/60 
E-85 Flex Fuel PHEV 10/30/40/60 
Diesel PHEV 10/30/40/60 
Battery-Electric 
Hydrogen Fuel Cell 
Methanol Fuel Cell 
Gasoline Fuel Cell 
Motorcycles 
Motorcycles (vehicle-miles traveled) Gasoline ICE * Dedicated Ethanol ICE 
Heavy-Duty Trucks 
Heavy-Duty Trucks (vehicle-miles traveled) 
Gasoline ICE * 
Diesel ICE * 
Diesel ICE (+10% Eff.) 
Diesel ICE (+20% Eff.) 
Diesel ICE (+40% Eff.) 
Natural Gas (CNG) ICE 
LPG ICE 
Dedicated Ethanol ICE 
Dedicated Methanol ICE 
Medium-Duty Trucks 
Medium-Duty Trucks (vehicle-miles traveled) 
Gasoline ICE * 
Gasoline HEV 
Diesel ICE * 
Diesel HEV 
Natural Gas (CNG) ICE 
Natural Gas (CNG) HEV 
LPG ICE 
Dedicated Ethanol ICE 
Gasoline PHEV30 
Diesel PHEV30 
Natural Gas (CNG) PHEV30 
Hydrogen ICE–HEV 
Hydrogen Fuel Cell 
Buses 
Transit Buses (vehicle-miles traveled) 
School Buses (vehicle-miles traveled) 
Intercity and Other Buses (vehicle-miles traveled) 
Gasoline ICE * 
Gasoline ICE (+20% Eff.) 
Gasoline ICE (+40% Eff.) 
Diesel ICE * 
Diesel ICE (+20% Eff.) 
Diesel ICE (+40% Eff.) 
Diesel HEV 
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Natural Gas (CNG) ICE * 
Natural Gas (CNG) HEV 
LPG ICE 
Dedicated Ethanol ICE 
Dedicated Methanol ICE 
Gasoline PHEV30 
Diesel PHEV30 
Natural Gas (CNG) PHEV30 
Electric * 
Hydrogen ICE–HEV 
Hydrogen Fuel Cell 
Rail 
Commuter Rail (passenger-miles traveled) 
Heavy Rail (passenger-miles traveled) 
Light Rail (passenger-miles traveled) 
Intercity Passenger Rail (passenger-miles traveled) 
Freight Rail (ton-miles traveled) 
Diesel * 
Electric * 
Marine 
Domestic - Intrastate/California - Large Shipping Vessel 
   (ton-miles traveled) 
Domestic - Intrastate/California - Harbor Craft 
   (hours of operation) 
Domestic - Intrastate/California - Personal Recreational Boat 
   (hours of operation) 
Domestic - Interstate - Large Shipping Vessel 
   (ton-miles traveled) 
Foreign/International - Large Marine Vessel 
   (vessel-miles traveled) 
Gasoline ICE * 
Diesel ICE * 
Residual Fuel Oil ICE * 
Dedicated Ethanol ICE 
Diesel Molten Carbonate Fuel Cell 
Aviation 
Domestic - Intrastate/California - Passenger Aviation 
   (passenger-miles traveled) 
Domestic - Intrastate/California - Freight Aviation 
   (ton-miles traveled) 
Domestic - Intrastate/California - General Aviation 
   (hours of operation) 
Domestic - Interstate - Passenger Aviation 
   (passenger-miles traveled) 
Domestic - Intrastate/California - Freight Aviation 
   (ton-miles traveled) 
Foreign/International - Passenger Aviation 
   (passenger-miles traveled) 
Foreign/International - Freight Aviation 
   (ton-miles traveled) 
Other Miscellaneous Aviation (PJ of activity) 
Jet Fuel Turbofan Jet Engine * 
Aviation Gasoline Propeller * 
Gasoline * 
Hydrogen Turbofan Jet Engine 
Off-Road & Construction 
Off-Road & Construction Devices (hours of operation) 
Gasoline * 
Diesel * 
LPG/CNG * 
Dedicated Ethanol 
Hydrogen 
Electricity 
Agriculture 
Agricultural Vehicles (hours of operation) 
Gasoline * 
Diesel * 
Dedicated Ethanol 
Hydrogen 
Electricity 
Pipelines 
Natural Gas Consumption for Pipelines (PJ of NG) Natural Gas * 
†
 Notes: The ‘*’ symbol is used to denote technologies that were used in the base-year 2005. 
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Industrial, Commercial, Residential, and Agricultural Sectors 
Because this dissertation research focuses on the transportation, electricity, and supply 
sectors (since they account for 85% of all GHG emissions related to fuel combustion in 
California), the current version of the CA-TIMES model has a fairly simple 
representation of end-use energy consumption in the industrial, commercial, residential, 
and agricultural (collectively “ICRA”) sectors.  Eventually, in later versions of the model 
and through contributions from other members of our research team, these other sectors 
will be modeled at a level of technological detail that is similar to that which currently 
exists for transportation, electricity, and supply (i.e., describing energy service demands 
for the different segments of each of these sectors and the technologies and fuels that can 
potentially be used to supply the end-use demands, such as light bulbs, air conditioner, 
refrigerators, etc.).  In the meantime, however, in order to satisfactorily develop future 
energy scenarios where deep reductions in economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions are 
to be made, there must be at least some representation of the ICRA sectors (and the fuel 
they consume and emissions they generate), no matter how limited the detail.  One cannot 
simply ignore these sectors entirely.  My approach to solving this problem has been to 
represent final energy consumption in each of the four ICRA sectors with generic input-
output technologies.  Each sector possesses only one of these technologies, and each 
technology consumes exogenously specified quantities of various types of fuel in each 
year.  In other words, both the supply of final energy and the demand for total useful 
energy are specified in energy units (e.g., PJ).  The efficiency of each of the generic 
input-output technologies is set at 100%.   
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Total useful energy demand by sector and the breakdown of final energy by fuel type by 
sector are calibrated to published energy statistics for the base-year 2005, using the fuel 
use estimates of the CARB GHG Inventory (CARB, 2010b).  For future years, demand 
trajectories and the fuel use mix are exogenously specified by the modeler; these input 
assumptions can be easily and quickly modified across different model runs (e.g., when 
running a reference case vs. a deep GHG reduction scenario).  Obviously, given this rigid 
framework, the model is not free to make fuel use and investment decisions by trading off 
the costs of competing end-use technologies (e.g., boilers, furnaces, compact fluorescent 
light bulbs, solar hot water heating, etc.), as it is able to do in the transportation, 
electricity, and supply sectors.  However, that being said, the framework does partially 
allow for feedback and interplay with the other sectors, since the fuel demands in the 
ICRA sectors send a price/quantity signal to these other sectors, which impacts the fuel 
use and investment decisions therein.   
 
In my dissertation work, I have relied on other studies to develop future fuel use and 
demand scenarios for the ICRA sectors.  For instance, in developing my Reference Case I 
draw heavily from the California Energy Commission and UC-Davis Advanced Energy 
Pathways (AEP) project (McCarthy et al., 2008a, b), while for my Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario I base my projections on the well-known BLUE Map scenarios of the IEA’s 
Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP) 2010 study (IEA, 2010).  The projections by fuel 
type for these two sets of scenarios are shown for the four ICRA sectors starting from 
Figure 30 and Figure 60, respectively. 
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Figure 24 illustrates the modeling framework adopted for the industrial, commercial, 
residential, and agricultural end-use sectors.  In each of the sectors, one or more of thirty 
different fuels is consumed by the generic input-output technology, and the combined 
intake of these fuels results in the total useful energy demand for the sector 
(IND/COM/RSD/AGR).  Of course, not every fuel is consumed in each sector.  For 
example, in the base-year 2005, only five different fuels were consumed in the 
agricultural sector, whereas more than a dozen fuels were consumed in the industrial 
sector. 
 
 
Figure 24  Simplified Schematic of Generic Input-Output Technology Used in the Industrial, 
Commercial, Residential, and Agricultural Sectors 
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II.2.3 Key Input Assumptions and Data Sources 
The results generated using the CA-TIMES model are, like any other model, entirely a 
function of the data and assumptions that go into building them.  It is, therefore, 
important to review some of the key input assumptions and data sources of the model, at 
least those that have not already been described.  That being said, because CA-TIMES is 
such a large model (and will only grow larger in the future), it is rather infeasible to list 
all assumptions in this single chapter of my dissertation, or even in an appendix.  (The 
best sources of documentation are the underlying VEDA-TIMES spreadsheets 
themselves.)  For this reason, I concentrate here on only certain parts of the electricity, 
supply, and transportation sectors, given that these are of greatest relevance and interest 
for the purposes of my dissertation. 
 
Electric Generation Sector 
As mentioned previously, calibration of the electric generation sector between 2005 and 
2010 is achieved by using input to and output from the EDGE-CA electricity dispatch 
model for California by McCarthy and Yang (2009), which is itself largely based on the 
U.S. EPA’s eGRID power plant database (EPA, 2009).  Then, in deciding how to supply 
electricity after 2010, the model is able to choose amongst a suite of more than three 
dozen power plant technologies.  In this regard, two of the most important decision-
making criteria are investment costs and plant efficiencies.  The next two tables 
summarize the Reference Case cost and efficiency assumptions of the CA-TIMES model 
in the particular model years, for which data is provided to CA-TIMES; the model then 
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interpolates for the costs in the in-between years.28  In general, investment cost and 
efficiency assumptions are taken from the EIA’s AEO2010 Reference Case.  (Fixed and 
variable O&M costs are also generally taken from the same source, although they are not 
shown here.)  Some notable exceptions include tidal/ocean energy plants, for which costs 
come from the IEA’s ETP2008 report (IEA, 2008), and nuclear plants, for which costs 
and efficiencies are calculated based on a combination of data from several sources 
(Ansolabehere, 2003; DOE, 2001; EIA, 1998, 2010a; NEI, 2003; OECD, 2002).  Note 
that the efficiencies of the three nuclear plants are not expressed in percentages, but 
rather in terms of metric tonnes of enriched uranium input per petajoule of produced 
electricity.  The latter can be calculated with knowledge of both the burn-up (i.e., fuel 
utilization)29 rate and thermal efficiency of each nuclear plant.  Furthermore, the 
efficiency assumptions shown in the tables for non-geothermal and non-biomass 
renewables (e.g., solar, wind, hydro, and tidal) are simply those of an average fossil-
thermal power plant.  This is done so that, from a primary energy resource perspective, 
all power plant inputs can be represented in terms of fossil energy-equivalents.  The 
investment cost numbers shown in the table below do not include the added costs of new 
transmission and distribution lines. 
 
  
                                                 
28
 Note that all costs in the CA-TIMES model are expressed in 2007 U.S. dollars. 
29
 The burn-up rate is defined as amount of energy output (usually in terms of kWh or MW-days) divided 
by the unit mass of fuel input (usually expressed in terms of heavy metal, e.g., kg Uranium). 
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Table 10  Investment Cost Assumptions for New Power Plants in the Reference Case 
 
 
  
Investment Costs for New Power Plants ($/kW)
(Notes:  Costs are interpolated between the data years shown.)
2005 2015 2035 2050
Natural Gas Combustion (Gas) Turbine (NGGT) 685 745 518 518
Advanced Natural Gas Combustion (Gas) Turbine (NGGT) 648 699 552 552
Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC) 984 1,070 744 744
Advanced Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC) 968 1,048 698 698
Advanced Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC), w/CCS 1,932 2,054 1,191 1,191
Coal Steam 2,223 2,418 1,681 1,681
Advanced Coal Int. Gasif. Combined-Cycle (IGCC) 2,569 2,769 1,829 1,829
Advanced Coal Int. Gasif. Combined-Cycle (IGCC), w/ CCS 3,776 4,022 2,410 2,410
Biomass IGCC (Forest Residues) 7,698 8,330 5,548 5,548
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed) 7,698 8,330 5,548 5,548
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Paper) 7,698 8,330 5,548 5,548
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Wood) 7,698 8,330 5,548 5,548
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Yard) 7,698 8,330 5,548 5,548
Biomass IGCC (Orchard and Vineyard Waste) 7,698 8,330 5,548 5,548
Biomass IGCC (Pulpwood) 7,698 8,330 5,548 5,548
Biomass IGCC (Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws) 7,698 8,330 5,548 5,548
Biomass IGCC (Energy Crops) 7,698 8,330 5,548 5,548
Biogas from Landfills and Animal Waste Digesters 5,199 5,625 3,747 3,747
Geothermal, in California 3,498 3,785 2,521 2,521
Geothermal, in Western U.S. Outside California 3,498 3,785 2,521 2,521
Hydroelectric, Conventional 4,583 4,959 3,303 3,303
Hydroelectric, Reversible (Pumped Storage) 2,291 2,480 1,652 1,652
Wind, Lower Class Resources in CA 3,931 4,254 2,833 2,833
Wind, Higher Class Resources in CA 3,931 4,254 2,833 2,833
Wind, Lower Class Resources in Western U.S. Outside CA 3,931 4,254 2,833 2,833
Wind, Higher Class Resources in Western U.S. Outside CA 3,931 4,254 2,833 2,833
Wind, Offshore 7,874 8,520 5,675 5,675
Solar Thermal, in CA 8,725 9,441 7,398 7,398
Solar Thermal, in Western U.S. Outside CA 8,725 9,441 7,398 7,398
Solar Photovoltaic 10,491 11,352 8,895 8,895
Molten Carbonate Fuel Cell 9,313 10,078 7,896 7,896
Tidal and Ocean Energy 14,667 12,633 8,567 6,667
Generic Distributed Generation – Baseload 1,400 1,515 1,009 1,009
Generic Distributed Generation – Peak 1,681 1,819 1,212 1,212
Nuclear, Conventional Light Water Reactors (LWR) 3,820 4,089 2,496 2,496
Nuclear, Pebble-Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) 3,316 3,549 2,167 2,167
Nuclear, Gas Turbine - Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR) 2,977 3,186 1,945 1,945
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Table 11  Efficiency Assumptions for New Power Plants in the Reference Case 
 
 
  
New Power Plant Efficiencies (%)
2005 2035 2055
Natural Gas Combustion (Gas) Turbine (NGGT) 31.6% 32.7% 32.7%
Advanced Natural Gas Combustion (Gas) Turbine (NGGT) 36.7% 39.9% 39.9%
Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC) 47.4% 50.2% 50.2%
Advanced Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC) 50.5% 53.9% 53.9%
Advanced Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC), w/CCS 39.6% 45.5% 45.5%
Coal Steam 37.1% 39.0% 39.0%
Advanced Coal Int. Gasif. Combined-Cycle (IGCC) 38.9% 45.8% 45.8%
Advanced Coal Int. Gasif. Combined-Cycle (IGCC), w/ CCS 31.6% 41.1% 41.1%
Biomass IGCC (Forest Residues) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Paper) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Wood) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Yard) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Orchard and Vineyard Waste) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Pulpwood) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Energy Crops) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biogas from Landfills and Animal Waste Digesters 25.0% 25.0% 25.0%
Geothermal, in California 10.3% 11.3% 11.3%
Geothermal, in Western U.S. Outside California 10.3% 11.3% 11.3%
Hydroelectric, Conventional 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Hydroelectric, Reversible (Pumped Storage) 77.5% 77.5% 77.5%
Wind, Lower Class Resources in CA 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Wind, Higher Class Resources in CA 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Wind, Lower Class Resources in Western U.S. Outside CA 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Wind, Higher Class Resources in Western U.S. Outside CA 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Wind, Offshore 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Solar Thermal, in CA 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Solar Thermal, in Western U.S. Outside CA 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Solar Photovoltaic 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Molten Carbonate Fuel Cell 43.0% 49.0% 49.0%
Tidal and Ocean Energy 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Generic Distributed Generation – Baseload 37.7% 38.3% 38.3%
Generic Distributed Generation – Peak 33.9% 34.5% 34.5%
New Nuclear Plant Efficiencies (tonnes enriched uranium per PJ electricity)
(Notes:  Efficiences are interpolated between the data years shown.)
2005 2035 2055
Nuclear, Conventional Light Water Reactors (LWR) 0.65 0.65 0.65
Nuclear, Pebble-Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) 0.36 0.36 0.36
Nuclear, Gas Turbine - Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR) 0.22 0.22 0.22
(Notes:  For non-geothermal and non-biomass renewables, efficiencies are assumed to be similar 
to an average fossil-thermal plant.  Efficiences are interpolated between the data years shown.)
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Supply Sector 
Supply curves for crude oil, natural gas, and coal are modeled in CA-TIMES as 
exogenously specified price projections, since California is assumed to be a price-taker 
for these energy resources under the CA-TIMES framework.  In the Reference Case 
scenario, these trajectories, which are shown in Figure 25, come from the EIA’s 
AEO2010 Reference Case projections (and extended post-2035 using projections from 
the IEA’s ETP 2010 Baseline Scenario), as discussed in Section II.2.2.  Interestingly, 
after having fallen steadily for several years, EIA forecasts oil and natural gas prices to 
rise significantly over the next two to three decades. 
 
 
Figure 25  Exogenous Fossil Fuel Price Projections in the Reference Case 
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Biomass supply curves are based on work by Parker (2010).  Two sets of his supply 
curves are used:  one for biomass produced in California, and a second for biomass 
produced in the Western U.S. outside of California.30  Unique supply curves exist for 
each of twelve different feedstock types.  Presumably, all biomass produced in California 
will be available for consumption in the state.  On the other hand, not all biomass in the 
Western U.S. will find its way to California in the form of raw biomass or, more likely, a 
liquid biofuel.  In this latter case, an important assumption is made within CA-TIMES 
that only a fraction of Western U.S. biomass can be “captured” by the California market.  
This “fair share” assumption is varied in different scenarios, but in the Reference Case I 
assume a value of approximately 30%, which is roughly equivalent to California’s 
current share (and projected future share) of Western U.S. population and liquid fuels 
consumption.  As an illustration, Figure 26 sums up the availability of the various 
biomass feedstock types in 2050 in the Reference Case into an aggregate supply curve for 
both California and the Western U.S.  Note that these costs only include biomass 
feedstock procurement; they do not include transport to a bio-refinery or power plant.  In 
total, approximately 1,876 PJ of biomass are available for consumption in the California 
“energy system” in 2050.  This is equivalent to roughly 117 million bone dry tons31, or 
less than 10% of total sustainable biomass potential in the U.S., as estimated by the 
“Billion-Ton Study” (Perlack et al., 2005).  For comparison, note that typical values for 
global sustainable biomass potential in 2050 are in the range of 50,000 to 150,000 PJ 
                                                 
30
 The Western U.S. is defined as all states in the continental U.S. (lower 48) that are west of the 
Mississippi River. 
31
 This simplified calculation assumes an average biomass energy content of 16 GJ per bone dry ton, which 
is representative of typical forest residues, energy crops, and certain types of municipal solid waste. 
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(van Vuuren et al., 2010) – between 27 and 80 times the level assumed to be available for 
California consumption in the same year. 
 
 
Figure 26  Aggregate Supply Curve for All Types of Biomass Available in California and the 
Western U.S. in the Reference Case in 2050 
 
Investment cost and efficiency assumptions for refinery technologies are shown in Table 
12 and Table 13, respectively.32  As previously mentioned, California’s existing refineries 
are able to expand production through a process known as “capacity creep”.  Such 
incremental growth is far less expensive than constructing a “greenfield” refinery on a 
brand new site.  Refinery cost assumptions come from EIA (2006) and are consistent 
with those of EPA’s US9r MARKAL model (EPA, 2008a).  Efficiency assumptions for 
                                                 
32
 Investment costs are expressed in units of million dollars per annual input capacity ($/PJ-yr) because the 
refinery technologies are input-normalized in CA-TIMES. 
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existing refineries are calibrated to the base-year 2005, using data from the CEC’s Energy 
Almanac (CEC, 2010a), the EIA Petroleum Navigator (EIA, 2010d), and the assumptions 
to the Petroleum Market Module of the EIA’s NEMS model (EIA, 2010c).  Efficiencies 
of future refineries are based on the latter.  Note that refinery efficiencies are expressed in 
terms of the amount of energy consumed divided by crude oil feedstock consumption.  In 
this sense, it is important to recognize that only a small portion of input crude oil is 
actually combusted at the refinery (~11%).  The vast majority of the energy and carbon 
content of crude oil (i.e., the feedstock portion) is converted into fuel products, which are 
subsequently consumed/combusted in other sectors. 
 
Table 12  Investment Cost Assumptions for New Refining Capacity 
 
 
Table 13  Efficiency Assumptions for Refineries 
 
 
The next several tables summarize the investment cost and efficiency assumptions for 
cellulosic ethanol, biodiesel, pyrolysis bio-oil, FT poly-generation, and hydrogen 
production plants and facilities.33  Data sources and further information are discussed in 
Section II.2.2, but in general the characterizations of these fuel conversion technologies 
are based on studies by Bain (2007) and Kreutz et al. (2008), EPA (2008a), and NRC 
                                                 
33
 Investment costs are expressed in units of million dollars per annual output capacity ($/PJ-yr) because 
these fuel conversion technologies are output-normalized in CA-TIMES. 
Investment Costs for New Refining Capacity (M$/PJ-yr)
(Notes:  Values apply to all model years.)
Existing Refinery ("Creep") 4.61
New Refinery ("Greenfield") 18.43
Refinery Energy Consumption (PJ_Input / PJ_Oil-Feedstock)
(Notes:  Values apply to all model years.)
Crude Oil Natural Gas Natural Gas Liquids Electricity
Existing Refinery 1.110 0.019 0.019 0.003
New Refinery 1.110 0.014 0.019 0.004
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(2004).  Note that, in contrast to the flexible refineries, the efficiencies of these 
technologies are expressed in terms of the amount of energy consumed divided by total 
plant output.  Furthermore, because of the particular studies that were consulted in 
building up the technological representation of the CA-TIMES model, many of the fuel 
conversion technologies are represented by investment cost and efficiency assumptions 
that do not change over time.  The assumptions shown in the tables below are the 
learned-out values, which are assumed to be achieved once the technology has matured 
and is commercially available at large-scale.  Such representation is a bit different than 
for the electric generation and, in general, transportation technologies, for which costs 
and efficiencies are assumed to change gradually over time due to learning and 
experience.  A potentially important impact of this difference in technological 
representation is on the rate of adoption of specific technologies.  For instance, CA-
TIMES results could show initial growth of these constant cost/efficiency technologies to 
be faster than what might ultimately be seen in reality, if the assumptions in the model 
turned out to be a bit too optimistic.  In the later years, however, the opposite effect could 
be seen:  the assumptions could turn to be too pessimistic. 
 
Table 14  Investment Cost Assumptions for New Cellulosic Ethanol Plants 
 
 
  
Investment Costs for New Cellulosic Ethanol Plants (M$/PJ-yr)
(Notes:  Values are interpolated between the data years shown.)
2005 2020 2035 2050
All Biomass Feedstock Types (50 MGY) 38.4 38.4 38.4 38.4
All Biomass Feedstock Types (100 MGY) 32.1 32.1 32.1 32.1
All Biomass Feedstock Types (50 MGY) 42.3 42.3 42.3 42.3
All Biomass Feedstock Types (100 MGY) 34.9 34.9 34.9 34.9
Biochemical Production Pathway
Thermochemical Production Pathway
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Table 15  Investment Cost Assumptions for New Biodiesel Plants 
 
 
Table 16  Investment Cost Assumptions for New Pyrolysis Bio-Oil Plants 
 
 
Table 17  Investment Cost Assumptions for New FT Poly-Generation Plants 
 
 
Table 18  Investment Cost Assumptions for New Hydrogen Production Facilities 
 
 
  
Investment Costs for New Biodiesel Plants (M$/PJ-yr)
(Notes:  Values are interpolated between the data years shown.)
2005 2020 2035 2050
All Biomass Feedstock Types (50 MGY) 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
All Biomass Feedstock Types (100 MGY) 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Investment Costs for New Pyrolysis Bio-Oil Plants (M$/PJ-yr)
(Notes:  Values are interpolated between the data years shown.)
2005 2020 2035 2050
All Biomass Feedstock Types (25 MGY) 15.1 15.1 15.1 15.1
All Biomass Feedstock Types (100 MGY) 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2
Investment Costs for New FT Poly-Generation Plants (M$/PJ-yr)
(Notes:  Values are interpolated between the data years shown.  Costs are the same for all biomass feedstock types.)
2005 2020 2035 2050
Biomass Gasification (61 MGY) 96.1 96.1 72.1 72.1
Biomass Gasification, w/ CCS (61 MGY) 106.0 106.0 75.7 75.7
Coal-Biomass Gasification, Syngas RC, w/ CCS (138 MGY) 93.8 93.8 66.9 66.9
Coal-Biomass Gasification, Syngas OT, w/ CCS (112 MGY) 88.3 88.3 63.1 63.1
Coal-Biomass Gasification, Syngas OT, w/ CCS (506 MGY) 67.9 67.9 48.4 48.4
Investment Costs for New Hydrogen Production Facilities (M$/PJ-yr)
(Notes:  Values apply to all model years. )
Coal Gasification 26.3
Coal Gasification, w/ CCS 26.9
Natural Gas SMR 11.0
Natural Gas SMR, w/ CCS 14.2
Natural Gas SMR 24.5
Natural Gas SMR, w/ CCS 33.4
Biomass Gasification 138.0
Biomass Gasification, w/ CCS 141.2
Water Electrolysis 96.6
Natural Gas SMR 106.9
Water Electrolysis 144.8
Centralized, Large-Size
Centralized, Mid-Size
Distributed
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Table 19  Efficiency Assumptions for New Cellulosic Ethanol Plants 
 
 
Table 20  Efficiency Assumptions for New Biodiesel Plants 
 
 
Cellulosic Ethanol Plant Biomass Consumption (PJ_Input / PJ_Output)
(Notes:  Values apply to all model years.)
50 MGY 1.74
100 MGY 1.74
50 MGY 1.54
100 MGY 1.54
50 MGY 1.72
100 MGY 1.72
50 MGY 1.59
100 MGY 1.59
50 MGY 1.69
100 MGY 1.69
50 MGY 1.74
100 MGY 1.74
50 MGY 1.53
100 MGY 1.53
50 MGY 1.76
100 MGY 1.76
50 MGY 2.12
100 MGY 2.12
50 MGY 1.61
100 MGY 1.61
50 MGY 1.87
100 MGY 1.87
50 MGY 2.10
100 MGY 2.10
50 MGY 1.94
100 MGY 1.94
50 MGY 2.05
100 MGY 2.05
50 MGY 2.12
100 MGY 2.12
50 MGY 1.86
100 MGY 1.86
50 MGY 2.15
100 MGY 2.15
Municipal Solid Waste, Yard
Orchard and Vineyard Waste
Pulpwood
Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws
Energy Crops
Energy Crops
Thermochemical Production Pathway
Forest Residues
Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed
Municipal Solid Waste, Paper
Municipal Solid Waste, Wood
Municipal Solid Waste, Paper
Municipal Solid Waste, Wood
Municipal Solid Waste, Yard
Orchard and Vineyard Waste
Pulpwood
Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws
Biochemical Production Pathway
Forest Residues
Biodiesel Plant Biomass Consumption (PJ_Input / PJ_Output)
(Notes:  Values apply to all model years.)
50 MGY 0.98
100 MGY 0.98
50 MGY 1.03
100 MGY 1.03
Yellow Grease
Animal Tallow
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Table 21  Efficiency Assumptions for New Pyrolysis Bio-Oil Plants 
 
 
  
Pyrolysis Bio-Oil Plant Biomass Consumption (PJ_Input / PJ_Output)
(Notes:  Values apply to all model years.)
25 MGY 1.59
100 MGY 1.59
25 MGY 1.20
100 MGY 1.20
25 MGY 1.40
100 MGY 1.40
25 MGY 1.57
100 MGY 1.57
25 MGY 1.45
100 MGY 1.45
25 MGY 1.53
100 MGY 1.53
25 MGY 1.59
100 MGY 1.59
25 MGY 1.39
100 MGY 1.39
25 MGY 1.61
100 MGY 1.61
Pulpwood
Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws
Energy Crops
Forest Residues
Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed
Municipal Solid Waste, Paper
Municipal Solid Waste, Wood
Municipal Solid Waste, Yard
Orchard and Vineyard Waste
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Table 22  Efficiency Assumptions for New FT Poly-Generation Plants 
 
 
  
FT Poly-Generation Plant Energy Consumption (PJ_Input / PJ_Output)
(Notes:  Values apply to all model years.)
Biomass Coal
Forest Residues 1.88 0.00
Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed 1.43 0.00
Municipal Solid Waste, Paper 1.66 0.00
Municipal Solid Waste, Wood 1.86 0.00
Municipal Solid Waste, Yard 1.72 0.00
Orchard and Vineyard Waste 1.82 0.00
Pulpwood 1.88 0.00
Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws 1.65 0.00
Energy Crops 1.91 0.00
Forest Residues 1.94 0.00
Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed 1.47 0.00
Municipal Solid Waste, Paper 1.72 0.00
Municipal Solid Waste, Wood 1.92 0.00
Municipal Solid Waste, Yard 1.78 0.00
Orchard and Vineyard Waste 1.88 0.00
Pulpwood 1.94 0.00
Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws 1.70 0.00
Energy Crops 1.97 0.00
Forest Residues 0.83 1.14
Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed 0.63 1.14
Municipal Solid Waste, Paper 0.74 1.14
Municipal Solid Waste, Wood 0.82 1.14
Municipal Solid Waste, Yard 0.76 1.14
Orchard and Vineyard Waste 0.81 1.14
Pulpwood 0.83 1.14
Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws 0.73 1.14
Energy Crops 0.84 1.14
Forest Residues 0.76 1.30
Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed 0.58 1.30
Municipal Solid Waste, Paper 0.67 1.30
Municipal Solid Waste, Wood 0.75 1.30
Municipal Solid Waste, Yard 0.70 1.30
Orchard and Vineyard Waste 0.73 1.30
Pulpwood 0.76 1.30
Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws 0.67 1.30
Energy Crops 0.77 1.30
Forest Residues 0.17 1.95
Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed 0.13 1.95
Municipal Solid Waste, Paper 0.15 1.95
Municipal Solid Waste, Wood 0.17 1.95
Municipal Solid Waste, Yard 0.16 1.95
Orchard and Vineyard Waste 0.17 1.95
Pulpwood 0.17 1.95
Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws 0.15 1.95
Energy Crops 0.18 1.95
Biomass Gasification (61 MGY)
Biomass Gasification, w/ CCS (61 MGY)
Coal-Biomass Gasification, Syngas RC, w/ CCS (138 MGY)
Coal-Biomass Gasification, Syngas OT, w/ CCS (112 MGY)
Coal-Biomass Gasification, Syngas OT, w/ CCS (506 MGY)
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Table 23  Efficiency Assumptions for New Hydrogen Production Facilities 
 
 
Transportation Sector 
Base-Year 2005 Fuel Consumption 
Base-year 2005 fuel consumption in each of the CA-TIMES transport subsectors and 
segments are estimated by a variety of means and sources – mostly by using the CARB 
GHG Inventory (CARB, 2010b), but in some cases other data sources are used to 
supplement, as described below.  The historical figures are typically provided in their 
native units (e.g., gallons gasoline, gallons diesel, standard cubic feet of natural gas, etc.); 
these can then be converted to common units, such as petajoules (PJ). 
 
For gasoline, diesel, and ethanol consumption by on-road transportation vehicles (i.e., 
light-duty passengers cars and trucks, heavy- and medium-duty trucks and buses, and 
motorcycles), historical fuel consumption estimates are based on a combination of data 
provided by the CARB GHG Inventory (CARB, 2010b), the California Energy 
Hydrogen Production Facility Feedstock Consumption (PJ_Input / PJ_Output)
Primary Feedstock Electricity
Coal Gasification 1.39 0.07
Coal Gasification, w/ CCS 1.39 0.11
Natural Gas SMR 1.04 0.02
Natural Gas SMR, w/ CCS 1.10 0.05
Natural Gas SMR 1.10 0.03
Natural Gas SMR, w/ CCS 1.15 0.07
Biomass Gasification 2.69 0.19
Biomass Gasification, w/ CCS 2.68 0.27
Water Electrolysis 156.77 1.63
Natural Gas SMR 1.32 0.07
Water Electrolysis 156.77 1.65
Centralized, Large-Size
Centralized, Mid-Size
Distributed
(Notes:  Units are in PJ_Input per PJ_Output, except for water electrolysis for which the primary 
feedstock is liquid H 2 O, and consumption is in million liters per PJ_output. Energy consumption is the 
same for all biomass feedstock types. Values apply to all model years.)
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Commission (CEC, 2007) and the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans, 
2006).  Similarly, natural gas consumption for on-road passenger vehicles is taken from 
the CARB GHG Inventory. 
 
Consumption of kerosene-type jet fuel for commercial passenger and freight aviation is 
calculated from data that was used to develop the CARB GHG Inventory estimates 
(CARB, 2008b).  More specifically, I utilize air carrier data to estimate the number of 
flights within, into, and out of California (both domestic and international).  Then, based 
on plane types and trip distances, fuel consumption is estimated.  For general aviation34, 
data on jet fuel and aviation gasoline consumption is obtained from the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA, 2007). 
 
Diesel and residual fuel oil consumption for California marine transport is taken from the 
CARB GHG Inventory.   
 
Diesel fuel consumption by California railways in 2005 is based on statistics from the 
U.S. DOT’s National Transit Database for commuter, heavy, and light rail (DOT, 2006a).  
For intercity and freight rail, diesel fuel consumption is estimated based on California’s 
share of intercity passenger-miles and freight ton-miles, respectively.  California intercity 
passenger-miles are estimated by using Amtrak passenger boardings as a proxy, 
specifically the share of California passenger boardings in the U.S. total (DOT, 2007b).  
The share of freight rail ton-miles that originated in California compared to the entire 
U.S. is obtained from DOT data as well (DOT, 2006b).   
                                                 
34
 General aviation includes personal and corporate jets and other small propeller aircraft. 
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Electricity consumption for transportation is also taken from the National Transit 
Database (DOT, 2006a).  First, the data are filtered for California transit agencies only, 
and then electricity consumption is estimated for each transit vehicle type.  The data 
shows that in 2005, electricity was only consumed by the following vehicle types:  cable 
car, heavy rail, light rail, bus, and trolleybus.  Note that these figures do not include 
electricity consumption for Amtrak trains, which is understandable since no Amtrak 
trains use electricity in California – they are all diesel-powered.  The data does not appear 
to include electricity consumption for recharging of personal electric vehicles (such as 
passenger cars, light-duty trucks, neighborhood electric vehicles, golf carts, etc.); though, 
in 2005 these demands were very small in comparison to other transportation electricity 
demands. 
 
Gasoline, diesel, and natural gas consumption for off-road and construction, agricultural 
vehicles, and personal recreational boats are estimated by using data obtained by running 
CARB’s OFFROAD2007 model for the year 2005 and then performing some subsequent 
calculations and data aggregation (CARB, 2007d).  For consumption of liquefied 
petroleum gases (LPG), the CARB GHG Inventory is used. 
 
California biodiesel consumption in 2005 is not listed in the GHG Inventory, so I 
estimate it independently by assuming that California’s biodiesel consumption is 
approximately 10% of the national total, which was 75 million gallons biodiesel in 2005 
(NBD, 2007).  Thus, California consumed about 7.5 million gallons in 2005, a figure that 
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is corroborated by the City and County of San Francisco Biodiesel Access Task Force, 
who estimate that California biodiesel consumption was about 7 million gallons in 2005 
(SFBATF, 2006).  Furthermore, it is assumed that in the base-year all biodiesel is 
consumed by heavy-duty vehicles (trucks and buses); obviously, this ignores the very 
small quantity of biodiesel consumed by passenger cars and light-duty trucks.   
 
Base-Year 2005 Activity Demands and Vehicle Stocks 
The calibration of base-year transport sector energy demands in CA-TIMES requires data 
on transport service demand, i.e., activity, (passenger-miles, vehicle-miles, ton-miles, 
etc.), vehicle stocks (cars, trucks, aircraft, ships, trains, etc.), and other data (e.g., 
passengers per vehicle, freight tons per train).  In some cases these statistics are obtained 
specifically for California; however, in other cases the data are approximated for 
California based on aggregate U.S. data. 
 
Light-duty Cars and Motorcycles 
The unit of activity is vehicle-miles of travel (VMT).  For cars, this data is obtained from 
CEC IEPR 2007 estimates (CEC, 2007).  For motorcycles, it is taken from the Caltrans 
2006 MVSTAFF report (Caltrans, 2006).  Further, I was able to find data on the number 
of motorcycles in California and the annual average mileage of those vehicles by running 
CARB’s EMission FACtors (EMFAC2007) model (CARB, 2007c).  Note that EMFAC 
data on vehicle stocks originally come from California Department of Motor Vehicle 
(DMV) registration data.  Stocks and annual mileages of conventional gasoline ICE 
vehicles and gasoline hybrid-electric vehicles are obtained from the CEC IEPR estimates.  
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The IEPR data shows that the number of diesel cars in California was zero in 2005; 
however, EMFAC shows otherwise.  Therefore, the EMFAC data is used to estimate the 
number of diesel cars and their average annual mileage.  Moreover, while EMFAC shows 
that there were a very small number of electric vehicles operating in California in 2005, I 
have ignored these vehicles here since their contribution to overall base-year energy 
demands is trivial, and little information exists about these vehicles.  In contrast, I have 
not been able to find any consistent data on the stock and total mileage of all natural gas 
vehicles in California, so this category is also ignored in the base-year 2005.   
 
Fuel economies for cars and motorcycles vary widely by vehicle type and model.  Yet, 
for the purposes of calibrating base-year transport sector energy demands, only average 
fuel economy values are needed for gasoline ICE cars, gasoline HEV cars, diesel cars, 
and gasoline ICE motorcycles.  These averages are obtained from the CEC IEPR and 
Caltrans MVSTAFF data. 
 
All light-duty cars and motorcycles are assumed to have a lifetime of 15 years, consistent 
with assumptions used in the EPA 9-region MARKAL model for the U.S.  The vehicle 
types, like all technologies in CA-TIMES are “vintaged”, meaning that the technological 
assumptions that apply to the technology in the year of its introduction continue to apply 
throughout the technology’s lifetime. 
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Light-Duty Trucks 
Activity data (in VMT) for light-duty trucks is obtained from CEC IEPR 2007 estimates.  
The number of light-duty trucks in California and the annual average mileage of those 
vehicles are also taken from IEPR for conventional gasoline vehicles and gasoline HEVs.  
For diesel light-duty trucks, the data comes from running CARB’s EMFAC model.  In 
EMFAC, we consider the truck categories T1, T2, T3, and T4 to be light-duty trucks.  
These categories include trucks that are less than 10,000 pounds in weight, which is 
slightly different from the CAFE-defined 8,750 pound maximum weight for light-duty 
trucks but is consistent with definitions found elsewhere for “light-duty trucks”.  Note 
that because the number of electric and natural gas light-duty trucks was so small in the 
base-year (or data on them could not be found), these vehicle types are ignored.  Average 
fuel economies for gasoline and gasoline HEV light-duty trucks are obtained from the 
CEC IEPR data.  The average fuel economy of diesel light-duty trucks in California 
comes from the CalTrans MVSTAFF report. 
 
All light-duty trucks are assumed to have a lifetime of 15 years, consistent with 
assumptions used in the EPA 9-region MARKAL model for the U.S. 
 
Heavy-Duty and Medium-Duty Trucks 
The EMFAC model is the source for total vehicle miles of travel, vehicle stock, and 
average annual mileage per vehicle for both medium- and heavy-duty trucks.  Medium-
duty trucks include EMFAC truck categories T5 and T6, corresponding to trucks with 
weights between 10,000 and 33,000 pounds.  Heavy-duty trucks include category T7, 
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with weights from 33,000 to 60,000 pounds.  While there are a larger number of medium-
duty trucks than heavy-duty trucks in California, they are typically used for shorter-
distance travel, and they are more efficient.  Hence, heavy-duty trucks account for greater 
quantities of total vehicle-miles and fuel consumption.  Average fuel economies for the 
two vehicle categories are obtained from CalTrans MVSTAFF. 
 
Heavy-duty trucks are assumed to have a lifetime of between 15 and 20 years, depending 
on technology, consistent with assumptions used in the IEA-ETP global MARKAL 
model.  Medium-duty trucks have lifetimes of 10-20 years.  In both cases, vehicles with 
compression-ignition (i.e., diesel) engines have longer lifetimes, while spark-ignition 
(i.e., gasoline) vehicles and other alternative-fuel vehicles have shorter lifetimes. 
 
Buses 
The bus subsector is comprised of three distinct segments:  transit buses, school buses, 
and other buses, the latter of which includes intercity buses.  The activity unit for all bus 
types is vehicle-miles traveled.  All transit bus statistics come from either the National 
Transit Database or EMFAC.  The number of school buses in operation in California is 
given by School Transportation News (STN, 2007).  Data on school bus passenger-miles 
(PMT) for the entire U.S. comes from The Public Purpose (The Public Purpose, 2007).  
The share of school buses in California versus the entire U.S. (about 5.5%) is then used to 
estimate California’s total school bus PMT.  School bus VMT is given by EMFAC.  All 
data on other types of buses, which include intercity (e.g., Greyhound) buses, are taken 
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from EMFAC.  Average fuel economies of the different bus types are calculated based on 
the fuel consumption and VMT estimates discussed above.   
 
Transit, school, and other/intercity buses are all assumed to have a lifetime of between 15 
and 20 years, depending on technology, consistent with assumptions used in the IEA-ETP 
global MARKAL model.  As with trucks, vehicles with compression-ignition (i.e., diesel) 
engines have longer lifetimes, while spark-ignition (i.e., gasoline) vehicles and other 
alternative-fuel vehicles have shorter lifetimes. 
 
Rail 
There are five different types of rail transport in California.  Passenger rail includes 
commuter, heavy, light, and intercity (e.g., Amtrak) rail.  The activity unit for these 
passenger modes is PMT.  The other type of rail transport is freight rail, the activity unit 
for which is ton-miles.  The National Transit Database provides statistics on total PMT, 
VMT, train-miles traveled (TMT), and vehicle stocks for commuter, heavy, and light rail 
(where a ‘train’ refers to a collection of a number of individual rail ‘vehicles’, i.e., 
locomotives and/or rail cars).  “Light rail” includes both traditional light rail street cars, 
as well as historic cable cars in San Francisco.  In California all heavy rail (e.g., BART) 
and light rail systems are completed electrified.  In contrast, commuter, intercity, and 
freight rail trains in California tend to use diesel-powered locomotives.  For intercity rail, 
as mentioned above, California passenger-miles, vehicle-miles, and train-miles, as well as 
the stock of locomotives and rail cars in California, are estimated by using Amtrak 
statistics (DOT, 2007b).  Similarly, freight rail ton-miles, vehicle-miles, train-miles, and 
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vehicle stocks are estimated using the share of ton-miles originated in California 
compared to the entire U.S. (DOT, 2006b, 2007a).  From these data I was able to 
calculate several useful metrics reflective of rail operations, including the number of 
passengers per rail vehicle, vehicles per train, passengers per train, and average train-
miles per train per year, as well as energy intensities for each type of vehicle.   
 
All types of rail equipment (i.e., locomotives and rolling stock for both passenger and 
freight trains) are assumed to have lifetimes of 20 years, consistent with assumptions 
used by the EPAUS9r and IEA-ETP. 
 
Marine 
The activity unit for domestic marine transport (both intrastate and interstate) via large 
shipping vessels is ton-miles.  Yet, because I could only find data on marine ton-miles for 
the entire U.S., California’s share of marine tons is used a proxy for ton-miles.  The 
amount of tons shipped by large shipping vessels to intrastate, interstate, and foreign 
markets is obtained from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE, 2007).  
California’s share of intrastate tons shipped (i.e., originated) is about 4.9% of the U.S. 
total.  When considering interstate shipments that either originate or terminate in 
California, the weighted average share is about 3.9%.  I use this latter share to estimate 
the number of large shipping vessels in operation in the state and the amount of ton-miles 
shipped by these vessels.  National level data are taken from the ORNL Transportation 
Energy Data Book (ORNL, 2010).  The shares of marine tons shipped to intrastate and 
interstate markets (from USACE) are then used to estimate the number of large shipping 
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vessels used for both intrastate and interstate marine transport.  Interstate trade comprises 
about 70% of domestic marine tons (and thus vessels and ton-miles by our calculations) 
while the other 30% is intrastate.  The energy intensity of California large shipping 
vessels is assumed to be the same as the national average value found in the ORNL Data 
Book. 
 
Harbor craft35 and personal recreational boats are two other types of domestic marine 
vehicles that operate within the state’s boundaries.  The unit of activity for both of these 
intrastate categories is hours of operation.  Data on harbor craft activity, stock, and 
energy intensity are calculated from CARB’s Statewide Commercial Harbor Craft Survey 
(CARB, 2004).  Data on personal boats come from running CARB’s OFFROAD2007 
model for the year 2005, then aggregating the output and estimating vehicle stocks, 
activity (hours of operation per year), and energy intensities (gallons of fuel per hour). 
 
The unit of activity for large marine vessels operating internationally is vessel-miles.  The 
data for these vehicle types, including vessel stock, come from CARB’s 2005 
Oceangoing Ship Survey (see “Appendix C:  Summary of Results” and “Appendix D:  
Emissions Estimation Methodology for Ocean-Going Vessels”) (CARB, 2005).  
According to the survey, about 99% of today’s large marine vessels use residual fuel oil 
as the main fuel for their propulsion systems, while the remaining 1% use diesel.  Using 
data provided by the CARB survey report on emissions, average speed, and average 
propulsion system power by type of oceangoing vessel, I estimate the total number of 
                                                 
35
 Harbor craft are vessels used for commercial purposes or to support public services.  There are several 
types of harbor craft including crew and supply boats, charter fishing vessels, commercial fishing vessels, 
ferry/excursion vessels, pilot vessels, towboat or push boats, tug boats and work boats. 
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vessel-miles traveled by these vessels in 2005, average annual mileage of the vessels, and 
fuel consumption per vessel-mile by. 
 
Large shipping vessels, large marine vessels, and harbor craft are assumed to have 
lifetimes of 30 years, based on EPAUS9r values, while personal recreational boats are 
assumed to have lifetimes of 20 years. 
 
Aviation 
Information on commercial flights within, leaving from, and arriving to California are 
obtained from CARB staff in spreadsheet database format (CARB, 2008b).  This data 
was originally obtained from DOT’s Research and Innovative Technology 
Administration’s (RITA) Form 41 Traffic database of air carrier statistics.  CARB filtered 
this data for California and then organized it by type of flight – intrastate (CA to CA), 
interstate (CA to US, US to CA), and international (CA to World, World to CA).  The 
database provides fairly detailed information for every single flight within these 
categories in 2005, for example, origin and destination airport, number of passengers, 
weight of freight, distance of flight, type of airplane, and so on.  From this data, the total 
number of passenger-miles and freight ton-miles was estimated for California in 2005 for 
each of the different types of flights.  Airplane stocks were determined by using as a 
proxy the share of California airplane-miles in the U.S. total (DOT, 2007c).  In reality, 
airplanes cannot be said to “belong” to California or any other state.  Yet, for the 
purposes of accounting and calibrating stock, passenger-mile, and ton-mile data to base-
year fuel demands, it is necessary to roughly estimate the number of “airplane-
148 
 
 
 
equivalents” operating solely within California energy system in a given year – i.e., on 
intrastate, interstate, and international routes for both passenger and freight aviation.   
 
The unit of activity for general aviation is hours of operation.  I assume that general 
aviation operates completely within the state (i.e., only intrastate trips are possible), 
which is likely not true in all cases, for example, with personal and corporate jets.  
Nevertheless, because no specific data on general aviation flight movements could be 
found (all data is aggregated) the assumption of general aviation being in the intrastate 
aviation category is made.  I recognize that this introduces a small amount of error into 
the model, though it is fairly trivial when considering that general aviation activity and 
fuel demands pale in comparison to commercial passenger and freight aviation.  As with 
jet fuel and aviation gasoline consumption for general aviation aircraft, all transport 
activity and energy intensity data is obtained from the FAA (FAA, 2007).  Some 
California-specific data is available in the survey, but most is for the entire U.S.  Thus, 
the share of general aviation aircraft in operation in California and the share of hours of 
operation, both compared to U.S. totals, are used as proxies for estimating other values, 
such as the number of jet aircraft vs. propeller aircraft.   
 
A third category of aviation includes other/miscellaneous aircraft flights and energy 
usage.  This category is part of the CARB GHG Inventory, and according to earlier 
conversations with CARB staff, it is unclear what the category actually comprises 
(CARB, 2008c).  Military flights are included, as is fuel used for ground operations at 
airports.  Part of the category could also include activity and fuel use that should be a part 
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of the passenger, freight, and general aviation categories but was not included because of 
errors in the calculations.  In other words, the other/miscellaneous category probably 
includes some remainder values from other categories.  Due to these data uncertainties, I 
make some simplifications in modeling this other/miscellaneous aviation category.  First, 
the unit for activity is in fictional “activity units”, and the level of activity in the base-
year 2005 is arbitrarily specified to be 100 activity units.  Then, efficiency (in activity 
units per PJ) is estimated by dividing the fictional activity units by this category’s total 
fuel use in 2005, which is known from the CARB GHG Inventory. 
 
Base-year aviation technologies of all types are assumed to have lifetimes of 20 years, 
consistent with EPAUS9r assumptions, whereas future aviation technologies have 
lifetimes of 30 years, consistent with IEA-ETP assumptions. 
 
Off-Road & Construction Devices 
The unit of activity for off-road and construction vehicles36 is hours of operation, which 
is fitting given that some of these vehicles never actually move anywhere, so they are not 
“transport vehicles” in the strictest sense of the phrase.  Data on total hours of vehicle 
operation, vehicle stocks by fuel type (gasoline, diesel, and LPG/CNG), and average 
annual hours of operation by fuel type all come from running CARB’s OFFROAD2007 
model, then aggregating the output and performing some subsequent calculations 
                                                 
36
 The off-road & construction subsector is comprised of a diverse set of vehicles including (to name just a 
few) off-road motorcycles, snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs, 4-wheelers), golf carts, cranes, 
forklifts, loaders, tractors, backhoes, excavators, dumpers, dredgers, aerial lifts, sweepers and scrubbers, 
riding lawn mowers, lawn and garden tractors, cargo tractors, and various types of airport vehicles (A/C 
tugs, baggage tugs, cargo loaders, deicers, forklifts, fuel trucks, ground power units, maintenance trucks, 
catering trucks, lavatory trucks, water and hydrant trucks). 
150 
 
 
 
(CARB, 2007d).  Energy intensity estimates are similarly obtained.  Note that the 
overwhelming majority of off-road vehicles in California are gasoline-powered.  Yet, 
because diesel vehicles consume so much fuel on a per hour basis, diesel fuel 
consumption is quite a bit higher than either gasoline or natural gas consumption.  
Because different fuels are used for different vehicle types, I divide this category up into 
three subcategories based on fuel type. 
 
All off-road and construction technologies are assumed to have a lifetime of 25 years, 
consistent with EPAUS9r assumptions. 
 
Agricultural Vehicles 
The unit of activity for off-road and construction vehicles37 is also hours of operation.  As 
for off-road and construction vehicles, data on agricultural vehicles is obtained from 
running OFFROAD2007.  Both gasoline and diesel are used in agricultural vehicles, and 
in terms of vehicle stocks, they are roughly equivalent.  However, since fuel consumption 
per hour is much higher for diesel vehicles (presumably because they are larger), diesel 
fuel consumption is an order of magnitude larger than gasoline consumption.  As with 
off-road and construction vehicles, I divide agricultural vehicles up into two categories 
based on fuel type. 
 
All agricultural vehicle technologies are assumed to have a lifetime of 25 years, 
consistent with EPAUS9r assumptions. 
                                                 
37
 The agricultural vehicle subsector is comprised of a diverse set of vehicles including tractors, combines, 
balers, mowers, sprayers, tillers, and swathers.   
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Pipelines 
Natural gas consumption for both natural gas and non-natural gas pipelines in California 
is taken from the EIA (EIA, 2010b).  The unit of activity for pipeline natural gas 
consumption is assumed to be total California natural gas consumption in any given year, 
which is also obtained from the same source.  In 2005, approximately 0.00479 scf of 
pipeline natural gas were consumed for every 1 scf of total natural gas transported (or 
alternatively, 0.00479 PJ per PJ).  By this metric, the relative consumption of natural gas 
for pipeline compressors is extremely small.  Note that this transport subsector is treated 
differently from the other subsectors since there is no stock or annual average activity per 
se. 
 
Service Demand Projections 
In CA-TIMES, future-year projections of demand (e.g., vehicle-miles, passenger-miles, 
ton-miles, vessel-miles, hours of operation, and so on) are exogenously specified.  This 
section discusses the key input assumptions and data sources for developing reference 
case demand projections for the various transport subsectors. 
 
Light-Duty Cars and Trucks 
Total combined light-duty car and truck VMT in California is projected into the future by 
applying annual growth rates for U.S. VMT per capita, which come from the EIA’s 
AEO2010 Reference Case projections (see Table 60 of AEO2010) (EIA, 2010a)38, and 
                                                 
38
 Note that in order to extrapolate out to later years, I assume the average annual percentage growth rate in 
per-capita VMT declines from the mean 2025-2030 value down to 0.5% per year in 2050.  Such a gradual 
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applying these rates to the base-year 2005 numbers from CEC.  Similarly, car-truck share 
splits are projected into the future, using the EIA’s projected changes for the U.S. light-
duty stock (see Table 58 of AEO2010).  With these two time series, the trajectories for 
both light-duty car and light-duty truck VMT can be calculated.  These trajectories are 
shown in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27  Light-Duty Car and Truck VMT Projections in the Reference Case Scenario 
 
Motorcycles 
Projections for on-road motorcycle demand between 2005 and 2030 are calculated based 
on growth rates from Caltrans (2009).  Then, because base-year demands are derived 
                                                                                                                                                 
decline is meant to represent an increasing saturation of private auto travel in California, as the population 
grows, densities increase, and congestion continues to get worse.   
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from EMFAC model results, the Caltrans growth rates are applied to the 2005 EMFAC 
numbers.  For the post-2030 time period, extrapolation is done by using the average 
annual percentage growth rate between 2020 and 2030 and applying it to the later years 
as a constant growth rate. 
 
Heavy-Duty and Medium-Duty Trucks 
As is the case with motorcycles, base-year VMT demands are projected into the future, 
using growth rates from Caltrans (2009).  Note that Caltrans’ definition for medium-duty 
trucks (‘Truck3’ in the MVSTAFF report) is the same as the EMFAC truck categories T5 
and T6 (vehicle weights of 10,000 – 33,000 pounds).  Similarly, heavy-duty trucks 
(‘Truck4’ in Caltrans MVSTAFF) are equivalent to the EMFAC truck category T7 
(greater than 33,000 pounds). 
 
Buses 
Because I was unable to find any reliable estimates of future California bus demands, I 
simply assume that the demands in the three bus segments each scale with population.  
California population projections are taken from the California Department of Finance 
(DOF, 2007).   
 
Rail 
Rail PMT and TMT in California is projected into the future by applying annual growth 
rates for energy use by rail segment for the entire U.S.  These projections come from the 
EIA’s AEO2010 Reference Case projections (see Supplemental Table 45 of AEO2010).  
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In doing this, I am effectively using rail energy growth as a proxy for demand growth, 
which is of course an approximation, though a necessary one given the absence of 
projections from any other sources. 
 
Marine 
For most of the marine segments (namely, domestic-intrastate and domestic-interstate 
large shipping vessels, harbor craft, and personal recreational boats), annual growth rates 
from AEO2010 are used to project ton-miles or hours of vehicle operation, whatever the 
case may be (see Supplemental Tables 7 and 67 of AEO2010).  In some cases, energy use 
is taken as a proxy for demand.  In contrast, for international large marine vessels, a 
different approach is utilized.  In short, vessel population projections estimated by Dr. 
James Corbett (University of Delaware) are used as a proxy for future vessel-miles (see 
Appendix D of CARB’s Oceangoing Ship Survey report, p. D-18) (CARB, 2005).   
 
Aviation 
For domestic and international freight and passenger aviation, national-level projections 
(in passenger-miles and ton-miles, respectively) are used to project California’s future 
commercial aviation demands (see Supplemental Table 66 of AEO2010).  Growth rates 
are estimated for each category of air travel and then applied to California’s base-year 
demands.  The domestic passenger and freight projections from AEO are assumed to be 
applicable to both domestic-intrastate and domestic-interstate aviation in California.  
General aviation demand is projected into the future using national-level projections of 
general aviation energy use as a proxy for hours of operation (see Supplemental Table 66 
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of AEO2010).  It is important to note that this approximation masks any future shifts 
between jet-powered and propeller airplanes, as well as the changing efficiency and 
usage (in terms of hours per year) of those planes.  The error this introduces to the model 
is relatively small, since general aviation demands are so minimal compared to the other 
aviation segments.  For the other/miscellaneous aviation category, the growth rate in 
future activity is tied to growth in the U.S. population.   
 
Off-Road & Construction Devices 
Projections for off-road and construction activity in the three different demand segments 
are estimated using CARB’s OFFROAD2007 model (CARB, 2007d).  First, I run the 
model for the years 2005 and 2040, in order to obtain demand and fuel use.  Then, I 
interpolate and extrapolate for all other years in the modeling horizon. 
 
Agricultural Vehicles 
Projections for agricultural vehicle activity are calculated in the same way as for off-road 
and construction devices by using CARB’s OFFROAD2007 model. 
 
Pipelines 
Future consumption of pipeline natural gas depends on the total quantity of natural gas 
demanded/transported in California in the future.  This, of course, depends on the 
particular scenario being run.  Therefore, projections for pipeline natural gas demand 
must be continually updated so that the exogenously specified trajectories are in line with 
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the endogenous demands for natural gas that are calculated by the model in a given 
model run. 
 
Light-duty Vehicle Cost and Efficiency Assumptions 
The following tables summarize the cost and efficiency assumptions for all light-duty 
vehicle technologies that are available to the CA-TIMES model in any future year.  For 
the most part, the baseline assumptions come from the EIA’s AEO2010 Reference Case 
assumptions and projections (EIA, 2010a, c).  Investment costs refer to the average price 
that a consumer would expect to pay for a vehicle. 
 
In certain cases, a handful of other sources are used to modify the EIA numbers data.  For 
instance, Moderate and Advanced Gasoline Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicles 
are not represented in the AEO2010.  Instead, I have created these two technologies to 
capture the potential for efficiency improvements in the light-duty sector.  These vehicles 
are simply conventional gasoline ICEs that achieve higher fuel economies (on the order 
of 15% to 30%) due to a suite of incremental efficiency enhancements, which necessitate 
small, but nontrivial, increases in the investment costs relative to the conventional 
Gasoline ICE.  The technology characterizations for Moderate and Advanced Gasoline 
ICEs are based on unpublished data from the U.S. EPA Office of Transportation and Air 
Quality (OTAQ) by way of the EPA’s US9r MARKAL model (EPA, 2008a).  Similarly, 
I have also added several E-85 Flex Fuel vehicle technologies beyond those represented 
in AEO2010 (e.g., E-85 Moderate ICEs, Advanced ICEs, HEVs, and PHEVs).  In all 
cases, the efficiencies of these technologies are the same as for their comparable gasoline 
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counterparts, while investment costs are based on the incremental cost increase of 
AEO2010’s standard E-85 Flex Fuel vehicle relative to the conventional Gasoline ICE 
(typically less than $1,000).  Only Gasoline PHEVs with 10- and 40-mile all-electric 
ranges are represented in AEO2010; however, as the tables below indicate, I also make 
PHEV 30s and 60s available to the model, as well as E-85 Flex Fuel and Diesel PHEVs 
with 10-, 30-, 40-, and 60-mile all-electric ranges.  In short, to make these technology 
characterizations, I use the AEO2010 cost estimates for PHEV 10s and 40s to 
approximate the cost of PHEV 30s and 60s, assuming the same per-kWh battery costs.  
(Note that in the AEO2010 Reference Case, the cost of lithium-ion batteries is assumed 
to level out at $500/kWh by 2030.  Fuel cell costs are assumed to drop to $139/kW by 
2030 and $55/kW by 2050.)  Then, I take the incremental cost increases of the Gasoline 
PHEV 10/30/40/60s compared to a Gasoline HEV and apply these to the E-85 Flex Fuel 
HEV and Diesel HEV, in order to approximate the costs of the PHEV versions of these 
technologies.  In general, Diesel ICEs, HEVs, and PHEVs are more expensive than the E-
85 Flex Fuel versions, which are more expensive than the Gasoline versions.  In 
calculating PHEV efficiencies, I assume that Gasoline, E-85 Flex Fuel, and Diesel PHEV 
10/30/40/60 efficiencies in charge-sustaining (CS) mode are the same as for their HEV 
counterparts, while efficiencies in charge-depleting (CD) mode are much higher, due to 
the greater efficiency of an electric motor in all-electric operation.39  CD-mode 
efficiencies are based on the technology characterizations of EPRI (2007) and Kromer 
and Heywood (2007a).  Furthermore, PHEVs are restricted from over-consuming either 
                                                 
39
 Note that the assumption of all PHEVs having the same efficiency in charge-sustaining mode is a bit of 
an approximation because of the varying weights that these vehicles would achieve.  However, for this 
same reason, I assume that PHEV efficiencies in charge-depleting mode are lower for vehicles with greater 
all-electric ranges (i.e., heavier battery packs).   
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electricity or liquid fuel for propulsion energy by applying fuel split shares based on 
published utility factor curves (EPRI, 2007; Kromer and Heywood, 2007a).  
 
Table 24  Investment Cost Assumptions for New Light-Duty Cars in the Reference Case 
 
 
  
Investment Costs for New Light-Duty Cars ($/vehicle)
(Note:  Missing data value indicates that technology is not available in given year.)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055
Gasoline ICE 25,775 25,924 26,421 26,875 26,951 27,092 27,291 27,291 27,291 27,291 27,291
Gasoline ICE (Moderate Eff.) 26,531 26,681 27,178 27,631 27,708 27,849 28,047 28,047 28,047 28,047 28,047
Gasoline ICE (Advanced Eff.) 27,288 27,437 27,934 28,388 28,464 28,605 28,804 28,804 28,804 28,804 28,804
Gasoline HEV 29,473 29,413 29,491 29,557 29,427 29,358 29,437 29,437 29,437 29,437 29,437
E85 Flex Fuel ICE 26,150 26,299 26,797 27,251 27,326 27,465 27,661 27,661 27,661 27,661 27,661
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Moderate Eff.) 26,906 27,055 27,554 28,008 28,082 28,221 28,417 28,417 28,417 28,417 28,417
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Advanced Eff.) 27,663 27,812 28,310 28,764 28,839 28,977 29,174 29,174 29,174 29,174 29,174
E85 Flex Fuel HEV 29,848 29,787 29,866 29,934 29,801 29,730 29,806 29,806 29,806 29,806 29,806
Diesel ICE 31,220 31,352 30,528 30,155 29,868 29,923 29,955 29,955 29,955 29,955 29,955
Diesel HEV -- -- 29,788 29,788 29,637 29,549 29,582 29,582 29,582 29,582 29,582
Gasoline PHEV10 31,967 31,967 31,967 31,456 30,962 30,745 30,824 30,824 30,824 30,824 30,824
Gasoline PHEV30 40,800 40,800 40,800 38,228 36,439 35,693 35,772 35,772 35,772 35,772 35,772
Gasoline PHEV40 45,216 45,216 45,216 41,614 39,178 38,167 38,246 38,246 38,246 38,246 38,246
Gasoline PHEV60 54,049 54,049 54,049 48,386 44,655 43,115 43,194 43,194 43,194 43,194 43,194
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV10 32,343 32,343 32,343 31,832 31,337 31,117 31,194 31,194 31,194 31,194 31,194
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV30 41,176 41,176 41,176 38,604 36,814 36,065 36,142 36,142 36,142 36,142 36,142
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV40 45,592 45,592 45,592 41,990 39,552 38,539 38,616 38,616 38,616 38,616 38,616
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV60 54,425 54,425 54,425 48,762 45,029 43,487 43,564 43,564 43,564 43,564 43,564
Diesel PHEV10 31,686 31,686 31,686 31,686 31,172 30,936 30,969 30,969 30,969 30,969 30,969
Diesel PHEV30 38,458 38,458 38,458 38,458 36,649 35,884 35,917 35,917 35,917 35,917 35,917
Diesel PHEV40 41,844 41,844 41,844 41,844 39,388 38,358 38,391 38,391 38,391 38,391 38,391
Diesel PHEV60 48,616 48,616 48,616 48,616 44,865 43,306 43,339 43,339 43,339 43,339 43,339
Battery-Electric 89,485 93,325 95,286 95,123 85,823 78,071 77,915 77,915 77,915 77,915 77,915
Hydrogen Fuel Cell -- -- 73,508 64,341 57,823 52,850 49,037 49,037 49,037 49,037 49,037
Gasoline Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Methanol Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Dedicated Ethanol ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Natural Gas ICE 33,400 33,541 33,971 34,413 34,485 34,607 34,790 34,790 34,790 34,790 34,790
Natural Gas Bi-Fuel ICE 32,065 32,211 32,634 33,077 33,159 33,300 33,515 33,515 33,515 33,515 33,515
LPG ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
LPG Bi-Fuel ICE 31,104 31,253 31,750 32,204 32,280 32,421 32,620 32,620 32,620 32,620 32,620
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Table 25  Investment Cost Assumptions for New Light-Duty Trucks in the Reference Case 
 
 
Table 26  Fuel Economy Assumptions for New Light-Duty Cars, All Except PHEVs in the Reference 
Case 
 
 
Investment Costs for New Light-Duty Trucks ($/vehicle)
(Note:  Missing data value indicates that technology is not available in given year.)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055
Gasoline ICE 34,084 34,207 34,658 35,174 35,353 35,561 35,818 35,818 35,818 35,818 35,818
Gasoline ICE (Moderate Eff.) 35,263 35,386 35,837 36,353 36,532 36,740 36,997 36,997 36,997 36,997 36,997
Gasoline ICE (Advanced Eff.) 36,442 36,565 37,016 37,532 37,711 37,919 38,176 38,176 38,176 38,176 38,176
Gasoline HEV 38,465 38,401 38,376 38,388 38,258 38,236 38,394 38,394 38,394 38,394 38,394
E85 Flex Fuel ICE 34,535 34,657 35,106 35,620 35,796 36,001 36,257 36,257 36,257 36,257 36,257
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Moderate Eff.) 35,714 35,836 36,285 36,799 36,975 37,180 37,436 37,436 37,436 37,436 37,436
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Advanced Eff.) 36,893 37,015 37,464 37,978 38,154 38,359 38,615 38,615 38,615 38,615 38,615
E85 Flex Fuel HEV 38,915 38,851 38,824 38,835 38,700 38,677 38,833 38,833 38,833 38,833 38,833
Diesel ICE 42,334 42,441 40,425 40,491 40,175 40,114 40,387 40,387 40,387 40,387 40,387
Diesel HEV -- -- -- 38,413 38,238 38,181 38,277 38,277 38,277 38,277 38,277
Gasoline PHEV10 39,793 39,793 39,793 39,793 39,793 39,623 39,781 39,781 39,781 39,781 39,781
Gasoline PHEV30 45,270 45,270 45,270 45,270 45,270 44,571 44,729 44,729 44,729 44,729 44,729
Gasoline PHEV40 48,008 48,008 48,008 48,008 48,008 47,045 47,203 47,203 47,203 47,203 47,203
Gasoline PHEV60 53,485 53,485 53,485 53,485 53,485 51,993 52,151 52,151 52,151 52,151 52,151
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV10 40,236 40,236 40,236 40,236 40,236 40,064 40,220 40,220 40,220 40,220 40,220
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV30 45,713 45,713 45,713 45,713 45,713 45,012 45,168 45,168 45,168 45,168 45,168
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV40 48,451 48,451 48,451 48,451 48,451 47,486 47,642 47,642 47,642 47,642 47,642
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV60 53,928 53,928 53,928 53,928 53,928 52,434 52,590 52,590 52,590 52,590 52,590
Diesel PHEV10 39,773 39,773 39,773 39,773 39,773 39,568 39,664 39,664 39,664 39,664 39,664
Diesel PHEV30 45,250 45,250 45,250 45,250 45,250 44,516 44,612 44,612 44,612 44,612 44,612
Diesel PHEV40 47,989 47,989 47,989 47,989 47,989 46,990 47,086 47,086 47,086 47,086 47,086
Diesel PHEV60 53,466 53,466 53,466 53,466 53,466 51,938 52,034 52,034 52,034 52,034 52,034
Battery-Electric 111,741 115,151 115,090 115,319 104,277 95,115 95,166 95,166 95,166 95,166 95,166
Hydrogen Fuel Cell -- -- 80,120 69,446 61,602 55,599 50,942 50,942 50,942 50,942 50,942
Gasoline Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Methanol Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Dedicated Ethanol ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Natural Gas ICE 33,503 33,584 34,026 34,630 34,749 34,898 35,064 35,064 35,064 35,064 35,064
Natural Gas Bi-Fuel ICE 32,604 32,687 33,123 33,716 33,837 33,991 34,173 34,173 34,173 34,173 34,173
LPG ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
LPG Bi-Fuel ICE 31,269 31,361 31,839 32,532 32,676 32,834 33,013 33,013 33,013 33,013 33,013
New Vehicle Fuel Economy (mpgge) - All Except PHEVs
(Note:  Fuel economies correspond to "test-cycle values, not on-road. Missing data value indicates that technology is not available in given year.)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055
Gasoline ICE 31.2 31.5 34.3 37.1 37.8 38.6 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0
Gasoline ICE (Moderate Eff.) 35.3 35.7 38.8 42.0 42.7 43.6 45.2 45.2 45.2 45.2 45.2
Gasoline ICE (Advanced Eff.) 40.6 41.0 44.6 48.3 49.1 50.1 52.0 52.0 52.0 52.0 52.0
Gasoline HEV 45.1 44.9 48.5 51.0 51.8 52.6 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5
E85 Flex Fuel ICE 31.5 31.9 34.6 37.5 38.1 38.9 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Moderate Eff.) 35.3 35.7 38.8 42.0 42.7 43.6 45.2 45.2 45.2 45.2 45.2
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Advanced Eff.) 40.6 41.0 44.6 48.3 49.1 50.1 52.0 52.0 52.0 52.0 52.0
E85 Flex Fuel HEV 45.1 44.9 48.5 51.0 51.8 52.6 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5
Diesel ICE 39.2 39.5 42.4 45.6 46.2 46.7 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.0
Diesel HEV -- -- 59.5 59.1 59.8 60.3 60.6 60.6 60.6 60.6 60.6
Battery-Electric 91.1 86.8 100.9 126.0 149.3 148.4 146.5 146.5 146.5 146.5 146.5
Hydrogen Fuel Cell 74.9 75.7 82.3 89.1 90.6 92.5 96.0 96.0 96.0 96.0 96.0
Gasoline Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Methanol Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Dedicated Ethanol ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Natural Gas ICE 33.2 33.4 36.6 39.5 40.2 41.0 41.9 41.9 41.9 41.9 41.9
Natural Gas Bi-Fuel ICE 30.8 31.0 33.9 36.6 37.2 38.0 39.0 39.0 39.0 39.0 39.0
LPG ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
LPG Bi-Fuel ICE 31.2 31.5 34.3 37.1 37.7 38.6 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0
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Table 27  Fuel Economy Assumptions for New Light-Duty PHEV Cars in the Reference Case 
 
 
Table 28  Fuel Economy Assumptions for New Light-Duty Trucks, All Except PHEVs in the 
Reference Case 
 
 
  
New Plug-in Hybrid Vehicle Fuel Economy (mpgge)
(Note:  Fuel economies correspond to "test-cycle values, not on-road. Missing data value indicates that technology is not available in given year.)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055
Gasoline PHEV10 45.1 44.9 48.5 51.0 51.8 52.6 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5
Gasoline PHEV30 45.1 44.9 48.5 51.0 51.8 52.6 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5
Gasoline PHEV40 45.1 44.9 48.5 51.0 51.8 52.6 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5
Gasoline PHEV60 45.1 44.9 48.5 51.0 51.8 52.6 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV10 45.1 44.9 48.5 51.0 51.8 52.6 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV30 45.1 44.9 48.5 51.0 51.8 52.6 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV40 45.1 44.9 48.5 51.0 51.8 52.6 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV60 45.1 44.9 48.5 51.0 51.8 52.6 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5 53.5
Diesel PHEV10 -- -- 59.5 59.1 59.8 60.3 60.6 60.6 60.6 60.6 60.6
Diesel PHEV30 -- -- 59.5 59.1 59.8 60.3 60.6 60.6 60.6 60.6 60.6
Diesel PHEV40 -- -- 59.5 59.1 59.8 60.3 60.6 60.6 60.6 60.6 60.6
Diesel PHEV60 -- -- 59.5 59.1 59.8 60.3 60.6 60.6 60.6 60.6 60.6
Gasoline PHEV10 158.7 158.2 157.2 175.0 197.6 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4
Gasoline PHEV30 156.9 156.3 155.4 170.5 189.2 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7
Gasoline PHEV40 156.9 156.3 155.4 170.5 189.2 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8
Gasoline PHEV60 155.3 154.8 153.8 166.8 182.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV10 158.7 158.2 157.2 175.0 197.6 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV30 156.9 156.3 155.4 170.5 189.2 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV40 156.9 156.3 155.4 170.5 189.2 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV60 155.3 154.8 153.8 166.8 182.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4
Diesel PHEV10 -- -- 157.2 175.0 197.6 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4
Diesel PHEV30 -- -- 155.4 170.5 189.2 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7
Diesel PHEV40 -- -- 155.4 170.5 189.2 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8
Diesel PHEV60 -- -- 153.8 166.8 182.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4
Charge-Sustaining Mode
Charge-Depleting Mode
New Vehicle Fuel Economy (mpgge) - All Except PHEVs
(Note:  Fuel economies correspond to "test-cycle values, not on-road. Missing data value indicates that technology is not available in given year.)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055
Gasoline ICE 22.5 22.5 24.4 26.9 28.0 28.9 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
Gasoline ICE (Moderate Eff.) 26.0 26.0 28.2 31.1 32.4 33.4 34.7 34.7 34.7 34.7 34.7
Gasoline ICE (Advanced Eff.) 30.8 30.7 33.3 36.8 38.3 39.5 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0
Gasoline HEV 32.6 32.4 35.1 37.6 38.6 39.5 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3
E85 Flex Fuel ICE 22.8 22.7 24.6 27.2 28.3 29.2 30.3 30.3 30.3 30.3 30.3
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Moderate Eff.) 26.0 26.0 28.2 31.1 32.4 33.4 34.7 34.7 34.7 34.7 34.7
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Advanced Eff.) 30.8 30.7 33.3 36.8 38.3 39.5 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0
E85 Flex Fuel HEV 32.6 32.4 35.1 37.6 38.6 39.5 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3
Diesel ICE 28.4 28.2 30.1 32.5 33.4 34.1 34.6 34.6 34.6 34.6 34.6
Diesel HEV 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 42.1 42.8 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3
Battery-Electric 51.7 53.4 63.4 78.4 92.7 92.4 92.1 92.1 92.1 92.1 92.1
Hydrogen Fuel Cell 54.1 54.1 58.6 64.6 67.3 69.4 72.1 72.1 72.1 72.1 72.1
Gasoline Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Methanol Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Dedicated Ethanol ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Natural Gas ICE 25.7 25.6 27.8 30.9 31.8 32.6 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5
Natural Gas Bi-Fuel ICE 23.9 23.7 25.7 28.6 29.4 30.2 31.1 31.1 31.1 31.1 31.1
LPG ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
LPG Bi-Fuel ICE 23.9 23.8 26.0 29.5 30.6 31.4 32.4 32.4 32.4 32.4 32.4
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Table 29  Fuel Economy Assumptions for New Light-Duty PHEV Trucks in the Reference Case 
 
 
  
New Plug-in Hybrid Vehicle Fuel Economy (mpgge)
(Note:  Fuel economies correspond to "test-cycle values, not on-road. Missing data value indicates that technology is not available in given year.)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055
Gasoline PHEV10 32.6 32.4 35.1 37.6 38.6 39.5 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3
Gasoline PHEV30 32.6 32.4 35.1 37.6 38.6 39.5 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3
Gasoline PHEV40 32.6 32.4 35.1 37.6 38.6 39.5 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3
Gasoline PHEV60 32.6 32.4 35.1 37.6 38.6 39.5 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV10 32.6 32.4 35.1 37.6 38.6 39.5 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV30 32.6 32.4 35.1 37.6 38.6 39.5 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV40 32.6 32.4 35.1 37.6 38.6 39.5 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV60 32.6 32.4 35.1 37.6 38.6 39.5 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3
Diesel PHEV10 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 42.1 42.8 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3
Diesel PHEV30 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 42.1 42.8 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3
Diesel PHEV40 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 42.1 42.8 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3
Diesel PHEV60 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 42.1 42.8 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3
Gasoline PHEV10 158.1 158.1 158.1 158.1 158.1 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0
Gasoline PHEV30 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2
Gasoline PHEV40 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1
Gasoline PHEV60 145.9 145.9 145.9 145.9 145.9 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV10 158.1 158.1 158.1 158.1 158.1 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV30 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV40 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV60 145.9 145.9 145.9 145.9 145.9 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1
Diesel PHEV10 158.1 158.1 158.1 158.1 158.1 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0
Diesel PHEV30 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2
Diesel PHEV40 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1
Diesel PHEV60 145.9 145.9 145.9 145.9 145.9 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1
Charge-Sustaining Mode
Charge-Depleting Mode
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II.3 Scenario Results and Discussion 
Now that the structure of the CA-TIMES model and many of its assumptions have been 
described, this section highlights the results of several analyses in which the model was 
used to understand how the California energy system could be significantly decarbonized 
in the long term, what the technological and resource implications might be in such a 
case, and how much the energy system transition could cost.  To this end, a number of 
scenarios have been created using the model, first a Reference Case scenario and then a 
multi-strategy Deep GHG Reduction Scenario that looks specifically at an ambitious 
“80in50” emission reduction target for the entire energy system (not just the transport 
sector, as was the case in the original 80in50 studies described in the Chapter I of this 
dissertation).  Finally, several variants of the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario are 
analyzed, in order to understand how the transition to a low-carbon economy in 
California could be different if the potential of certain technologies and resources is 
substantially restricted or enhanced. 
 
II.3.1 Reference Case Scenario 
The CA-TIMES Reference Case is a scenario describing the potential development of 
California’s energy system over the next several decades under business-as-usual (BAU) 
conditions.  It is not a prediction of what will happen, but rather a single vision of what 
could happen, if the technological and policy assumptions in the model were to come to 
fruition and consumers and firms behaved optimally from a cost minimization standpoint.  
While, in theory, a number of Reference Case scenarios could be developed, it is really 
only practical to develop one.  The Reference Case is the scenario to which all other 
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scenarios, particularly the deep greenhouse gas reduction scenarios, are compared.  The 
following sections illustrate the development of the energy system in the Reference Case, 
taking an in-depth view of it from a variety of different perspectives.  These various 
“cuts” hopefully provide a sense for how the system could potentially develop in the 
absence of any substantial effort to transition California toward a low-carbon society. 
 
Policy is an important driver of energy system development.  And while the previous 
sections have discussed the most important resource, technology, and demand 
assumptions – and their respective data sources – that have been used to develop the CA-
TIMES Reference Case, the Reference Case is also strongly dependent on current 
policies and how they are assumed to develop over time.    
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Table 30 summarizes the policies represented in the Reference Case, providing brief 
descriptions of each, how they are modeled in CA-TIMES, and when they are assumed to 
expire, if at all.  Although it is not possible to represent every single policy that affects 
California’s energy system, the list below attempts to capture those of greatest 
importance and with the largest impact.  Notably excluded from explicit policy 
representation are, for example, the Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS), Zero Emissions 
Vehicle (ZEV) mandates, California’s “anti-sprawl” transportation and land use 
regulations (SB 375), and certain measures for appliance energy efficiency and goods 
movement.  Future iterations will make it possible to represent these policies, especially 
with respect to the LCFS, for which the emissions accounting framework of CA-TIMES 
would first need to be significantly overhauled. 
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Table 30  Brief Descriptions of Policies Represented in the CA-TIMES Reference Case 
Policies Descriptions 
Biofuel Subsidies 
- Corn ethanol:  Federal Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (i.e., “blender’s 
credit”) of $0.45/gal.  Assumed to expire in 2015. 
- Sugar cane ethanol:  Same as corn ethanol. 
- Cellulosic ethanol:  Federal tax credit of $1.01/gal.  Based on the Food, 
Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 (i.e., the “farm bill”).  Assumed to 
expire in 2020. 
- Biodiesel:  Federal tax credit of $1.00/gal for biodiesel from soy and animal 
tallow, $0.50/gal for biodiesel from yellow grease.  Based on American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004.  Assumed to expire in 2015. 
Biofuel Import Tariffs - Sugar cane and other types of imported ethanol:  Import duty of $0.54/gal. 
Transportation Fuel Taxes40 
- Gasoline:  California state tax of $0.49/gal (includes excise tax and state, 
county, and local sales taxes).  Federal excise tax of $0.184/gal.  Assumed to 
always be the same. 
- Diesel:  California state tax of $0.49/gal (includes excise tax and state, county, 
and local sales taxes).  Federal excise tax of $0.244/gal.  Assumed to always be 
the same. 
- Ethanol and E-85:  No additional taxes other than those for gasoline. 
- Jet Fuel (kerosene-type):  Federal excise tax of $0.044/gal for commercial 
aviation. 
- Aviation gasoline:  Federal excise tax of $0.194/gal.  Assumed to always be the 
same. 
- Liquid Petroleum Gases (LPG):  Federal excise tax of $0.183/gal.  Assumed to 
always be the same. 
- Compressed Natural Gas (CNG):  Federal excise tax of $0.044/gal.  Assumed to 
be the same as jet fuel.  Assumed to always be the same. 
- Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG):  Federal excise tax of $0.243/gal.  Assumed to 
always be the same. 
- Liquefied H2:  Federal excise tax of $0.184/gal.  Assumed to be the same as 
conventional gasoline.  Assumed to always be the same. 
- FT liquid fuels from coal:  Federal excise tax of $0.244/gal.  Assumed to be the 
same as conventional diesel.  Assumed to always be the same. 
- FT liquid fuels from biomass:  Federal excise tax of $0.244/gal.  Assumed to be 
the same as conventional diesel.  Assumed to always be the same. 
Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) Standards 
- Light-duty passenger cars:  New model-year vehicle fleet must achieve 263 
gCO2/mile (33.8 mpg) in 2012, strengthening to 225 gCO2/mile (39.5 mpg) in 
2016, assumed to remain constant thereafter.   
- Light-duty passenger trucks:  New model-year vehicle fleet must achieve 346 
gCO2/mile (25.7 mpg) in 2012, strengthening to 298 gCO2/mile (29.8 mpg) in 
2016, assumed to remain constant thereafter. 
Electric Vehicle Subsidies 
- Light-duty PHEVs and BEVs:  Tax credit for new plug-in electric vehicles is 
worth $2,500 plus $417 for each kWh of battery capacity over 5 kWh.  The 
portion of the credit determined by battery capacity cannot exceed $5,000; 
therefore, the total amount of the credit allowed for a new plug-in electric 
vehicle is $7,500.  Based on the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 
2008, and later the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009.  Credit is 
supposed to expire for each manufacturer soon after it has sold 200,000 
cumulative PHEV/BEVs for use in the U.S.  However, in CA-TIMES the 
credit is simply assumed to expire in 2012. 
GHG Emission Performance 
Standard for New Power Plants 
- Establishes a greenhouse gases emission performance standard for all baseload 
generation of local publicly owned electric utilities at a rate of emissions of 
greenhouse gases that is no higher than the rate of emissions of greenhouse 
gases for combined-cycle natural gas baseload generation [California Senate 
Bill (SB) 1368].  This essentially equates to “no new coal plants in California”.  
In CA-TIMES, the law is applied to coal steam, coal IGCC, and coal-to-H2 
                                                 
40
 For current federal fuel tax information, see the following U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) webpage:  
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p510/ch01.html#d0e2009.  For current state gasoline and diesel tax 
information, see the following API webpage:  http://www.api.org/statistics/fueltaxes/. 
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plants. 
Renewable Fuels Standard 
(RFS) 
- Mandates the increased use of transportation biofuels, culminating in 15 billion 
gallons per year (BGY) of corn ethanol in 2022, 16 BGY cellulosic ethanol, 1 
BGY biodiesel, and 4 BGY other advanced biofuels.  “Other advanced 
biofuels” are assumed to be sugar cane ethanol and bio-gasoline in the CA-
TIMES model.  RFS mandates are assumed to end in 2022.  California is 
assumed to only be “responsible” for 9% to 10.5% of the total U.S. biofuels 
mandates, consistent with its current and projected share of the U.S. population 
and liquid fuels consumption.  Based on the Energy Independence and Security 
Act (EISA) of 2007. 
Renewable Electricity 
Incentives 
- Renewable electricity production tax credit (PTC):  Credit of 2.2 cents/kWh for 
Wind, Geothermal, and Closed-loop biomass; and 1.1 cents/kWh for all other 
renewables (Open-loop biomass, Landfill gas, Hydroelectric, Municipal Solid 
Waste, Hydrokinetic “Flowing Water” Power, Small Hydroelectric, Tidal 
Energy, Wave Energy, and Ocean Thermal).  Duration of credit is 10 years for 
facilities placed in service by the end of 2012 (wind) or 2013 (all others).  
Thus, all credits assumed to expire by 2022/2023.  Note that Solar is excluded 
from the production tax credit because it receives the investment tax credit. 
- Business energy investment tax credit (ITC) for renewables:  Credit equal to 
30% of capital expenditures for Solar and Fuel cells.  No maximum credit for 
solar; a maximum of $3,000/kW for fuel cells.  In general, credits are available 
for eligible systems placed in service before the end of 2016.  In CA-TIMES, 
credits are assumed to expire in 2016.  Note that as of 2009, other types of 
renewable generation are allowed to take the ITC; however, they would then 
have to forfeit the PTC.  In CA-TIMES, it is assumed that only solar and fuel 
cells can take the ITC. 
 
Electricity Generation 
The electric generation sector is sure to play an instrumental role in the future 
development of California’s energy system and its corresponding environmental impacts.  
Figure 28 illustrates the model’s Reference Case projections for electricity generation by 
plant type over the entire time horizon.  Several noteworthy observations can be made.  
First, electricity supply and demand is projected to grow significantly over the next 
several decades (by more than 50%).  This will necessitate considerable future 
investment in the generation stock, especially in light of the multitude of older, existing 
plants, which are scheduled to retire over the next two decades.  Second, natural gas 
generation grows considerably between 2020 and 2025.  This is due to natural gas being 
the most attractive, least-cost generation source during these years and because a 
significant amount of generation is needed after 2020 to make up for the shortfall caused 
by the retirement of existing nuclear plants and termination of existing electricity import 
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contracts, both of which are scheduled to occur around 2020 or soon thereafter.  The 
growth in natural gas generation is accounted for by the increased utilization of existing 
NGCC plants, many of which are not at the moment used to their full capacities, as well 
as investment in new NGCC plants.  In short, natural gas becomes increasingly used for 
baseload power generation in California.  Later in the model time horizon, generation 
from wind, geothermal, and solar thermal plants becomes cost-competitive with natural 
gas plants, thanks to increasing natural gas prices and assumed declines in the investment 
costs of these renewable options.  This causes the share of low- and zero-carbon 
electricity generation to rise in the later periods, after having been relatively low for 
several decades as a result of the retirement of the state’s two nuclear plants around 2020 
(Figure 29).  Unless the lives of existing nuclear plants are extended, new nuclear plants 
are built, and/or a renewable portfolio standard is implemented, fossil generation could 
still be quite high in California for years to come.   
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Figure 28  Electricity Generation by Plant Type in the Reference Case 
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Figure 29  Share of Low-Carbon Electricity Generation by Type in the Reference Case 
 
At this point, it is important to briefly note the way electricity imports are handled in CA-
TIMES.  There are two categories of imports, firm and system.  Firm imports of coal, 
nuclear, hydro, and oil are dealt with in a relatively straightforward manner:  they are 
phased out according to the scheduled expiration of known firm import contracts.  
System imports, on the other hand, are a bit less certain since they depend on the spot 
market for electricity, as well as electricity demand in other western states.  In the CA-
TIMES Reference Case, an important assumption is made that system imports from both 
the Pacific Northwest and Desert Southwest decline from 2010 to 2025, ultimately 
ceasing in this final year.  This is not to say, however, that no electricity imports are 
allowed to enter California in the later years.  They are just represented in a different way 
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from the “Exogenous Imports” category shown in the figure (i.e., exogenous imports 
refers to current firm and system imports with a certain point-estimate cost signature, say 
in ¢/kWh, whose contracts are either set to retire within the next decade or whose use in 
California is difficult to predict going forward).  From a modeling standpoint, it is 
preferable to represent all new electricity supply to California at the technology level 
(i.e., with investment cost, efficiency, availability data), rather than as commodity flows; 
hence, future supplies of imports are endogenously embedded in some of the power plant 
technologies listed in Table 7 and shown in Figure 28.  For instance, although not shown, 
a portion of the wind generation expected in California in the Reference Case actually 
comes from out-of-state resources, since these resources are likely to be exploited by 
California electric utilities or their partners and are, thus, part of the California energy 
system within the framework of the CA-TIMES model.  Similarly, due to siting issues, it 
may be reasonable to assume that a few of the natural gas plants that are brought into the 
state’s energy system over time will in fact be built outside of the its borders.  The 
advantage of this approach to representing imports is that the electricity produced by 
these out-of-state power plants can be modeled with bottom-up technological detail.  
Note that electricity imports are also subject to the Renewable Portfolio Standard within 
the framework of CA-TIMES. 
 
Industrial, Commercial, Residential, and Agricultural Sectors 
Along with natural gas, electricity is one of the two most consumed energy commodities 
in the industrial, commercial, residential, and agricultural (ICRA) end-use sectors.  
Hence, it should not be surprising that the continuously growing energy demands of the 
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ICRA sectors are largely responsible for driving the increases in electricity generation 
witnessed above.  Projections of useful energy demand by fuel type are shown for each of 
the ICRA sectors, starting in Figure 30.  The industrial and commercial sectors appear 
poised for the most substantial growth over the next four decades, though growth is 
strong in the residential and agricultural sectors as well.  In terms of the fuel mix, there is 
a small, but noticeable, shift from natural gas to electricity; yet, for the most part the mix 
remains unchanged.  It is important to remember that, as discussed previously, both 
demand trajectories and the fuel use mix for each of the ICRA sectors are exogenously 
specified by the modeler for all future years.  Therefore, the assumptions input to the 
model entirely govern the solution that is obtained.  In developing the CA-TIMES 
Reference Case, I have decided to ground these exogenous assumptions in a publicly 
available scenario that has already undergone review, namely the Baseline demand 
scenario developed for the California Energy Commission as part of the UC-Davis 
Advanced Energy Pathways (AEP) project (McCarthy et al., 2008a, b).  The energy 
demand projections created in the AEP study are based on growth trajectories for various 
other things, such as shipments of industrial and agricultural products, commercial floor 
space, number of residential households, gross state product, and population, to name just 
a few.  Incremental energy efficiency improvements are taken into account in these 
projections, in the sense that the Baseline demand scenario assumes a continuation of 
historical and projected near-term trends – in other words, business-as-usual. 
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Figure 30  Useful Energy Demand by Fuel Type in the Industrial Sector in the Reference Case 
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Figure 31  Useful Energy Demand by Fuel Type in the Commercial Sector in the Reference Case 
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Figure 32  Useful Energy Demand by Fuel Type in the Residential Sector in the Reference Case 
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Figure 33  Useful Energy Demand by Fuel Type in the Agricultural Sector in the Reference Case 
 
Transportation Fuels Consumption and Technology Trends 
Final energy demand in the transportation sector is projected to grow strongly in the 
Reference Case (more than 50% between 2005 and 2050), as shown in Figure 34.  (Note 
that unlike for the ICRA sectors, fuel choice and investment decisions in the transport 
sector – as in the electric generation and energy supply and conversion sectors – are 
calculated endogenously by the model.  In other words, they are model outputs, not input 
assumptions.)  Increased consumption of diesel, jet fuel, natural gas, and residual fuel oil 
in the non-LDV subsectors is responsible for much of this growth, while increased 
ethanol demand (primarily cellulosic ethanol) in the light-duty subsector, particularly in 
the later years, contributes to a slowing of gasoline demand.  A considerable quantity of 
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ethanol is consumed in the form of E-85 fuel (85% ethanol, 15% gasoline, by volume), as 
opposed to oxygenated gasoline, for which the ethanol blend limit after 2010 is, by 
assumption, relaxed from 5.7% to 10% (by vol.) – so-called E-10 fuel.  After initially 
being spurred by the biofuels mandates of the RFS, cellulosic ethanol consumption grows 
on its own, thanks to favorable production economics compared to gasoline, which only 
becomes more expensive over time due to the ever-increasing cost of crude oil (Figure 
25).   
 
 
Figure 34  Final Energy Demand by Fuel Type in the Transportation Sector in the Reference Case 
 
In fact, biofuels consumption in general takes off in the Reference Case, experiencing a 
more than 10-fold increase between 2005 and 2050, reaching a combined level of almost 
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1,050 PJ (~8.0 billion gge) by 2050 (Figure 35).  Continued use of imported corn- and 
sugarcane-based ethanol, combined with an expanding market for biodiesel and cellulosic 
ethanol, contribute to this strong growth.  For the biofuels whose production is explicitly 
modeled in CA-TIMES (i.e., all except for corn and sugar cane ethanol imports), Figure 
36 shows the breakdown of the various biomass feedstock types used for production.  
Some feedstocks grow more quickly than others and/or are consumed in greater 
quantities in the near to medium term, i.e., pre-2030 (e.g., Orchard and Vineyard Wastes 
and the various types of Municipal Solid Waste).  Of course, the particular biomass 
feedstocks the model chooses to use are simply a function of the production economics, 
specifically the assumed supply curves for each feedstock type, which come from Parker 
(2010).  Site-specific issues and geo-spatial concerns are not explicitly taken into account 
within the single-region framework of the CA-TIMES model.  That being said, the 
biomass supply curves from Parker (2010) are derived from a spatially-explicit 
geographic information system (GIS) optimization model for biomass production, 
transport, and conversion to liquid fuel products.  Hence, spatial considerations are, at the 
very least, not completely overlooked in the current analysis. 
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Figure 35  Biofuels Consumption by Fuel Type in the Reference Case 
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Figure 36  Biomass Supply by Feedstock Type in the Reference Case 
 
The previous figures have shown essentially no increased penetration of electricity or 
hydrogen as transportation fuels in the Reference Case, save for electricity use in the 
light- and heavy-rail segments.  This result is a function of the economics of these vehicle 
pathways, including vehicle investment, O&M, and fuel costs, the latter of which 
depends on the cost of building new fuel conversion facilities and refueling/recharging 
infrastructure to supply electricity and hydrogen to these vehicles.  The costs of these 
alternative pathways are further compounded by the higher technology-specific discount 
rates that are assumed for them in order to better represent consumer behavior (i.e., 
perceived risk and unfamiliarity with alternative fuel vehicles).  Higher hurdle rates have 
the impact of increasing annualized investment costs, in effect shortening required 
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payback periods.  Hence, the more efficient, though more capital-intensive, vehicle 
technologies – HEVs, PHEVs, BEVs, and FCVs – become less attractive from the point-
of-view of the model, since their fuel savings are not valued quite as much.  The hurdle 
rates assumed in the CA-TIMES model are pulled from different sources – namely, 
Schäfer and Jacoby (2006) and the U.S. EPA’s 9-region MARKAL model (EPA, 2008a).  
As an example, conventional gasoline and ethanol ICE vehicles are assumed to have a 
hurdle rate of 18%, gasoline and ethanol HEVs 25%, and BEVs and FCVs 45%.41 
 
Over the next several decades, Reference Case energy consumption by light-duty cars 
and trucks is projected to grow quite significantly (Figure 37) and in addition is expected 
to maintain its high share of total transportation fuels demand (~50%), even in spite of 
considerable demand growth expected in the non-LDV subsectors.  Unlike today, 
however, LDV energy demand will be met by more than just oxygenated gasoline.  E-85 
could also see much more widespread use, due to the biofuels mandates and increasing 
cost-competitiveness of ethanol relative to gasoline.  Such significant market penetration 
would necessitate a fairly rapid uptake of E-85 Flex Fuel vehicles, especially over the 
next 10-15 years (Figure 38).  Aside from flex fuel technologies, gasoline vehicles 
continue to remain the dominant technology in the LDV subsector, though not all of these 
will be of the conventional ICE variety.  As Figure 38 shows, both Advanced Gasoline 
ICEs and Gasoline HEVs achieve significant market share over the next two decades.  At 
first, these more efficient technologies are needed to meet the increasingly stringent 
CAFE standards of the 2012-2016 time period.  But then, the model simply chooses them 
                                                 
41
 A 25% hurdle rate corresponds to a payback period of approximately 4 years, while a 45% payback 
period is a little more than 2 years. 
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because, with rising oil prices ($98/barrel in 2020, $111/barrel in 2030, and $125/barrel 
in 2050), they are more attractive from an economic standpoint (weighing the lifecycle 
costs of fuel, capital, variable and fixed O&M, and taking into account higher hurdle 
rates).  Due to the rising average fuel economy of the light-duty vehicle fleet (Figure 39), 
total fuel consumption plateaus over the next decade or so, before re-attaining its 
historically steep upward trajectory once annual demand growth again overtakes annual 
efficiency gains.  The obvious take-home message from this model result is that increased 
fuel economy standards can indeed by quite effective at slowing the growth of light-duty 
vehicle fuel consumption.  Though, achieving absolute reductions in fuel use, in the face 
of continuously increasing demand for light-duty VMT, could be a substantially more 
difficult challenge altogether.   
 
Note that in Figure 38, the reason conventional Gasoline ICEs re-take their portion of the 
gasoline vehicle market in the later years is simply because of the exogenously specified 
inputs for vehicle efficiency, which assume (at the technology level) a slow but sustained 
rise in conventional ICE vehicle fuel economy over time, even in the absence of more 
stringent CAFE standards after 2016.  This also explains why one observes a “kink” after 
2030 in the new model-year vehicle fuel economies shown in Figure 39.  Of course, it is 
entirely possible that, in a BAU baseline future, new vehicle fuel economies never again 
rise above the 2016 CAFE standard requirement, with automakers choosing to put all 
propulsion system efficiency gains into increased vehicle weight, higher horsepower, and 
vehicle acceleration times.  After all, this is what we have seen over the past 25 years, 
and barring increasingly stringent vehicle efficiency and emissions standards and/or high, 
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sustained fuel prices, there is probably no reason to think that the situation going forward 
will be any different. 
 
 
Figure 37  Fuel Consumption for Light-Duty Vehicles in the Reference Case 
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Figure 38  Technology Penetration in the Light-Duty Vehicle Subsector in the Reference Case 
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Figure 39  Average Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy in the Reference Case 
 
Fuel consumption trends in the non-LDV transport subsectors are, for the most part, in 
line with what one would typically expect of a Reference Case:  the various subsectors 
continue to look very much like they do today, save for some increased biodiesel 
consumption as a result of the RFS mandates and, in later years, due to favorable 
production economics compared to conventional fossil diesel.  The only means of 
producing biodiesel in the Reference Case is via hydrotreatment of yellow grease and 
animal tallow feedstocks, which are in relatively short supply in comparison to the 
various types of cellulosic biomass.  Moreover, biodiesel production via FT synthesis of 
these feedstocks remains uncompetitive from a cost perspective in all years, even at high, 
sustained crude oil prices later in the modeling horizon.  If biomass supplies were not so 
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limited, biodiesel consumption would likely capture even greater market share than what 
we see in the Reference Case.  However, as it stands, cellulosic ethanol is the preferred 
pathway for supplying biofuels.  In particular, utilization of a biochemical (hydrolysis) 
process is the most attractive pathway.   
 
The technology and fuel development trends in the medium-duty truck and bus 
subsectors are particularly interesting.  More specifically, diesel replaces oxygenated 
gasoline within a specific segment of the medium-duty subsector (Figure 41), a decision 
made by the model because of the increasing cost competitiveness of diesel vehicles in 
this segment (namely, fleet delivery trucks).  Similarly, natural gas loses market share to 
diesel in the bus subsector for essentially the same reason (Figure 42):  the capital costs 
of natural gas buses are simply too high, and their efficiencies too low, to make up for the 
lower cost of natural gas fuel compared to petroleum-based diesel.  In considering the 
likelihood of these findings, it is important to note that in these cases the model does not 
explicitly take air quality and noise concerns into account during its decision-making 
process, both of which represent two important motivating factors for why we see natural 
gas vehicles in cities around the world today. 
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Figure 40  Fuel Consumption for Heavy-Duty Trucks in the Reference Case 
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Figure 41  Fuel Consumption for Medium-Duty Trucks in the Reference Case 
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Figure 42  Fuel Consumption for Buses in the Reference Case 
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Figure 43  Fuel Consumption for Rail in the Reference Case 
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Figure 44  Fuel Consumption for Marine Vessels in the Reference Case 
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Figure 45  Fuel Consumption for Aviation in the Reference Case 
 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Given the projected increases in service demands and energy consumption in the 
business-as-usual Reference Case scenario, it is perhaps not surprising that California 
greenhouse gas emissions are expected to continue to rise over the next several decades.  
Figure 46 shows CA-TIMES model estimates of CA-Combustion GHG emissions42 
produced via fuel combustion activities in each of the various energy producing and 
consuming sectors.  (As discussed in Section II.1.3, the model covers intrastate, 
                                                 
42
 CA-Combustion GHGs include all emissions produced from fuel combustion activities within 
California’s borders, from interstate and international aviation and marine trips whose origin is California, 
and from production of electricity that is consumed in California, even if the plants producing the 
electricity are located out-of-state.  +Out-of-state Supply GHGs also include upstream emissions of 
imported energy commodities, which therefore captures well-to-tank emissions that are generated outside 
of California. 
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interstate, and international aviation and marine activities, whereas non-energy GHGs are 
not estimated at the present time.)  The transportation sector remains the single largest 
emissions category for many years to come, growing its share of total fuel combustion 
emissions to well over half (~56%) by 2050.  The combined industrial/supply sector 
eventually takes over the second position from the electric sector, whose emissions are 
about the same in 2050 as they are today.  Allocation of electric sector emissions to end-
uses (Figure 47) better illustrates the contribution of the industrial, commercial, 
residential, and agricultural sectors to total GHG emissions.  Yet, even under this 
accounting scheme, it is clear that the transportation sector is poised to drive emissions 
growth in California in the long term.  What is potentially more interesting is the near 
term, specifically the coming decade up to 2020.  Results of the CA-TIMES model show 
that the currently planned policies of the Reference Case (i.e., those summarized in  
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Table 30) are not likely to be enough to bring emissions back down to 1990 (or even 
2005) levels by 2020.  That being said, the new CAFE standards (from 2012 to 2016) and 
the RFS biofuels mandates (to 2022) do help to slow California’s rapid emissions growth 
quite considerably. 
 
 
Figure 46  CA-Combustion GHG Emissions by Sector in the Reference Case 
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Figure 47  CA-Combustion GHG Emissions by Sector in the Reference Case with Electricity 
Emissions Allocated to the Various End-Use Sectors 
 
If one also considers upstream emissions of imported energy commodities (i.e., +Out-of-
state Supply emissions), the projected future increases in California’s GHG emissions 
become even greater (Figure 48 and Figure 49).  The significantly higher growth of 
supply sector emissions, especially in the long term, is entirely responsible for this result, 
since emissions from all other sectors are, by definition, the same in both the CA-
Combustion and +Out-of-state Supply cases.  Allocation of supply sector emissions to 
each of the end-use sectors, in a way similar to electric sector emissions, is also possible 
in theory.  While not shown here, the likely result of such an allocation would be a 
further increase in emissions for each of the end-use sectors.  The bulk of supply sector 
emissions in the Reference Case actually occur as a result of crude oil and natural gas 
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extraction and petroleum refining.  Therefore, the end-use sectors that consume the most 
crude-oil- and natural-based fuels (transportation, industrial, and residential) would see 
particularly large gains in GHG emissions. 
 
 
Figure 48  +Out-of-state Supply GHG Emissions by Sector in the Reference Case 
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Figure 49  +Out-of-state Supply GHG Emissions by Sector in the Reference Case with Electricity 
Emissions Allocated to the Various End-Use Sectors 
 
The implications of allowing California GHG emissions to rise to such high levels in the 
long term are not entirely certain, principally because the situation depends entirely on 
how the energy system develops in the rest of the United States and in other countries 
over the next several decades.  If the adoption of advanced technologies and alternative 
fuels also remains weak throughout the rest of the world, then emissions will continue to 
rise at a rapid pace, with growth being strongest in developing countries.  According to 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 4th Assessment Report, such 
unrestrained emissions growth could ultimately lead to severe climate change, with 
global mean surface air temperatures rising by 1.1 to 6.4 ºC (“likely range”, depending on 
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scenario and assumptions) over the course of the century (IPCC, 2007).  Based on the 
various computer models used to support the IPCC 4AR, warming of the planet is likely 
to lead to an increase in the frequency of warm spells, heat waves, and events of heavy 
rainfall, as well as sea level rise of 18 to 59 cm.  These global changes will most probably 
have a pronounced local impact here in California, affecting the state’s economy, natural 
and managed ecosystems, and human health and mortality in ways that are hard to predict 
(California Department of Environmental Protection, 2006). 
 
While transportation-related GHG emissions (including both upstream/ “well-to-tank” 
and downstream/“tank-to-wheel” stages) rise considerably in the Reference Case, their 
growth is actually slower than total transport sector energy consumption (see Figure 34).  
Hence, the average lifecycle carbon intensity of all fuels consumed in the transportation 
sector decreases, from 82.8 gCO2-eq/MJHHV in 2005 to 75.1 gCO2-eq/MJHHV in 2050, a 
difference of about 10% (Figure 50).  Figure 51 shows similar trends for fuels consumed 
in the light-duty vehicle subsector.  (Remember that because these carbon intensities are 
calculated on a HHV basis, they are about 7 to 11% lower than if calculated on a LHV 
basis.)  Increased consumption of natural gas and biofuels is primarily responsible for 
lowering average lifecycle carbon intensities.  In particular, greater utilization of biofuels 
raises the relative contribution from upstream fuel production processes and consequently 
lowers the contribution from downstream fuel combustion activities.  Interestingly, in the 
near term ethanol consumption actually increases the average carbon intensity of LDV 
fuels, at least according to the results of CA-TIMES, which are based on input 
assumptions for imported corn and sugar cane ethanol that include significant indirect 
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land use change (iLUC) impacts in their carbon intensity values.  For example, the total 
lifecycle carbon intensity, including iLUC, of corn ethanol is 121.4 gCO2-eq/MJHHV, 
while for sugar cane ethanol it is 66.3 gCO2-eq/MJHHV, assumptions that are based on 
CARB (2009b) and Plevin et al. (2010).43  In addition, the total carbon intensity 
(including iLUC) of energy crop-derived cellulosic ethanol is assumed to be a much 
smaller 18.4 gCO2-eq/MJHHV.  Of course, in reality, with the LCFS regulations in place, it 
is unlikely that biofuels with such high iLUC impacts would ever be used in California, 
and in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario described later, these two types of ethanol are 
actually phased out over time. 
 
                                                 
43
 A median estimate for iLUC of 58.7 gCO2-eq/MJHHV is assumed for corn ethanol based on Plevin et al.  
CARB’s mean iLUC estimate of 41.5 gCO2-eq/MJHHV is assumed for sugar cane ethanol from Brazil. 
199 
 
 
 
 
Figure 50  Average Lifecycle Carbon Intensity of All Fuels Consumed in the Transportation Sector 
in the Reference Case 
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Figure 51  Average Lifecycle Carbon Intensity of All Fuels Consumed in the Light-Duty Vehicle 
Subsector in the Reference Case 
 
II.3.2 Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
The CA-TIMES Deep GHG Reduction Scenario describes the potential development of 
California’s energy system over the next several decades in the context of a social, 
political, and economic framework that highly values the threat of climate change, both 
within California and in the rest of the U.S. and the world.  Hence, individuals, firms, and 
governments all make substantial efforts to transition California toward a low-carbon 
society.  As with the Reference Case, one should not misconstrue this scenario as a 
prediction of what will happen as a result of strong climate policy, but rather as a single 
vision of what could feasibly happen, under the large set of technological and policy 
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assumptions input to the model.  In theory, an infinite number of GHG reduction 
scenarios could potentially be developed; however, in order to keep the current analysis 
manageable and digestible, only a limited number will be discussed here.  In particular, I 
first develop and discuss a Deep GHG Reduction Scenario that achieves an 80% 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels by 2050, with most major 
advanced technology and alternative fuel options available to the model (at least in the 
sectors that are represented with bottom-up detail).  Then, I develop several interesting 
variants of this core scenario, most of which do not actually meet the 80% reduction 
target because the availability of key resources and technologies is limited.  The 
following sections take an in-depth look at the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario and its 
variants. 
 
Notable Modifications of the Reference Case Input Assumptions in Developing the Deep 
GHG Reduction Scenario 
Policy is undoubtedly the most important driver of the dramatic energy system transition 
that plays itself out in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario.44  The scenario includes all the 
same policies that are present in the Reference Case, as well as additional policies that 
would likely also need to be enacted, if the goal were to drive the energy system toward a 
low-carbon future (Table 31).  A few of these policies are already being discussed, the 
most important of which is the so-called “80in50” target, which calls for an 80% 
reduction in GHG emissions below 1990 levels by 2050.  In reality, this would probably 
be achieved by a market mechanism such as a cap-and-trade (i.e., emissions trading) 
                                                 
44
 Some might argue that evolving social values, like increased environmental consciousness, will be the 
most important driver of global change in the future.  While this is very much true, I would contend that 
policy is simply the embodiment of society’s collective willingness to enact change. 
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program or a carbon tax.  For simplicity and transparency within the CA-TIMES model, a 
declining carbon cap constraint is utilized – specifically, a straight line trajectory from 
2020 to 2050 is assumed.  Other policies included in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
are renewable portfolio standard on electricity generation and energy efficiency and 
emissions standards for end-use sector demand technologies (e.g., cars, trucks, heaters, 
light bulbs, air conditioners, consumer and household electronic appliances, etc.). 
 
Table 31  Additional Policies Represented in the CA-TIMES Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
Policies Descriptions 
80% GHG Reduction Goal by 
2050 
- Reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, and 80% below 1990 
levels by 2050.  Based on a California Executive Order S-3-05.  Only 
applies to fuel combustion emissions in CA-TIMES.  Interim emission 
targets between 2020 and 2050 are linearly interpolated. 
Renewable Portfolio Standard 
(RPS) 
- By 2020, 33% of California electricity generation must come from 
renewable sources (excluding hydro).  Assumed to remain constant 
thereafter.  Based on Executive Order S-14-08 and Executive Order S-21-
09. 
Light-Duty Vehicle GHG 
Emission Standards  
(CAFE for 2017-2025) 
- GHG emissions rate of new model-year light-duty cars and trucks declines 
4.5% per annum (on a gCO2-eq per mile basis) between 2017 and 2025.  
Based on notices of intent and an interim technical assessment by DOT-
NHTSA, EPA-OTAQ, and CARB, which analyzes the feasibility of an 
annual rate of improvement of 3 to 6% (EPA-DOT-CARB, 2010). 
- Light-duty passenger cars:  New model-year vehicle fleet must achieve 215 
gCO2/mile (41.4 mpg) in 2017, strengthening to 149 gCO2/mile (59.8 
mpg) in 2025, assumed to remain constant thereafter.   
- Light-duty passenger trucks:  New model-year vehicle fleet must achieve 
285 gCO2/mile (31.2 mpg) in 2017, strengthening to 197 gCO2/mile (45.1 
mpg) in 2025, assumed to remain constant thereafter. 
Energy Efficiency Standards for 
ICRA Sector Technologies 
- Average annual efficiency improvement of generic end-use sector 
technologies in the Industrial, Commercial, Residential, and Agricultural 
sectors.  Efficiency gains are over and above those assumed in the 
Reference Case, and are technically feasible with today’s technologies.  
Industrial (0.41% per year); Commercial (0.50% per year); Residential 
(0.68% per year); Agricultural (0% per year).  Based on the Baseline – 
high efficiency scenario of McCarthy et al. (2008b) compared to the 
Baseline demand scenario. 
 
In addition to policy, the development of the energy system in the Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario depends on the multitude of resource, technology, and demand assumptions that 
are input to the CA-TIMES model.  These assumptions are for the most part the same in 
both the Reference Case and Deep GHG Reduction Scenario.  However, in some 
203 
 
 
 
important instances, they are quite different.  The following discussion attempts to 
summarize the key areas where the inputs diverge. 
 
Electric Generation Sector 
The following two tables summarize the cost and efficiency assumptions of the CA-
TIMES model in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario.  The values, which are notably 
more optimistic than in the Reference Case, are drawn from the EIA’s Electricity Module 
Assumptions to the AEO2010 (EIA, 2010a).  More specifically, I utilize a combination of 
the assumptions used for the EIA’s Low Fossil Technology Cost Case, Low Nuclear Cost 
Case, and Low Renewable Technology Cost Case.  Underlying these cases is a storyline 
where strong policy and R&D efforts lead to significant technological advances and 
progress along the cost curves for various energy technologies.  In other words, the Deep 
GHG Reduction Scenario exogenously assumes greater technological learning than in the 
Reference Case, namely because energy R&D (for both fossil and low-carbon 
technologies) is given much higher priority in a future world where energy and climate 
become much higher priorities than they are today.  These cost reductions and efficiency 
improvements are achieved for free within the context of the simplified CA-TIMES 
model (since endogenous technological learning and a top-down macro-economic model 
are not utilized); though to be sure, these gains would not be achieved for free in reality, 
give that there are very real costs to R&D spending on the part of public and private 
entities.   
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Combined with caps on greenhouse gas emissions, and thus a strong carbon price, and 
various other energy and environmental policies, the advanced power plant technologies 
naturally become increasingly attractive.  Specifically, the investment costs for coal, 
natural gas, nuclear, and renewable power plants are 10% lower than in the Reference 
Case in 2010, and they fall to 25% below Reference Case levels in 2035 and beyond.  
The cost distribution among the various power plant technologies does not change 
markedly in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario compared to the Reference Case:  
renewables and other advanced technologies (e.g., coal and natural gas with CCS) 
continue to be more expensive than conventional fossil thermal technologies.  Therefore, 
the main effect is increasing the attractiveness of electricity as an end-use fuel and 
reducing the cost of electricity produced by renewables and other advanced types of 
power plants.  Lastly, all fixed and variable O&M costs and power plant efficiencies in 
the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario are assumed to be the same as in the Reference Case. 
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Table 32  Investment Cost Assumptions for New Power Plants in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
 
 
  
Investment Costs for New Power Plants ($/kW)
(Notes:  Costs are interpolated between the data years shown.)
2005 2015 2035 2050
Natural Gas Combustion (Gas) Turbine (NGGT) 685 648 388 388
Advanced Natural Gas Combustion (Gas) Turbine (NGGT) 648 608 339 339
Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC) 984 931 559 559
Advanced Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC) 968 913 524 524
Advanced Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC), w/CCS 1,932 1,787 893 893
Coal Steam 2,223 2,104 1,261 1,261
Advanced Coal Int. Gasif. Combined-Cycle (IGCC) 2,569 2,408 1,372 1,372
Advanced Coal Int. Gasif. Combined-Cycle (IGCC), w/ CCS 3,776 3,499 1,807 1,807
Biomass IGCC (Forest Residues) 7,698 7,257 4,165 4,165
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed) 7,698 7,257 4,165 4,165
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Paper) 7,698 7,257 4,165 4,165
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Wood) 7,698 7,257 4,165 4,165
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Yard) 7,698 7,257 4,165 4,165
Biomass IGCC (Orchard and Vineyard Waste) 7,698 7,257 4,165 4,165
Biomass IGCC (Pulpwood) 7,698 7,257 4,165 4,165
Biomass IGCC (Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws) 7,698 7,257 4,165 4,165
Biomass IGCC (Energy Crops) 7,698 7,257 4,165 4,165
Biogas from Landfills and Animal Waste Digesters 5,199 4,901 2,813 2,813
Geothermal, in California 3,498 3,298 1,893 1,893
Geothermal, in Western U.S. Outside California 3,498 3,298 1,893 1,893
Hydroelectric, Conventional 4,583 4,959 3,303 3,303
Hydroelectric, Reversible (Pumped Storage) 2,291 2,480 1,652 1,652
Wind, Lower Class Resources in CA 3,931 3,706 2,127 2,127
Wind, Higher Class Resources in CA 3,931 3,706 2,127 2,127
Wind, Lower Class Resources in Western U.S. Outside CA 3,931 3,706 2,127 2,127
Wind, Higher Class Resources in Western U.S. Outside CA 3,931 3,706 2,127 2,127
Wind, Offshore 7,874 7,423 4,260 4,260
Solar Thermal, in CA 8,725 8,225 5,554 5,554
Solar Thermal, in Western U.S. Outside CA 8,725 8,225 5,554 5,554
Solar Photovoltaic 10,491 9,890 6,678 6,678
Molten Carbonate Fuel Cell 9,313 8,779 5,928 5,928
Tidal and Ocean Energy 14,667 12,633 8,567 6,667
Generic Distributed Generation – Baseload 1,400 1,320 758 758
Generic Distributed Generation – Peak 1,681 1,585 910 910
Nuclear, Conventional Light Water Reactors (LWR) 3,820 3,470 1,872 1,872
Nuclear, Pebble-Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) 3,316 3,012 1,625 1,625
Nuclear, Gas Turbine - Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR) 2,977 2,704 1,459 1,459
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Table 33  Efficiency Assumptions for New Power Plants in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
 
 
  
New Power Plant Efficiencies (%)
2005 2035 2055
Natural Gas Combustion (Gas) Turbine (NGGT) 31.6% 32.7% 32.7%
Advanced Natural Gas Combustion (Gas) Turbine (NGGT) 36.7% 39.9% 39.9%
Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC) 47.4% 50.2% 50.2%
Advanced Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC) 50.5% 53.9% 53.9%
Advanced Natural Gas Combined-Cycle (NGCC), w/CCS 39.6% 45.5% 45.5%
Coal Steam 37.1% 39.0% 39.0%
Advanced Coal Int. Gasif. Combined-Cycle (IGCC) 38.9% 45.8% 45.8%
Advanced Coal Int. Gasif. Combined-Cycle (IGCC), w/ CCS 31.6% 41.1% 41.1%
Biomass IGCC (Forest Residues) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Mixed) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Paper) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Wood) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Municipal Solid Waste, Yard) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Orchard and Vineyard Waste) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Pulpwood) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Agricultural Residues, Stovers/Straws) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biomass IGCC (Energy Crops) 36.1% 43.9% 43.9%
Biogas from Landfills and Animal Waste Digesters 25.0% 25.0% 25.0%
Geothermal, in California 10.3% 11.3% 11.3%
Geothermal, in Western U.S. Outside California 10.3% 11.3% 11.3%
Hydroelectric, Conventional 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Hydroelectric, Reversible (Pumped Storage) 77.5% 77.5% 77.5%
Wind, Lower Class Resources in CA 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Wind, Higher Class Resources in CA 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Wind, Lower Class Resources in Western U.S. Outside CA 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Wind, Higher Class Resources in Western U.S. Outside CA 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Wind, Offshore 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Solar Thermal, in CA 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Solar Thermal, in Western U.S. Outside CA 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Solar Photovoltaic 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Molten Carbonate Fuel Cell 43.0% 49.0% 49.0%
Tidal and Ocean Energy 34.5% 34.5% 34.5%
Generic Distributed Generation – Baseload 37.7% 38.3% 38.3%
Generic Distributed Generation – Peak 33.9% 34.5% 34.5%
New Nuclear Plant Efficiencies (tonnes enriched uranium per PJ electricity)
(Notes:  Efficiences are interpolated between the data years shown.)
2005 2035 2055
Nuclear, Conventional Light Water Reactors (LWR) 0.65 0.65 0.65
Nuclear, Pebble-Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) 0.36 0.36 0.36
Nuclear, Gas Turbine - Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR) 0.22 0.22 0.22
(Notes:  For non-geothermal and non-biomass renewables, efficiencies are assumed to be similar 
to an average fossil-thermal plant.  Efficiences are interpolated between the data years shown.)
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Supply Sector 
Exogenously specified resource price trajectories for crude oil, natural gas, and coal are 
lower in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario than in the Reference Case.  Up until 2015, 
the price paths are the same, but eventually there is a divergence in the two, which 
actually becomes quite pronounced in the later time periods, especially for crude oil 
(compare Figure 52 with Reference Case Figure 25).  The reason for lower fossil fuel 
prices is that, in a less carbon-intensive world (where other U.S. states and countries are 
also trying to significantly reduce their GHG emissions), the demand for crude oil, 
natural gas, and coal will likely be lower than in a BAU future; therefore, fossil prices are 
likely to fall.  At least, this is the storyline underlying the BLUE Map scenario of the 
IEA’s Energy Technology Perspective (ETP) 2010 study, which envisions a 50% 
reduction in global energy-related CO2 emissions below 2005 levels by 2050.  In support 
of this worldwide effort, the IEA estimates that energy-related CO2 emissions in the U.S. 
and other industrialized nations would have to be reduced by about 80% over this 
timeframe, implying concomitant reductions in fossil energy consumption of almost the 
same magnitude.45  The fossil fuel price projections that I have assumed in the CA-
TIMES Deep GHG Reduction Scenario are largely based on the IEA’s BLUE Map 
scenario.46  As shown in Figure 52, crude oil and natural gas prices increase over the next 
few years before leveling out at roughly constant values until 2035.  Prices then drop 
                                                 
45
 See Chapter 9 of the IEA’s 2010 Energy Technology Perspectives report for a U.S.-focused analysis in 
both BAU and deep GHG reduction scenarios. 
46
 Technically, the fossil fuel price projections of the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario are developed by first 
calculating the price reductions assumed in the IEA’s BLUE Map scenario versus their BAU Reference 
Case, and then second by applying the reduction ratios in each year to the Reference Case fossil fuel price 
projections of the EIA’s AEO2010.  The reason for using the EIA projections as a basis is because their 
numbers are more specific, and arguably more applicable, to the U.S. context. 
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considerably until 2050 as the world shifts away from fossil fuels to lower-carbon 
options. 
 
 
Figure 52  Exogenous Fossil Fuel Price Projections in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
 
All other supply sector assumptions and data sources are the same as in the Reference 
Case.  This includes the biomass supply curves and investment cost and efficiency 
assumptions for petroleum refineries and cellulosic ethanol, biodiesel, pyrolysis bio-oil, 
FT poly-generation, and hydrogen production plants (see Section II.2.3 above). 
 
Transportation Sector 
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Projections of transportation demand (e.g., in vehicle-miles, passenger-miles, ton-miles, 
vessel-miles, hours of operation, and so on) in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario are 
exogenously specified modifications of the demands in the Reference Case.  For certain 
transport subsectors and segments, these demands are assumed to be higher, while for 
others they are lower.  In the light-duty sector, for instance, lower demands are consistent 
with a low-carbon scenario storyline.  Specifically, I assume that a suite of strong travel 
demand management (TDM) policies dealing with transit, land use, and auto pricing 
(e.g., road, cordon, and parking pricing; fuel taxes; and pay-as-you-go insurance) could 
feasibly reduce VMT 7% (18/21/24%) below Reference Case levels by 2020 
(2030/2040/2050).  Such VMT reduction potential has been estimated by both Cowart 
(2008b) and Rodier (2009).  In addition, the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario assumes a 
gradual shift in consumer preferences away from light-duty trucks and toward light-duty 
cars.47  Starting from their approximate share of total light-duty vehicle VMT of 53% in 
2005, cars are assumed to obtain 55% market share in 2020, 65% in 2030, 70% in 2040, 
and 75% in 2050.  (Compare this to the Reference Case, for which the light-duty car 
market share is projected to be 51% in 2020, 56% in 2030, 60% in 2040, and 65% in 
2050.)  Contingent upon these assumptions, the light-duty VMT projections of the Deep 
GHG Reduction Scenario are shown in Figure 53 (compare to Reference Case Figure 27). 
 
                                                 
47
 One could imagine this shift occurring for a number of reasons, e.g., high and sustained energy prices: 
greater environmental consciousness among society; the coming of age of a new generation of drivers for 
whom “bigger is not always better”; and/or a preference for smaller vehicles as urban and suburban spaces 
become denser and more crowded.  Of course, the shift could also happen the other way (toward light-duty 
trucks), but this outcome would not be entirely consistent with the low-carbon scenario storyline envisioned 
here. 
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Figure 53  Light-Duty Car and Truck VMT Projections in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
 
If transit, land use, and auto pricing policies are the driving force behind the light-duty 
VMT reductions assumed above, then one would naturally expect the projected future 
demands for bus and rail transit to rise gradually over time, as they substitute for trips not 
taken by private motor vehicles.  For this reason, the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
assumes greater demand for urban transit bus VMT and commuter, heavy, and light rail 
PMT in the future.  More specifically, I assume that one out of every ten vehicle-miles 
lost by LDVs is shifted to either bus or rail transit.  This is not to say that one out of every 
ten people, who decide not to drive, end up shifting their mode of travel to bus or rail, but 
rather the 1/10th factor accounts for the greater occupancy levels that transit vehicles can 
accommodate (at reasonably high transit ridership levels).  Therefore, not every vehicle-
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mile of travel that is lost by LDVs is actually gained by bus or rail transit.  In fact, some 
of the VMT would, in effect, disappear, as improved land use patterns and more densely 
populated cities would allow for shorter trip distances and/or the avoidance of motorized 
trips in general (i.e., greater number of bike and walk trips). 
 
For all other transport subsectors/segments, the future-year demands assumed in the Deep 
GHG Reduction Scenario are the same as in the Reference Case (see Section II.2.3). 
 
The cost and efficiency assumptions for certain transportation technologies are also 
modified in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario, most notably for light-duty cars and 
trucks.  As in the Reference Case, the LDV input values are largely based on the EIA’s 
AEO2010 assumptions and projections; however, in this instance I use the EIA’s High 
Technology Case assumptions for light-duty vehicles as a basis for the CA-TIMES 
technology characterizations (EIA, 2010a, c).  This generally has the effect of reducing 
the costs of ICEs and HEVs by a small amount, while for BEVs, PHEVs, and FCVs, the 
differences are much larger.  For example, whereas in the Reference Case the cost of 
lithium-ion batteries is assumed to level out at $500/kWh by 2030, the Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario assumes a drop to a much lower $196/kWh by the same year.  
Similarly, in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario I assume that fuel cell costs drop to 
$55/kW by 2030 and are held constant thereafter, well ahead of the Reference Case cost 
trajectory, which assumes that fuel cell costs are still $139/kW in 2030 and do not reach 
$55/kW until 2050.  Efficiency assumptions are also slightly more optimistic in the EIA’s 
High Technology Case and, thus, in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario.  The following 
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few tables summarize the investment cost and efficiency assumptions for light-duty cars 
and trucks in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario.  (These can be compared to Reference 
Case Table 24 and the several tables that come after it.) 
 
Table 34  Investment Cost Assumptions for New Light-Duty Cars in the Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario 
 
  
Investment Costs for New Light-Duty Cars ($/vehicle)
(Note:  Missing data value indicates that technology is not available in given year.)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055
Gasoline ICE 25,775 25,924 26,141 26,544 26,648 26,809 26,990 26,990 26,990 26,990 26,990
Gasoline ICE (Moderate Eff.) 26,531 26,681 26,898 27,300 27,404 27,565 27,746 27,746 27,746 27,746 27,746
Gasoline ICE (Advanced Eff.) 27,288 27,437 27,654 28,057 28,160 28,322 28,502 28,502 28,502 28,502 28,502
Gasoline HEV 29,352 29,239 28,586 28,726 28,568 28,575 28,650 28,650 28,650 28,650 28,650
E85 Flex Fuel ICE 26,150 26,299 26,513 26,918 27,019 27,178 27,357 27,357 27,357 27,357 27,357
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Moderate Eff.) 26,906 27,055 27,269 27,674 27,776 27,934 28,114 28,114 28,114 28,114 28,114
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Advanced Eff.) 27,663 27,812 28,026 28,430 28,532 28,691 28,870 28,870 28,870 28,870 28,870
E85 Flex Fuel HEV 29,727 29,613 28,958 29,099 28,940 28,944 29,017 29,017 29,017 29,017 29,017
Diesel ICE 31,220 31,352 30,252 29,906 29,522 29,671 29,953 29,953 29,953 29,953 29,953
Diesel HEV -- -- 28,856 28,856 28,664 28,652 28,685 28,685 28,685 28,685 28,685
Gasoline PHEV10 32,218 32,218 32,218 30,658 29,143 29,150 29,225 29,225 29,225 29,225 29,225
Gasoline PHEV30 44,233 44,233 44,233 37,876 32,896 32,902 32,977 32,977 32,977 32,977 32,977
Gasoline PHEV40 50,179 50,179 50,179 41,388 34,620 34,626 34,702 34,702 34,702 34,702 34,702
Gasoline PHEV60 62,082 62,082 62,082 48,432 38,099 38,105 38,180 38,180 38,180 38,180 38,180
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV10 32,590 32,590 32,590 31,031 29,515 29,519 29,593 29,593 29,593 29,593 29,593
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV30 44,605 44,605 44,605 38,249 33,267 33,271 33,345 33,345 33,345 33,345 33,345
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV40 50,550 50,550 50,550 41,762 34,992 34,996 35,069 35,069 35,069 35,069 35,069
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV60 62,454 62,454 62,454 48,806 38,470 38,474 38,548 38,548 38,548 38,548 38,548
Diesel PHEV10 30,788 30,788 30,788 30,788 29,239 29,227 29,260 29,260 29,260 29,260 29,260
Diesel PHEV30 38,006 38,006 38,006 38,006 32,991 32,979 33,013 33,013 33,013 33,013 33,013
Diesel PHEV40 41,518 41,518 41,518 41,518 34,715 34,703 34,737 34,737 34,737 34,737 34,737
Diesel PHEV60 48,562 48,562 48,562 48,562 38,194 38,182 38,216 38,216 38,216 38,216 38,216
Battery-Electric 77,838 72,673 67,548 69,711 61,111 54,625 54,409 54,409 54,409 54,409 54,409
Hydrogen Fuel Cell -- -- 68,962 58,725 50,359 43,112 39,171 39,171 39,171 39,171 39,171
Gasoline Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Methanol Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Dedicated Ethanol ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Natural Gas ICE 33,400 33,541 33,693 34,093 34,195 34,387 34,629 34,629 34,629 34,629 34,629
Natural Gas Bi-Fuel ICE 32,065 32,211 32,384 32,766 32,880 33,075 33,320 33,320 33,320 33,320 33,320
LPG ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
LPG Bi-Fuel ICE 31,104 31,253 31,470 31,873 31,976 32,138 32,318 32,318 32,318 32,318 32,318
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Table 35  Investment Cost Assumptions for New Light-Duty Trucks in the Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario 
 
 
Table 36  Fuel Economy Assumptions for New Light-Duty Cars, All Except PHEVs in the Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario 
 
  
Investment Costs for New Light-Duty Trucks ($/vehicle)
(Note:  Missing data value indicates that technology is not available in given year.)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055
Gasoline ICE 34,084 34,207 34,609 34,927 35,074 35,276 35,521 35,521 35,521 35,521 35,521
Gasoline ICE (Moderate Eff.) 35,263 35,386 35,788 36,106 36,253 36,455 36,700 36,700 36,700 36,700 36,700
Gasoline ICE (Advanced Eff.) 36,442 36,565 36,967 37,285 37,432 37,634 37,879 37,879 37,879 37,879 37,879
Gasoline HEV 38,276 38,123 37,576 37,398 37,194 37,267 37,401 37,401 37,401 37,401 37,401
E85 Flex Fuel ICE 34,535 34,657 35,057 35,372 35,517 35,716 35,958 35,958 35,958 35,958 35,958
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Moderate Eff.) 35,714 35,836 36,236 36,551 36,696 36,895 37,137 37,137 37,137 37,137 37,137
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Advanced Eff.) 36,893 37,015 37,415 37,730 37,875 38,074 38,316 38,316 38,316 38,316 38,316
E85 Flex Fuel HEV 38,726 38,573 38,024 37,843 37,636 37,707 37,838 37,838 37,838 37,838 37,838
Diesel ICE 42,334 42,441 40,408 40,442 40,221 40,185 40,457 40,457 40,457 40,457 40,457
Diesel HEV -- -- -- 37,499 37,259 37,306 37,379 37,379 37,379 37,379 37,379
Gasoline PHEV10 37,769 37,769 37,769 37,769 37,769 37,842 37,976 37,976 37,976 37,976 37,976
Gasoline PHEV30 41,521 41,521 41,521 41,521 41,521 41,595 41,729 41,729 41,729 41,729 41,729
Gasoline PHEV40 43,245 43,245 43,245 43,245 43,245 43,319 43,453 43,453 43,453 43,453 43,453
Gasoline PHEV60 46,724 46,724 46,724 46,724 46,724 46,798 46,932 46,932 46,932 46,932 46,932
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV10 38,211 38,211 38,211 38,211 38,211 38,283 38,413 38,413 38,413 38,413 38,413
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV30 41,964 41,964 41,964 41,964 41,964 42,035 42,166 42,166 42,166 42,166 42,166
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV40 43,688 43,688 43,688 43,688 43,688 43,759 43,890 43,890 43,890 43,890 43,890
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV60 47,167 47,167 47,167 47,167 47,167 47,238 47,369 47,369 47,369 47,369 47,369
Diesel PHEV10 37,834 37,834 37,834 37,834 37,834 37,881 37,954 37,954 37,954 37,954 37,954
Diesel PHEV30 41,587 41,587 41,587 41,587 41,587 41,634 41,707 41,707 41,707 41,707 41,707
Diesel PHEV40 43,311 43,311 43,311 43,311 43,311 43,358 43,431 43,431 43,431 43,431 43,431
Diesel PHEV60 46,790 46,790 46,790 46,790 46,790 46,837 46,910 46,910 46,910 46,910 46,910
Battery-Electric 98,179 90,892 82,851 87,325 79,138 71,814 71,888 71,888 71,888 71,888 71,888
Hydrogen Fuel Cell -- -- 74,505 63,214 53,687 45,526 40,813 40,813 40,813 40,813 40,813
Gasoline Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Methanol Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Dedicated Ethanol ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Natural Gas ICE 33,503 33,584 34,022 34,421 34,513 34,640 34,807 34,807 34,807 34,807 34,807
Natural Gas Bi-Fuel ICE 32,604 32,687 33,114 33,491 33,580 33,709 33,894 33,894 33,894 33,894 33,894
LPG ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
LPG Bi-Fuel ICE 31,269 31,361 31,814 32,254 32,359 32,490 32,656 32,656 32,656 32,656 32,656
New Vehicle Fuel Economy (mpgge) - All Except PHEVs
(Note:  Fuel economies correspond to "test-cycle values, not on-road. Missing data value indicates that technology is not available in given year.)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055
Gasoline ICE 31.2 31.5 34.6 37.4 38.5 39.5 41.1 41.1 41.1 41.1 41.1
Gasoline ICE (Moderate Eff.) 35.3 35.7 39.1 42.3 43.5 44.7 46.4 46.4 46.4 46.4 46.4
Gasoline ICE (Advanced Eff.) 40.6 41.0 45.0 48.6 50.1 51.4 53.4 53.4 53.4 53.4 53.4
Gasoline HEV 45.1 44.9 48.4 51.6 53.2 54.3 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5
E85 Flex Fuel ICE 31.5 31.9 34.9 37.8 38.9 39.9 41.5 41.5 41.5 41.5 41.5
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Moderate Eff.) 35.3 35.7 39.1 42.3 43.5 44.7 46.4 46.4 46.4 46.4 46.4
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Advanced Eff.) 40.6 41.0 45.0 48.6 50.1 51.4 53.4 53.4 53.4 53.4 53.4
E85 Flex Fuel HEV 45.1 44.9 48.4 51.6 53.2 54.3 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5
Diesel ICE 39.2 39.5 42.2 45.0 46.0 46.2 45.4 45.4 45.4 45.4 45.4
Diesel HEV -- -- 59.6 59.3 60.5 61.2 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5
Battery-Electric 91.1 86.8 100.0 121.2 142.5 142.2 141.3 141.3 141.3 141.3 141.3
Hydrogen Fuel Cell 74.9 75.7 83.1 89.7 92.4 94.8 98.6 98.6 98.6 98.6 98.6
Gasoline Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Methanol Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Dedicated Ethanol ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Natural Gas ICE 33.2 33.4 37.0 40.4 42.1 43.0 43.9 43.9 43.9 43.9 43.9
Natural Gas Bi-Fuel ICE 30.8 31.0 34.3 37.4 39.0 40.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0
LPG ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
LPG Bi-Fuel ICE 31.2 31.5 34.6 37.4 38.5 39.5 41.1 41.1 41.1 41.1 41.1
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Table 37  Fuel Economy Assumptions for New Light-Duty PHEV Cars in the Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario 
 
 
Table 38  Fuel Economy Assumptions for New Light-Duty Trucks, All Except PHEVs in the Deep 
GHG Reduction Scenario 
 
  
New Plug-in Hybrid Vehicle Fuel Economy (mpgge)
(Note:  Fuel economies correspond to "test-cycle values, not on-road. Missing data value indicates that technology is not available in given year.)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055
Gasoline PHEV10 45.1 44.9 48.4 51.6 53.2 54.3 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5
Gasoline PHEV30 45.1 44.9 48.4 51.6 53.2 54.3 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5
Gasoline PHEV40 45.1 44.9 48.4 51.6 53.2 54.3 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5
Gasoline PHEV60 45.1 44.9 48.4 51.6 53.2 54.3 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV10 45.1 44.9 48.4 51.6 53.2 54.3 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV30 45.1 44.9 48.4 51.6 53.2 54.3 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV40 45.1 44.9 48.4 51.6 53.2 54.3 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV60 45.1 44.9 48.4 51.6 53.2 54.3 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5
Diesel PHEV10 -- -- 59.6 59.3 60.5 61.2 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5
Diesel PHEV30 -- -- 59.6 59.3 60.5 61.2 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5
Diesel PHEV40 -- -- 59.6 59.3 60.5 61.2 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5
Diesel PHEV60 -- -- 59.6 59.3 60.5 61.2 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5
Gasoline PHEV10 158.7 158.2 157.2 175.0 197.6 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4
Gasoline PHEV30 156.9 156.3 155.4 170.5 189.2 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7
Gasoline PHEV40 156.9 156.3 155.4 170.5 189.2 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8
Gasoline PHEV60 155.3 154.8 153.8 166.8 182.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV10 158.7 158.2 157.2 175.0 197.6 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV30 156.9 156.3 155.4 170.5 189.2 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV40 156.9 156.3 155.4 170.5 189.2 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV60 155.3 154.8 153.8 166.8 182.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4
Diesel PHEV10 -- -- 157.2 175.0 197.6 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4 227.4
Diesel PHEV30 -- -- 155.4 170.5 189.2 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7 212.7
Diesel PHEV40 -- -- 155.4 170.5 189.2 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8 208.8
Diesel PHEV60 -- -- 153.8 166.8 182.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4 201.4
Charge-Sustaining Mode
Charge-Depleting Mode
New Vehicle Fuel Economy (mpgge) - All Except PHEVs
(Note:  Fuel economies correspond to "test-cycle values, not on-road. Missing data value indicates that technology is not available in given year.)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055
Gasoline ICE 22.5 22.5 24.6 27.2 29.0 30.2 31.5 31.5 31.5 31.5 31.5
Gasoline ICE (Moderate Eff.) 26.0 26.0 28.4 31.4 33.5 34.9 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4
Gasoline ICE (Advanced Eff.) 30.8 30.7 33.6 37.1 39.6 41.3 43.1 43.1 43.1 43.1 43.1
Gasoline HEV 32.6 32.4 35.3 38.1 40.2 41.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6
E85 Flex Fuel ICE 22.8 22.7 24.9 27.4 29.3 30.5 31.8 31.8 31.8 31.8 31.8
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Moderate Eff.) 26.0 26.0 28.4 31.4 33.5 34.9 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4
E85 Flex Fuel ICE (Advanced Eff.) 30.8 30.7 33.6 37.1 39.6 41.3 43.1 43.1 43.1 43.1 43.1
E85 Flex Fuel HEV 32.6 32.4 35.3 38.1 40.2 41.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6
Diesel ICE 28.4 28.2 30.0 32.0 33.2 34.0 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5
Diesel HEV 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 42.2 43.2 43.7 43.7 43.7 43.7 43.7
Battery-Electric 51.7 53.4 63.3 77.4 91.4 91.1 90.7 90.7 90.7 90.7 90.7
Hydrogen Fuel Cell 54.1 54.1 59.1 65.2 69.6 72.5 75.7 75.7 75.7 75.7 75.7
Gasoline Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Methanol Fuel Cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Dedicated Ethanol ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Natural Gas ICE 25.7 25.6 27.8 30.4 31.8 32.9 34.1 34.1 34.1 34.1 34.1
Natural Gas Bi-Fuel ICE 23.9 23.7 25.7 28.1 29.4 30.4 31.6 31.6 31.6 31.6 31.6
LPG ICE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
LPG Bi-Fuel ICE 23.9 23.8 26.2 29.6 31.6 32.9 34.1 34.1 34.1 34.1 34.1
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Table 39  Fuel Economy Assumptions for New Light-Duty PHEV Trucks in the Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario 
 
 
The cost and efficiency assumptions for technologies in most of the other transport 
subsectors are the same in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario as they are in the 
Reference Case.  (Of course, just because an advanced technology, say an electrified 
railway or hydrogen fuel cell bus, is available to the model in the Reference Case does 
not necessarily mean that the model will choose it.48)  An important exception is the 
aviation subsector, for which cost and efficiency trajectories from the BLUE Map 
scenario of the IEA’s 2008 ETP report are used as a basis for CA-TIMES inputs (IEA, 
2008).  These assumptions represent a maximum technology case in which aircraft energy 
intensity reductions are 10% below the Reference Case by 2050.  (Note that the 
Reference Case itself already assumes reasonable increases in energy efficiency and 
                                                 
48
 The decision depends on the full lifecycle costs of the technology compared to all other technologies; and 
since advanced technologies tend to have higher costs, at least when external/social costs are ignored, they 
are not typically chosen in a BAU Reference Case scenario. 
New Plug-in Hybrid Vehicle Fuel Economy (mpgge)
(Note:  Fuel economies correspond to "test-cycle values, not on-road. Missing data value indicates that technology is not available in given year.)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055
Gasoline PHEV10 32.6 32.4 35.3 38.1 40.2 41.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6
Gasoline PHEV30 32.6 32.4 35.3 38.1 40.2 41.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6
Gasoline PHEV40 32.6 32.4 35.3 38.1 40.2 41.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6
Gasoline PHEV60 32.6 32.4 35.3 38.1 40.2 41.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV10 32.6 32.4 35.3 38.1 40.2 41.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV30 32.6 32.4 35.3 38.1 40.2 41.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV40 32.6 32.4 35.3 38.1 40.2 41.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV60 32.6 32.4 35.3 38.1 40.2 41.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6
Diesel PHEV10 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 42.2 43.2 43.7 43.7 43.7 43.7 43.7
Diesel PHEV30 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 42.2 43.2 43.7 43.7 43.7 43.7 43.7
Diesel PHEV40 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 42.2 43.2 43.7 43.7 43.7 43.7 43.7
Diesel PHEV60 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 42.2 43.2 43.7 43.7 43.7 43.7 43.7
Gasoline PHEV10 158.1 158.1 158.1 158.1 158.1 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0
Gasoline PHEV30 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2
Gasoline PHEV40 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1
Gasoline PHEV60 145.9 145.9 145.9 145.9 145.9 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV10 158.1 158.1 158.1 158.1 158.1 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV30 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV40 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1
E85 Flex Fuel PHEV60 145.9 145.9 145.9 145.9 145.9 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1
Diesel PHEV10 158.1 158.1 158.1 158.1 158.1 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0 183.0
Diesel PHEV30 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2 171.2
Diesel PHEV40 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 151.3 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1 168.1
Diesel PHEV60 145.9 145.9 145.9 145.9 145.9 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1 162.1
Charge-Sustaining Mode
Charge-Depleting Mode
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airplane load factors, amounting to a 28% total reduction in aircraft energy intensity 
between 2005 and 2050.)  This should not be confused with an extreme technology case, 
however.  For example, conventional swept-wing body aircraft designs remain the norm 
in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario, and new designs (e.g., flying wing and blended 
wing body aircraft) are not introduced.  On the other hand, Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario sees an increased utilization of winglets and increased wingspans; light-
weighting via advanced materials becomes an important design feature; and more 
advanced technologies, such as laminar flow control and highly efficient unducted fan 
open-rotor engines, become more common.  In addition, the Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario assumes that aircraft energy intensity is reduced by an additional 5% due to air 
traffic control and operational improvements, such as (1) greater use of continuous 
descent approaches, (2) improvements in communications, navigation, and surveillance 
(CNS) and air traffic management (ATM) systems, and/or (3) utilization of multiple 
stages for long-distance travel (i.e., limiting trip lengths to shorter-distances).  (Such 
operational improvements are the goal of the NextGen project in the U.S. and SESAR in 
Europe.)  In order to make all of these efficiency gains possible, investment costs for 
aircraft would likely be higher.  Therefore, this scenario assumes that the cost difference 
between conventional aircraft in the Reference Case and advanced aircraft in the Deep 
GHG Reduction Scenario gradually climbs to 25% by 2050. 
 
Industrial, Commercial, Residential, and Agricultural Sectors 
In the “ICRA” sectors, future energy demand trajectories and fuel use mixes are 
exogenously specified by the modeler.  Hence, the greenhouse gas reductions that are 
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achieved are entirely a function of the input assumptions.  For this reason, it is important 
that the fuel demands of the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario are consistent with an overall 
storyline where GHGs are reduced 80% below 1990 levels by 2050, and to this end the 
IEA’s well-known BLUE Map scenario – published in the 2010 ETP study (IEA, 2010) – 
greatly informs the CA-TIMES Deep GHG Reduction Scenario.  In BLUE Map, global 
energy-related CO2 emissions are reduced 50% below 2005 levels by 2050, with the U.S. 
and other industrialized countries reducing their emissions by about 80%.  In developing 
this scenario, the IEA partly utilized its global MARKAL energy systems model, which 
simulates energy investment and fuel use decisions across all regions of the world and in 
all sectors.  These decisions are made based on the least-cost principle, just as in CA-
TIMES, in an effort to reflect reality as much as possible.  The U.S. is one of many 
regions in the IEA’s global MARKAL model, and I use the results of ETP analysis for 
the U.S. as a basis for defining the fuel use mixes in the industrial, commercial, 
residential, and agricultural sectors in 2030 and 2050 in the CA-TIMES Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario.  Fuel demand shares in the in-between years are automatically 
calculated by the model via linear interpolation.  For a summary of energy use, 
emissions, and technology development in the industrial and buildings sectors in the 
IEA’s Baseline and BLUE Map scenarios, see Figures 9.10 and 9.14 of the IEA’s most 
recent ETP report (IEA, 2010).   
 
Utilization of U.S.-specific results from another scenario study has some limitations, 
however.  Most notably, the current energy landscape in California is a bit different than 
it is in the rest of the U.S., and this is likely to remain the case for some time into the 
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future.  For instance, because the state is not home to certain heavy industries (e.g., steel-
making), only a small amount of coal is consumed in the industrial sector.  Also, due to 
California’s relatively temperate climate, heating demands are not as high as in other 
parts of the country, and for historical reasons heating oil is not a commonly used fuel in 
the commercial and residential sectors.  Previous sections have shown that California 
currently relies heavily on natural gas and electricity in each of the ICRA sectors; as a 
result, the carbon intensity of state’s end-use sectors, aside from transport, is lower in 
than in other parts of the country.  Assuming these trends continue in the long term (i.e., 
assuming that California remains ahead of other states on the “carbon intensity curve” 
and continues on its path toward being a post-industrial, service-oriented, information-
based economy), and drawing on the results of the IEA BLUE Map scenario, it is perhaps 
reasonable to assume that a dramatic transition to a low-carbon economy in California 
could potentially lead to much greater use of electricity as an end-use fuel, even moreso 
than today.  In the cases where electricity is not a satisfactory alternative, such as steam 
generation and other high-temperature processes, natural gas or biomass could become 
attractive low-carbon options.  Such a storyline forms the basis of the fuel use mix 
assumptions of the ICRA sectors in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario. 
 
Furthermore, the projected demands for each of the ICRA sectors (except for 
Agriculture) are lower in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario than in the Reference Case.  
In particular, the projections are based on the Baseline – high efficiency scenario 
developed for the California Energy Commission as part of the UC-Davis Advanced 
Energy Pathways (AEP) project (McCarthy et al., 2008a, b).  Motivating these demand 
219 
 
 
 
reductions are energy efficiency and conservation efforts, spurred by a strong carbon 
price and efficiency standards on end-use technologies (as described in Table 31).  The 
annual efficiency improvements assumed in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario (0% to 
0.7% depending on the end-use sector), which are over and above those already 
embedded in the Reference Case, are technically feasible with today’s technologies 
(McCarthy et al., 2008a, b). 
 
The Deep GHG Reduction Scenario also assumes that carbon capture and storage 
technologies are increasingly utilized for a certain portion of fuel combustion in the 
industrial sector.  Specifically, CCS is applied to ten percent (10%) of CO2 emissions 
from natural gas, biomass, and coal (where utilized) combustion processes in 2030, a 
share that rises to 75% in 2050.  Values in the in-between years are calculated by linear 
interpolation.  The assumed capture rate for all of these generic CCS processes is 90%. 
 
Results of the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario  
Electricity Generation 
The development of the electric sector in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario is markedly 
different than in the Reference Case (Figure 54).  For starters, the sheer magnitude of 
electricity generation is substantially greater in this scenario, as a result of the increased 
electrification of the end-use sectors.  In 2050, electricity supply is 36% greater than in 
the Reference Case, and compared to 2005, it is 105% greater.  Second, over time natural 
gas ceases to be the preferred method of generation; instead, the generation mix becomes 
much more diverse.  Of the natural gas generation that still lingers in 2050, most is 
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equipped with carbon capture and storage.  Coal IGCC plants with CCS also achieve 
significant market share in the later time periods.  In order to achieve deep reductions in 
GHG emissions, however, zero-carbon electricity must grow significantly in the years 
ahead.  For this reason the scenario sees a large uptake of new nuclear plants (particularly 
of the advanced light water reactor variety) and of renewables (solar, wind, geothermal, 
biomass).  In addition, a small but non-trivial amount of electric generation comes from 
bio-refineries and FT poly-generation plants.  The primary purpose of these facilities is to 
produce liquid fuels, but they also happen to produce low-carbon electricity as a co-
product; thus, they are especially attractive to the model.   
 
 
Figure 54  Electricity Generation by Plant Type in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
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Figure 55 shows the dramatic growth of low- and zero-carbon electric generation over 
time in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario.  By 2050, more than 80% of all California’s 
electricity is produced by zero-carbon sources (nuclear, hydro, and other renewables), 
with the remainder coming from biomass and fossil power plants equipped with CCS.  In 
particular, the share of non-hydro renewables in the generation mix grows to 
approximately 50% in 2050, a fairly high level in light of intermittency concerns with 
solar and wind power.  Whether or not the vast array of renewable resources (not all of 
which are intermittent) could reliably supply such a large share of California’s electricity 
demand is still an open question, and one this analysis only begins to address.  To some 
extent, both geothermal and solar thermal technologies have the potential to act as 
baseload generators; however, the intermittency of wind power could become a major 
challenge without adequate electrical storage capacity.  On these points, it is important to 
note that the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario assumes no additional storage capacity than 
what already exists in California’s power system today (i.e., a small amount of pumped 
storage).  Moreover, while the CA-TIMES model is not able to represent the timing of 
electricity supply and demand in the way that a full-blown electricity dispatch model is 
able to do, its high timeslice resolution nevertheless allows it to do a fairly reasonable 
job.  Even though no constraints have been introduced to the model to limit the share of 
generation from particular renewable technologies in a given year (as is common practice 
in other energy systems models), CA-TIMES has full knowledge of end-use electricity 
demands and the availability of renewable resource supplies in all timeslices.  Therefore, 
in some sense the model is capable of acting as a judge for how much electricity could be 
feasibly supplied from renewables in any future time period.  Lastly, it is important to 
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note that the total generation potential from each of the various renewable resource types 
is constrained based on total renewable resource estimates for California and the western 
United States, which are found in the California Public Utility Commission’s “33% RPS 
Implementation Analysis” (CPUC, 2009).  Only a share of these total resources are made 
available to the California market. 
 
 
Figure 55  Share of Low-Carbon Electricity Generation by Type in the Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario 
 
Energy Supply and Conversion 
The mix of fuels supplied by the resource and energy conversion sectors also looks quite 
different in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario than in the Reference Case.  Most 
notably, a substantial quantity of liquid fossil fuels is replaced by low-carbon substitutes, 
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such as biofuels, synthetic fuels, electricity, and hydrogen.  The types of biofuels 
consumed are not the same as in the Reference Case, however; for instance, the 
importance of ethanol declines significantly in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
(compare Figure 56 with Reference Case Figure 35).  Instead, the model chooses to direct 
biomass to the production of bio-derived gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and residual fuel oil.  
The reason for this is fairly intuitive:  there are fewer technological/fuel options to reduce 
GHG emissions in the non-LDV transport subsectors, hence the value of a tonne of 
biomass is higher when producing a liquid fuel for these other uses.  Especially attractive 
are FT poly-generation plants equipped with CCS and consuming only biomass.  In the 
process of producing zero-carbon bio-based gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel, as well as clean 
electricity, these technologies function as negative emissions technologies, essentially 
removing CO2 from the atmosphere and permanently sequestering it underground.   
 
Interestingly, total consumption of biofuels in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario is at 
roughly the same level in 2050 (975 PJ or 7.5 billion gge) as it is in the Reference Case.  
In the latter scenario, the high price of crude oil in a BAU future is enough to motivate 
substantial biofuels production, while in the former the incentive for biofuels has more to 
do with the stringent climate targets that are imposed.  Total biomass supply (roughly 
1,740 PJ, or 108 million bone dry tons) is a bit higher in the Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario than in the Reference Case (Figure 57 vs. Reference Case Figure 36), due to the 
marginally less efficient production methods for producing the non-ethanol biofuels and 
the attractiveness of generating zero-carbon outputs while at the same time storing CO2 
permanently underground.  One important difference, however, is just how much more 
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quickly biomass supply grows in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario, especially between 
2025 and 2035, in order to meet the increasingly stringent cap on GHG emissions.  
Specifically, Herbaceous Energy Crops see greater utilization in the Deep GHG Scenario, 
despite their higher prices relative to other types of biomass.  On the other hand, the 
model opts for a slower uptake of Mixed Municipal Solid Waste (e.g., foodstuffs and 
other dirty MSW), which is presumably related to the non-zero carbon intensity of the 
latter. 
 
 
Figure 56  Biofuels Consumption by Fuel Type in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
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Figure 57  Biomass Supply by Feedstock Type in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
 
Hydrogen also becomes an extremely important fuel in the Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario, and as Figure 58 illustrates the hydrogen production industry grows quickly 
after 2030.  The preferred method of generation is natural gas steam methane reforming 
(SMR) with CCS.  Water electrolysis and biomass gasification are, in contrast, not cost-
competitive under the set of assumptions supplied to the model; hence, they are not used.  
Moreover, the fact that the model does not opt for biomass-to-H2 plants with CCS – even 
though this pathway is also a negative emissions option – is particularly noteworthy since 
it shows the relative attractiveness of converting biomass into liquid fuels via a FT 
process equipped with CCS, rather than biomass-to-H2.  Of course, adding to this 
226 
 
 
 
attractiveness is the fact that biofuels are in such high demand in certain transport 
subsectors for which there is no substitute. 
 
 
Figure 58  Hydrogen Production by Plant Type in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
 
The CCS industry grows quickly after 2025 in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
(Figure 59), and by 2050 the total quantity of carbon dioxide being stored underground 
every year is almost twice as much as that being emitted to the atmosphere.  Such high 
CO2 flows may seem high at first glance, but actually the cumulative quantity of 
emissions stored until 2055 (~2,930 Mton CO2) is fairly small relative to the overall 
storage potential that exists in California (~1.5% of total estimated capacity) and the 
potential in the western U.S. that California energy facilities could possibly have access 
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to (~0.3%), according to mid-range geologic storage estimates from the U.S. DOE 
National Energy Technology Laboratory’s (NETL) Carbon Sequestration Atlas of the 
United States and Canada (NETL, 2008).  In other words, CCS is not likely to be limited 
by storage capacity going forward.  The bulk of CO2 capture and storage takes place at 
natural gas combined-cycle and coal IGCC power plants and FT poly-generation and 
hydrogen production facilities. 
 
 
Figure 59  CO2 Emissions Captured and Stored via CCS in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
 
Industrial, Commercial, Residential, and Agricultural Sectors 
Treatment of the ICRA sectors – and their exogenously specified trajectories for energy 
demands and fuel mixes – has already been described earlier in this section.  The key 
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points to make note of are two-fold.  First, the fuel use mixes of the Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario are largely based on the BLUE Map scenario of the IEA.  Hence, 
they are consistent with an overall storyline where California greenhouse gas emissions 
are reduced 80% below 1990 levels by 2050.  Second, the carbon intensities of these 
sectors are substantially reduced due to a pronounced shift towards what essentially 
becomes a dual fuel system:  electricity is the energy carrier of choice in applications 
where its use is feasible, and natural gas is utilized for high temperature processes.  In 
addition, a small but non-trivial amount of both biomass (e.g., for industrial boilers) and 
solar energy (e.g., passive rooftop water heating on buildings) also contributes to the 
energy supply.  The following four figures illustrate the evolution of the ICRA sectors 
over time in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario. 
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Figure 60  Useful Energy Demand by Fuel Type in the Industrial Sector in the Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario 
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Figure 61  Useful Energy Demand by Fuel Type in the Commercial Sector in the Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario 
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Figure 62  Useful Energy Demand by Fuel Type in the Residential Sector in the Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario 
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Figure 63  Useful Energy Demand by Fuel Type in the Agricultural Sector in the Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario 
 
Transportation Fuels Consumption and Technology Trends 
A major transformation also occurs in the transportation sector in the Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario.  This is illustrated in Figure 64, which shows the mix of fuels 
consumed sector-wide.  The main fossil fuels of today (gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and 
residual fuel oil) decline in importance over time:  they are still widely used, but their 
continued upward growth slows down significantly.  In contrast ethanol, biodiesel, bio-
gasoline, bio-RFO, bio-jet fuel, hydrogen, and electricity all gain market share in the 
future.  Particularly interesting is the small contribution from ethanol in this scenario.  In 
the Reference Case, ethanol (in the form of both E-10 and E-85) grows substantially over 
the coming decades, once its cost of production becomes competitive with petroleum-
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based gasoline at high and sustained crude oil prices.  In the Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario, however, ethanol consumption initially increases (due to the RFS biofuels 
mandates), but then in the long-run its importance diminishes.  The reason for this, as has 
been discussed previously, is the absence of suitable alternatives for liquid fuels in some 
of the other transport subsectors and, hence, the higher value of converting biomass to 
other forms of biofuel (e.g., namely biodiesel, bio-RFO, and bio-jet fuel).  An important 
lesson for policy that derives from these results is the following:  while low-carbon 
ethanol may be an attractive alternative to gasoline over the next 10-20 years, its 
production may not be the best use of biomass in the long term, assuming deep reductions 
in GHG emissions need to be made across the all transport subsectors and indeed the 
entire economy. 
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Figure 64  Final Energy Demand by Fuel Type in the Transportation Sector in the Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario 
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Figure 65  Fuel Consumption for Light-Duty Vehicles in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
 
Total transportation fuel consumption in 2050 is cut by about one-third in the Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario compared to the same year in the Reference Case, while for light-
duty vehicles the reduction is even greater, about one-half (Figure 65).  A portion of this 
reduction can be attributed to the lower LDV VMT demands assumed in this scenario, 
which are motivated by strong transit, land use, and auto pricing policies.  The bulk of the 
reductions, however, are due to greatly increased vehicle efficiencies, made possible by 
advanced technologies. 
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The Deep GHG Reduction Scenario sees extensive penetration of advanced vehicle 
technologies, particularly in the light-duty sector (Figure 66).49  These actions are 
motivated by the declining cap on economy-wide GHG emissions, as well as the new, 
more stringent LDV GHG emissions standards, which are enacted between 2017 and 
2025 and gradually raise the minimum fuel economies of new light-duty cars and trucks 
to 60 mpg and 45 mpgge, respectively, assuming all the GHG reductions are achieved by 
vehicle efficiency improvements (Figure 67).  Standards of such stringency are in line 
with recent announcements of the U.S. EPA, U.S. DOT, and CARB, who are currently in 
the process of setting new federal fuel economy and tailpipe emissions standards for 
model-year 2017-2025 vehicles.  In support of this plan, the organizations recently 
undertook a joint technical assessment to gauge the feasibility of raising vehicle 
efficiency standards from 3% to 6% per year between 2017 and 2025 (EPA-DOT-CARB, 
2010).  (The current CAFE standards are set to expire in 2016.)  Several scenarios are 
developed in their analysis, but the main conclusion is that between now and 2025 
automakers will need to significantly increase their supply of advanced technology 
vehicles (namely HEVs, PHEVs, BEVs, and Diesel ICEs) if they hope to meet the more 
stringent standards.  My analysis essentially reaches this same conclusion, as evidenced 
by the vehicle market share curves shown in Figure 66.  The primary difference is that 
the CA-TIMES Deep GHG Reduction Scenarios also foresees a limited introduction of 
Hydrogen FCVs by 2025, since the model (with its perfect foresight) recognizes that this 
low-carbon option must be introduced to the market in the near to medium term, in order 
for FCVs to have adequate time to build up their capacity by the 2040-2050 timeframe.  
                                                 
49
 Note that while the main purpose of CA-TIMES is to serve as an energy systems model, it also acts 
implicitly as a vehicle stock turnover model as well. 
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Actually, this is true of all advanced vehicle types:  subject to constraints on growth, if 
these technologies are to have enough time to gain significant market share by the middle 
part of the century, their introduction needs to occur in earnest over the next 10-20 years. 
 
By 2050, the LDV market is dominated by Gasoline HEVs, with Gasoline PHEVs, 
Hydrogen FCVs, Gasoline ICEs, and E-85 Flex Fuel ICEs and HEVs also playing 
important roles (Figure 66).  Much of the gasoline still consumed by the ICE and PHEV 
vehicles is petroleum-based, whereas a significant portion (~20%) is either bio-gasoline 
or synthetic gasoline, both of which are low in carbon and produced by one of the various 
FT coal-biomass poly-generation plants.  Interestingly, battery-electric vehicles do not 
experience any growth in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario, an outcome due entirely to 
the relatively high lifecycle costs of supplying VMT using BEVs, considering both the 
capital costs of vehicles and their requisite recharging infrastructure (the capital costs for 
Level I, II, and III charging are all represented in the model).  Such a result is indeed 
questionable given the activity we see around electric vehicles today.  However, from the 
perspective of the CA-TIMES model, one can understand this result by noting that in the 
model no distinction is made between vehicle classes – i.e., all LDV technologies are 
represented as mid-size cars.  Because mid-size cars weigh significantly more than the 
types of compact BEVs currently being introduced by automakers around the world, and 
in order to satisfy consumer demands for vehicle range (200+ miles on a single charge), 
the battery packs for the light-duty BEVs represented in the CA-TIMES model are 
actually quite large (~80 kWh).  Therefore, total BEV costs are rather expensive relative 
to other advanced LDV technologies, and partly for this reason we do not see any 
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significant penetration of these vehicles in this very low-carbon future.  It is planned that 
future versions of the CA-TIMES model will allow for greater disaggregation of the 
various LDV class segments, from compact to mid-size to large cars, and from small to 
large trucks, minivans, and SUVs.  Such market segmentation could potentially lead to 
greater penetration of BEVs. 
 
The fact that ICE-based drivetrains (including HEVs and PHEVs) continue to make up 
the bulk of the light-duty vehicle market in 2050 is an interesting result, as it shows the 
relatively higher abatement costs in this particular transport subsector, not to mention the 
others.  As discussed later, the lack of a dramatic transformation in transport has much to 
do with the huge emissions reductions that are achieved in the other energy sectors over 
the next few decades, particularly in the electricity and supply sectors, where zero and 
even negative emissions are possible, thanks to bio-CCS technologies. 
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Figure 66  Technology Penetration in the Light-Duty Vehicle Subsector in the Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario 
 
The average new model-year vehicle fuel economy for light-duty cars and trucks is 
approximately 66 mpgge in 2050, almost twice the level in the Reference Case and 2.5 
times that of today (Figure 67).  Fleet fuel economy (averaging both on-road and new 
cars and trucks) climbs to 60 mpgge by 2050.  Such high efficiencies lead to the large 
reductions in LDV fuel demand that are shown in Figure 65.  (Note that the peak in new 
vehicle fuel economy in 2050 is caused by the so-called “end-year effect”, an artifact of 
energy-economic systems optimization models that is actually quite common.  In this 
case, because the required GHG reductions between 2050 and 2055 are quite small, in 
comparison to the reductions required in the previous five-year intervals, the model – 
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with its perfect foresight – chooses to invest in cheaper, less efficient vehicles in 2055 
than in 2050.) 
 
 
Figure 67  Average Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
 
In the non-LDV subsectors, the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario also sees a pronounced 
shift toward alternative fuels and advanced technologies.  Heavy-duty trucks provide a 
good example:  total fuel demands are cut significantly as a result of the introduction of 
high-efficiency Diesel ICE technologies.  (Other advanced technologies, such as PHEVs, 
BEVs, and FCVs, are not available to the HDT subsector in CA-TIMES, due to range 
limitations and excessively long refueling times.)  Moreover, the diesel consumed by 
these vehicles is only partly sourced from conventional petroleum; a large portion comes 
from low-carbon biodiesel and synthetic diesel.  The Medium-duty Truck and Bus 
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subsectors do not face some of the range and refueling issues associated with long-haul 
trucks (in fact, a large share of MDTs and Buses are fleet vehicles), hence a greater 
number of alternative fuel and technology options are available.  Accordingly, we see a 
shift in these subsectors from high-carbon fossil fuels, such as gasoline and diesel, to 
lower-carbon biodiesel, hydrogen, and natural gas.  The model invests in both Hydrogen 
FCVs and Hydrogen hybrid-electric ICEs in these cases, since both technologies allow 
for higher efficiencies than Diesel ICEs and both make possible the use of low-carbon 
hydrogen fuel.  In the rail subsector, a portion of Freight Rail operations are electrified by 
2050, despite the relatively high capital costs assumed in the model for rail track 
electrification.  Because electrically-powered locomotives are more efficient than 
conventional diesel or diesel-electric propulsion systems, this technological shift helps to 
lower total energy demand in the subsector.  Emissions reductions in the Marine and 
Aviation subsectors, on the other hand, are primarily limited to fuel switching, as the 
options for alternative propulsion systems are more limited.  Therefore, the model 
chooses to direct substantial quantities of bio-derived RFO and bio-jet fuel to these 
subsectors.  Interestingly, Figure 72 shows bio-RFO consumption by marine vessels 
growing quickly from 2020 to 2035 and then shrinking just as quickly toward 2050.  The 
reason for this seemingly odd behavior has to do with the lack of CCS-capability (and 
thus negative emissions potential) with the pyrolysis bio-oil production pathway used for 
making bio-RFO.  The model prefers instead to direct limited biomass supplies to the FT 
poly-generation plants, which produce bio-based gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel, as well as 
electricity, while at the same time sequestering a significant portion of the biomass 
carbon permanently underground.   
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Figure 68  Fuel Consumption for Heavy-Duty Trucks in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
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Figure 69  Fuel Consumption for Medium-Duty Trucks in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
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Figure 70  Fuel Consumption for Buses in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
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Figure 71  Fuel Consumption for Rail in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
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Figure 72  Fuel Consumption for Marine Vessels in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
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Figure 73  Fuel Consumption for Aviation in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
By transitioning to an energy system that relies more heavily on advanced technologies 
and alternative fuels, the potential exists for substantial reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions in California in the long term.  Figure 74 shows CA-TIMES model estimates 
of annual GHG emissions produced via fuel combustion activities in each of the state’s 
various energy sectors.  Figure 75 is similar except that emissions from electric 
generation are allocated to end-uses.  Note that a straight line declining cap on emissions 
is assumed in the scenario, which helps to explain the shape of the emissions trajectory 
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shown here.50  Otherwise, if the model were free to set its own schedule for emission 
reductions (as estimated in a side analysis, the results for which are not shown here), it 
would choose to push the deepest cuts to the later time periods (i.e., after 2040), in 
response to the non-zero global discount rates used in the model, which essentially make 
long-term costs less important than near- to medium-term costs in the calculation of total 
discounted system costs on a net present value basis.51  While postponing mitigation 
actions may make sense from the point of view of the model, it is probably not reflective 
of the real world, in which policymakers of the future are likely set interim emission 
targets between 2020 and 2050, in order to ensure that the system is on track to meet the 
long-term deep reduction goals (as well as to further the achievement of various other 
political objectives, such as job creation).   
 
A particularly noteworthy finding relates to the GHG emissions target for 2020 (i.e., the 
AB32 goal of returning to 1990 levels by this year).  Even though a cap is set for 2020, 
the model actually opts to undershoot the limit (i.e., the constraint is non-binding), in 
order to prepare for the following time period just five years later, when the emissions 
cap is lower still.  What this says is that, according to the multitude of assumptions made 
in this particular scenario, for the California energy system to put itself on track to reach 
the deep reduction targets of the long term (80% by 2050), while following a linearly 
declining emissions trajectory, GHG emissions in 2020 will likely need to be lower than 
                                                 
50
 Other modeling groups in the U.S. and abroad tend to represent declining emission caps by the same 
straight line trajectory approach that I have used, as noted through my interactions with the North American 
MARKAL-TIMES users group and the Stanford-based Energy Modeling Forum. 
51
 In such a case, the primary limiting factors that would militate against such an outcome (i.e., pushing 
GHG emissions reductions to the very last period) are the growth constraints assumed in the model, which 
force the investment in and utilization of advanced technologies and alternative fuels in the near- and 
medium-term, so that there is enough time for them to gain significant market share by 2050. 
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the cap currently specified by AB32.  In other words, while returning to 1990 emission 
levels by 2020 will certainly represent a big achievement for California, from a long-term 
perspective such a target may not be stringent enough. 
 
 
Figure 74  CA-Combustion GHG Emissions by Sector in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
 
Two other striking observations from the GHG emissions figures shown here relate to the 
dominance of transport sector emissions in the long term and the huge potential for 
negative emissions in the supply sector.  Both of these findings are intimately related to 
each other, since the types of technologies that are able to permanently sequester biomass 
carbon underground (i.e., FT poly-generation plants) are the same ones that supply the 
transport sector with biomass-based gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel.  Because of the 
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considerable potential for bio-CCS, the other sectors are allowed to emit more than they 
otherwise would be able to, if negative emissions technologies were not available.  In 
other words, these other sectors are not forced to reduce their emissions so stringently.  
The transportation sector is the primary benefactor in such a circumstance, given that 
marginal CO2 abatement costs are generally higher in transport than in other sectors.  
(Another reason is the exogenously specified scenario storyline assumed for the 
industrial, commercial, residential, and agricultural sectors.)  For instance, while supply 
sector emissions are reduced 262% between 2005 and 2050 (and in the electric sector by 
99%), emissions in transport decrease by only 32%.  Such findings are in line with other 
modeling studies (e.g., IEA (2010)), which show that from a cost-perspective and in the 
absence of any transport-specific GHG policies, certain segments of the transport sector 
are likely to be the last to decarbonize.  The unique contribution of this study, at least 
within the California context, is that it highlights the enormous potential for bio-CCS 
negative emissions technologies and the critical role they may be able to play in 
controlling GHG emissions in the state, as well as taking the load off some of the other 
sectors, especially transport.  Of course, this line of reasoning is contingent upon the 
eventual success and public acceptance of these technologies, as well as the ultimate size 
of the sustainable biomass feedstock base available to California.  If bio-CCS 
technologies are constrained for any of these reasons in the future, then the potential for 
negative emissions in California would be significantly hindered, and the transportation 
sector would indeed be required to reduce its emissions by a considerably larger amount.  
These kind of sensitivities are explored in later sections of this chapter, wherein a handful 
of interesting variants of the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario are analyzed.   
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At first glance, the results discussed here might seem to contradict those shown in the 
first chapter of this dissertation, which looked at the potential for making 80% cuts in 
(well-to-wheel) greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. transport sector by 2050 (alsoYang, 
McCollum et al. (2009), who studied similar scenarios for California).  That analysis 
highlighted the critical role that advanced vehicle technologies and alternative fuels 
would perhaps need to play in the long term.  The question raised by the analysis was 
whether or not the transport sector would ever actually need to achieve an 80% reduction 
on its own, or could emissions reductions be made more cost-effectively in other sectors.  
The CA-TIMES work discussed here was developed for the express purpose of 
addressing these kinds of questions, and the findings that derive from the analysis are 
very interesting.  Namely, emissions reductions in the transport sector may not actually 
need to be as large as that assumed in the 80in50 study of Chapter I; in fact, they may not 
need to be anywhere near as great, so long as the potential for negative emissions 
technologies exists on the supply side. 
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Figure 75  CA-Combustion GHG Emissions by Sector in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario with 
Electricity Emissions Allocated to the Various End-Use Sectors 
 
The cumulative quantity of GHGs emitted between 2005 and 2055 (i.e., the area under 
the total emissions curve in Figure 74) is approximately 15,762 Mton CO2-eq in the Deep 
GHG Reduction Scenario.  Over the more limited period of 2012 to 2050, cumulative 
emissions are just 12,048 Mton CO2-eq.  By comparison, cumulative emissions in the 
Reference Case are a much higher 27,552 and 21,140 Mton CO2-eq, respectively, over 
these two timeframes.  The period between 2012 and 2050 is particularly relevant 
because of the U.S. National Research Council’s recent recommendation that total 
domestic U.S. greenhouse gases from all sources (both fuel combustion and non-energy 
GHGs) stay within a cumulative emissions “budget” of 170,000 to 200,000 Mton CO2-eq 
during this timeframe (NRC, 2010).  Such a budget corresponds to reductions in annual 
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GHG emissions by 2050 that are between 80% and 50% below 1990 levels, respectively, 
at the national level.  In the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario developed here (an 80% 
reduction scenario), California’s cumulative emissions, which one should be reminded 
only include fuel combustion, represent about 7.1% of this national emissions budget, 
which is only slightly less than the state’s current contribution to total domestic U.S. 
GHGs.  (The small discrepancy is understandable when considering that only fuel 
combustion emissions are captured by CA-TIMES.)  For illustrative purposes, if we 
assume that this 7.1% figure is roughly representative of California’s “fair share” of U.S. 
GHGs, then California’s emissions budget over the 2012 to 2050 time period is estimated 
at 12,100 and 14,200 Mton CO2-eq, respectively, depending on the stringency of the 
2050 emissions target (80% or 50%).  While the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario remains 
within these budgets, the Reference Case far exceeds it.  In fact, if California continues to 
follow a business-as-usual Reference Case scenario for energy system development, then 
its emissions budget is likely to be exceeded well before 2050.  Instead, the budget would 
probably be exceeded around 2035. 
 
The average “well-to-wheel” lifecycle carbon intensity (including both upstream/ “well-
to-tank” and downstream/“tank-to-wheel” stages) of all fuels consumed in the 
transportation sector decreases from 82.8 gCO2-eq/MJHHV in 2005 to 31.1 gCO2-
eq/MJHHV in 2050, a difference of about 62% (Figure 76).  (Remember that because these 
carbon intensities are calculated on a HHV basis, they are about 7 to 11% lower than if 
calculated on a LHV basis.)  In the LDV subsector, the drop is not quite as large, with 
average carbon intensity declining to just 44.8 gCO2-eq/MJHHV in 2050 (Figure 77).  In 
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other words, fuel carbon intensities are lower, on average, in the non-LDV subsectors, 
thanks to a larger amount of fuel switching.  Emissions reductions made during the well-
to-tank stages of fuel production are the primary driver of lower total lifecycle carbon 
intensities.  In particular, the fact that well-to-tank emissions eventually become negative 
has everything to do with the increased utilization of biomass-based gasoline, diesel, and 
jet fuel, which are produced by bio-CCS negative emissions technologies, as previous 
discussions in this section have made all too clear.  During the tank-to-wheel stage (i.e., 
fuel combustion), greater consumption of low- and zero-carbon biofuels and electricity, 
as well as hydrogen in certain transport subsectors, is responsible for the declines that 
result. 
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Figure 76  Average Lifecycle Carbon Intensity of All Fuels Consumed in the Transportation Sector 
in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
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Figure 77  Average Lifecycle Carbon Intensity of All Fuels Consumed in the Light-Duty Vehicle 
Subsector in the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
 
II.3.3 Deep GHG Reduction Scenario Variants 
Up to this point in the chapter, two core scenarios have been thoroughly discussed – the 
Reference Case and Deep GHG Reduction Scenario.  Each represents a potential path for 
the development of California’s energy system over the coming decades.  A considerable 
amount of time and effort has gone into creating these scenarios, but at the end of the day 
they are just two out of an infinite number of possible eventualities.  And while both 
paths are thought to be feasible from a technological perspective, in the sense that both 
were developed based on reasonable assumptions from the literature, neither should be 
taken as a definitive prediction of how events will unfold in the coming years.  Herein 
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lies one of the most delicate elements of “what-if”-type scenario analyses:  because no 
single scenario offers an absolutely certain picture of the future, it is up to the modeler to 
develop alternate scenarios and to undertake sensitivity analyses around key assumptions.  
The challenge, of course, centers around where to focus one’s attention, given that 
scenarios of the type developed using energy systems models, such as CA-TIMES, are 
built on thousands, or even tens of thousands, of assumptions. 
 
In this section, several variants of the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario are developed.  In 
the first exercise, I maintain all previous assumptions, while changing the most important 
policy driver:  the stringency of the cap on GHG emissions.  Then, in a second exercise 
the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario is modified much more extensively: specifically, 
assumptions concerning the potential of certain key low-carbon technologies and 
resources are significantly altered (generally resulting in less technological optimism).  
The scenario variants are compared across a range of energy, environmental, and cost 
metrics. 
 
Scenario Variants #1:  Modification of the GHG Emissions Cap  
The most important driver of energy system development in the core Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario is the declining cap on GHG emissions, which ultimately reaches 
80% below 1990 emissions levels by 2050.  A climate target of such stringency leads to 
dramatic shifts in the types of technologies and fuels utilized in California in the future, 
as shown in previous sections.  Due to its importance, an obvious question thus becomes, 
“How might the situation change if the emissions cap were less stringent?”  Perhaps 
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policymakers decide next year, or in ten years from now, to scale back their aspirations 
for achieving the 80% reduction target, opting instead for something less stringent.  Or 
perhaps the science surrounding climate change evolves in such a way that suggests an 
80% cut in California (as well as U.S. and other industrialized country) emissions is not 
actually necessary.  (Of course, the alternate outcome is equally as likely, that even 
deeper cuts in emissions are needed.)  In an effort to address this question, I develop three 
additional scenarios, in which the cap on GHG emissions is set at 50%, 60%, and 70% 
below 1990 levels by 2050.  For each scenario, the trajectory of the cap is assumed to 
decline linearly from the same 2020 starting point as in the original Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario (i.e., the 1990 level). 
 
Other than the modified emission targets, all other assumptions in these scenario variants 
are the same as in the core Deep GHG Reduction Scenario.  This includes the exogenous 
fossil fuel price projections and the exogenously specified fuel demands in the ICRA 
sectors, both of which, it should be reminded, were developed with an 80% reduction 
scenario in mind.  With respect to the ICRA sectors in particular, by keeping their fuel 
mixes the same, the introduction of climate caps with reduced stringencies effectively 
means that the transport, electricity, and supply sectors do not have to reduce their 
emissions quite as much.  This potentially injects some error into these scenarios, since it 
is unlikely that exactly the same technologies and fuels would be used in the ICRA 
sectors in an 80% reduction scenario as would be in a 50% scenario.  However, in any 
event I have decided not to explicitly address the issue for now, given that my analysis 
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focuses on the transport, electricity, and supply sectors and the advanced technologies 
and alternative fuels utilized therein.  
 
In addition to the three scenario variants with alternative caps on GHG emissions, I also 
develop a scenario that is a variant of the Reference Case.  The only differences between 
the original Reference Case and its variant are the demands exogenously assumed in the 
end-use sectors.  More specifically, the lower demands of the Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario are used; hence, this scenario variant is named “Reference Case (w/ Lower 
Demands)”.  Otherwise, all technological assumptions are the same as in the original 
Reference Case – fossil fuel price projections, the exogenously specified fuel demands of 
the ICRA end-use sectors, and so on.  The reason for developing this scenario variant is 
that, as evidenced in the discussions that follow, demand reduction apparently has a fairly 
substantial impact on energy use, greenhouse gas emissions, and costs.  Therefore, in 
analyzing the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario variants across the range of energy, 
environmental, and cost metrics, it seems only fair to compare them to the Reference 
Case (w/ Lower Demands), since the policies leading to the assumed demand reductions 
in these scenarios (e.g., strong transit, land use, and auto pricing policies in the transport 
sector, and energy efficiency standards in the industrial, commercial, residential, and 
agricultural sectors) are not adequately captured by the CA-TIMES model.  
 
Figure 78 compares the GHG emissions trajectories of the Reference Case, Reference 
Case (w/ Lower Demands), Deep GHG Reduction Scenario, and the three Deep GHG 
variants.  As a result of demand reduction, GHG emissions in 2050 are 125 Mton lower 
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in the Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) than in the original Reference Case.  All 
other emissions cuts can be classified as technological reductions, in the sense that they 
result from switching to lower-carbon fuels and the introduction of advanced, more 
efficient technologies.  Increasing the stringency of the emissions cap plays an important 
role in driving technological change, as is clearly evident in Figure 78, and by 2050 the 
emissions spread between the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario and its variants is quite 
large.  In fact, annual GHG emissions in 2050 in the five scenario variants are lower than 
in the original Reference Case by 21%, 63%, 70%, 78%, and 85%, respectively.  
Particularly in the Deep GHG scenario variants, the reductions stem from energy system 
development paths that actually quite different from each other.  Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note that up until about 2020–2025, these landscapes are still quite similar, 
and the GHG emissions trajectories of each do not diverge until about this time.  Such a 
result essentially says that whether California ultimately decides to follow a 50% or 80% 
GHG reduction path, or any path in between, technological investment decisions and fuel 
choices made over the coming decade (2010-2020) will, for the most part, need to be the 
same. 
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Figure 78  GHG Trajectories of the Scenario Variants with Modified Emissions Caps 
 
The following series of tables shows a number of indicators comparing the Reference 
Case, Deep GHG Reduction Scenario, and their variants across several different 
dimensions.  Particular attention is paid to the transportation sector, electricity generation, 
biofuels and biomass supply, and emissions.  A fairly small number of indicators are 
shown (out of the hundreds or thousands possible), but the point here is to give the reader 
a quick sense of what these scenarios look like and how the stringency of the emissions 
cap impacts the development of the energy system in a different way.  For instance, 
targeting deeper reductions in GHG emissions necessitates greater electrification of the 
light-duty vehicle fleet, namely PHEVs and Hydrogen FCVs (  
262 
 
 
 
Table 40).  In the Deep GHG 50% scenario, the total share of light-duty VMT supplied 
by PHEVs, BEVs, and FCVs is just 11% in 2050, whereas it rises to 28% in the Deep 
GHG 80% scenario.  Electrification of vehicles has the effect of raising the average fuel 
economy of the entire 2050 LDV fleet (both on-road and new cars and trucks) from 55 
mpgge to 60 mpgge in these two scenarios, respectively.  Simultaneously, because of the 
much greater use of low-carbon biofuels, electricity, and hydrogen, the average lifecycle 
carbon intensity of all fuels consumed in the California transportation sector in 2050 
declines from 53.2 gCO2-eq/MJHHV in the Deep GHG 50% scenario to 31.1 gCO2-
eq/MJHHV in the Deep GHG 80% scenario.  Furthermore, while the light-duty vehicle 
fleet becomes increasingly electrified, in no scenarios do we see a penetration of battery-
electric vehicles, which as described previously has everything to do with the relatively 
high lifecycle costs of supplying VMT using mid-sized BEVs with relatively large 
batteries, considering both the capital costs of vehicles and their requisite recharging 
infrastructure.   
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Table 40  Comparison of Key Transportation Indicators for Scenario Variants with Modified 
Emissions Caps 
 
 
Climate policies of greater stringency also have the effect decarbonizing the electric 
generation mix to increasingly lower levels (Table 41).  The contribution from nuclear 
power is roughly the same in each of the Deep GHG scenarios; however, generation from 
renewable sources and from fossil and biomass plants equipped with CCS grows higher.  
These differences lead to average carbon intensities for electricity in 2050 that range 
Transportation Indicators 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Reference Case 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 0.0% 1.4% 12.5% 12.4% 10.9%
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 0.0% 1.4% 12.5% 12.4% 10.9%
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 0.0% 1.4% 12.5% 12.4% 10.8%
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 0.0% 1.4% 12.9% 11.1% 22.3%
Reference Case 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Reference Case 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 0.0% 0.1% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 0.0% 0.1% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 0.0% 0.1%
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 2.4% 5.6%
Reference Case 25.8 30.7 34.2 35.1 35.9
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 25.8 30.8 35.0 36.1 37.0
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 25.8 32.3 48.3 53.8 54.6
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 25.8 32.3 48.3 53.8 54.6
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 25.8 32.3 48.3 53.8 54.6
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 25.8 32.3 48.3 53.8 59.6
Reference Case 25.8 34.1 34.2 35.6 36.3
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 25.8 34.3 35.5 36.7 36.9
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 25.8 41.3 53.9 54.2 54.7
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 25.8 41.3 53.9 54.2 54.7
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 25.8 41.3 53.9 54.2 54.7
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 25.8 41.3 53.9 54.2 65.6
Reference Case 83.0 80.8 78.8 75.6 75.1
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 83.0 80.0 77.7 74.2 73.3
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 83.0 79.4 71.5 60.3 53.2
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 83.0 79.4 69.6 54.3 45.6
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 83.0 79.4 67.8 49.8 38.1
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 83.0 79.4 65.9 46.7 31.1
Share of LDV VMT 
Supplied by PHEVs
Share of LDV VMT 
Supplied by BEVs
Share of LDV VMT 
Supplied by FCVs
Average LDV Fleet 
Fuel Economy 
(mpgge, test-cycle)
Average New Model-
Year LDV Fuel 
Economy 
(mpgge, test-cycle)
Average Carbon 
Intensity of All 
Transportation 
Fuels 
(gCO2-eq/MJHHV)
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from 35 gCO2-eq/kWh in the Deep GHG 50% scenario to -11 gCO2-eq/kWh in the Deep 
GHG 80% scenario (9.7 and -3.1 gCO2-eq/MJHHV, respectively). 
 
Table 41  Comparison of Key Electricity Generation Indicators for Scenario Variants with Modified 
Emissions Caps 
 
 
Biomass supply and biofuels consumption are strong in each of the Deep GHG scenario 
variants (Table 42).  In fact, because of the attractive of achieving emissions reductions 
through utilization of negative emissions bio-CCS technologies, the scenarios with 50%, 
60%, and 70% reduction targets have biomass/biofuels demands that are about the same 
in 2050 as in the Deep GHG 80% scenario – biomass consumption of 1,669 to 1,737 PJ, 
or 104 to 108 million bone dry tons; biofuels consumption of 972 to 1,019 PJ, or 7.41 to 
7.77 billion gge.  Actually, these levels are approximately the same as in the Reference 
Electricity Generation Indicators 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Reference Case 20.2% 18.6% 16.4% 17.4% 35.7%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 20.3% 19.4% 17.9% 20.2% 42.5%
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 20.3% 42.4% 40.9% 40.1% 47.3%
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 20.3% 42.4% 40.9% 40.1% 50.2%
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 20.3% 42.4% 41.0% 41.7% 51.1%
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 20.2% 42.4% 41.1% 48.3% 58.7%
Reference Case 12.4% 11.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 12.4% 11.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 12.4% 9.6% 9.7% 18.1% 25.2%
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 12.4% 9.6% 9.7% 18.1% 25.2%
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 12.4% 13.6% 13.0% 21.1% 27.8%
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 12.4% 13.8% 13.2% 21.2% 24.6%
Reference Case 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 8.2% 14.1%
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 0.0% 0.0% 2.7% 8.9% 15.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 0.0% 0.0% 3.0% 9.2% 14.9%
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 0.0% 0.0% 6.3% 12.1% 15.7%
Reference Case 317 337 308 277 210
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 317 334 306 272 186
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 317 239 169 110 35
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 317 239 165 104 19
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 317 223 159 85 5
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 317 222 146 53 -11
Share of Renewable 
& Hydro Electricity 
in Total Generation
Share of Nuclear 
Electricity in Total 
Generation
Share of Fossil & 
Biomass w/ CCS 
Electricity in Total 
Generation
Average Carbon 
Intensity of 
Electricity 
(gCO2-eq/kWh)
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Case, though the types of biofuels being produced are markedly different (more cellulosic 
ethanol and less bio-based gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel in the Reference Case). 
 
Table 42  Comparison of Key Biofuels and Biomass Indicators for Scenario Variants with Modified 
Emissions Caps 
 
 
  
Biofuels & Biomass Indicators 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Reference Case 164 419 632 946 1044
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 164 447 647 937 1039
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 164 441 513 795 972
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 164 441 614 877 1019
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 164 439 690 937 976
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 164 439 728 951 975
Reference Case 148 448 785 1210 1598
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 148 471 751 1159 1555
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 148 744 914 1407 1669
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 148 744 974 1534 1732
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 148 742 1026 1580 1732
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 148 729 1067 1581 1737
Biofuels 
Consumption 
(PJ)
Biomass Supply 
(PJ)
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Table 43 highlights some key GHG emissions indicators of the scenarios, for example, 
total energy sector GHG emissions in California relative to projected sizes of the state’s 
population and economy.  Also shown are total cumulative GHG emissions over the 
entire model time horizon and the annual quantity of emissions that are captured and 
stored underground via CCS.  In all instances, the trends appear sensible:  GHG 
emissions per capita and per GSP decline to increasingly lower levels as the climate 
policy becomes more stringent, and utilization of CCS grows as the GHG reduction 
targets become stricter. 
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Table 43  Comparison of Key GHG Emissions Indicators for Scenario Variants with Modified 
Emissions Caps 
 
 
Costs are another important metric by which to compare the Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario and its variants with the Reference Case.  Figure 79 shows cumulative total 
discounted energy system costs for each of these scenarios.  Energy system costs include 
all investment, fixed and variable O&M, and resource/fuel costs accounted for in the CA-
TIMES model.  (Note that investments and O&M costs in the industrial, commercial, 
residential, and agricultural end-use sectors are not captured, but at least fuel costs are 
accounted for.)  The first observation one makes is that costs in the Reference Case (w/ 
Lower Demands) are lower than in the original Reference Case by a fair amount.  This 
result illustrates the importance of controlling the future growth of end-use demands, 
which can lead to significantly reduced capital investment requirements and substantial 
O&M and fuel savings.  (Of course, the steps taken to reduce demand are themselves 
GHG Emissions Indicators 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Reference Case 256 211 174 143 117
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 256 200 154 121 93
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 256 183 121 75 43
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 256 183 116 67 35
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 256 181 111 60 26
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 256 181 106 52 17
Reference Case 12.1 11.5 11.0 10.6 10.2
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 12.1 10.9 9.7 8.9 8.1
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 12.1 9.9 7.6 5.5 3.8
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 12.1 9.9 7.3 5.0 3.0
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 12.1 9.8 7.0 4.4 2.3
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 12.1 9.8 6.7 3.9 1.5
Reference Case 0 0 0 0 0
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 0 0 0 0 0
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 0 0 7 59 115
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 0 0 11 71 135
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 0 0 18 79 152
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 0 0 26 91 166
Reference Case
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands)
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction)
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction)
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction)
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction)
GHG Emissions 
Relative to Gross 
State Product 
(tCO2e per M$ GSP)
GHG Emissions per 
Capita 
(tCO2e per person)
GHG Emissions 
Captured and Stored 
via CCS 
(Mton CO2e)
Cumulative GHG 
Emissions, 2005-2055 
(Mton CO2e)
27,552
24,433
18,498
17,609
16,670
15,762
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likely to incur costs that are non-trivial, and so long as they are made outside of the 
energy system, they are not captured by the CA-TIMES model.)  Second, total costs 
appear to increase with the stringency of the emission reduction target.  Compared to the 
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands), for example, costs are between 7.3% and 9.7% 
higher in the Deep GHG scenarios.  Interestingly, the jump from a 70% to 80% target 
necessitates a greater incremental cost increase than for the other scenario variants (i.e., 
from 50% to 60%, and 60% to 70%).  Moreover, while investment costs continue to rise 
under increasingly stringent climate policy, variable costs (namely fuel costs) remain 
roughly constant, and compared to the Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands), variable 
costs are actually smaller.  For instance, while cumulative investment costs are estimated 
to be $1.34 trillion greater in the Deep GHG 80% scenario than in the Reference Case (w/ 
Lower Demands), variable and O&M costs are actually $0.41 trillion lower.  These are 
important results because they show that the although the per-unit cost of fuels may be 
higher in the Deep GHG scenarios, total aggregate fuel costs across the entire energy 
system are lower, as a result of greatly increased technological efficiencies in all sectors.   
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Figure 79  Comparison of Cumulative Total Discounted Energy System Costs for Scenario Variants 
with Modified Emissions Caps 
 
While the costs of the scenarios may seem high at first glance (in the trillions of dollars), 
they actually only make up a fraction of California’s projected cumulative discounted 
GSP over the same time period.    
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Table 44 shows that the climate policies of the Deep GHG scenarios (50% to 80% 
reductions) add about 1.1 to 1.5 percentage points to total energy system costs (as a share 
of cumulative discounted GSP).  In fact, in none of the Deep GHG scenarios are the costs 
incurred any greater than in the original Reference Case, again highlighting the important 
effect of demand reduction.   
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Table 44  Comparison of Key Cost Indicators for Scenario Variants with Modified Emissions Caps 
 
 
It should be noted that in estimating costs relative to GSP, the results presented here do 
not account for investment and O&M costs in the industrial, commercial, residential, 
commercial, and agricultural end-use sectors.  And while not the focus of the current 
study, this undoubtedly leaves a gaping hole in the analysis.  That being said, it is not 
entirely clear that the results shown here on a relative change basis would differ markedly 
if these other sectors were added to the model in bottom-up technological detail.  After 
all, absolute costs would rise in all scenarios, including the Reference Case, and thus 
relative changes could theoretically remain the same.  The exact change would, of course, 
depend on the relative costs of deploying advanced technologies to reduce GHG 
emissions in the ICRA sectors.  If the marginal costs of doing so were less than for the 
sectors explicitly modeled in the current version of CA-TIMES (transport, electricity, 
supply), one might even expect the relative increases for total energy system costs to be 
lower than those discussed here. 
 
Cost Indicators Notes
Reference Case 9.8%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) --
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 7.3%
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 7.7%
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 8.3%
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 9.7%
Reference Case 1.5%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) --
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 1.1%
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 1.2%
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 1.3%
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 1.5%
Reference Case --
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) --
Deep GHG Scenario (50% Reduction) 118
Deep GHG Scenario (60% Reduction) 107
Deep GHG Scenario (70% Reduction) 102
Deep GHG Scenario (80% Reduction) 107
Costs are relative to 
Reference Case (w/ 
Lower Demands)
Costs are relative to 
Reference Case (w/ 
Lower Demands)
Costs and GHGs are 
relative to Reference 
Case (w/ Lower 
Demands)
Cumulative Discounted 
System Costs, 2005-2055
Cumulative Discounted 
System Costs as a Share of 
Cumulative Discounted GSP, 
2005-2055
Average Cost of GHG 
Abatement 
($ per tCO2e)
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Another potentially useful metric for comparing the relative costs of the Deep GHG 
scenario variants is the average cost of GHG abatement over the entire model time 
horizon.  For a given scenario, this is calculated as the difference in cumulative total 
discounted energy system costs relative to the Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 
divided by the cumulative emissions of the same scenario relative to the Reference Case 
(w/ Lower Demands).    
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Table 44 summarizes these values for each of the Deep GHG scenarios.  Average costs 
are in the range of $102 to $118 per tonne of CO2-equivalent, which means that marginal 
costs of emissions abatement range from well below this average (i.e., near zero) all the 
way up to several hundred dollars per tonne.  Of particular note is the fact that the 
average cost of abatement is actually lower for the more stringent climate scenarios.  
Generally, one would expect average abatement costs to exhibit an upward trend with 
increasingly stringent climate policy, as shown previously for total system costs.  
Presumably, this has to do with the specific timing of energy investments and the fact that 
on a net present value basis utilization of a non-zero discount rate makes costs incurred in 
later time periods less significant in the calculation of total energy system costs. 
 
The transportation sector is responsible for an overwhelming share of the total capital 
investment costs shown in Figure 79, with electric sector investments coming a distant 
second (see Figure 80).  In particular, capital costs of light-duty vehicles account for 
about 50-55% of all transport sector investments (which interestingly is roughly the same 
level as the subsector’s share of energy use and GHG emissions in the overall transport 
total).  One of the reasons why transport sector investments – especially for LDVs – are 
so disproportionately high is that cars, trucks, buses, ships, airplanes, and trains are 
relatively expensive energy production devices, when viewed on a $/MJ basis, compared 
to power plants, refineries, and other fuel conversion facilities.52  In addition to the 
                                                 
52
 Firstly, the efficiency of converting a MJ of fuel to a MJ of useful work is substantially lower for 
transportation vehicles, due to the range of parasitic, dissipative, aerodynamic and hydrodynamic drag, and 
other losses that come into play.  Secondly, the capacity factors of transportation vehicles, particularly 
private motor vehicles, are extremely low compared to energy supply facilities, some of which operate 
almost continuously.  For example, a typical light-duty car or truck is used for perhaps a handful of trips a 
day, and for just an hour in total time.  The remainder of the day, the vehicle, and all the capital investment 
that went into producing it, sits idle.  Heavy- and medium-duty trucks, ships, airplanes, and trains are much 
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transport and electric sectors, imposition of increasingly stringent climate policies leads 
to larger investments in the hydrogen and syn-fuels industries (Figure 80).  At the same 
time, investments in the fossil fuels and biofuels industries decline.  (Note that by this 
definition, production of bio-based gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel at FT poly-generation 
plants is accounted for in the syn-fuels industry.)  The diminishing importance of the 
fossil fuels industry is an intuitive result, but that of the biofuels industry requires a bit of 
explanation.  As the model attempts to meet the lower emissions targets of the Deep 
GHG scenarios, it relies less heavily on certain biofuels production technologies – 
namely cellulosic ethanol (via biochemical and thermochemical pathways) and biodiesel 
(via hydrotreatment) – and instead it shifts limited biomass resources to FT poly-
generation plants equipped with CCS.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
better in this respect, since they are treated more like business investments; however, they are still 
relatively expensive means by which to produce useful work. 
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Figure 80  Comparison of Cumulative Discounted Energy Investments for Scenario Variants with 
Modified Emissions Caps 
 
On a final note, even though the fossil industry is seen to shrink in the low-carbon futures 
described here, it may very well be the case that the same players continue to be 
involved, as today’s large fuel producers and energy companies are likely to be the only 
ones capable of making the necessary, but huge, capital investments in syn-fuels and 
hydrogen production/distribution capacity over the coming decades.  In other words, the 
industry may look different, but the names may be the same. 
 
Scenario Variants #2:  Modification of Key Resource and Technology Potentials  
To be sure, the stringency of future climate policy is by no means the only uncertainty 
going forward.  The potential of certain key resources and technologies to mitigate 
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greenhouse gas emissions on a large scale is also not yet fully understood at the present 
time.  For instance, many questions still remain regarding the availability of sustainable 
biomass in large quantities; the risks associated with and social acceptance of nuclear 
power and carbon capture and storage; the ability of batteries to meet the stringent 
demands of transport vehicles; and the well-known “chicken and egg” dilemma for 
initiating hydrogen infrastructure.  In an effort to partially address these questions, I 
develop several additional variants of the original Deep GHG Reduction Scenario in this 
section.  As with the first set of scenario variants dealing with the stringency of the 
emissions cap, all assumptions are the same in these scenarios as they are in the core 
Deep GHG Reduction Scenario.  Importantly, fuel demands in the ICRA sectors remain 
the same as before. 
• Deep GHG Reduction Scenario (Low Biomass) 
Assumes the potential supply of sustainable biomass in California and the 
Western U.S. is 50% lower than in the original Deep GHG Reduction Scenario.  
The supply curves for each type of biomass feedstock retain their same shapes 
(i.e., same price levels), but the quantities available at each step and for each type 
of biomass are reduced. 
• Deep GHG Reduction Scenario (High Biomass) 
Assumes the potential supply of sustainable biomass in California and the 
Western U.S. is 50% greater than in the original Deep GHG Reduction Scenario.  
The supply curves for each type of biomass feedstock retain their same shapes 
(i.e., same price levels), but the quantities available at each step and for each type 
of biomass are increased. 
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• Deep GHG Reduction Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 
Assumes that due to basic NIMBY (“Not In My Backyard”) issues and societal 
concerns over, for example, nuclear waste and security and CO2 leakage and 
groundwater contamination, neither new nuclear power nor CCS ever become 
viable technological options within the California energy system.  No new nuclear 
plants are allowed to be built, and no carbon capture and storage ever takes place.  
The GHG mitigation potential of these technologies is, therefore, zero in all future 
years.   
• Deep GHG Reduction Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 
Assumes that on the one hand battery technology never matures to the point 
where consumer demands for vehicle size, power, and range are met at reasonable 
cost (or alternately, that consumers never become willing to sacrifice these 
attributes by adopting smaller, less powerful vehicles), and that at the same time 
the chicken and egg problem for centralized hydrogen production and distribution 
proves to be impossible to overcome at large scale.  Thus, BEVs and PHEVs are 
substantially more limited in the share of LDV, MDT, and Bus VMT they are able 
to supply.  (For example, in the light-duty subsector, the original Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario assumed that no more than 50% of VMT could be supplied 
jointly by BEVs and PHEVs due to real limits on the number of people who 
would be able to recharge at home or work (O'Connor, 2007b).  However, in this 
scenario variant the share is reduced to just 25%.)  In the case of FCVs, only 
distributed production of hydrogen is possible at refueling stations and fleet 
vehicle depots, and the availability of this infrastructure is fairly limited in scope 
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(maximum 200 PJ, or 1.41 million metric tonnes, of hydrogen production in any 
year). 
 
Figure 81 compares the GHG emissions trajectories of the Reference Case, Reference 
Case (w/ Lower Demands), and these new variants of the Deep GHG Reduction 
Scenario.  The first thing one notices is that not all scenarios are able to meet the 80% 
reduction target.  In fact, only the High Biomass and Limited EV-FCV Success scenarios 
are able to make such deep reductions, whereas imposing such a stringent target in the 
other scenarios leads to model infeasibilities.  This is not to say that it is absolutely 
impossible to make an 80% cut in GHGs without a large supply of biomass and without 
widespread success of nuclear or CCS.  Rather, the scenarios show that, based on the 
current assumptions input to the model, it becomes extremely difficult to meet such a 
target if the potential of any of these key resources and technologies is significantly 
limited.  In other words, meeting California’s long-term goal of an 80% reduction in 
GHG emissions essentially requires that every major technological and fuel option 
remains on the table (i.e., a multi-strategy, portfolio approach is needed).  If some of 
these options are unavailable, then demand reduction through even more aggressive 
energy and conservation efforts would have to play a much greater role in helping to 
bring emissions down to lower levels.  Nevertheless, while deep cuts in GHGs depend 
strongly on the availability of technologies, it is quite interesting to note that large 
reductions still appear to be possible by 2050 in these other scenario variants:  Low 
Biomass (70% reduction) and No Nuclear or CCS (65%). 
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Figure 81  GHG Trajectories of the Scenario Variants with Modified Resource and Technology 
Potentials 
 
Because these scenario variants do not meet the 80% reduction target in all cases, it is a 
little difficult to compare them with the original Deep GHG Reduction Scenario.  Perhaps 
a more useful exercise is to compare them with the first set of scenario variants, which, as 
discussed in the previous section, look at emissions caps of varying stringencies.  For 
example, the Low Biomass scenario reduces GHGs 70% below 1990 levels by 2050, but 
the way these reductions are made is a bit different than in the Deep GHG 70% scenario 
variant from above.  Notably, because supplies of biomass, and thus biofuels, are so 
limited in the Low Biomass scenario, the model relies more heavily on electricity and 
hydrogen in the transport sector, especially for light-duty vehicles (Table 45).  Whereas 
the share of LDV VMT supplied by PHEVs, BEVs, and FCVs was about 11% in the 
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Deep GHG 70% scenario, it is a much greater 70% in the Deep GHG Low Biomass 
scenario.  For this reason, average fleet fuel economy is higher in 2050 in the latter case:  
75.1 vs. 54.6 mpgge.  In contrast, when assuming much more optimistic levels of 
biomass availability, as in the High Biomass scenario, there is less of a need for 
hydrogen, and the penetration of FCVs in the LDV subsector is a bit lower:  11% in the 
Deep GHG High Biomass scenario compared to 28% in the original Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario (both of these scenarios meet the 80% reduction target in 2050). 
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Table 45  Comparison of Key Transportation Indicators for Scenario Variants with Modified 
Resource and Technology Potentials 
 
 
The results of this study illustrate that bio-CCS negative emissions technologies can be a 
cost-effective means by which to significantly reduce California energy system 
emissions.  When these technologies are available, the model fully maximizes their 
utilization (subject to constraints on biomass supply) and at the same time chooses not to 
decarbonize the transport sector to a significant degree.  However, when CCS is 
eliminated from the potential technology mix, the situation changes drastically.  For 
Transportation Indicators 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Reference Case 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 0.0% 1.4% 11.8% 19.0% 42.1%
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 0.0% 1.4% 12.5% 12.4% 10.9%
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 0.0% 1.4% 16.1% 22.1% 50.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 0.0% 1.4% 12.8% 11.7% 24.3%
Reference Case 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Reference Case 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 0.0% 0.2% 2.5% 8.7% 18.7%
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 0.0% 0.1% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 0.0% 0.3% 3.2% 11.3% 26.4%
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 1.8% 4.2%
Reference Case 25.8 30.7 34.2 35.1 35.9
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 25.8 30.8 35.0 36.1 37.0
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 25.8 32.3 48.3 55.2 75.1
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 25.8 32.3 48.3 53.8 54.6
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 25.8 32.3 48.3 57.9 83.7
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 25.8 32.3 48.3 53.8 60.7
Reference Case 25.8 34.1 34.2 35.6 36.3
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 25.8 34.3 35.5 36.7 36.9
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 25.8 41.3 53.9 58.2 107.3
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 25.8 41.3 53.9 54.2 54.7
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 25.8 41.3 53.9 67.0 104.3
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 25.8 41.3 53.9 54.2 68.3
Reference Case 83.0 80.8 78.8 75.6 75.1
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 83.0 80.0 77.7 74.2 73.3
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 83.0 80.0 72.4 58.0 43.8
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 83.0 79.4 63.1 42.9 28.0
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 83.0 79.6 68.7 57.8 43.4
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 83.0 79.4 65.8 47.5 31.5
Share of LDV VMT 
Supplied by PHEVs
Share of LDV VMT 
Supplied by BEVs
Share of LDV VMT 
Supplied by FCVs
Average LDV Fleet 
Fuel Economy 
(mpgge, test-cycle)
Average New Model-
Year LDV Fuel 
Economy 
(mpgge, test-cycle)
Average Carbon 
Intensity of All 
Transportation 
Fuels 
(gCO2-eq/MJHHV)
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instance, Table 45 shows that in the Deep GHG No Nuclear or CCS scenario, the 
contribution of PHEVs, BEVs, and FCVs to total LDV VMT rises to 76%, thus raising 
the fleet-average fuel economy of all on-road light-duty cars and trucks to 83.7 mpgge by 
2050.  In sum, when bio-CCS is on the table, the more advanced vehicle technologies 
(especially BEVs and FCVs) may not actually be needed to reach the deep GHG 
reduction targets; instead, HEVs and PHEVs fueled by a mixture of conventional and 
bio-based gasoline and E-85 ethanol may be able to suffice. 
 
The impact of removing both nuclear power and CCS from the technology portfolio is 
also evident in the electric sector.  For the most part, the electric generation mix is 
consistent between the scenario variants shown here and the previous set with modified 
emission caps.  However, in the No Nuclear or CCS scenario the model is forced to 
supply electricity using a far greater share of renewable resources:  86% in the No 
Nuclear or CCS scenario (Table 46) compared to between 47% and 59% in the scenario 
variants with modified emission caps.  Although not shown, the bulk of the renewable 
generation in the No Nuclear or CCS scenario is from solar and wind, though geothermal 
and hydro make important contributions as well.  Due to the inherent mismatch between 
nighttime wind generation and daytime electricity loads (assuming no significant 
storage), the model estimates the upper limit on wind power, as a share of total 
generation, to be about 40%, a level that is somewhat higher than the 20-30% limits 
estimated by recent wind integration and transmission studies, albeit for the 2030 time 
horizon (NREL, 2010a, b).  A reason for this discrepancy is the inability of CA-TIMES 
to analyze timing and intermittency issues on the level of seconds to minutes, but rather 
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on the level of hours.  In the real world, it could very well be the case that such high 
levels of renewable penetration are simply unrealistic from an operational standpoint, 
barring significant investments in storage capacity.  Hence, by extension, it may be 
unrealistic to expect GHG reductions on the order of 50-80% if low-carbon options such 
as nuclear and CCS are altogether absent from the available technology portfolio.  Future 
research with the CA-TIMES model will attempt to shed some more light on these issues.   
 
Table 46  Comparison of Key Electricity Generation Indicators for Scenario Variants with Modified 
Resource and Technology Potentials 
 
 
The Deep GHG Low Biomass scenario sees the use of only 489 PJ (3.7 billion gge) of 
biofuels in 2050 (Table 47), half that of the original Deep GHG Reduction Scenario.  
Most of this biofuel is in the form of bio-based residual fuel oil, diesel, jet fuel, and 
gasoline, with only a fraction coming from cellulosic ethanol.  As has been previously 
Electricity Generation Indicators 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Reference Case 20.2% 18.6% 16.4% 17.4% 35.7%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 20.3% 19.4% 17.9% 20.2% 42.5%
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 20.3% 42.4% 45.6% 55.8% 65.4%
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 20.3% 42.4% 41.0% 43.7% 53.8%
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 20.3% 42.4% 60.4% 78.3% 86.2%
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 20.3% 42.4% 41.2% 49.6% 60.9%
Reference Case 12.4% 11.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 12.4% 11.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 12.4% 13.8% 13.2% 20.8% 20.7%
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 12.4% 11.1% 10.9% 19.3% 26.3%
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 12.4% 9.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 12.4% 13.8% 13.2% 21.3% 23.2%
Reference Case 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 0.0% 0.0% 6.9% 12.1% 13.8%
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 0.0% 0.0% 3.2% 9.4% 14.3%
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 0.0% 0.0% 6.4% 12.3% 15.4%
Reference Case 317 337 308 277 210
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 317 334 306 272 186
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 317 223 124 34 -6
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 317 233 163 81 0
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 317 238 146 60 27
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 317 222 145 47 -13
Share of Renewable 
& Hydro Electricity 
in Total Generation
Share of Nuclear 
Electricity in Total 
Generation
Share of Fossil & 
Biomass w/ CCS 
Electricity in Total 
Generation
Average Carbon 
Intensity of 
Electricity 
(gCO2-eq/kWh)
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discussed, when supplies of biomass/biofuels are limited, the results of this analysis 
indicate that biofuels are most optimally used in the non-LDV subsectors, due to inherent 
technological limitations on fuel switching to hydrogen and electricity in these other 
segments.  Results of the Deep GHG High Biomass scenario appear to lead to the same 
conclusion, except in this case the supply of biofuels is large enough (1,669 PJ in 2050, 
or 12.7 billion gge) that a GHG reduction target of 80% is able to be reached.  (In the 
Low Biomass scenario, only a 70% reduction is possible.)  Another interesting, even 
counter-intuitive, finding from the High Biomass scenario is that when the availability of 
biomass is extremely large, the model actually chooses to utilize less carbon capture and 
storage than in the original Deep GHG Reduction Scenario, where mid-range estimates 
for biomass supply are used (Table 48).  One might expect to see greater utilization of 
CCS when biomass supplies are large, because of the potential for negative emissions 
using bio-CCS technologies.  However, it seems that the high cost of CCS as a mitigation 
option is an impediment to its use, especially when the potential for “conventional” zero-
emissions biomass conversion technologies is larger (e.g., bio-refineries and FT poly-
generation plants without CCS). 
 
Table 47  Comparison of Key Biofuels and Biomass Indicators for Scenario Variants with Modified 
Resource and Technology Potentials 
 
Biofuels & Biomass Indicators 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Reference Case 164 419 632 946 1044
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 164 447 647 937 1039
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 164 450 445 466 489
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 164 440 843 1257 1669
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 164 430 652 920 973
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 164 438 720 951 975
Reference Case 148 448 785 1210 1598
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 148 471 751 1159 1555
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 148 583 726 846 924
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 148 755 1252 2187 2757
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 148 448 947 1536 1737
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 148 733 1069 1580 1737
Biofuels 
Consumption 
(PJ)
Biomass Supply 
(PJ)
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Table 48  Comparison of Key GHG Emissions Indicators for Scenario Variants with Modified 
Resource and Technology Potentials 
 
 
Figure 82 and Table 49 both illustrate that total policy costs are lower in the Deep GHG 
High Biomass scenario than in the original Deep GHG Reduction Scenario (1.3% vs. 
1.5% as a share of GSP, relative to the baseline), even though both scenarios achieve the 
same GHG reduction target of 80%.  The average cost of carbon abatement is lower in 
the High Biomass scenario as well.  The explanation for this finding is relatively 
straightforward:  since, based on the assumptions for biomass used in this study, biofuels 
are a relatively inexpensive way to mitigate emissions in the transport sector – compared 
to electric and hydrogen vehicles and their requisite recharging/refueling infrastructure – 
greater biomass potential leads to reduced mitigation costs.  Of course, it is none too clear 
that upwards of 13 billion gge of biofuels will be available to the California 
GHG Emissions Indicators 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Reference Case 256 211 174 143 117
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 256 200 154 121 93
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 256 181 111 60 26
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 256 183 106 52 17
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 256 184 114 64 30
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 256 181 106 52 17
Reference Case 12.1 11.5 11.0 10.6 10.2
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 12.1 10.9 9.7 8.9 8.1
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 12.1 9.8 7.0 4.4 2.3
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 12.1 9.9 6.7 3.9 1.5
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 12.1 10.0 7.2 4.7 2.6
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 12.1 9.8 6.7 3.9 1.5
Reference Case 0 0 0 0 0
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) 0 0 0 0 0
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 0 0 21 82 139
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 0 0 22 83 145
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 0 0 0 0 0
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 0 0 26 86 153
Reference Case
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands)
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass)
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass)
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS)
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success)
GHG Emissions 
Relative to Gross 
State Product 
(tCO2e per M$ GSP)
GHG Emissions per 
Capita 
(tCO2e per person)
GHG Emissions 
Captured and Stored 
via CCS 
(Mton CO2e)
Cumulative GHG 
Emissions, 2005-2055 
(Mton CO2e)
27,552
24,433
16,671
15,779
17,144
15,761
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transportation fuels market in the future, especially if all other U.S. states and countries 
are also pushing for deep emission cuts (though it should noted that this analysis already 
builds this supposition into all the scenario storylines).  The availability of biofuels may 
ultimately turn out to be lower than 13 billion gge, or even less than 8 billion gge as is the 
case in the Reference Case and the original Deep GHG Reduction Scenario.  On the other 
hand, there is still a chance, albeit small, that total biofuels potential could be larger than 
this already high estimate.  At this point in the time, the situation is none too clear.  
Biomass supply continues to be one of the greatest uncertainties in modeling low-carbon 
futures at all levels, whether for California, the U.S., or globally – hence the importance 
of conducting a sensitivity analysis on this critical issue. 
 
 
Figure 82  Comparison of Cumulative Total Discounted Energy System Costs for Scenario Variants 
with Modified Resource and Technology Potentials 
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Table 49  Comparison of Key Cost Indicators for Scenario Variants with Modified Resource and 
Technology Potentials 
 
 
As in all the other scenarios and scenario variants discussed until now, the transportation 
sector, by far, comprises the lion’s share of total capital investment costs (Figure 83).  
Electric sector investments are the second largest component, and it is this category that 
sees the largest cost increase in the No Nuclear or CCS scenario, which only achieves a 
65% reduction in GHG emissions by 2050.  This scenario is the most expensive of all the 
scenarios and variants discussed thus far, even more than the original Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario with its 80% level of reduction.  Lacking nuclear power and CCS as 
mitigation options, the model is forced to invest in an even greater amount of out-of-state 
wind and solar power, an action that requires significant investments in transmission lines 
in order to bring these renewable resources into the California market from their often 
distant locations. 
 
Cost Indicators Notes
Reference Case 9.8%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) --
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 13.3%
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 8.2%
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 17.2%
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 10.4%
Reference Case 1.5%
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) --
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 2.1%
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 1.3%
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 2.7%
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 1.6%
Reference Case --
Reference Case (w/ Lower Demands) --
Deep GHG Scenario (Low Biomass) 164
Deep GHG Scenario (High Biomass) 90
Deep GHG Scenario (No Nuclear or CCS) 225
Deep GHG Scenario (Limited EV-FCV Success) 114
Costs are relative to 
Reference Case (w/ 
Lower Demands)
Costs are relative to 
Reference Case (w/ 
Lower Demands)
Costs and GHGs are 
relative to Reference 
Case (w/ Lower 
Demands)
Cumulative Discounted 
System Costs, 2005-2055
Cumulative Discounted 
System Costs as a Share of 
Cumulative Discounted GSP, 
2005-2055
Average Cost of GHG 
Abatement 
($ per tCO2e)
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Figure 83  Comparison of Cumulative Discounted Energy Investments for Scenario Variants with 
Modified Resource and Technology Potentials 
 
  
289 
 
 
 
II.4 Conclusions 
The specter of climate change looms large as one of the most critical global issues to 
address in the twenty-first century.  Its varied impacts are likely to be felt in California in 
a very direct way, and for this reason the state has taken important, initial steps over the 
past several years to enact a suite of policies that will ultimately reduce its contribution of 
greenhouse gas emissions.  California’s current energy and climate policies (e.g., 
emissions trading program, renewable portfolio standard for electricity, vehicle efficiency 
and emissions standards, low carbon fuels standard) tend to have a near-term time 
horizon of 2020 and are fairly modest in their level of stringency.  Yet, they will 
nevertheless have a worldwide effect since climate change is a global phenomenon.  
While making an important contribution to U.S. and global mitigation efforts, the policies 
will undoubtedly provide a solid foundation for transitioning to a lower-carbon economy.  
In the long term, however, it is clear that far greater reductions will ultimately be required 
– not only in California but worldwide – to keep global temperature change to below 2º C 
over the course of this century, which the science indicates is necessary in order to avoid 
the most destructive impacts of climate change (IPCC, 2007).  To this end, California has 
an aspirational goal of reducing its GHG emissions 80% below 1990 levels by 2050.  
Such a target would necessitate a dramatic transformation in how energy is produced and 
consumed within the state – an “energy revolution” in the truest sense of the phrase.   
 
The overarching challenge is that the technology and policy options for making a 
dramatic energy transformation are not well enough understood at the present time, and 
in addition the (publicly-available) tools for modeling this kind of transition at the level 
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of California’s entire energy system have been, to date, rather limited.  The analysis 
described in this dissertation chapter has attempted to fill this void by developing an 
energy-engineering-environmental-economic (4E) systems optimization model to 
represent the vast majority of energy and emission flows within, to, and from California.  
The CA-TIMES model, as it is called, is built within the well-established MARKAL-
TIMES framework and is, thus, extremely rich in bottom-up technological detail.  The 
main application of the model is to develop scenarios for how California’s energy system 
could potentially evolve over the next several decades, in light of strong policies to 
reduce energy use and greenhouse gas emissions.  With a few notable exceptions, most 
technologies and policies can be represented within CA-TIMES. 
 
A variety of scenarios have been developed in this analysis, ranging from a business-as-
usual Reference Case to a Deep GHG Reduction Scenario, in which a mixed-strategy, 
portfolio approach allows California emissions to be reduced 80% below 1990 levels by 
2050.  Several variants of the Deep GHG scenario are then also developed, in order to 
explore important sensitivities related to the stringency of the emissions cap (i.e., less 
stringent than an 80% reduction) and the ultimate potential of key resources and 
technologies to contribute to greenhouse gas mitigation (e.g., sustainable biomass supply, 
nuclear power, carbon capture and storage, and electricity and hydrogen as transportation 
fuels). 
 
In sum, this analysis shows that deep reductions on the order of 50% to 80% appear to be 
technically feasible at reasonable costs (e.g., 1.0% to 2.7% of California Gross State 
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Product over the 2005-2055 time period, relative to the baseline scenario – only 
considering the transportation, electricity, and fuel conversion sectors).  Policy cost 
estimates of this magnitude are in line with those of other studies for decarbonization of 
the U.S. and global energy systems (IEA, 2010; NRC, 2010).  The bulk of the costs 
would be incurred in the medium to long term (between 2025 and 2050), as increasingly 
advanced technologies are used to make deeper and deeper reductions.  The challenge for 
policy, however, is perhaps the next ten years (2010-2020).  This analysis shows that 
whether policymakers ultimately decide to pursue a reduction target of 80% or something 
much less stringent (say, 50%), the types of technologies that need to be introduced in the 
near term are for the most part the same; hence, the emissions trajectories up to 2025 
would be fairly similar.  Furthermore, results of this study indicate that California’s 
current target for 2020 – the AB32 goal of bringing emissions back down to 1990 levels – 
may not be stringent enough.  To allow time for significant market penetration of the 
kinds of transformational technologies that will be needed in the long term (due to the 
inertia of energy system infrastructure and investments), advanced technologies must be 
introduced over the next ten years at a quicker rate than what the existing 2020 target is 
likely to motivate.  More specifically, over the coming decade a significant expansion in, 
or at least the introduction of, the following mitigation options are likely needed:  
renewable electricity generation, specifically from wind, solar, and geothermal resources; 
advanced transportation technologies and fuels, including biofuels, hybrid-electric 
vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, battery-electric vehicles, and hydrogen fuel cell 
vehicles; and a shift toward greater utilization of electricity as an end-use fuel in the 
industrial, commercial, residential, and agricultural sectors.  Demand reduction is also 
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likely to play an invaluable role in mitigating future emissions, both through energy 
efficiency and conservation efforts and reduced vehicle travel.  The latter, which could be 
achieved by strong transit, land use, and auto pricing policies, deserves a considerably 
more attention in the development of energy and climate scenarios for California.   
 
At the present time, it is not exactly clear what a declining cap on GHG emissions after 
2020 would actually cover, if such targets were ever to be codified into law.  The existing 
2020 cap excludes emissions from interstate and international aviation and marine 
activities.  However, because this emissions category is fairly large and growing quickly, 
I have decided to include it in the emissions caps envisioned by the scenarios in this 
analysis.  After all, in reality these emissions would somehow have to be covered, no 
matter which entities have jurisdiction over them.  Perhaps they might be included in a 
federal emissions cap, or maybe the international component of the emissions could be 
dealt with under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) or 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (McCollum et al., 2009).  Either way, the 
emissions must ultimately be controlled, and advanced technologies and fuels will be 
required for this purpose.  While CA-TIMES is not able to explicitly model the impact of 
policies enacted outside of the California energy system, it is nevertheless important to 
capture the fuel use and investment decisions that might be made in these important 
transport segments if such policies were in place.  Of course, had emissions from 
interstate and international aviation and marine transport not been included in the 
scenarios developed in this study, it would certainly have been a bit easier and cheaper to 
achieve the 50-80% reduction targets. 
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In terms of decarbonizing California’s energy system, the transportation sector poses 
perhaps the biggest challenge and is therefore the most costly.  Over half of the state’s 
GHG emissions are attributable to transport at present, resulting primarily from the 
combustion of fossil fuels (gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and residual fuel oil).  Of course, 
because fossil fuels are relied upon so heavily, the potential for reducing transport GHGs 
via alternative fuel and vehicle technologies is quite huge.  Biofuels are the most cost-
effective option for making these emission cuts, both from the perspective of a single 
vehicle or when viewed at the energy systems level, the latter including fuel production 
and distribution infrastructure and considering competition for biomass from other 
sectors, such as electric generation and industry.  The challenge with biomass is that total 
resources, while renewable on an annual basis, are actually rather limited.  Only if 
California were to have access to biomass supplies far beyond its “fair share” of the 
national or global total (e.g., >30% of all U.S. consumption), would the state be able to 
fuel its entire transport sector with biofuels.  This is perhaps unlikely in a future where 
other U.S. states and countries are also counting on biomass/biofuels to mitigate their 
GHG emissions.  Given constraints on biomass resources, the results of this analysis 
indicate that the most optimal use of biofuels is in the non-light duty subsectors, namely 
in the form of bio-derived gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and residual fuel oil.  The reason for 
this is fairly intuitive:  there are fewer alternative technological/fuel options to reduce 
GHG emissions in these other transport subsectors, hence the value of a tonne of biomass 
is higher.  In fact, a marked advantage of light-duty vehicles is that there are quite a few 
alternatives for technology- and fuel-switching.  Specifically, electric-drive vehicles 
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could feasibly be used to satisfy a large portion of total VMT demand, whereas electricity 
and/or hydrogen are simply not realistic alternatives in some of the other subsectors, due 
to range limitations and refueling issues.  The GHG reduction scenarios developed here 
rely heavily on HEVs and PHEVs (Gasoline and E-85), as well as Hydrogen FCVs to 
some extent, to make deep emission cuts in the light-duty subsector.  In contrast, BEVs 
do not penetrate the LDV market to any significant degree, a result that may have more to 
do with model dynamics than anything else.  BEVs are not favored by the model because 
of the various inputs that are currently assumed for the efficiencies and costs of vehicles 
and plug-in recharging infrastructure.  The assumed costs for BEVs, for instance, are 
higher than for other advanced vehicle technologies because, in an effort to be fair, all 
vehicles in CA-TIMES are assumed to have roughly the same size, weight, range, power, 
etc.  While this aggregated level of vehicle class representation for the most part makes 
sense within the modeling framework, it potentially disadvantages BEVs, which may be 
particularly well suited to the small car and small light truck markets or to urban driving, 
where travel distances are shorter.  The current version of CA-TIMES is not able to 
capture this possibility, though future work may attempt to address this issue. 
 
As the transport sector is decarbonized, emissions from the energy supply/conversion 
sector are likely to be reduced significantly as well, since the types of facilities that 
produce low-carbon transport fuels (e.g., bio-refineries, FT syn-fuels poly-generation 
plants, hydrogen plants, zero- and low-carbon electricity generation) tend to emit low 
levels of greenhouse gases, or at least they would in a low-carbon future.  The exact 
carbon signature of these fuels, of course, depends on which energy resources are used 
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for generating heat and electricity at these plants, and also whether or not carbon capture 
and storage is utilized.  Bio-CCS technologies appear to be an especially attractive means 
by which to decarbonize the energy system, since they allow for negative emissions (i.e., 
permanently storing biomass carbon underground).  In the scenarios developed in this 
study, bio-CCS play a major role in reducing GHG emissions while at the same time 
taking the burden off of other sectors, namely transport, which have higher abatement 
costs.  When bio-CCS technologies are eliminated from the potential technology 
portfolio, however, the transport sector is forced to decarbonize much more significantly, 
and in the light-duty sector in particular, more advanced electric-drive vehicles (PHEVs 
and Hydrogen FCVs) become a preferred option for making these emissions cuts. 
 
Emissions from the industrial, commercial, residential, and agricultural (ICRA) end-use 
sectors are reduced in this study through energy efficiency and fuel switching.  In 
particular, drawing on other scenario studies by the IEA (2010), the Deep GHG 
Reduction Scenario assumes that an increasing share of energy demand is met by 
electricity and natural gas in the ICRA sectors in the future.  How authentic these 
emission reductions actually are depends in large part on the simultaneous 
decarbonization of the electric sector, which also appears to be a likely outcome of 
stringent climate policy, as found in this and numerous other studies. 
 
Comparatively, reducing emissions from electric generation is fairly straightforward and 
can be done at abatement costs that are lower than in the transport and energy supply 
sectors (IEA, 2010).  Nonetheless, significant hurdles still remain, particularly with 
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respect to spatial and temporal issues.  For example, it could potentially be quite 
expensive to tap solar, wind, and geothermal resources in distant out-of-state locations, 
owing to the substantial capital investments required for long-distance transmission lines.  
In addition, it is still not entirely clear whether intermittent renewables, especially solar 
and wind, can be relied upon to contribute a majority share of total electric generation, 
unless significant storage and/or back-up capacity is built as well.  For these reasons, the 
availability of nuclear power and fossil and/or biomass CCS is critical, so that low-carbon 
options for baseload generation remain in play.  If nuclear and CCS are wholly absent 
from the technology portfolio, as one variant of the Deep GHG Reduction Scenario 
illustrates, then it will likely become considerably more difficult, and indeed more costly, 
to achieve a deep reduction target, if it is even possible.  Other scenario variants lead to 
similar conclusions when biomass resources are significantly constrained or when the 
potential for electricity and hydrogen to be used in the transport sector is considerably 
limited. 
 
An important caveat to this analysis is that it only does a partial economic accounting.  In 
other words, it attempts to capture the total energy system costs of climate mitigation but 
largely ignores the significant economic benefits of pursuing this goal.  For instance, the 
analysis does not consider the avoided costs (i.e., benefits) of climate change (e.g., more 
frequent extreme weather events, impacts on global agriculture and food production) or 
of climate adaptation (e.g., construction of sea walls, relocation of coastal populations).  
Similarly, the benefits accruing from reduced health expenditures and increased life 
expectancies, to the extent they can attributed to climate mitigation, have not been 
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monetized here.  Given this partial accounting, it is highly likely that the cost figures 
shown in this chapter are somewhat overestimated, a practice that is a known issue with 
integrated assessment models used to inform energy and climate policymaking (Nemet et 
al., 2010). 
 
Like any study, this one has probably created more questions than it has answered.  (At 
least that should be the goal of good research in my opinion.)  And for this reason a 
number of issues must be left for future work.  These issues have already been discussed 
in the appropriate sections of the text, but they are summarized again here.  First, and 
probably foremost, the level of technological detail in the ICRA end-use sectors must be 
improved.  Even though they account for only 15% of current fuel combustion-related 
emissions in California, it is still important to understand the fuel use and investment 
decisions that might be made in these sectors under stringent climate policy.  Then, once 
this model improvement has been made, it would be very interesting to look more deeply 
into the timing of electricity supply and demand, specifically with respect to the 
intermittency of renewables, electric vehicle recharging, and “smart” appliances.  In 
terms of behavioral changes and transport demand reduction, the development of more 
sophisticated low-VMT scenarios is probably desirable, if possible harnessing the 
capabilities of travel demand modeling experts, such as those in the UC-Davis Urban 
Land Use and Transportation (ULTRANS) Center.  At the same time, our group would 
like to be able to explicitly model transport mode-switching (i.e., between LDVs and 
transit buses/rail) and also class-switching within particular subsectors (i.e., between 
compact, small, mid-size, and large cars).  Such endogenous representation of consumer 
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behavior in the transport sector is not a common feature of typical energy systems 
models, despite its obvious importance.  Therefore, it could be a ripe area for research.  
Other ideas for future research include bringing endogenous technological learning (ETL) 
into the model for certain key technologies (e.g., fuel cells, batteries, solar, wind, nuclear, 
IGCC, CCS) and better representing the staged development of vehicle refueling 
infrastructure (namely biofuels, hydrogen, and electricity).  In the latter case, our group 
plans to draw upon previous work by other UC-Davis STEPS Program researchers, such 
as Yang and Ogden (2007) for hydrogen and Parker (2010) for biofuels.  The CA-TIMES 
model would also be substantially improved if the emissions accounting framework were 
overhauled so that dynamic lifecycle analyses could be conducted, thereby making it 
possible for policies such as an LCFS to be explicitly and endogenously represented.  
Lastly, although they account for only 11% of California’s total emissions at the present 
time, non-energy greenhouse gases also need to be accounted for in the modeling 
framework, even if there are no technologies in the model that are able to reduce them. 
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III. Exploring synergies and trade-offs between global energy 
objectives: Near-term energy security and air pollution goals 
and mid- to long-term climate targets (IIASA collaboration) 
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b Energy Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), 
Laxenburg, Austria 
 
Abstract: 
The energy system of the future could potentially develop along a number of different 
paths, depending on how society and its decision makers prioritize various, worthwhile 
energy objectives, including:  climate change mitigation; access to affordable, reliable 
energy for healthy socio-economic growth; energy security; reduced air and water 
pollution and human health impacts; minimization of ancillary risks such as nuclear 
waste and proliferation; and alleviation of global poverty.  These objectives are generally 
discussed in the context of different timeframes (e.g., security and pollution/health in the 
near term; climate in the medium to long term).  Therefore, they frequently compete for 
attention in the policy world.  The work described in this chapter summarizes the findings 
of a unique study conducted at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
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(IIASA) in support of the Global Energy Assessment, in which global energy and climate 
scenarios are used to illuminate some of the key synergies, and to a lesser extent the 
trade-offs, between climate mitigation, energy security, air pollution and human health 
impacts, and affordability.  Two tools are jointly utilized in this project:  a systems 
engineering global energy model (MESSAGE) and a global climate model (MAGICC).  
In sum, a wide array of plausible energy futures are generated and analyzed, in order to 
understand the potential evolution of the global energy system, and the subsequent 
climate system response, over the twenty-first century, under varying assumptions for 
energy security, air pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions.  Each of these scenarios 
looks different, in both its inputs and outputs, and on a sliding scale of satisfaction, each 
meets the different energy system objectives to varying degrees.  Analysis of this large 
ensemble of scenarios leads to several important conclusions.  First, the synergies 
between the various objectives far outweigh the trade-offs.  The principal trade-offs 
center around, on the one hand, the reduction of certain climate-cooling air pollutant 
emissions, which can have an important impact on the global climate by leading to 
increased radiative forcing; and on the other hand, the enactment of virtually any 
significant climate, air pollution, and/or energy security legislation, which is likely to 
have a non-zero policy cost relative to a no-policy, business-as-usual baseline scenario.  
That being said, when viewed from an holistic and integrated perspective, the combined 
costs of climate mitigation, energy security, and air pollution control come at a 
significantly reduced total energy bill if the multiple benefits of each are properly 
accounted for in the calculation of total energy system costs (i.e., when taking a systems 
view of the problem).  Second, zero-carbon energy technologies, particularly biomass and 
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other renewables, appear to be especially attractive, robust options for achieving the 
various objectives because they are able to contribute to virtually all sustainable 
development goals simultaneously.   
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III.1 Introduction 
The energy challenges facing society are as varied as they are great.  And if sustainability 
is truly the end goal, then any future energy system would achieve a number of different 
objectives:  climate change mitigation; access to affordable, reliable energy for healthy 
socio-economic growth; energy security; reduced human health impacts; reduced air and 
water pollution; minimization of ancillary risks such as nuclear waste and proliferation; 
and alleviation of global poverty.53  In an ideal world, it would be possible to 
simultaneously meet each of these important aspirations; however, when considering 
constraints on resources and on financial, human and political capital, as well as the long 
turnover times that characterize the energy industry and energy end-use sectors, the 
challenge inherent in this proposition becomes abundantly clear.  What is more, the 
prioritization of the multiple objectives is not shared equally by all stakeholders 
(individuals, firms, and governments), and at times the objectives are in conflict with one 
another and compete for attention.  In addition, the time horizons envisioned for meeting 
the different objectives are quite varied.  For example, while energy security and 
pollution reduction (i.e., improved global health) are discussed as near-term goals (2010-
2030), climate change is, generally-speaking, more of a long-term problem (2030-2050 
and beyond). 
 
The work described in this dissertation chapter was conducted as part of the Global 
Energy Assessment (GEA), a major initiative seeking to redefine the global energy policy 
                                                 
53
 Incredibly, some two billion in the developing world currently lack access to affordable modern forms of 
energy. 
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agenda.54  Coordinated by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) with contributions from more than 200 scientists from a range of disciplines and 
countries, this multi-year and multi-stakeholder activity, scheduled to be published in 
early-2011, aims to help decision makers address the challenges of providing energy 
services for sustainable development throughout the world.  The GEA will examine 
trade-offs and synergies between energy objectives and identify robust energy strategies 
and scenarios that contribute to all development goals simultaneously.   
 
In my dissertation research, I focus specifically on trade-offs and synergies between near-
term energy security and air pollution/health goals, mid-term greenhouse gas reduction 
targets, and long-term climate system impacts.  Two tools are jointly utilized in order to 
study these interactions using scenario analysis:  a systems engineering global energy 
model (MESSAGE) and a global climate model (MAGICC).  This methodology is 
discussed in more detail in the sections that follow.  I have collaborated extensively with 
IIASA researchers, in order to carry out this analysis.  This collaboration has culminated 
in two distinct products:  1) a chapter of my dissertation, and 2) a section of the scenarios 
chapter of the GEA report. 
 
The motivation for this study derives directly from the global energy and climate policy 
agenda.  Climate change has become a core issue at the international level over the past 
several years.  In 2009, the Group of Eight (G8) industrialized nations agreed to reduce 
global GHG emissions 50% below 1990 levels by 2050, with the intent to hold global 
                                                 
54
 For more information on the Global Energy Assessment, see the following URL:  
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/ENE/GEA/index.html.  
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warming to less than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels (G8, 2009).  The 
Copenhagen Accord later affirmed the 2 ºC target.  This level of warming is what many 
scientific studies suggest is necessary to achieve in order to avoid the most destructive 
impacts of climate change (IPCC, 2007).  Energy security, on the other hand, is quite a 
different issue, though as this paper shows, pushing the security objective could have a 
potentially significant impact on the global climate.  For the most part, energy security is 
an issue of concern at the level of individual nations or groups of nations (e.g., the 
European Union), and the time horizon of interest is nearer to the present than that which 
is being discussed for climate mitigation (2020-2030 vs. 2020-2050).  In addition, energy 
security goals are much less well-defined than climate targets – something that creates a 
challenge from a modeling perspective – and while the concept of energy security is 
widely discussed, its definition is vague, and there is no consensus as to its precise 
interpretation (Kruyt et al., 2009).  Security can be measured in several ways, for 
example, through diversity of supply (with respect to resources and/or trading partners); 
reduced energy imports and, consequently, increased domestic production; and/or an 
attempt to dampen volatile price swings.  In the United States, much of the policy 
discussion centers on reducing imports of foreign oil, though security of natural gas 
supplies and the reliability of electricity supply systems have also captured the attention 
of policymakers (Yergin, 2006).  In Europe, the discussion is similar, except that 
imported natural gas appears to be the main concern (EU, 2008).  Finally, the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG) include, in part, the improvement of 
human health (United Nations, 2010), and since air pollution (both indoor and outdoor) is 
an important contributor to child and adult mortality, especially in the developing world, 
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the benefits to reducing pollution from the energy system are potentially significant 
(Amann, 2009; Cofala et al., 2010; Cofala et al., 2009). 
 
Few published studies have analyzed trade-offs and synergies among multiple energy 
objectives.  Perhaps the most comprehensive study to date was that which was carried out 
under Research Stream RS2b of the European Union Integrated Project NEEDS (New 
Energy Externalities Developments for Sustainability) (Schenler et al., 2009).  In this 
project researchers compared 26 future (year 2050) electricity generation technologies 
(e.g., nuclear, solar, advanced coal) in four European countries across 36 different 
environmental, economic, and social metrics.  Then, stakeholder preferences were 
surveyed and the relative sustainability and robustness of different technologies were 
evaluated.  The central conclusion of the study is that an individual’s unique preference 
profile for a range of sustainability criteria has a critical influence on the technology that 
is considered “best” or “optimal”.  The study also finds that future renewable energy 
technologies are generally attractive, fairing well across all dimensions (environmental, 
economic, and social), whereas the overall attractiveness of nuclear and fossil 
technologies depends strongly on the emphasis placed on environmental performance 
and/or social acceptance (Schenler et al., 2009). 
 
Similarly, Jacobson (2009) reviews twelve different technological solutions 
(combinations of energy sources and vehicle types) to a range of energy and 
environmental challenges and compares them across multiple criteria and externalities, 
including global warming, air pollution mortality, and energy security, as well as their 
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impacts on water supply, land use, wildlife, resource availability, reliability, thermal 
pollution, water pollution, nuclear proliferation, and undernutrition.  Each vehicle-fuel 
combination is ranked and weighted with respect to these impact categories.  The study 
finds that, among the technologies considered, four tiers emerge from the rankings, with 
wind-powered battery-electric vehicles and wind-powered hydrogen fuel cell vehicles the 
most attractive technology combinations, followed closely by several of the other 
renewably-powered BEV combinations (e.g., concentrated solar power, solar 
photovoltaic, geothermal, tidal, and wave).  Nuclear power, coal with carbon capture and 
storage, and flexible fuel vehicles powered by corn-based and cellulosic ethanol fair the 
worst in the author’s analysis. 
 
Martinsen and Krey (2008) carry out an analysis somewhat similar to ours in the sense 
that future energy scenarios, rather than single energy technologies, are analyzed and 
compared based on their ability to achieve a range of energy objectives.  They introduce 
fuzzy (or soft) constraints to a bottom-up, myopic energy optimization model for 
Germany, IKARUS, and use their framework to “obtain a better representation of 
political decision processes” by finding compromises between competing energy 
objectives (e.g., environment, economy, security, and nuclear phase-out).  A key 
conclusion of the study is that while some policy targets are contradictory, others push in 
the same direction, an obvious example of which is the reduction of GHG emissions and 
a renewable portfolio standard (minimum share of renewables in total electricity supply).  
The authors also suggest that hard constraints (i.e., those typically used in energy systems 
models) may have an unjustifiably strong impact on the model solution, hence the need 
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for using soft constraints in combination with multi-objective optimization (Martinsen 
and Krey, 2008).  For those interested, Rommelfanger (1996) surveys the methods for 
solving linear programming (LP) models with soft constraints and reviews several 
applications, while Oder et al. (1993) and Canz (1998) provide examples of how fuzzy 
LP can be applied to energy systems models. 
 
Other studies – specifically Meinshausen et al. (2009) and O’Neill, Riahi, et al. (2010) – 
have explored the relationship between mid-century global GHG targets and long-term 
climate system outcomes, research that builds upon other major works found in the 
literature – e.g., Nakicenovic and Swart (2000), Keppo et al. (2007), and Van Vuuren et 
al. (2008).  These studies develop probabilistic estimates of climate system impacts (e.g., 
atmospheric CO2-eq concentrations and global-mean surface temperature increase) based 
on an assortment of emissions trajectories.  The research described in this dissertation 
chapter contributes to this diverse body of literature, encompassing the fields of energy 
modeling, energy and climate policy, and climate change science.  It then goes beyond 
these studies by also considering energy security and air pollution.  Notably, both 
Meinshausen et al. (2009) and O’Neill, Riahi, et al. (2010) employ essentially the same 
reduced complexity coupled global climate-carbon cycle model, MAGICC, that I am 
using in my dissertation research, MAGICC.  The only difference is that the modified 
version of MAGICC that I use is also able to account for the climate impacts of black and 
organic carbon, which is important in my case since I am evaluating the trade-offs 
between, and co-benefits from, climate change mitigation and reduced air pollution.  In 
addition, I employ the same model of the global energy system, the IIASA MESSAGE 
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integrated assessment modeling framework, that O’Neill, Riahi, et al. (2010) use in their 
analysis. 
 
Meinshausen et al. (2009) estimate the probability of exceeding maximal warming levels 
(namely the G8’s 2 ºC target) using a set of 26 IPCC SRES and 20 EMF-21 scenarios 
(Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000; Van Vuuren et al., 2008), as well as 948 additional equal 
quantile walk emission pathways, which are developed by the authors.  This large set of 
multi-gas mitigation scenarios represents a wide range of plausible 21st century GHG 
emissions trajectories – from scenarios where early action is taken to scenarios where 
action is delayed, the emissions peak comes later, and emissions then rapidly decline 
thereafter.  Importantly, only one of these scenarios assumes the possibility of negative 
fossil CO2 emissions later in the century.  In using the MAGICC climate model, 
Meinshausen et al. (2009) vary several dozen climate response and other key model 
parameters (based on 19 different probability distributions for the important parameter of 
climate sensitivity), in order to estimate the probability of exceeding 2 ºC warming both 
as a function of cumulative GHG emissions over the first half of the twenty-first century 
and of annual emissions in 2050.  Under the mitigation scenarios used, a 50% reduction 
of global GHG emissions below 1990 levels by 2050 would lead to a 12 to 45% 
probability of exceeding 2 ºC warming (i.e., a 55 to 88% probability of staying below 2 
ºC). 
 
O’Neill, Riahi, et al. (2010) conduct an analysis similar to that of Meinshausen et al. 
(2009), exploring the relationship between mid-century GHG targets and long-term 
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climate system outcomes.  In order to estimate the probability of staying below 2 ºC 
warming (over pre-industrial temperatures) based on a range of GHG emissions 
trajectories, the reduced complexity climate model, MAGICC, is run stochastically, 
varying several key climate system parameters per probability density functions found in 
the literature,.  In addition, rather than relying on other mitigation scenarios found in the 
literature, as is the case in the Meinshausen et al. (2009) study, the authors use a model of 
the global energy system with detailed technological representation (the IIASA 
MESSAGE integrated assessment modeling framework).  This allows the authors to look 
at scenarios with negative annual GHG emissions later in the century (e.g., through 
biomass carbon capture and storage), which allows for delayed mitigation action and a 
later peak in global emissions, while still retaining a realistic probability of achieving the 
2 ºC target.  Also, by explicitly capturing inertia and path dependency in the energy 
system (e.g., rates of capital stock turnover, limits to market penetration rates of 
particular technologies, and relationships between production and distribution systems), 
the authors are able to estimate “feasibility thresholds” – i.e., the conditions that must be 
present in 2050 in order to preserve the possibility of meeting certain long-term climate 
targets.  An important illustrative result is that, assuming a medium energy demand 
scenario (e.g., a B2 storyline), if global average temperature change over the course of 
the century is to be kept below 2 ºC with 50% probability or greater, then global annual 
GHG emissions in 2050 must be at least 20% below 2000 levels.  Failing to reach the 
20% reduction target by mid-century would significantly hamper the ability of meeting 
the long-term target because of the inability to invest in low-carbon technologies quickly 
enough in the second half of the century.  
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III.2 Methodology 
This project brings together two distinct modeling tools into a cohesive framework.  Both 
are described more fully in the sections that follow. 
1) MESSAGE (Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and their General 
Environmental Impact), a global systems engineering optimization model used for 
medium- to long-term energy system planning, energy policy analysis, and 
scenario development (Messner and Strubegger, 1995) 
2) MAGICC (Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate 
Change) version 5.3, a reduced complexity coupled global climate-carbon cycle 
model, which calculates internally consistent projections for atmospheric 
concentrations, radiative forcing, global annual-mean surface air temperature, and 
sea level rise (Wigley, 2008) 
 
III.2.1 Systems Engineering Global Energy Model (MESSAGE) 
The MESSAGE integrated assessment model is an evolving framework that has been 
developed at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) for more 
than two decades (Messner and Strubegger, 1995).  Like other global energy models in its 
class (e.g., AIM, EPPA, IMAGE, IPAC, and MiniCAM), MESSAGE has gained 
recognition over time via its repeated utilization in developing global energy and 
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emissions scenarios, especially its use in previous IPCC reports (e.g., see Nakicenovic 
and Swart (2000)).   
 
MESSAGE is an 11-region global energy model (Figure 84) which attempts to represent 
the world’s energy system with all its interdependencies from resource extraction, 
imports and exports, conversion, transport, and distribution, to the provision of energy 
end-use services such as light, space conditioning, industrial production processes, and 
transportation.  Trade flows (imports and exports) between regions are monitored, capital 
investments and retirements are made, fuels are consumed, and emissions are generated.  
In addition to the energy system, the model includes also the other main greenhouse-gas 
emitting sectors, agriculture and forestry.    MESSAGE tracks a full basket of greenhouse 
gases and other radiatively active gases – CO2 , CH4 , N2O , NOx , volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs), CO, SO2, PM, BC, OC, NH3, CF4, C2F6, HFC125, HFC134a, 
HFC143a, HFC227ea, HFC245ca, and SF6 – from both the energy and non-energy 
sectors (e.g., deforestation, livestock, municipal solid waste, manure management, rice 
cultivation, wastewater, and crop residue burning).  In other words, all Kyoto gases plus 
several others are accounted for. 
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Figure 84  Map of 11 Regions in MESSAGE Model  
(for a list of countries by region, see the appendix) 
 
Similar to the MARKAL-TIMES modeling framework (described in Chapter II), 
MESSAGE is a linear programming model, in which optimization is performed by 
minimizing total discounted energy system costs over the entire model time horizon 
(1990-2110).  All primary energy resources are characterized by supply (cost) curves, and 
all energy technologies are characterized by investment, variable, and O&M costs.  
Energy prices are calculated endogenously, and investment decisions and fuel choices are 
made based on the least-cost decision-making principle, subject to constraints (both 
technical and policy), thus reflecting a perfectly functioning global energy market, to the 
extent possible.  The model is able to choose between both conventional and non-
conventional technologies and fuels (e.g., advanced fossil, nuclear fission, biomass, and 
renewables).  Obviously, the selection of technologies/fuels available to the model has an 
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important effect on the model result.  In the version of the model used in this paper, we 
consider a portfolio of technologies whose components are either in the early 
demonstration or commercialization phase (e.g., coal, natural gas, oil, nuclear, biomass, 
solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, carbon capture and storage, and hydrogen).  Notably, this 
includes bio-CCS, a technology that can potentially lead to negative emissions 
(permanent underground storage of CO2 that was originally pulled out of the atmosphere 
by photosynthesis).  Nuclear fusion and geo-engineering options, however, are not 
included in the current version of the MESSAGE model.   
 
Price-induced changes in energy demand (i.e., elastic demands) are also modeled in our 
version of MESSAGE.  In short, we use an approach, similar to that described in Messner 
and Schrattenholzer (2000), which systematically assesses regional conservation costs for 
different levels of prices and demand.  For each of the eleven MESSAGE regions, we 
estimate a conservation cost (i.e., demand response) curve for each of the six end-use 
demands.  These curves are meant to represent energy conservation and efficiency 
improvements in each region.  Put simply, a specified quantity of demand reduction can 
be achieved at a particular cost.  The quantity and cost steps for each of these curves are 
generated via a multi-stage iterative solution process between MESSAGE and a top-
down, macro-economic model of the global economy.55  This integrated modeling 
                                                 
55
 Development of the conservation cost curves (CCCs) is relatively straightforward in practice.  First, we 
run a baseline scenario and a set of five stabilization runs using the integrated MESSAGE-MACRO 
modeling framework.  After several iterations of a given run, the two models reach convergence, and at that 
point the demand responses in each region are in equilibrium with the price increases resulting from a 
carbon constraint (or any other energy-related constraint that causes prices to increase or decrease, i.e., an 
energy security constraint).  Once the six MESSAGE-MACRO runs have been completed (baseline + five 
stabilization runs), we obtain CCCs for each of the six end-use demands in each region.  The equilibrium 
prices from the five stabilization runs are used directly as costs for the conservation steps, because these 
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framework is known as MESSAGE-MACRO (Messner and Schrattenholzer, 2000) and 
only needs to be run once, since the five-step demand response curves that are generated 
can subsequently be used in all of our non-MACRO model runs.  Such a procedure 
substantially reduces total computing time, when compared to the alternate method of 
solving MESSAGE-MACRO iteratively for every single scenario, and for this reason 
several recent studies have utilized this simplified demand response methodology (Keppo 
and Strubegger, 2009; Krey and Riahi, 2009; O'Neill et al., 2010).  Note that the demand-
side conservation costs derive from the elasticities in the macro-economic model, and 
these costs represent both technological and behavioral measures for achieving energy 
efficiency and conservation, while considering the substitutability of capital, labor, and 
energy as inputs to the production function at the macro level.  In this sense, demand 
reduction due to behavioral change is monetized in a way similar to technology-related 
costs.  In essence, the conservation costs derived from the macro model represent the 
costs that society would be willing to bear to bring demand and prices into equilibrium.  
They do not, however, include macro-economic costs (e.g., GDP, welfare, and 
consumption losses). 
 
Further and more detailed information on the MESSAGE modeling framework is 
available, including documentation of model set-up and mathematical formulation 
(Messner and Strubegger, 1995) and the model’s representation of technological change 
and learning (Rao et al., 2006; Riahi et al., 2004; Roehrl and Riahi, 2000). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
price levels trigger the demand response.  The differentials between the six demand levels (for each of the 
six demands per region) represent the corresponding sizes of the steps. 
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III.2.2 Global Climate Model (MAGICC) 
MAGICC is a reduced complexity coupled global climate-carbon cycle model, in the 
form of a user-friendly software package that runs on a personal computer.  The standard 
version of MAGICC (v5.3) calculates internally consistent projections for atmospheric 
concentrations, radiative forcing, global annual-mean surface air temperature, ice melt, 
and sea level rise, given emissions trajectories of a range of gases (CO2, CH4, N2O, CO, 
NOx, VOCs, SO2, and various halocarbons, including HCFCs, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6) 
(Wigley, 2008).  For this analysis, a modified version of MAGICC v5.3 was used, which 
allows for an explicit treatment of black and organic carbon (BC and OC).56  The time 
horizon of the model extends as far back as 1750 and can make projections as far forward 
as 2400.  The climate model in MAGICC is an upwelling-diffusion, energy-balance 
model, which produces output for global- and hemispheric-mean temperature and for 
oceanic thermal expansion.  Climate feedbacks on the global carbon cycle are accounted 
for through the interactive coupling of the climate model and a range of gas-cycle 
models.  The primary developer of MAGICC is Dr. Tom Wigley at the National Center 
for Atmospheric Research in the United States.  The modeling package has been used in 
all IPCC Assessment reports, dating back to 1990; its strength lies in its ability to 
replicate the more complex global climate models, which run on supercomputers.  For 
our analysis, we use a version of the software that is consistent with the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report, Working Group 1. 
 
                                                 
56
 I gratefully acknowledge Dr. Steve Smith of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (USA) for 
sharing a modified version of MAGICC (v5.3), which takes user-specified trajectories of BC and OC as 
inputs. 
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In contrast to how MAGICC is typically used, I run the model stochastically in order to 
generate probabilistic estimates of climate system responses (e.g., temperature increase or 
atmospheric GHG concentrations), a methodology first described in Keppo et al. (2007).  
Whereas a typical user of MAGICC, who is interested in generating (deterministic) point 
estimates of climate system responses, would run the user-interface version of the model 
by feeding in a single set of emissions trajectories under a single set of assumptions for 
key climate system parameters (e.g., climate sensitivity, ocean diffusivity and aerosol 
forcing), we automate a process to integrate MAGICC’s executable and configuration 
files into a Java code script, in order to run a single set of trajectories under 100 different 
sets of parameter assumptions.  In other words, I explore the uncertainty in climate 
system responses for a single emissions trajectory (from MESSAGE scenario output) by 
using a probability density function (PDF) to describe the following parameters: climate 
sensitivity, ocean diffusivity, and aerosol forcing.  Therefore, instead of simply saying 
that, for a given mitigation scenario and emissions trajectory, “the projected maximum 
global temperature increase over the course of the twenty-first century is estimated at X 
ºC”, I can say something like “the probability of staying below X ºC maximum global 
temperature increase is Y%.” 
 
The reason I estimate projections of climate system responses probabilistically is because 
of the large amount of uncertainty in key climate system parameters.  Perhaps the most 
important among these, and one of the most uncertain, is climate sensitivity, which refers 
to the equilibrium global average warming expected if CO2 concentrations were to be 
sustained at double their pre-industrial values.  This value is estimated, by the IPCC 
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Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) “as likely to be in the range 2 to 4.5°C with a best 
estimate of about 3°C” (IPCC, 2007).  Contributing to the IPCC AR4 were a number of 
studies that estimate PDFs for climate sensitivity (see Meinshausen et al. (2009), and 
O’Neill, Riahi, et al. (2010) for good reviews).  And as Figure 85 illustrates, the shape of 
these PDFs can be quite different.  In this study, our group divided each of these PDFs 
into 100 steps between 0.1 and 10 ºC.  PDFs for ocean diffusivity and aerosol forcing, 
two other important though uncertain climate parameters, were then generated by 
correlating them with climate sensitivity at each step (Meinshausen, 2006).  Although 
there is the potential to use any of the PDFs shown in Figure 85, I focus on the Forest et 
al. (2002) distribution with uniform priors (bold line in figure), since it is near the middle 
of the range found in the literature and also so that my results are directly comparable to 
those of previous studies on this topic (e.g., O’Neill, Riahi, et al. (2010)).  Note that a 
climate sensitivity value of 3 ºC has a likelihood of 53.9% using the PDF from Forest et 
al. (2002). 
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Figure 85  Probability Density Functions (PDF) for Climate Sensitivity  
(figure from O’Neill et al. (2010); reproduced with permission) 
 
III.2.3 Joint Modeling Framework and Study Design 
A thorough analysis of synergies and trade-offs among energy objectives necessitates a 
broad scenario space, stretching the potential development of the energy system in 
several dimensions.  Therefore, in this project several hundred scenarios were developed, 
each of which meets the different objectives (climate mitigation, air pollution and health, 
energy security, and affordability) in a unique way.  For instance, some scenarios push 
the climate mitigation objective while ignoring security and air pollution reduction, at 
least explicitly, while other scenarios prioritize only security while ignoring the other 
objectives.  By generating a large ensemble of potential energy system futures, a 
significant portion of the feasible scenario space is covered.57   
                                                 
57
 Note that achievement of the access objective is taken as given in this analysis, as all scenarios have been 
developed to meet the access targets of the GEA, including even the baseline scenario.  This simplification 
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Since this project has been conducted in support of the Global Energy Assessment, the 
scenario ensemble that is created here springs from one of the three core scenario 
pathways developed for the Assessment, specifically the GEA-Mix.  For a brief 
description of these pathways, see Box 1; for a fuller description, including the 
underlying scenario assumptions, see GEA (2011).)  In other words, assumptions for 
global population and gross domestic product (GDP) development and the availability of 
technologies are the same as in the standard GEA-Mix pathway.  The problem is that no 
baseline scenarios are developed in the GEA, only the pathways that meet the targets for 
sustainability.  Hence, it became necessary in this analysis to relax some of the 
constraints in the GEA-Mix pathway, in order to develop a baseline with business-as-
usual energy system development.  Then, from this baseline, within the MESSAGE 
modeling framework, several hundred scenarios were developed by imposing varying 
combinations of policy constraints at varying levels of stringency across several different 
dimensions.  In particular, constraints are imposed on three important variables:  
cumulative global GHG emissions over the entire model time horizon (1990-2110); 
global annual GHG emissions in 2050; and absolute upper limits on the total amount of 
energy that can be supplied by imports in a given region and year, starting in 2030.58  
Note that because the full scenario ensemble covers a large portion of the feasible 
scenario space, the GEA-Mix is inherently included.  Also, it is important to realize that 
the objective function is the same in all scenarios – total discounted energy system costs 
                                                                                                                                                 
was made because energy access, compared to other objectives, has the lowest impacts on energy use and 
GHG emissions. 
58
 For an extended discussion of how energy security policies are modeled in MESSAGE, see the appendix. 
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are minimized over the entire model time horizon.  It is simply the constraints of the 
scenarios that differ, i.e., how far they push each energy objective. 
 
Box 1 
Description of the Global Energy Assessment Scenario Pathways 
 
The GEA-Mix scenario pathway of the Global Energy Assessment is used in this project as a 
starting point for populating the scenario ensemble with a large number of potential energy 
futures.  In brief, there is a single overarching storyline for the GEA, in which transformation of 
the energy system over the course of the twenty-first century occurs in such a way that all energy 
objectives are met simultaneously.  The quantitative targets of the GEA scenario include:  1) 
universal access to electricity and modern cooking fuels in all regions of the world by 2030; 2) 
reduction of premature deaths due to air pollution 50% by 2030; 3) limitation of global average 
temperature increase to 2 ºC above pre-industrial levels with a likelihood of >50% in order to 
avoid dangerous climate change; and 4) improvement of energy security by 2050 by constricting 
global trade flows and increasing the diversity and resilience of energy supply.  There are, of 
course, manifold pathways by which the normative objectives of the GEA could potentially be 
met in the future; however, for manageability the Assessment simply develops three core 
pathways (GEA-Supply, GEA-Efficiency, and GEA-Mix), along with several dozen pathway 
variants.  Each of these pathways is designed to describe transformative changes toward a more 
sustainable future, and each is constructed to represent a different emphasis in terms of demand-
side efficiency improvements and supply-side transformations.  For example, the GEA-Supply 
pathway emphasizes supply-side changes but little on the demand-side efficiency; therefore, the 
growth projections for end-use demand across all sectors are relatively high.  The GEA-
Efficiency pathway, on the other hand, emphasizes demand-side measures (faster than the 
historical trend for improvement) and achieves relative low demand as a result.  The GEA-Mix 
pathway represents an intermediate ground between the GEA-Supply and GEA-Efficiency 
pathways and, thus, leads to intermediate levels of demand growth in the future. 
 
The three GEA pathways share a set of harmonized assumptions about future drivers of global 
change, namely population and gross domestic product within each world region, and their pace 
of socio-economic development is consistent with other studies in the literature.  For instance, 
global population increases from almost 7 billion at present to roughly 9 billion by around 2050, 
before declining toward the end of the century.  Such a trajectory represents a median 
development path based on demographic projections by the United Nations (2009).  With respect 
to economic development, global GDP roughly triples by 2050 and increases more than seven 
times by 2100.  Developing and emerging economies are projected to grow faster than currently 
industrialized countries, with the total economic output of the former surpassing that of the latter 
by about 2040.  On average, global per capita income in the GEA scenario pathways grows at an 
annual rate of 2% over the next half-century.  The following figures show the global population 
and GDP projections underlying GEA pathways, as well as for all of the scenarios in the full 
ensemble of the current study.  (The full range of projections from the literature are shown by the 
shaded region, while the median projections used in this and the GEA studies are highlighted with 
a trend line.  The inserts in the upper left corners show development for each of the industrialized 
and developing regions.) 
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Figure 86  Projections for Global Population in the Scenarios Used in the GEA and This Study  
(Source:  Global Energy Assessment (GEA, 2011)) 
 
 
Figure 87  Projections for Global Economic Development in the Scenarios Used in the GEA and This 
Study 
(Source:  Global Energy Assessment (GEA, 2011)) 
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Furthermore, the GEA-Mix pathway assumes a full and diverse portfolio of supply-side 
technological options.  In other words, advanced, yet uncertain, technologies – such as nuclear, 
CCS, renewables, and biomass – are available in all of the GEA pathways and, by extension, all 
of the scenarios developed for the current study.  Of particular note, global biomass potential tops 
out at about 200 EJ by 2050 and remains at this level until 2100 (GEA, 2011). 
 
 
To estimate air pollutant emissions and pollution control costs for each MESSAGE 
energy scenario, data and output from IIASA’s Greenhouse Gas and Air Pollution 
Interactions and Synergies (GAINS) model was utilized (Amann et al., 2009).59  At each 
of the different levels of pollution control stringency and for each pollutant and region, 
emissions factors by were obtained from GAINS for each corresponding energy 
technology in MESSAGE.  In addition, for a given level of pollution control stringency, 
GAINS was used to estimate the cost of installing all necessary pollution control 
equipment by energy technology (i.e., higher stringency requires more expensive control 
technologies).  Care was taken not to double-count MESSAGE and GAINS technology 
costs. 
 
Finally, after using MESSAGE to generate a large ensemble of scenarios, the emissions 
trajectories of each are fed to the MAGICC global climate model.  As discussed 
previously, MAGICC is used to estimate climate system impacts, for example, 
projections for atmospheric GHG concentrations, radiative forcing, global annual-mean 
surface air temperature, and sea level rise.  In particular, my research focuses on the 
probability of staying below 2 ºC maximum temperature increase over the century. 
 
                                                 
59
 I gratefully acknowledge Shilpa Rao, Peter Kolp, and Wolfgang Schöpp for their invaluable roles in 
translating the pollutant emissions factor and cost estimates from GAINS to MESSAGE. 
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The two-step process described here culminates in several hundred unique energy and 
emissions scenarios, which in practice takes several days of computer time to complete. 
 
III.3 Characterization of the Full Scenario Space 
Figure 88 illustrates the full scenario space in the climate dimension.  Each scenario of 
the large ensemble has a unique GHG emissions trajectory.  In the baseline scenario, for 
instance, annual emissions grow from 13,450 Mton Carbon-eq in 2010 to 22,841 Mton C-
eq in 2050, a level that is 121% greater than emissions in 1990 (10,322 Mton).60,61  
Emissions then peak near 26,000 Mton in the later part of the century.  All other 
scenarios achieve emissions reductions compared to the baseline.  In the most stringent 
climate scenarios, for instance, emissions in 2050 are just 5,161 Mton, 50% below 1990.  
Depending on the particular emissions trajectory, each scenario is associated with a 
unique probability for reaching the 2 ºC target – the probability of staying below 2 ºC 
maximum temperature rise, relative to pre-industrial levels, throughout the twenty-first 
century.  (The uniform prior climate sensitivity PDF from Forest et al. (2002) is used to 
do the probabilistic assessment in this case.)  These probabilities are shown in Figure 88 
for various ranges of scenarios.  Note that reaching the 2 ºC target with greater than 50% 
probability requires that emissions peak in 2020 at levels that are only marginally higher 
than today and then be reduced significantly in the decades that follow. 
 
                                                 
60
 The GHG estimates include all well-mixed Kyoto greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, CF4, and 
halocarbons). 
61
 To convert between carbon (C) and carbon dioxide (CO2), multiply the carbon by 44/12 (the ratio of the 
molecular weight of carbon dioxide to carbon).  For comparison, annual CO2-only emissions in 1990 and 
2010 are estimated at 7,516 and 9,657 Mton C, respectively.  In the baseline scenario, CO2 emissions are 
projected to climb to 17,287 Mton C in 2050. 
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Figure 88  Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trajectories for the Full Scenario Ensemble 
 
Air pollutant emissions depend on the structure and composition of the energy system 
and on the nature of the pollution control strategies employed.  Hence, the pollutant 
emissions trajectories of each of the scenarios in the ensemble are determined by the 
stringency of policy in three key areas: pollution control, climate mitigation, and energy 
security.  As with GHG emissions, each scenario of the large ensemble possesses unique 
emissions trajectories for sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), volatile organic 
compounds (VOC), carbon monoxide (CO), black carbon (BC), organic carbon (OC), 
ammonia (NH3), and fine particulate matter (PM 2.5).  Typical pollution control 
strategies to limit the generation of these chemical species include utilization of low-
sulfur fossil fuels (especially for coal and petroleum-based fuels) and application of “end-
Baseline 
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of-pipe” technologies, such as flue gas desulfurization, selective catalytic reduction, 
electrostatic precipitators, and particulate filters, for both stationary and mobile sources.  
In addition, pollution can be reduced through measures that are typically thought of as 
climate mitigation strategies: energy efficiency improvements, combined heat and power 
(CHP), fuel switching (e.g., from coal and oil to natural gas), and utilization of nuclear 
and renewable energy technologies.   
 
For the purposes of this analysis, four different levels of air pollution legislations are 
considered.  (For further details on the types of controls assumed in each case, see 
Knowledge Module 17 of the full Global Energy Assessment report (GEA, 2011).)  
These include:  
• FLE  
Frozen Legislation; no change in future pollution policies relative to 2010 in all 
regions 
• CLE  
Current and planned Legislation for air quality is enacted in all regions (baseline 
case) 
• SLE  
Stringent Legislation for air quality that exceeds CLE levels; feasible, aggressive 
pollution control is enacted in all regions; implementation level is 70% of what 
could theoretically be achieved via MFR in every region 
• MFR  
Maximum Feasible Reduction; best practice technologies of today are employed 
in every region by 2030; theoretical limit to pollution control 
 
Figure 89 attempts to illustrate the full space of the scenario ensemble in the air pollution 
dimension by showing, as an example, the ranges of PM 2.5 emissions trajectories.  
Particulate matter is chosen as a representative pollutant for this discussion because, of all 
types of air pollutant emissions, PM 2.5 causes some of the most serious impacts on 
human health; thus, it can be used as a proxy for health impacts, as has been done in a 
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number of recent analyses (e.g., Amann (2009)).  One observes that a CLE policy in the 
absence of policies on climate change, as is the case in the baseline, leads to a low 
reduction in PM 2.5 emissions of less than 5% in 2030 compared to today, whereas 
application of SLE and MFR levels of pollution control leads to a sharp reduction of air 
pollutants for the same energy scenario (i.e., the same technologies and fuels being used 
in the energy system, only with more stringent pollution control).  Alternately, by driving 
the energy system toward zero-carbon, emissions-free technologies, stringent climate and 
security policies can also play a role in reducing pollutant emissions, even under a 
relatively slack air pollution policy regime (FLE or CLE).  This is shown by the wide-
ranging extent of the FLE and CLE regions in the figure.  The lower borders of these 
regions show how far PM 2.5 emissions can be reduced with stringent climate and 
security policies.  Reducing pollution via climate mitigation comes at a cost, however, as 
discussed later in this section.  In the most extreme scenario – stringent climate and 
security policies combined with either SLE or MFR pollution control – global PM 2.5 
emissions in 2030 fall to roughly half of the 2010 level. 
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Figure 89  Global PM 2.5 Emissions Trajectories for the Full Scenario Ensemble 
 
The scenarios also cover a broad space in the energy security dimension, although, as yet, 
there is no real consensus as to the precise definition of security (Kruyt et al., 2009).  
Therefore, as discussed above, this analysis models security in a straightforward, 
transparent way: limiting energy trade flows between individual regions in order to 
reduce import dependence.  The underlying premise is that in a future world where 
security becomes a major concern, countries might shift towards trade partners that are 
fairly similar in the geographic, political, economic, and cultural sense.  Such a paradigm 
would represent a marked shift from the situation as it exists today, but that being said, 
energy security has not exactly been high on the priority list of most countries until fairly 
recently.  Furthermore, past examples show that increased domestic production and 
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reduced imports do not always guarantee a reliable, secure energy supply.  (Consider, for 
example, the coal miners’ strike in the Great Britain in 1984.)  Nevertheless, in spite of 
these caveats, I have chosen to operationalize energy security in terms of import 
constraints in this study.  In future work alternate formulations will be applied.  For 
reference, note that as of 2010, only five of the eleven MESSAGE regions – Western 
Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, Pacific OECD, Other Pacific Asia, and South Asia – 
imported more than 35% of their total primary energy supply from all sources, while 
North America’s net import share stood at 24% and that of Centrally Planned Asia and 
China was 3%.  The other regions (Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, 
the newly independent states of the Former Soviet Union, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean) are actually net exporters at the present time (i.e., they have a negative net 
import share) and are projected to continue in this capacity for many decades to come.  It 
is perhaps noteworthy that even while North America’s share of imported energy is not 
dramatically high, relative to some other regions of the world, even this level has become 
a major concern for policymakers in recent years, particularly because a high percentage 
of crude oil consumed in the U.S. is sourced from foreign markets (>50%). 
 
Other strategies to achieve energy security include diversification of energy supply (with 
respect to resources and/or trading partners) and attempts to dampen volatile price 
swings.  In this analysis, the diversity of the energy mix within each region is estimated 
with two simple diversity indicators, one that only takes into account the diversity of 
primary energy resources (I1) and another that also takes into account where those 
resources are sourced, whether from imports or domestic production (I2).  Both of these 
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indicators derive from the Shannon index (Jansen et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2009; Kruyt et 
al., 2009; Stirling, 1994).  Both diversity indicators increase with increasing diversity of 
the energy system, but the second indicator decreases at higher levels of import 
dependency.  In either case, the higher the diversity indicator for a given country or 
region, the more secure is its energy system.  
 
I1,i  =   -Σj (pj • ln pj)         (1) 
 
I2,i  =   -Σj { (1 - mj) • (pj • ln pj) }       (2) 
 
where: 
- I1:  energy diversity indicator #1 in region i (resources only) 
- I2:  energy diversity indicator #2 in region i (resources + imports) 
- pj:  share of primary energy resource j in total primary energy supply 
- mj:  share of primary energy resource j that is supplied by (net) imports 
 
 
Figure 90 illustrates the range of diversities achieved in the scenarios, using the region 
with the lowest diversity indicator (I2) in 2030 – i.e., the worst performing region – as a 
proxy for overall global performance across the energy security dimension.  Each bar in 
the figure represents a single scenario, and the scenarios are sorted in order of decreasing 
diversity (i.e., lower energy security).  For reference, the red box highlights the range of 
diversity indicators of the world’s seven importing regions at present (North America, 
Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, Pacific OECD, Other Pacific Asia, South 
Asia, and Centrally Planned Asia and China).  Note that the baseline scenario is one of 
the least desirable scenarios in terms of diversity: virtually every other scenario, whether 
through climate or security policy, achieves a greater diversification of the energy mix by 
2030.   
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Figure 90  Energy Diversity in 2030 for All Scenarios in the Full Ensemble 
[minimum primary energy diversity indicator among all world regions is used as a proxy for global 
performance] 
 
Because the individual scenarios in the ensemble vary so greatly along the dimensions of 
climate mitigation, energy security, and pollution control, total energy system costs span 
a fairly wide range.  This is illustrated in Figure 91, where each bar represents a single 
scenario, and the scenarios are sorted in order of increasing costs, which include the 
cumulative discounted sum between 2010 and 2050 of energy system investments (for 
both climate mitigation and energy security), pollution control investments, O&M, fuel, 
non-energy mitigation, and demand reduction (i.e., energy efficiency improvements and 
conservation).62  Total costs for each scenario are then related to the cumulative 
                                                 
62
 A discount rate of 5% is used. 
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discounted sum of global gross domestic product (GDP) over the same time period and 
subsequently normalized to the costs incurred in the baseline scenario.63   
 
This “policy cost” measure attempts to capture the added costs of energy, climate, and 
pollution control policies relative to the baseline scenario.  As shown in the figure, 
achieving the 2 ºC target with greater than 50% probability does not appear to be possible 
in any of the scenarios where global policy costs are less than 1.0% of GDP.  On the 
other hand, achievement of the target is quite likely in virtually all scenarios where policy 
costs are greater than 1.25% of GDP.  In between these two levels is an intermediate 
region, where some scenarios meet the target and others do not.  The variability in this 
intermediate region can be attributed to the particular combination of objectives being 
pushed in each scenario.  For instance, scenarios with stringent climate policies but 
relatively weaker security and pollution control policies may be able meet the 2 ºC target 
with >50% probability at a lower cost (say, between 1.0% and 1.25%) than a scenario 
with the same climate policies but, in addition, much more stringent security and 
pollution control policies (costs >1.25%). 
 
An important caveat to this analysis is that it only does a partial economic accounting.  It 
attempts to capture the multiple benefits of climate mitigation, energy security, and 
pollution control in terms of total energy system costs.  However, the analysis largely 
ignores the significant economic benefits of pursuing these three objectives.  For instance, 
it does not consider the avoided costs (i.e., benefits) of climate change (e.g., more 
                                                 
63
 Total global energy system costs (not policy costs) are projected to be roughly 2.2% of global GDP 
between 2010 and 2050. 
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frequent extreme weather events, impacts on global agriculture and food production) or 
of climate adaptation (e.g., construction of sea walls, relocation of coastal populations).  
Similarly, the benefits accruing from reduced health expenditures and increased life 
expectancies have not been monetized here.  Given this partial accounting, it is highly 
likely that the cost figures shown in this section are somewhat overestimated.  This is a 
known issue with integrated assessment models used to inform energy and climate 
policymaking (Nemet et al., 2010). 
 
 
Figure 91  Total Policy Costs for All Scenarios in the Full Ensemble 
[cumulative from 2010 to 2050, discounted, as a % share of GDP, relative to baseline] 
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III.4 Synergies and Trade-offs Between Objectives 
As the discussions above have already begun to show, the inherent synergies, and to a 
lesser extent the trade-offs, between the various objectives can be illuminated through 
analysis of a large ensemble of possible energy futures.  Among energy planners and 
decision makers, however, these relationships are not well enough understood.  Cost 
trade-offs are obviously the most familiar: the greater society’s aspiration for a 
sustainable energy future, the larger the costs.  But as for questions like: How much extra 
might it cost to achieve each additional objective?  How can costs be reduced by 
pursuing multiple objectives?  These issues are much less clear.  This section highlights 
the main findings of one of the few attempts in the scenario literature to explore the 
important relationships between climate mitigation, energy security, and reduced air 
pollution (for further reading, see van Vuuren et al. (2006), Cofala et al. (2009), Cofala et 
al. (2010) and Bollen et al. (2010)). 
 
III.4.1 Near- and Mid-Term Actions to Achieve Long-Term Objectives 
Probabilistic assessment of the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and global 
temperature change has been studied by den Elzen and van Vuuren (2007), Schneider and 
Mastrandrea (2005), Keppo et al. (2007), Meinshausen et al. (2009), and O’Neill, Riahi, 
and Keppo (2010).  The current analysis builds on these previous studies and extends 
them through inclusion of additional energy objectives.  Figure 92 shows, for the wide-
ranging ensemble of scenarios described above, maximum global mean surface air 
temperatures relative to pre-industrial levels over the 21st century (at the IPCC 4AR best 
estimate climate sensitivity value of 3 ºC) as a function of the cumulative quantity of 
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greenhouse gas emissions (considering all Kyoto gases) emitted between 2000 and 2049 
(i.e., the GHG emissions budget).  Stringency of air pollution legislation is shown in the 
third dimension, using data markers of differing colors and shapes.  Two noteworthy 
trends emerge from the figure.   
 
First, as climate policy becomes more stringent and GHG emissions are increasingly 
limited, maximum transient temperatures are considerably reduced, from greater than 4 
ºC in the baseline scenario to less than 2 ºC in the most stringent climate scenarios.  Note 
that, although not shown, in all scenarios global temperatures peak in the second half of 
the century, following the peak in net global radiative forcing by at least a couple of 
decades, due to time lags in the global climate system (Clarke et al., 2009). 
 
Second, temperatures appear to increase with the stringency of pollution control, at least 
according to the definition of pollution control in this study, which assumes that all 
pollutants (PM 2.5, SO2, NOx, VOCs, CO, BC, OC, and NH3) are simultaneously limited 
in equal proportions.  This pollution control impact on the climate becomes stronger at 
higher levels of GHG emissions (in the figure, note how the separation between the 
pollution cases widens at higher emission levels), increasing temperatures by a small, but 
non-trivial, 0.2 to 0.4 ºC in the most extreme case (i.e., the baseline scenario).  This 
phenomenon can be explained by the greater shares of fossil energy technologies that 
comprise the energy system in the high-GHG scenarios.  Fossil technologies are directly 
impacted by pollution control, whereas zero-carbon energy technologies, which make up 
an increasing share of the system in the low-GHG scenarios, do not generate air pollutant 
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emissions and, thus, do not require pollution control.  In other words, because the process 
of decarbonization reduces pollution so strongly in the scenarios with more stringent 
climate policy, the added impact of end-of-pipe pollution control measures on the climate 
is far smaller. 
 
 
Figure 92  Relationship Between the GHG Emissions Budget from 2000 to 2049 and Maximum 
Global Mean Surface Air Temperatures Relative to Pre-Industrial Levels 
 
Herein lies the main trade-off between pollution control and climate mitigation, a topic 
that is addressed more fully in Section III.4.2 and Box 2, the latter of which highlights the 
climate feedbacks of reducing air pollutant emissions, particularly climate-cooling 
aerosols.  In sum, for an equivalent amount of radiative forcing from fossil components 
(e.g., CO2, CH4, etc.), an “across-the-board” reduction in air pollution tends to increase 
stringency of climate mitigation 
Baseline 
2 ºC probability = 50% 
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warming, on balance.  Such an outcome need not be the case, however, as there are a 
number of different ways that pollution could be controlled, in theory.  While a wholesale 
reduction in pollution may be the best approach for minimizing human health impacts 
and also for certain environmental reasons (e.g., acid rain), it may not be the best strategy 
for the climate.  In fact, one could imagine scenarios in which specific pollutants are 
proportionally reduced more than others, for example, warming components, such as 
black carbon and the ozone precursors (CH4, NOx, CO, and VOCs), are reduced more 
than cooling components, such as SO2 and organic carbon, in an effort to preserve the 
overall cooling effect of aerosols and, thus, to produce a net gain for the climate, or at 
least to remain radiant energy-neutral (Cofala et al., 2009; Ramanathan and Xu, 2010). 
 
Related to the current discussion, Figure 93 shows the relationship between the 
probability of staying below 2 ºC maximum temperature rise (relative to pre-industrial 
levels) throughout the century and the GHG emissions budget between 2000 and 2049.  
Consistent with Clarke et al. (2009), the 2 ºC probability is found to vary considerably 
depending on the stringency of the GHG emissions budget.  In particular, meeting the 2 
ºC target with greater than 50% probability requires limiting the GHG emissions budget 
(considering all Kyoto gases) to less than 625 Gton C-eq (2,292 Gton CO2-eq) over the 
first half of the century.  To put this number in perspective, cumulative global GHG 
emissions between 2000 and 2010 were approximately 119 Gton C-eq (~19% of the total 
budget).  Hence, assuming that the global GHG emissions rate could be held constant at 
the current level of 13.45 Gton C-eq (49.3 Gton CO2-eq) per year for the next several 
decades, the total GHG emissions budget would be “spent” before 2040.  In actuality, 
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however, given that global GHGs are projected to increase rapidly in a Baseline scenario, 
the emissions budget could be spent by around 2030.  Moreover, with regard to the 
impact of air pollution on the global climate, stringent pollution control appears to reduce 
the probability of staying below the 2 ºC temperature target by up to four percentage 
points, depending on the scenario. 
 
 
Figure 93  Relationship Between the GHG Emissions Budget from 2000 to 2049 and Probability of 
Staying Below 2 ºC Maximum Temperature Rise Relative to Pre-Industrial Levels 
 
These 2 ºC probability results discussed here are compatible with, though slightly more 
optimistic than, those of Meinshausen et al. (2009), who are notable for having conducted 
pioneering work in this area.  For example, Meinshausen et al. (2009) estimate that with a 
GHG emissions budget of 625 Gton C-eq, the probability of staying below the 2 ºC target 
stringency of climate mitigation 
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ranges from 14% to 53%, depending on the particular climate sensitivity PDF that is 
chosen.64  Using the uniform prior climate sensitivity PDF from Forest et al. (2002), as is 
done in the current analysis, a probability of 38% is estimated by Meinshausen et al. 
(2009).  Put another way, based on the calculations of Meinshausen et al. (2009), meeting 
the 2 ºC target with 50% probability (using the Forest et al. (2002) uniform prior PDF; 
full range of 34% to 75% using other PDFs) would require limiting the GHG emissions 
budget to 567 Gton C-eq over the first half of the century, a bit less than the 625 Gton C-
eq level calculated in this analysis.  The reasons for these discrepancies are two-fold.  
First, a different version of the climate model MAGICC is used in this analysis.  Second, 
in the current analysis a number of stringent climate policy scenarios in the large 
ensemble achieve near-zero or even negative GHG emissions in the latter part of the 
century.  In contrast, very few scenarios with this kind of trajectory were considered in 
the analysis of Meinshausen et al. (2009).  Thus, for a given likelihood of staying below 
the 2 ºC target, their calculations would naturally suggest that greater GHG reductions 
must be achieved in the first part of the century, thereby lowering the required emissions 
budget.  Moreover, similar to Meinshausen et al. (2009), this study finds that the 
relationship between the 2000-2049 GHG emissions budget and the 2 ºC probability is 
strongly correlated; and on top of that, it appears to be quite linear.  In fact, for every 41.7 
Gton C-eq reduction in the emissions budget – approximately 3.1 years’ worth at current 
global emission rates – the 2 ºC probability increases by ten percentage points.   
                                                 
64
 These probability estimates are calculated using the “The PRIMAP 2°C Check Tool”, which summarizes 
the full data set underlying Table 1, Figure 3 and Figure S1 of Meinshausen et al. (2009) (found at 
http://sites.google.com/a/primap.org/www/nature).  Note that in actuality, Meinshausen et al. (2009) 
calculate the probability of exceeding the 2 ºC target, rather than staying below it, and they quote their 
GHG emissions estimates in units of either CO2-only or CO2-eq (all Kyoto gases considered) rather than C-
eq. 
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Box 2 
Net Global Radiative Forcing 
 
According to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (4AR), “Radiative forcing is a measure of how 
the energy balance of the Earth-atmosphere system is influenced when factors that affect climate 
are altered” (Solomon et al., 2007).  This equilibrium, which refers to the balance between 
incoming solar radiation and outgoing infrared radiation within the Earth’s atmosphere, controls 
the surface temperature of the Earth.  The term “forcing” refers to the notion that the factors 
affecting the climate are pushing the Earth’s radiative balance away from its normal state 
(generally construed to be the pre-industrial era (pre-1750), before human activities led to the 
extensive alteration of natural land cover and generation of significant quantities of greenhouse 
gas and air pollutant emissions).  Therefore, radiative forcing can be thought of as a relative 
measure, comparing the forcing that is experienced today, or at some point in the future, versus 
the forcing that prevailed during pre-industrial times.  Radiative forcing is typically estimated as 
the “rate of energy change per unit area of the globe as measured at the top of the atmosphere”.  It 
is normally expressed in units of “Watts per square meter” (W/m2). 
 
A number of chemical and physical components contribute to net global radiative forcing (Figure 
94).  Some of these have long atmospheric lifetimes (e.g., CO2, CH4, N2O, and various 
halocarbons including HCFCs, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6), while others decompose or are converted 
rather quickly in the atmosphere (e.g., air pollutant emissions and/or the chemical species they act 
as precursors for: ozone, CO, NOx, VOCs, SO2, BC, and OC).  The radiative forcings of some of 
these individual components operate on a continental or global scale (e.g., GHGs and pollutant 
emissions), whereas others are more regional in nature (land use changes and black carbon on 
snow and ice).  Perhaps most importantly, some components contribute to warming (positive 
forcings), while others cool the Earth (negative forcings).  As illustrated in Figure 94, the long-
lived greenhouse gases are responsible for the bulk of global warming, and their contribution is 
the dominant radiative forcing term.  This category also has the highest level of scientific 
understanding.  In contrast, the contributions from the cooling components (total aerosols and 
cloud and surface albedo effects) are less well understood and have larger uncertainties.  Note 
that the contribution from aerosols, while likely negative in total, is actually comprised of both 
positive forcing components (e.g., BC) and negative forcing components (e.g., SO2, OC, and 
nitrate and mineral dust aerosols). 
 
On balance, net global radiative forcing (between 1750 and 2005) is positive, with a best estimate 
of +1.6 W/m2 [90% confidence interval: +0.6 to +2.4 W/m2] (Solomon et al., 2007). 
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Figure 94  Global Mean Radiative Forcings (RF) in 2005 
[90% confidence intervals shown in brackets; LOSU = level of scientific understanding] (Source: 
Solomon et al. (2007)) 
 
 
Limiting global temperature rise and increasing the probability of staying below the 2 ºC 
temperature target necessitates decarbonization of the global energy system.  This will be 
achieved largely through increased utilization of zero-carbon technologies (renewables 
and nuclear)65 and the application of carbon capture and storage (CCS) to fossil and 
biomass conversion technologies.  Hence, a useful near-term measure for attaining 
society’s longer-term climate objectives is the share of total primary energy derived from 
                                                 
65
 In this section, “zero-carbon energy” is defined as energy derived from nuclear and renewables (biomass, 
hydro, wind, solar, and geothermal).  This definition does not include CCS.   
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zero-carbon sources in 2030.66  As Figure 95 illustrates, the likelihood of staying below 
the 2 ºC warming target throughout the century increases dramatically as zero-carbon 
energy utilization increases beyond the fairly low shares (~10%) that would otherwise be 
realized in 2030 under a baseline scenario.  Specifically, achieving the 2 ºC target with 
greater than 50% probability in the long term requires zero-carbon energy shares in the 
near term (2030) approaching 20-25% or higher.  Yet, while it is not immediately 
obvious from the figure, this actually equates to a less than 2.5x increase in total zero-
carbon energy supply (in EJ), due to the double dividend effect of climate policy: zero-
carbon energy sources become more attractive under stringent climate policy and at the 
same time total energy demand/supply from all sources is reduced (because of efficiency 
and conservation).  Thus, shares of zero-carbon energy supply grow faster than in 
absolute terms. 
 
                                                 
66
 Primary energy for nuclear, hydro, wind, solar and geothermal is calculated using direct energy 
equivalents.    
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Figure 95  Relationship Between Shares of Zero-Carbon Energy (Nuclear and Renewables) in 2030 
and the Likelihood of Staying Below the 2 ºC Warming Target 
 
III.4.2 Climate Mitigation and Air Pollution 
In addition to limiting climate change to “safer” levels, decarbonization of the economy 
has the supplementary benefit of reducing pollution and its impact on human health 
(Amann, 2009; Nemet et al., 2010; Swart et al., 2004).  Put more directly, climate 
mitigation is an important entry point for achieving society’s pollution-, and by extension 
health-, related goals.  This is shown clearly in Figure 96, which relates global PM 2.5 
emissions in the near term (2030) to the probability of staying below 2 ºC maximum 
temperature rise over the course of the century.  As the energy system is decarbonized 
and increasing shares of zero-carbon, pollution-free technologies are utilized, the 2 ºC 
stringency of climate mitigation 
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probability increases, and pollutant emissions are significantly reduced.  In fact, the 
levels of pollutions in the most stringent climate scenarios with CLE pollution control 
(~16 Mton) are similar to those with much lower climate stringency but much more 
stringent pollution control policies (SLE and MFR).  In other words, near-term targets for 
pollution reduction can be achieved just as effectively through climate policy as they can 
through stricter pollution control measures that are enacted in the absence of climate 
policy.  Another interesting trend in Figure 96 is that the spread between the four 
pollution control cases narrows as the system is decarbonized, showing that the impacts 
of pollution control policy are much less variable as zero-carbon technologies penetrate 
the market and fossil technologies are forced out.  This occurs because pollution control 
is applicable to fewer technologies (e.g., power plants, factories, vehicles, etc.) when 
there is less fossil energy in the system.   
 
Figure 97 shows similar relationships for the regions of Centrally Planned Asia and 
China (CPA) and South Asia (SAS), the latter of which largely consists of India.  Taken 
together, these two regions are projected to account for more than half of all global PM 
2.5 emissions in 2030 in the baseline scenario.  Therefore, decarbonization of the energy 
system and/or pollution control are particularly critical in these parts of the world because 
of the dramatic improvements in human health that can be realized (see KM-17 of the full 
GEA report for a further discussion of health impacts).  
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Figure 96  Synergies Between Near-Term PM 2.5 Emissions and Climate Mitigation (Global) 
 
  
Figure 97  Synergies Between Near-Term PM 2.5 Emissions and Climate Mitigation (CPA and SAS 
Regions) 
 
Reducing global air pollution levels – whether through air pollution legislation or climate 
policy, or both – will necessarily lead to additional energy system costs, an important 
stringency of climate mitigation 
348 
 
 
 
trade-off that relates to policy choices and the resulting direction of the energy system.  
However, given the enormous co-benefits between pollution and climate policy, 
achieving society’s pollution/health objectives via climate mitigation as an entry point 
has the potential to significantly reduce the added costs of pollution control, as illustrated 
in Figure 98 which plots pollution control costs (relative to all other energy system costs) 
for each scenario in the ensemble. 
   
 
Figure 98  Synergies Between Pollution Control Costs and Climate Mitigation 
 
A closer look at three select scenarios of the ensemble provides a more detailed 
understanding of the climate-pollution-cost relationship.  These three scenarios are shown 
in Figure 99:  (1) the baseline scenario with SLE pollution control; (2) a scenario with 
intermediate climate stringency and CLE pollution control; and (3) the most stringent 
stringency of climate mitigation 
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climate scenario with CLE pollution control.  Compared to the baseline scenario with 
pollution control policies at the CLE level (Current and planned Legislation is Enacted), 
in which global PM 2.5 emissions in 2030 are projected at 23.9 Mton, each of these focus 
scenarios achieves a significant, and roughly similar, level of reduction.  Declines of this 
magnitude, as well as proportionally similar reductions for other pollutant emissions 
(SO2, NOx, VOCs, CO, BC, OC, and NH3), add a significant $773 billion to total annual 
energy system costs in the Baseline (SLE) scenario in 2030, compared to $1,759 billion 
for all other energy system costs (investments and O&M).  In contrast, while the 
structural changes that come along with mitigating the climate also add significantly to 
total energy system costs67, these costs can be partially offset by pollution control 
benefits.  This is a striking result of the current analysis, and it corroborates findings from 
other studies (e.g., Amann (2009) for Europe):  namely that a significant portion of 
climate mitigation costs can be compensated for by reduced pollution control costs.  As 
Figure 99 illustrates, in the Intermediate Climate (CLE) and Stringent Climate (CLE) 
scenarios, the additional annual costs of pollution control in 2030 are just $195 and $133 
billion, respectively – some $578 and $640 billion less (-75% and -83%) than the 
pollution control costs needed in Baseline (SLE) to achieve a similar level of pollutant 
emissions reduction. 
 
Moreover, the co-benefits of climate mitigation and air quality also show up as avoided 
human health impacts.  By the author’s calculations, based on marginal damage costs 
                                                 
67
 It is important to note that because the climate costs shown here include investments in low-carbon 
technologies along with their corresponding variable costs, demand reduction (energy efficiency 
investments and conservation efforts) beyond the baseline, and non-energy GHG mitigation measures, they 
may appear larger than estimates reported elsewhere for climate mitigation, especially with respect to the 
Stringent Climate (CLE) scenario. 
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from other studies (specifically Nemet et al. (2010)), these air quality co-benefits average 
$8 to $752 billion per year (mean: $188 billion) over the 2010 to 2030 time period in the 
Intermediate Climate (CLE) scenario and $14 to $1,390 billion annually (mean: $345 
billion) in the Stringent Climate (CLE) scenario.68 
 
Also noteworthy in Figure 99 are the sectors contributing to the added costs of pollution 
control.  In the Baseline (SLE) scenario, all sectors require significant amounts of 
investment, with refineries and the residential and commercial end-use sectors being 
responsible for the bulk of investment.  In the two climate scenarios, however, even with 
pollution control policies that are less aggressive per se, pollution costs decrease 
dramatically in virtually all sectors. 
 
                                                 
68
 The air quality co-benefits of reduced human health impacts are calculated by first estimating the 
cumulative GHG emissions reductions of the two climate scenarios compared to Baseline (CLE) between 
2010 and 2030 and then multiplying by the marginal co-benefit of GHG reduction, as estimated in the 
literature and summarized by Nemet et al. (2010): $2 to $196 per ton CO2, with a mean of $49/ton.  (For 
the full distribution of values, see the original Nemet et al. (2010) paper.)  These cumulative, undiscounted 
costs are then divided by 20 to estimate the annual average for each scenario over the 20-year timeframe.  
Note that the Baseline (SLE) scenario would also lead to reduced human health impacts due to air pollution 
reduction compared to Baseline (CLE).  However, these are not calculated here because the marginal co-
benefits estimates are presented in terms of CO2 reductions, not air pollutant emissions reductions. 
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Figure 99  Comparison of Pollution Control and Total Climate Mitigation Costs for Three Different 
Scenarios in 2030 
 
In sum, from an holistic and integrated perspective the combined costs of climate 
mitigation and pollution control come at a significantly reduced total energy bill if the 
benefits of pollution reduction are properly figured into the calculation of greenhouse gas 
abatement strategies (see also Nemet et al., (2010) for a similar conclusion).  The design 
of cost-effective future policies, therefore, needs to integrate holistic portfolios of 
measures, which address both pollution and climate objectives simultaneously.  This is, 
of course, no simple task, given that in many countries air pollution and climate change 
are dealt with by separate policy institutions.  Hence, the enormous co-benefits of the two 
objectives are often overlooked and the costs of reaching each objective individually are 
often overstated (Amann, 2009).  Furthermore, from a technological perspective, a robust 
Climate 
Mitigation 
Pollution 
Control 
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finding of this analysis is that a key strategy for meeting both climate and pollution/health 
objectives is through the increased utilization of zero-carbon, pollution-free energy 
technologies, such as nuclear and renewables. 
 
III.4.3 Climate Mitigation and Energy Security 
The previous discussion has shown that near-term deployment of zero-carbon 
technologies can help to achieve both near-term pollution and health objectives and long-
term climate targets.  In addition, this study finds that there are important synergies 
between decarbonization and energy security, yet another key near-term objective, and 
that climate mitigation appears to be an important entry point for achieving energy 
security goals.  In short, as countries and regions invest more heavily in renewables, in an 
effort to decarbonize their economies, they will by extension reduce their imports of 
globally traded commodities, such as coal, oil, and natural gas.  Since renewables 
(biomass, hydro, wind, solar, and geothermal) have the potential to be produced almost 
entirely domestically (or at least regionally within a cluster of like-minded countries), 
they are inherently secure resources (intermittency and reliability are different issues).  
Moreover, increased utilization of renewables and nuclear energy tends to diversify the 
energy resource mix away from one that relies heavily on fossil energy.  Hence, 
decarbonization has the potential to simultaneously reduce import dependence and 
increase energy diversity, both of which are important indicators of a more secure energy 
supply, as discussed in Section III.3.  In this respect, the results of this analysis indicate 
that the most “secure” scenario, from the perspective of both diversity and trade, is one in 
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which all regions pursue very stringent policies that promote both climate mitigation and 
reduced import dependence. 
 
Figure 100 illustrates this relationship by showing energy diversity in 2030 as a function 
of the probability of staying below the 2 ºC warming target, with maximum import levels 
shown in the third dimension.  The minimum primary energy diversity indicator (I2, as 
introduced in the previous section) among all world regions (i.e., the worst performing, 
least diverse region) is used as a proxy for overall global performance along the security 
dimension.  Figure 101 focuses on costs, showing the 2 ºC probability versus cumulative 
total global policy costs as a share of global GDP between 2010 and 2050, with 
maximum import levels shown in the third dimension.  Note that only a subset of the 
scenarios from the full ensemble is shown, namely those corresponding to the CLE 
pollution control case.69  Total policy costs, which are calculated relative to the baseline 
scenario, attempt to capture the added costs of all energy, climate, and pollution control 
policies.70   
 
                                                 
69
 The other pollution control cases (FLE, SLE, and MFR) show qualitatively similar trends. 
70
 Costs include energy system investments, pollution control investments, O&M, fuel, non-energy 
mitigation, and demand reduction (i.e., the macro-economic response). 
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Figure 100  Synergies Between Near-Term Energy Security Objectives and Climate Mitigation 
stringency of climate mitigation 
reduced import 
dependence and 
greater diversity 
increased 
security 
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Figure 101  Total Policy Costs for Simultaneously Achieving Energy Security and Climate Mitigation 
Objectives (Global) 
 
The double effects of decarbonization and reduced import dependence are quite clear 
from the figures.  As regions pursue strategies to mitigate the climate and/or enact 
policies and procurement strategies that prioritize domestic energy supplies over imports, 
the diversities of their energy resource mixes tend to increase.  Moreover, like pollution 
control, the pursuance of climate mitigation and energy security adds to total energy 
system costs.  The costs of security, however, are significantly reduced at higher levels of 
decarbonization, highlighting the multiple benefits of the two objectives.  This second 
point is illustrated by Figure 101.  At lower levels of decarbonization (i.e., 
stringency of climate mitigation 
security costs 
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correspondingly low 2 ºC probabilities), security costs can increase total system costs by 
as much as 0.3 percentage points.  In contrast, under stringent climate policies, in which 
total global policy costs are roughly 1.7% of GDP, the added costs of security become 
extremely small, approaching zero. 
 
Figure 102 provides a deeper look into the climate-security-cost relationship.  Three 
different scenarios of the full ensemble are selected:  (1) the baseline scenario; (2) a 
scenario with intermediate climate stringency; and (3) the most stringent climate 
scenario.  Each scenario assumes CLE pollution control.  For the Baseline scenario, if 
import dependence in each importing region could be reduced to less than 20% of its 
baseline total primary energy supply in 2030 (compared to a baseline where free trade 
dominates and there are no restrictions on trade flows) and then imports were capped at 
this level for the remainder of the century, globally aggregated energy system 
investments would increase by $240 billion annually in 2030.  Such measures would 
primarily spur additional investments in efficiency, biomass production, synthetic fuels 
conversion, and non-fossil electricity generation, while at the same time reducing 
investments in fossil electricity generation and fossil energy extraction (namely coal 
mining and oil production).  Yet, Figure 102 also shows, as is the case with air pollution 
control, when viewed from an holistic and integrated perspective, the combined costs of 
climate mitigation and energy security come at a significantly reduced total energy bill if 
the security benefits are properly figured into the calculation of greenhouse gas 
abatement strategies.  For instance, in contrast to the Baseline scenario, where security 
costs are rather large, the added investment costs related to energy security in 2030 in the 
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two climate scenarios decline to just $68 and $56 billion, respectively – reductions of 
72% and 77% from the Baseline.  These security benefits can largely be attributed to the 
reduced need for extra “security investments”, since climate policy promotes energy 
efficiency and conservation and the increased utilization of domestically produced, low-
carbon energy sources.  Of course, climate policy itself also adds to the total energy bill, 
so for comparison Figure 102 also shows climate mitigation costs in 2030 for the two 
climate scenarios.  Climate costs are obviously quite substantial, though it is important to 
note that the cost accounting for climate policy is more comprehensive than that shown 
for security.  Climate mitigation considers all costs beyond those motivated by security 
policy, including investments in low-carbon technologies and the associated variable 
costs, demand reduction (energy efficiency investments and conservation efforts), and 
non-energy GHG mitigation measures.     
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Figure 102  Comparison of Energy Security Investments and Total Climate Mitigation Costs for 
Three Different Scenarios in 2030 
 
As one might anticipate, the impacts of climate, pollution, and security policies vary 
considerably by world region, for example, between industrialized and developing 
countries.  Because developing countries will account for the bulk of development 
throughout this century, their aggregate energy system costs should be higher than in 
industrialized countries.  This is illustrated in Figure 103, which shows total energy 
system costs as a share of GDP (not policy costs, hence not relative to the baseline) for 
industrialized and developing countries, respectively.  It should be noted that the results 
shown here are somewhat distorted, since they only consider where energy expenditures 
are made and do not answer the critical question of “Who pays?”  Financial transfers 
have not been modeled explicitly.  Thus, industrialized country costs are underestimated, 
Climate 
Mitigation 
Energy 
Security 
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and developing country costs are overestimated.  These distortions balance each other at 
the global level. 
 
An interesting observation from Figure 103 is that for a given level of climate stringency 
the added costs of energy security tend to be higher for industrialized countries.  This can 
be partly explained by the fact that these countries are at present much more dependent 
on imports than developing countries, a trend that is projected to continue through 2030, 
and even beyond, in the baseline scenario.  Therefore, industrialized countries may have a 
more difficult time reducing their import dependence than developing countries, at least 
in the near term, because they are effectively locked in to using energy technologies that 
rely on imported resources.  In contrast, most of the energy infrastructure that will 
ultimately be needed in developing countries has not yet been built, so it may be easier 
for these countries to adapt their systems, especially in the near term, to rely less on 
imports and more on domestically produced resources (e.g., renewables).  Another 
interesting relationship shown in Figure 103 is that while for developing countries total 
energy costs exhibit a continuously upward sloping trend with respect to increasing 
climate stringency, costs increase rather slowly for industrialized countries and are 
actually fairly flat between the baseline scenario (1.3% of GDP) and scenarios with 
intermediate climate stringency (1.3% to 1.6%).  This result demonstrates that a 
significant level of decarbonization can be achieved in industrialized countries at costs 
that are only marginally above the baseline. 
 
360 
 
 
 
  
Figure 103  Total Energy System Costs for Simultaneously Achieving Energy Security and Climate 
Mitigation Objectives (Industrialized and Developing Countries) 
 
III.5 Conclusions 
The energy system of the future could potentially develop along a number of different 
paths, depending on how society and its decision makers prioritize various, worthwhile 
energy objectives, including, but not limited to, climate mitigation, energy security, air 
pollution and human health, and affordability.  These objectives are generally discussed 
in the context of different timeframes (e.g., security and pollution/health in the near term; 
climate in the medium to long term).  Therefore, they frequently compete for attention in 
the policy world.  An added challenge is that in many countries separate policy 
institutions are often responsible for dealing with the multiple objectives.  As a result, 
important synergies between them are either overlooked or simply not understood, and 
the costs of reaching each objective individually are often overstated.  In the future, cost-
effective climate-pollution-security policies should account for the substantial added 
benefits of adopting a more holistic and integrated perspective, which addresses all of the 
objectives simultaneously.   
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This study has attempted to illuminate some of the key synergies, and to a lesser extent 
the trade-offs, between climate mitigation, energy security, air pollution and human 
health, and affordability, highlighting the main results and findings from an analysis that 
was conducted at IIASA in support of the Global Energy Assessment (GEA, 2011).  One 
of the main findings of the analysis is that the synergies between the various objectives 
far outweigh the trade-offs.  The trade-offs we refer to principally have to do with, first, 
the effect of climate, air pollution, and security policies on total energy system costs 
(relative to a baseline scenario) and, second, the impact of pollution control on radiative 
forcing. 
 
A commonly discussed long-term goal for climate mitigation is the so-called “2 ºC 
target” – i.e., staying below 2 ºC maximum temperature rise, relative to pre-industrial 
levels, throughout the twenty-first century – which is thought to be needed to avoid 
dangerous interference with the climate system (Solomon et al., 2007).  Maximizing the 
likelihood of achieving the 2 ºC target depends, above all, on making deep reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions over the next several decades, a feat that will be principally 
accomplished by dramatically scaling up the utilization of zero-carbon energy 
technologies (nuclear, biomass, and other renewables) in the global energy mix.  
Specifically, meeting the 2 ºC target with greater than 50% probability in the long term 
requires zero-carbon energy shares (relative to total global primary energy supply) that 
are 25% or higher in the near term (2030) (Figure 95).  Furthermore, because it is 
pollution-free and can be derived from a variety of sources, zero-carbon energy also has 
the potential to significantly decrease air pollution and its corresponding health impacts, 
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as well as improve security through supply diversification and reduced import 
dependence.  For example, Figure 96 and Figure 97 show that near-term targets for 
pollution reduction – both globally and in key developing world regions where air 
pollution and its health impacts are strongest – can be achieved just as effectively through 
decarbonization as they can through more stringent pollution control measures that are 
enacted in the absence of climate policy.  The main pollution-climate trade-off centers 
around the small, but non-trivial, impact that lower levels of air pollutant emissions, 
namely climate-cooling aerosols (e.g., SO2 and organic carbon), could have on the 
radiative forcing balance of the Earth.  Figure 92 demonstrates that for a constant level of 
GHG emissions, stringent pollution control policies could potentially increase global 
temperatures by a few tenths of a degree, consequently lowering the probability of 
staying below 2 ºC maximum temperature rise by several percentage points.  In terms of 
security benefits, substitution of domestically produced renewables (biomass, hydro, 
wind, solar, and geothermal) for imports of globally traded fossil commodities (coal, oil, 
and natural gas) could simultaneously reduce import dependence and diversify the energy 
resource mix away from one that relies too heavily on fossil energy.   
 
Viewed from an holistic and integrated perspective, the combined costs of climate 
mitigation, energy security, and air pollution control come at a significantly reduced total 
energy bill if the multiple benefits of each are properly accounted for in the calculation of 
total energy system costs (i.e., when taking a systems view of the problem).  For instance, 
Figure 98 shows that the total added costs of pollution control are cut significantly as the 
stringency of climate policy increases and the utilization of zero-carbon, pollution-free 
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(hence, pollution control-free) technologies rises.  In fact, pollution control cost 
reductions of greater than 80% are possible in the most stringent climate scenarios.  
Similarly, security costs also substantially decrease under increasingly aggressive levels 
of decarbonization (Figure 101).  And in scenarios with extremely stringent climate 
policies, the added costs of security actually approach zero.  While steps taken to mitigate 
the climate will necessarily add to total energy system costs compared to a baseline 
scenario, these climate costs will be substantially compensated for by the corresponding 
pollution control and energy security cost reductions. 
 
An important caveat to this analysis is that it only does a partial economic accounting.  It 
attempts to capture the multiple benefits of climate mitigation, energy security, and 
pollution control in terms of total energy system costs.  However, the analysis largely 
ignores the significant economic benefits of pursuing these three objectives.  For instance, 
it does not consider the avoided costs (i.e., benefits) of climate change (e.g., more 
frequent extreme weather events, impacts on global agriculture and food production) or 
of climate adaptation (e.g., construction of sea walls, relocation of coastal populations).  
Similarly, the benefits accruing from reduced health expenditures and increased life 
expectancies have not been monetized here. 
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III.7 Appendix 
Appendix 1:  Listing of 11 MESSAGE Regions by Country 
  
11 MESSAGE 
regions Definition (list of countries) 
NAM North America (Canada, Guam, Puerto Rico, United States of America, Virgin Islands) 
WEU 
Western Europe 
(Andorra, Austria, Azores, Belgium, Canary Islands, Channel Islands, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Faeroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, 
Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madeira, Malta, 
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom) 
PAO Pacific OECD (Australia, Japan, New Zealand) 
EEU 
Central and Eastern Europe 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, The former 
Yugoslav Rep. of Macedonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Yugoslavia) 
FSU 
Former Soviet Union 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan) 
CPA 
Centrally Planned Asia and China 
(Cambodia, China (incl. Hong Kong), Korea (DPR), Laos (PDR), Mongolia, Viet 
Nam) 
SAS South Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) 
PAS 
Other Pacific Asia 
(American Samoa, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji, French Polynesia, Gilbert-Kiribati, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Caledonia, Papua, New Guinea, Philippines, 
Republic of Korea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Taiwan (China), Thailand, Tonga, 
Vanuatu, Western Samoa) 
MEA 
Middle East and North Africa 
(Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt (Arab Republic), Iraq, Iran (Islamic Republic), Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya/SPLAJ, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Syria (Arab Republic), Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen) 
LAC 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, French Guyana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Santa Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela) 
AFR 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Angola, Benin, Botswana, British Indian Ocean Territory, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, 
Saint Helena, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe) 
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Appendix 2:  Modeling Energy Security Policy Within MESSAGE 
 
In modeling energy security policy within the MESSAGE integrated assessment 
framework, an absolute upper limit is placed on the total amount of energy that can be 
supplied by imports in a given region and year (see equation below). This limit, which 
begins in 2030 and remains fixed throughout the century,71 is calculated as a share of 
baseline total primary energy supply (TPES) in the region in 2030.  
 
Ii  ≤  Xi • TPESi 
 
where: 
- Ii:  total energy imports into region i 
- Xi:  Maximum share of total primary energy supply in region i that can be imported 
- TPESi:  Total primary energy supply (= sum of imports, exports, and domestically 
produced energy) 
 
The limit Xi varies by scenario and ranges from 20% to 100%.  The higher end of this 
range represents a non-constraining limit (i.e., a scenario where no explicit energy 
security policies are enacted), and the lower end represents a world where global energy 
trade flows are significantly reduced as a result of countries’ efforts to achieve their 
security goals.  
 
  
                                                 
71
 This statement is true of all regions except South Asia.  In order to avoid model infeasibilities, the 
absolute upper limit in South Asia in each year is not fixed at the 2030 level, but rather is set at particular 
share of the region’s baseline TPES.  
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